P802.11i
Draft Supplement to Standard for
Telecommunications and Information Exchange
Between Systems—
LAN/MAN Specific Requirements—

Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications:

Specification for Enhanced Security

Prepared by the LAN MAN Standards Committee of the IEEE Computer Society

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- **Draft Supplement to STANDARD FOR**
- **Telecommunications and Information Exchange** 4
- **Between Systems -**
- LAN/MAN Specific Requirements -

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- Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC)
- and physical layer (PHY) specifications:

10 11

- **Specification for Enhanced Security**
- 12 Sponsored by the
- IEEE 802 Committee 13
- of the 14
- 15 **IEEE Computer Society**

16

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Introduction

- 2 (This introduction is not part of IEEE P802.11i, Draft Supplement to STANDARD FOR
- 3 Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems -LAN/MAN Specific Requirements -
- 4 Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications:
- 5 Specification for Operation in Additional Regulatory Domains)
- 6 To be added later

7 <u>Example:</u>

9 At the time this supplement to the standard was submitted to Sponsor Ballot, the working group had the

10 following membership:

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1

12 Stuart J. Kerry, Chair Al Petrick and Harry Worstell, Vice Chairs

13 **Tim Godfrey,** Secretary

14

15 **Dave Halasz,** Chair Task Group i

16 **Jesse Walker**, Editor, 802.11i

- 19 This list to be added upon
- 20 conclusion of the sponsor
- 21 ballot.
- 22 Major contributions were received from the following individuals:

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- 3 Between Systems -
- 4 LAN/MAN Specific Requirements -

- 6 Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC)
- 7 and physical layer (PHY) specifications:

8

- 9 Specification for Enhanced Security
- This supplement is based on the current edition of IEEE Std 802.11, 1999 Edition and the IEEE 802.11a
- and IEEE 802.11b supplements.
- NOTE—The editing instructions contained in this supplement define how to merge the material contained
- 13 herein into the existing base standard to form the new comprehensive standard as created by the addition of
- 14 IEEE Std 802.11-1999.
- 15 The editing instructions are shown in bold italic. Three editing instructions are used: change, delete, and
- insert. *Change* is used to make small corrections in existing text or tables. The editing instruction specifies
- 17 the location of the change and describes what is being changed either by using strikethrough (to remove old
- 18 material) or underscore (to add new material). *Delete* removes existing material. *Insert* adds new material
- 19 with-out disturbing the existing material. Insertions may require renumbering. If so, renumbering
- 20 instructions are given in the editing instruction. Editorial notes will not be carried over into future editions.
- 21 2. Normative references
- 22 Add the following text to clause 2:
- 23 FIPS PUB 180-1, Secure Hash Standard, April 1995
- 24 FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 2001 November 26H. Krawczyk, et al, "HMAC:
- 25 Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
- 26 R. Housley, "Advance Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm," RFC 3394, September 2002
- 27 IEEE STD 802.1X, Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port Based Access Control, June
- 28 14, 2001
- 29 3. Definitions
- 30 Add the following text in the appropriate location in clause 3:

- 1 Associated Data: Data that is sent as plaintext but still is to be cryptographically protected in an IEEE
- 2 802.11 MSDU. This typically consists of information from the IEEE 802.11 header itself.
- 3 Authentication Server: See the IEEE 802.1X specification for a definition of this concept.
- 4 Authentication Suite: a set of authentication and key management suite selectors.
- 5 Authenticator: See the IEEE 802.1X specification for a definition of this concept.
- 6 Authorized: to be explicitly allowed.
- 7 Big-Endian: The representation of an integer, with its most significant bit first, least significant bit last, and
- 8 bytes ordered from most significant to least significant.
- 9 Cipher Suite: a set of one or more algorithms, designed to pro provide data privacy, data authenticity or
- integrity, and/or replay protection.
- 11 Controlled Port: An IEEE 802.1X concept, referring to an IEEE 802.1X Port. See IEEE 802.1X for this
- 12 concept.
- 13 Counter-CBC-MAC Mode: a symmetric key block cipher mode providing both privacy using Counter mode
- and data origin authenticity using CBC-MAC.
- 15 Decapsulate: a verb meaning to recover an unprotected packet from a protected one.
- Decapsulation: a noun referring to the plaintext data produced by decapsulating an encapsulation.
- 17 EAPOL-Key Encryption Key: Key used to encrypt the Key Material field in an EAPOL-Key Message.
- 18 EAPOL-Key Key: Combination of EAPOL-Key Encryption key and EAPOL-Key MIC Key.
- 19 EAPOL-Key MIC Key: A key used to integrity check an EAPOL-Key Message.
- 20 Encapsulate: a verb meaning to construct a protected packet from an unprotected packet.
- 21 Encapsulation: a noun meaning the cryptographic payload constructed from plaintext data. This is
- 22 comprised by the ciphertext, as well as any associated cryptographic state required by the receiver of the
- 23 data, such as initialization vectors, sequence numbers, message integrity codes, key identifiers, etc.
- Group: the entities in a wireless network; an AP and associated STAs, or all the STAs in an IBSS network.
- 25 Group Master Key: the key that is used as one of the inputs to the Pseudo-Random Function to derive the
- 26 Group Transient Key.
- 27 Group Nonce: A nonce used to derive a Group Transient Key.
- 28 Group Transient Key: a value that is derived from the Pseudo-Random Function using the Group Nonce,
- 29 and is split up into as many as three keys (Temporal Encryption Key, two Temporal MIC Keys) for use by
- 30 the rest of the system.
- 31 Key Counter: a 256 bit (32 octets) counter that is used in the Pseudo-Random Function as a nonce to derive
- 32 Transient Session Keys. There is a single Key Counter per STA (AP or STA) that is global to that station
- across all key hierarchies that it is the Key Owner for.
- 34 Key Management Service: A service to distribute and manage cryptographic keys within an Robust Security
- 35 Network
- 36 Little-Endian: The representation of an integer, with its least significant bit first, most significant bit last,
- and bytes ordered from least significant to most significant.

- 1 Message Integrity Code: A cryptographic digest, designed to make it computationally infeasible for an
- 2 adversary to alter data. This is usually called a Message Authentication Code, or MAC, in the literature, but
- 3 the acronym MAC is already reserved for another meaning in this standard.
- 4 Michael: Message Integrity Code for the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol.
- 5 Nonce: a value that is never reused with a key. "Never reused within a context" means exactly that,
- 6 including over all re-initializations of the system through all time.
- 7 Offset Codebook Mode: a symmetric key block cipher mode that provides both privacy and data origin
- 8 authenticity through the use of offset.
- 9 Pairwise: two entities that is associated with each other; an AP and one associated station, or a pair of
- 10 stations in an IBSS network, used to describe the key hierarchies for keys that are shared only between the
- 11 two entities in a pairwise.
- 12 Pairwise Master Key (PMK): the key that is generated on a per-session basis and is used as one of the
- inputs into the PRF to derive the Pairwise Transient Keys (PTK). For EAP-TLS authentication, the
- 14 Pairwise Master Key is the key from the RADIUS MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attribute. For Pre-Shared Key
- authentication, the Pairwise Master Key is the Pre-Shared Key.
- Pairwise Transient Key (PTK): a value that is derived from the PRF using the SNonce, and is split up into
- as many as five keys (Temporal Encryption Key, two Temporal MIC Keys, EAPOL-Key Encryption Key,
- 18 EAPOL-Key MIC Key) for use by the rest of the system.
- 19 Pass phrase: A secret text string supposedly known only by a particular user, employed to prove the user's
- 20 identity.
- 21 Per-Packet Encryption Key. A unique encryption key constructed for each MPDU, employed by IEEE
- 22 802.11 RC4-based protocols.
- 23 Per-Packet Sequence Counter: For TKIP, the counter that is used as the nonce in the derivation of the Per-
- Packet Encryption Key; for AES-based protocols, the Per-Packet IV.
- 25 Pre-Shared Key: A static key that is distributed to the units in the system by out-of-band means.
- 26 Pseudo-Random Function: a function that hashes various inputs to derive a pseudorandom value. To add
- 27 liveness to the pseudo random value, a nonce should be one of the inputs; in our case the Key Counter
- 28 provides nonce.
- 29 Robust Security Network: An IEEE 802.11 LAN relying on IEEE 802.1X for its authentication and key
- 30 management services and CCMP, WRAP, or TKIP for data protection.
- 31 Selector: an item specifying a list constituent in an IEEE 802.11 Management Message Information
- 32 Element.
- 33 Supplicant: an IEEE 802.1X concept, which in the context of IEEE 802.11 represents a STA seeking to
- 34 attach to an IEEE 802 LAN via an IEEE 802.1X Port. See the IEEE 802.1X specification for a complete
- 35 definition
- 36 Temporal Encryption Key: The portion of a transient key used directly or indirectly to encrypt data in
- 37 packets.
- 38 Temporal Key: Combination of temporal encryption key and temporal MIC key.
- 39 Temporal MIC Key: The portion of a transient key used to insure the integrity of data packets.
- 40 Uncontrolled Port: An IEEE 802.1X concept, referring to an IEEE 802.1X Port. See the IEEE 802.1X
- 41 specification for a complete definition

4. Abbreviations and acronyms

- 2 Add the following text in the appropriate location in clause 4:
- 3 AA Authenticator Address
- 4 AES Advanced Encryption Standard
- 5 AKMP Authenticated Key Management Protocol
- 6 ANonce Authenticator Nonce
- 7 AS Authentication Server
- 8 CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
- 9 CBC-MAC CBC Message Authentication Code.
- 10 CCM Counter mode with CBC-MAC
- 11 CCMP CCM Protocol
- 12 CTR Counter mode
- 13 EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol (RFC 2284)
- 14 EAPOL EAP over LAN (IEEE 802.1X)
- 15 EAP-TLS EAP Transport Layer Security (RFC 2716)
- 16 GMK Group Master Key
- 17 GNonce Group Nonce
- 18 GTK Group Transient Key
- 19 IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
- MIC Message Integrity Code. Because of the special meaning of MAC within the IEEE 802 architecture, this specification uses MIC in place of the standard acronym MAC, which ordinarily
- stands for Message Authentication Code.
- 23 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technologies
- 24 NTP Network Time Protocol
- 25 OCB Offset Codebook Block mode
- 26 OUI Organizationally Unique Identifier
- 27 PEAP Protected EAP
- 28 PN Packet Number
- 29 PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator

- 1 RSN Robust Security Network
- 2 RSN IE Robust Security Network Information Element
- 3 SNonce Supplicant Nonce
- 4 TLS Transport Layer Security (RFC 2246)
- 5 TK Temporal Key
- 6 TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
- 7 TSC TKIP Sequence Counter
- 8 TSN Transition Security Network
- 9 TTAK TKIP mixed Transmit Address and Key
- 10 WRAP Wireless Robust Authenticated Protocol
- 5.1.1.4 Interaction with other IEEE 802 layers
- 12 Add the following paragraph at the end of clause "5.1.1.4 Interaction with other IEEE 802
- 13 *layers*":
- 14 A Robust Security Network (RSN) depends upon IEEE 802.1X to deliver its authentication and key
- 15 management services. All STAs and APs in an RSN contain an IEEE 802.1X entity that handles many of
- these services. This document defines how an RSN utilizes IEEE 802.1X to access these services.
- 17 A Transition Security Network (TSN) is an RSN that also supports unmodified pre-RSN equipment. A TSN
- is defined only to facilitate migration to an RSN. A TSN is insecure, since the pre-RSN equipment can
- 19 compromise the larger network.

- 21 Add the following clause after clause "5.1.1.4 Interaction with other IEEE 802 layers" but
- before clause "5.2 Components of the IEEE 802.11 architecture":
- 23 5.1.1.5 Interaction with non-802 Protocols
- 24 An RSN utilizes non-802 protocols for its authentication and key management services. These protocols are
- defined by other standards organizations, such as the IETF.

26

- 27 Add the following clause before clause "5.2.3 Area concepts" and after clause "5.2.2.1
- 28 Extended service set (ESS): The large coverage network", renumbering the Figures as
- 29 appropriate:
- 30 **5.2.2.2 The Robust Security Network**
- 31 A Robust Security Network provides a number of security features to the IEEE 802.11 architecture. These
- 32 features notably include:
- enhanced authentication mechanisms for both APs and STAs;

- 1 key management algorithms;
- dynamic cryptographic keys; and
- enhanced data encapsulation mechanism, called CCMP and, optionally, TKIP and WRAP.
- 4 An RSN makes extensive use of IEEE 802.1X protocols with IEEE 802.11 to provide the authentication
- 5 and key management. This allows IEEE 802.11 to take advantage of work already done in other standards
- 6 groups.
- An RSN introduces several components into the IEEE 802.11architecture. These components are only
- 8 present in RSN systems.
- 9 The first new component is an *IEEE 802.1X Port*. IEEE 802.1X Ports are present on all STAs in an RSN.
- 10 They reside above IEEE 802.11 fragmentation and reassembly layer, and all data traffic that flows through
- the RSN MAC also passes through the IEEE 802.1X Port. The IEEE 802.1X specification describes the
- internal structure of the IEEE 802.1X Port.
- 13 A second component is the Authentication Server (AS). The AS is an entity that resides in the DS that
- 14 participates in the authentication of all STAs (including APs) in the ESS. It may authenticate the elements
- of the RSN itself—i.e., the STAs and APs—or it may provide material that the RSN elements can use to
- authenticate each other. The AS communicates with the AA on each STA, enabling the STA to be
- 17 authenticated to the ESS and *vice versa*. Mutual authentication of both the ESS and the STA is an important
- goal of the RSN. It is important to note that the AS is a logical entity only; in real implementations it may
- be integrated into the same physical device as an AP, in order to accommodate low end markets such as the
- 20 home and SoHo.

22

- 5.4.2.2 Association
- 24 Add the following paragraph after the second paragraph of clause "5.4.2.2 Association":
- Within an RSN this situation is slightly different. In an RSN IEEE 802.1X determines when to allow
- 26 general data traffic across an IEEE 802.11 link. A single IEEE 802.1X Port maps to one association, and
- 27 each association maps to an IEEE 802.1X Port. After association, the IEEE 802.11 implementation allows
- any and all data traffic to pass. The IEEE 802.1X Port, however, blocks general data traffic from passing
- 29 between the STA and the AP until after an IEEE 802.1X authentication procedure completes. Once IEEE
- 30 802.1X authentication completes, IEEE 802.1X unblocks to allow data traffic.
- **5.4.2.3 Reassociation**
- 32 Add the following paragraphs to the end of clause "5.4.2.3 Reassociation":
- 33 As in the case of Association, an AP in an RSN maps a Reassociation to an IEEE 802.1X Port. Although
- 34 the 802.1X Ports on the STA and AP allows a IEEE 802.1X protocol to traverse the link, they block other
- data traffic over the link until the IEEE 802.1X signals it has completed successfully.
- **5.4.2.4 Disassociation**
- 37 Add the following paragraphs to the end of clause "5.4.2.4 Disassociation":

- Informative Note: Disassociation can terminate an in-progress IEEE 802.1X authentication attempt, as disassociation makes the AP unreachable to the STA and *vice versa*. In particular, the IEEE 802.1X protocol between the STA and the AS will not necessarily complete.
- 4 5.4.3 Access and confidentiality control services
- 5 Change the sentence of the first paragraph of clause "5.4.3 Access and confidentiality control
- 6 services" from:
- 7 Two services are required for IEEE 802.11 to provide functionality equivalent to that which is inherent to
- 8 wired LANS.
- 9 *to:*
- 10 Change the second paragraph of clause "5.4.3 Access and confidentiality control services"
- 11 *from*:
- 12 Two services are provided to bring the IEEE 802.11 functionality in line with wired LAN assumptions:
- 13 authentication and privacy. Authentication is used instead of the wired media physical connection. Privacy
- is used to provide the confidential aspects of closed wired media.
- 15 *to:*
- 16 In a pre-RSN WLAN, two services are provided to bring the IEEE 802.11 functionality in line with wired
- 17 LAN assumptions: authentication and privacy. Authentication is used instead of the wired media physical
- 18 connection. Privacy is used to provide the confidential aspects of closed wired media.
- 19 An RSN does not directly provide either service. Instead, an RSN uses IEEE 802.1X to provide access
- 20 control and key distribution, and confidentiality is provided as a side effect of key distribution.
- 21 **5.4.3.1 Authentication**
- 22 Change the first sentence of the fourth paragraph of clause "5.4.3.1 Authentication" from:
- 23 IEEE 802.11 provides link-level authentication between IEEE 802.11 STAs.
- 24 *to*:
- 25 IEEE 802.11 supports link-level authentication between IEEE 802.11 STAs.
- Add the following paragraphs between the sixth and seventh paragraphs of clause "5.4.3.1
- 27 Authentication":
- 28 An RSN-capable IEEE 802.11 network also supports authentication based on IEEE 802.1X. IEEE 802.1X
- 29 authentication utilizes protocols above the MAC to authenticate STAs and the ESS with one another. IEEE
- 30 802.1X allows a number of authentication algorithms to be utilized. The standard does not specify a
- 31 mandatory-to-implement IEEE 802.1X method. In a pure RSN—that is, one deploying only RSN security
- 32 mechanisms—only Open System Authentication operates at the MAC sub layer itself. An RSN relies on the
- 33 IEEE 802.1X framework, both to control MSDU flows and to carry the higher layer authentication 34 protocols. In an RSN, the respective IEEE 802.1X Ports of both Access Points and STAs discard MSDUs
- protocols. In an RSN, the respective IEEE 802.1X Ports of both Access Points and STAs discard MSDUs before the peer is known to have been authenticated. In this associated but unauthenticated state, the IEEE

- 1 802.1X Ports permit only the selected IEEE 802.1X authentication protocol to flow across the IEEE 802.11
- 2 association.
- 3 Since a STA may encounter multiple ESSes, it is necessary to provide a way for a STA to identify the
- 4 security domain of each, and to determine the authentication mechanisms each supports. If the ESS is an
- 5 RSN, a STA can determine the authentication protocols in use though Beacons and Probe Responses.
- 6 Furthermore, the RSN design provides a means by which a STA can indicate the authentication protocol it
- 7 intends to use with the ESS. It should be noted that the choice of an acceptable authentication protocol is an
- 8 issue for both APs and the STAs, since the goal of IEEE 802.1X Authentication is mutual authentication
- 9 between the ESS and the STA, not just authentication of the STA to an AP. Upon encountering an ESS, a
- STA determines if the authentication mechanisms—Open System, Shared Key, or IEEE 802.1X—
- supported by the AP suffice, given its own security requirements. A STA might choose not to associate with
- a particular ESS/AP for many reasons, among them being that the supported authentication mechanisms
- 13 cannot achieve mutual authentication, or the ESS may constitute an un-trusted security domain.
- 14 **5.4.3.2 Deauthentication**
- 15 Change the text of clause "5.4.3.2 Deauthentication" to:
- The Deauthentication service is invoked whenever an existing Open System or Shared Key Authentication
- is to be terminated. Deauthentication is an SS.
- 18 In an ESS RSN, Open System Authentication is required for MAC layer authentication. In this
- 19 environment, Deauthentication results in any association for the deauthenticated station to be terminated,
- and also results in the 802.1X controlled port for that station being disabled. The Deauthentication
- 21 notification is provided to 802.1X via the MAC sub layer.
- 22 **5.4.3.3 Privacy**
- 23 Add the following paragraph between the fourth and fifth paragraphs of "5.4.3.3 Privacy":
- 24 IEEE 802.11 provides four cryptographic algorithms to protect data traffic. Two are based on the RC4
- 25 algorithm defined by RSA, and two are based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This standard
- 26 refers to these as WEP, as TKIP, WRAP, and CCMP. A means is provided for stations to select the
- algorithm to be used for a given association.

- 29 Add the following clauses after clause "5.4.3.3 Privacy" but before clause "5.5 Relationship
- 30 among services":
- 31 **5.4.3.4 Key distribution**
- 32 The enhanced privacy, data authentication, and replay protection mechanisms require fresh cryptographic
- 33 keys. These keys need to be created, distributed, and "aged." IEEE 802.11 supports two key distribution
- 34 mechanisms. The first is manual key distribution. The second is automatic key distribution, and is available
- only in an RSN that uses a IEEE 802.1X to provide key distribution services.
- 36 **5.4.3.5 Data Origin Authentication**
- 37 The data origin authentication mechanism defines a means by which a station that receives a unicast data
- 38 frame from another station can ensure that the MSDU actually originated from the station whose MAC
- 39 address is specified in the source address field of the packet. This feature is necessary since an unauthorized
- 40 station may transmit packets with a source address that belongs to another station. This mechanism is
- 41 available only to stations using WRAP and TKIP.

- 1 Data origin authenticity is only applicable to unicast traffic.
- Note: All known algorithms to provide data origin authentication of multicast/broadcast rely on public key cryptography. Because of their computational cost, these methods are inappropriate for bulk data transfers.

4 5.4.3.6 Replay Detection

- 5 The replay detection mechanism defines a means by which a station that receives a unicast data packet from
- 6 another station can ensure that the packet is not an unauthorized retransmission of a previously sent packet.
 - This mechanism is available only to stations using CCMP, WRAP and TKIP.

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- 9 5.6 Differences between ESS and IBSS LANs
- 10 Add the following paragraphs at the end of Clause "5.6 Differences between ESS and IBSS
- 11 *LANs*":
- 12 In an IBSS each STA must define and implement its own security model, and each STA must trust the other
- 13 STAs to implement and enforce a security model compatible with its own. In an ESS the AP enforces a
- uniform security model.
- 15 In an ESS the STA initiates all associations. In an IBSS a STA must be prepared for other STAs to initiate
- 16 communications. Thus, a STA in an IBSS can negotiate the security algorithms it desires to use when it
- 17 accepts an association initiated by another station, while in an ESS the AP always chooses the security suite
- 18 being used.
- 19 In an RSN ESS, the AP offloads the authentication decision to an authentication server, while in an IBSS
- 20 each STA must make its own authentication decision regarding each peer. There is no architectural
- 21 difference between the two, as in the IBSS case, every STA implements its own Authentication Server.
- 22 **5.7.6 Authentication**
- 23 Change the first paragraph in Clause "5.7.6 Authentication" from:
- 24 For a STA to authenticate with another STA, the authentication service causes one or more authentication
- 25 management frames to be exchanged. The exact sequence of frames and their content is dependent on the
- authentication scheme invoked. For all authentication schemes, the authentication algorithm is identified
- within the management frame body.
- 28 *to:*
- 29 For a STA to authenticate with another STA using either Open System or Shared Key authentication, the
- 30 authentication service causes one or more authentication management frames to be exchanged. The exact
- 31 sequence of frames and their content is dependent on the authentication scheme invoked. For both of these
- 32 authentication schemes, the authentication algorithm is identified within the management frame body.

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- 34 **5.7.7 Deauthentication**
- 35 Change the first paragraph in Clause "5.7.7 Deauthentication" from:
- For a STA to invalidate an active authentication, the following message is sent:

1 to:

2 For a STA to invalidate an active authentication that was established using Open System or Shared Key 3 authentication, the following message is sent:

4 5

- 6 Add the following clauses after Clause "5.8 Reference model", renumbering the Figures as
- 7 appropriate:

8 5.9 IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1X

- 9 An RSN relies on an IEEE 802.1X entity above IEEE 802.11 to provide authentication and key
- 10 management services. With this model, decisions as to which packets are permitted onto the DS are made
- by the IEEE 802.1X entity in addition to the IEEE 802.11 MAC entity. 11
- 12 Given the key role of IEEE 802.1X, a brief summary of IEEE 802.1X and its use with IEEE 802.11 is
- 13 presented here.

14 5.9.1 IEEE 802.1X (Informative)

- 15 Devices that attach to a LAN, referred to as Systems, have one or more points of attachment to the LAN,
- 16 referred to as Ports.
- 17 The Ports of a System provide the means whereby the System can access services offered by other Systems
- 18 reachable via the LAN, and also provide the means whereby it can export services to other Systems
- reachable via the LAN. Port based network access control allows the operation of a System's Port(s) to be 19
- 20 controlled in order to ensure that access to its services is only permitted by Systems that are authorized to
- 21 do so.

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- 22 For the purposes of describing the operation of Port based access control, a Port of a System is able to
- 23 adopt one of two distinct roles within an access control interaction:
- 24 a) Authenticator. The Port configured to enforce authentication and authorization before allowing 25 access to services that are accessible via that Port adopts the Authenticator role;
- 26 b) Supplicant. The Port configured to access the services offered by the Authenticator's system adopts the Supplicant role.
- 28 A further System role is described:
- 29 c) Authentication Server. The Authentication Server performs the authentication function necessary 30 to check the credentials of the Supplicant on behalf of the Authenticator, and indicates whether or 31 not the Supplicant is authorized to access the Authenticator's services.
- 32 As can be seen from these descriptions, all three roles are necessary in order to complete an authentication
- 33 exchange. A given System can be capable of adopting one or more of these roles; for example, an
- 34 Authenticator and an Authentication Server can be co-located within the same System, allowing that System
- 35 to perform the authentication function without the need for communication with an external server.
- 36 Similarly, a Port can adopt the Supplicant role in some authentication exchanges, and the Authenticator role 37 in others. An example of the latter might occur when a STA acts in the role of a Supplicant in a BSS, but as
- 38 either the Supplicant or the Authenticator in an IBSS.


- A Port Access Entity (PAE) operates the Algorithms and Protocols associated with the authentication mechanisms for a given Port of the System.
- 3 In the Supplicant role, the PAE is responsible for responding to requests from an Authenticator for
- 4 information that will establish its credentials. The PAE that performs the Supplicant role in an
- 5 authentication exchange is known as the Supplicant PAE.
- 6 In the Authenticator role, the PAE is responsible for communication with the Supplicant, and for submitting
- 7 the information received from the Supplicant to a suitable Authentication Server in order for the credentials
- 8 to be checked, and for the consequent authorization state to be determined. The PAE that performs the
- 9 Authenticator role in an authentication exchange is known as the Authenticator PAE.
- 10 The Authenticator PAE controls the authorized/unauthorized state of its controlled Port depending upon the
- 11 outcome of the authentication process.

Figure 1 illustrates that the operation of Port based access control has the effect of creating two distinct

- 13 points of access to the Authenticator System's point of attachment to the LAN. One point of access allows
- 14 the uncontrolled exchange of PDUs between the System and other Systems on the LAN, regardless of the
- 15 authorization state (the *uncontrolled Port*); the other point of access allows the exchange of PDUs only if
- the current state of the Port is Authorized (the controlled Port). The uncontrolled and controlled Ports are
- 17 considered to be part of the same point of attachment to the LAN; any frame received on the physical Port is
- 18 made available at both the controlled and uncontrolled port, subject to the authorization state associated
- with the controlled Port.
- 20 The point of attachment to the LAN can be provided by any physical or logical Port that can provide a one-
- 21 to-one connection to a Supplicant System. For example, the point of attachment could be provided by a
- 22 single LAN MAC in a switched LAN infrastructure. In LAN environments where the MAC method allows
- 23 the possibility of a one-to-many relationship between an Authenticator and a Supplicant (for example, in
- shared media environments), the creation of a distinct association between a single Supplicant and a single
- 25 Authenticator is a necessary pre-condition in order for the access control mechanisms described in this
- standard to function. An example of such an association would be an IEEE 802.11 association between a
 - station and an access point.

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Figure 1 – Uncontrolled and controlled Ports

1 5.9.2 IEEE 802.11 usage of IEEE 802.1X

- 2 IEEE 802.11 depends upon IEEE 802.1X to control the flow of MSDUs between the DS and unauthorized
- 3 stations by use of the controlled/uncontrolled port model outlined above. EAP authentication packets
- 4 (contained in IEEE 802.11 MAC data frames) are passed via the IEEE 802.1X authenticator. Non-
- 5 authentication packets are passed (or blocked) via the controlled port. Each association between a pair of
- 6 stations creates a unique IEEE 802.1X "port," and authentication takes place relative to that port alone.
- 7 IEEE 802.11 depends upon IEEE 802.1X to change its cryptographic keys. IEEE 802.1X may choose to
- 8 change the keys for a variety of reasons. Some of the reasons include elapsed time or when a certain number
- 9 of packets have been transmitted or received.

5.9.3 Model description

- 11 The following authentication and key management operations are carried out when an IEEE 802.1X
- 12 Authentication Server is used:

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- 1. The Authenticator and Authentication Server authenticate each other and create a secure channel between them (the possibilities include RADIUS, IPsec, TLS). The security of the channel between the Authenticator and the Authentication Server is outside the scope of this specification.
- 2. The Supplicant and Authentication Server authenticate each other (e.g., possibilities include EAP-TLS and PEAP) and must generate a Master Key. The authentication must be carried over the Authenticator/Authentication Server secure channel. In addition, there must be crypto-separation over the Authenticator/Authentication Server secure channel for each Supplicant.
- A Pairwise Master Key (PMK) is generated for use between the Supplicant and Authenticator. The
 PMK is generated from the EAP master key that is obtained from the Supplicant/Authentication
 Server authentication.
 - 4. A 4-way handshake utilizing EAPOL-Key messages occurs between the Supplicant and Authenticator to
- a. Confirm the existence of the PMK;
- b. Confirm that the PMK is current;
 - c. Derive the Pairwise Transient Key from the PMK;
- d. Install the encryption and integrity keys into IEEE 802.11;
- e. Confirm the installation of the keys.
- 5. The Group Transient Key is sent from the Authenticator to the Supplicant to allow the Supplicants to receive, and in an IBSS, transmit broadcast messages, and optionally to transmit and receive unicast packets. EAPOL-Key messages are used to carry out this exchange.
- When a Pre-shared Key is used,
- 1. A Pairwise master key (PMK) is generated for use between the Supplicant and Authenticator. The PMK is the Pre-Shared Key in this case.
- 2. The 4-way handshake using EAPOL-Key messages is used just as in the Authentication Server case.

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- 3. The Group Transient Key is sent from the Authenticator to the Supplicant just as in the Authentication Server case.
- There are two implementations of this architecture:
 - 1. For an ESS, the AP is the Authenticator, and associated STAs are the Supplicants. The Authentication Server may be a RADIUS Server.
 - 2. For an IBSS, each STA is an Authenticator and Supplicant. Each STA implements an Authentication Server, or else uses a Global pre-shared key is required.

5.9.3.1 Frame exchange overview

Before IEEE 802.11 can protect packets, the STA must perform IEEE 802.11 Open System Authentication and associate to the AP. These steps allow the STA and AP to negotiate security association characteristics, including the authenticated key management, unicast and multicast cipher suites employed. IEEE 802.11 Open System Authentication and association are used to retain legacy IEEE 802.11 state flow. Figure 2 depicts how a STA discovers an AP and negotiates a security policy.






Figure 2—Establishing the IEEE 802.11 connection and negotiation

30 Once the STA and AP successfully establish a common security policy, both filter both data traffic, restricting this to IEEE 802.1X EAP authentication frames. In the next phase the STA to successfully 31 32 authenticate with an Authentication Server (AS), as depicted by Figure 3.

30





5.9.4 Deployment discussion

- The Authenticator/Authentication Server authentication protocol is out of scope, but, to provide security assurances, the protocol needs the following characteristics:
 - 1. Authenticate the Authenticator and Authentication Server.
 - 2. Provide a secure channel for the Supplicant/Authentication Server authentication and provide separation of different Supplicant to Authentication Server exchanges.
 - 3. Pass the generated key from the Authentication Server to the Authenticator for use by the Authenticator to communicate to the Supplicant.
- 21 Suitable protocols include RADIUS and Diameter.
- 22 Change the phrase "Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)" in Clause 7.1.3.1 to "Protected
- 23 *Frame*".

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- 24 Change "WEP" in Figure 13 to "Protected Frame".
- 25 Change the title of Clause 7.1.3.1.9 to:

26 7.1.3.1.9 Protected Frame field

- 27 Change the text of Clause 7.1.3.1.9 to:
- 28 The Protected Frame field is one bit in length. The Protected Frame field is set to 1 if the Frame Body field
- 29 contains information that has been processed by a cryptographic encapsulation algorithm. The Protected
- 30 Frame field is only set to 1 within frames of Type Data and frames of Type Management, Subtype
- 31 Authentication. The Protected Frame field is set to 0 in all other frames. When the Protected Frame bit is set
- 32 to 1, the Frame Body field is protected utilizing the cryptographic algorithm selected during association or
- Reassociation and expanded as defined in Clause 8.

1 Change the text of paragraph from Clause 7.2.2 reading

- 2 The frame body consists of the MSDU or a fragment thereof, and a WEP IV and ICV (if and only if the
- WEP subfield in the frame control field is set to 1). The frame body is null (0 octets in length) in data
- 4 frames of Subtype Null function (no data), CF-Ack (no data), CF-Poll (no data), and CF-Ack+CF-Poll (no
- 5 data).
- 6 *to*
- 7 The frame body consists of the MSDU or a fragment thereof, and a security header and trailer (if and only if
- 8 the Protected Frame subfield in the frame control field is set to 1). The frame body is null (0 octets in
- 9 length) in data frames of Subtype Null function (no data), CF-Ack (no data), CF-Poll (no data), and CF-
- 10 Ack+CF-Poll (no data).

7.2.3.1 Beacon frame format

12 Add the following rows to the end of Table 4 in Clause "7.2.3.1 Beacon frame format":

14	RSN Information Element	A Beacon may specify a single RSN Information
		Element.

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7.2.3.4 Association Request frame format

Add the following rows to the end of Table 7 in Clause "7.2.3.4 Associate Request frame

16 *format*":

5	RSN Information Element	An association request may specify a single RSN
		Information Element.

17

7.2.3.6 Reassociation Request frame format

- 19 Add the following rows to the end of Table 9 in Clause "7.2.3.6 Reassociate Request frame
- 20 *format*":

6	RSN Information Element	A Reassociation request may specify a single RSN
		Information Element.

21

22

7.2.3.9 Probe Response frame format

23 Add the following rows to the end of Table 12 in Clause "7.2.3.9 Probe Response frame

24 *format*":

	A Probe response may specify a single RSN Information Element.
--	--

7.2.3.10 Authentication frame format

- 26 Add the following text after the first sentence of Clause "7.2.3.10 Authentication frame
- 27 *format*"

- Only Open System Authentication frames may be used with RSN.
- 2 7.3.1.4 Capability Information field
- 3 Add the following paragraphs to Clause 7.3.1.4:
- 4 STAs (including APs) that include the RSN IE in beacons and probe responses shall set the Privacy subfield
- 5 to 1 in any frame that includes it.

Delete the last row and then add the following rows to "Table 18—Reason codes":

	12	L. P. L. G. and C. Eland
	13	Invalid Information Element
	14	MIC failure
	15	4-way handshake timeout
Į.	16	Group key update timeout
	17	Information element in 4-way handshake different from (Re-)associate request/Probe response/Beacon
	18	Multicast Cipher is not valid
	19	Unicast Cipher is not valid
	20	AKMP is not valid
	21	Unsupported RSNE version
	22	Invalid RSNE Capabilities
	23	IEEE 802.1X Authentication failed
	24-65535	Reserved

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9 Add the following row to "Table 20 – Element IDs":

RSN Information Element	48

10

- Add the following clause after Clause "7.3.2.8 Challenge Text element" but prior to Clause "8
- 12 Authentication and privacy", renumbering Tables and Figures as appropriate:

13 7.3.2.17 RSN Information Element (RSN IE)

- 14 The RSN Information Element (RSN IE) lists authentication and pairwise key cipher suite selectors, a
- single group key cipher suite selector, and an RSN capabilities field. All STAs implementing RSN shall
- support this element.

2

Element	Length	Version	Group	Pairwise	Pairwise	Authenticated	Authenticated	RSN
ID	1 aatat	2 octets	Key	Key	Key	Key	Key	Capabilities
1 ootat	1 octet	2 octets	Cipher	Cipher	Cipher	Management	Management	
1 octet			Suite	Suite	Suite	Suite Count	Suite List	
			4	Count	List	2 octets	4⋅n octets	2 octets
			octets	2 octets	$4 \cdot m$			
					octets			

Figure 6—RSN Information Element format

- 3 Informative Note. The count fields of the RSN IE were chosen to be two octets each to improve alignment.
- 4 All fields use the bit convention from 7.1.1. The RSN IE, if supplied, shall contain up to and including the
- 5 Version field. The group key cipher suite field, pairwise cipher suite field, authenticated key management
- suite field, and RSN Capabilities field are optional. If the group key suite field is not supplied, then the
- pairwise key cipher suite and authenticated key management suite fields shall not be supplied. If the group
- key cipher suite field is supplied but not the pairwise key suite field, then the authenticated key management 8
- suite field shall not be supplied.
- 10 Element ID shall be 48 decimal (30 hex).
- 11 Length gives the number of octets in the information element.
- The Version field indicates the version number of the RSN protocol. The range of Version field values a 12
- 13 STA supports shall be contiguous.
- 14 RSN Version 1 shall indicate the following:
 - 1. A STA may support IEEE 802.11 Open System Authentication.
- 16 2. A STA sets the Privacy bit set in the same way as WEP.
- A STA supports the RSN IE. An AP supporting RSN shall include the RSN IE in Beacons and 18 Probe Responses. A STA supporting RSN shall include the RSN IE in the Association and Reassociation Requests.
- 20 4. A STA supports CCMP.
- 21 A STA supports key updates using EAPOL-Key descriptor from this document.
- 22 A suite selector has the following format:

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OUI – 3 Octets	Suite Type – 1 octet

Figure 7—Suite selector format

- 25 The order of the OUI field shall follow the ordering convention for MAC addresses from IEEE 802.11
- 26 7.1.1.

Table 1 – Authenticated Key Management Suite Selectors

OUI	Value	Meaning		
		Authentication Type	Key Management Type	
00:00:00	0	Reserved	Reserved	
00:00:00	1	Unspecified authentication over IEEE 802.1X– RSN default	IEEE 802.1X Key Management as defined in 8.5 – RSN default	
00:00:00	2	None	IEEE 802.1X Key Management as defined in 8.5, using preshared key	
00:00:00	3-255	Reserved	Reserved	
Vendor Specific	Any	Vendor Specific	Vendor Specific	
Other	Any	Reserved	Reserved	

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4 The Authenticated Key Management suite selector value 00:00:00:1 "Unspecified authentication over IEEE

5 802.1X" with "IEEE 802.1X key management as defined in 8.5" shall be the assumed default when the

6 Authenticated Key Management Suite Selector field is not supplied.

> Informative Note. The Selector value 00:00:00:1 specifies only that IEEE 802.1X is used as the authentication transport, and that IEEE 802.1X selects the authentication mechanism.

9 The Authenticated Key Management suite selector value 00:00:00:2 "Pre-shared key over IEEE 802.1X" is 10 used when a pre-shared key is used with IEEE 802.1X.

Informative Note: The inclusion of different Authentication types allows the simplification of the User Interface. It allows the pre-shared key UI to be enabled/disabled on stations depending on the configuration of the AP so users are only asked for the information that is required for any particular scenario.

Informative Note: This specification defines no vendor specific Authenticated Key Management Suites. The category "Vendor Specific" is reserved as a standardized way to introduce suites.

Table 2 – Cipher Suite Selectors

OUI	Value	Meaning
00:00:00	0	None
00:00:00	1	WEP-40
00:00:00	2	TKIP
00:00:00	3	WRAP
00:00:00	4	CCMP – default in an RSN
00:00:00	5	WEP-104
00:00:00	6-255	Reserved
Vendor OUI	Other	Vendor Specific
Other	Any	Reserved

- 17 The cipher suite selector 00:00:00:4 "CCMP" shall be the default cipher suite value.
- 18 The cipher suite selector 00:00:00:1 "WEP" is only valid as a cipher suite in a TSN.
- 19 Use of CCMP or WRAP as the group key cipher suite with TKIP or WEP as the pairwise key cipher suite 20 shall not be supported.

- The cipher suite selector 00:00:00:0 "None" is only valid as the unicast cipher suite. An AP may specify the
- 2 selector 00:00:00:0 "None" for a pairwise key cipher suite if it does not support any pairwise cipher suites.
- 3 An AP shall not specify the selector 00:00:00:0 "None" as the group key cipher suite selector. The group
- key cipher suite selector in the Associate Request and the Reassociate Request shall match the value the
- 5 STA received in the Probe Response or the Beacon.

Informative Note: The selector 00:00:00:0 "None" informs STAs that the AP is not configured to support pairwise key cipher suites.

8 Informative Note: This specification defines no vendor specific Cipher Suites. The category "Vendor Specific" is reserved as a standardized way to introduce suites.

It does not make sense to use every cipher suite in any context. Table 3 indicates the circumstances under which each may be used.

Table 3—Cipher Suite Usage

Cipher Suite Selector	Group Key, IBSS	Group Key, ESS	Pairwise Key
None	No	No	Yes
WEP	No	Yes	No
TKIP	Yes	Yes	Yes
WRAP/CCMP	Yes	Yes	Yes

The RSN Capability Information field indicates requested or advertised capabilities. The length of the RSN Capability Information field is two octets. An AP sets the Pre-authentication Subfield (Bit 0) of the RSN Capability Information field to signal it supports Pre-Authentication, and it clears the subfield when it does not support Pre-Authentication. A STA sets the Pairwise Key Subfield to 1 if the STA supports Pairwise keys using default keys rather than using key-mapping keys, and clears the subfield otherwise. The remaining subfields of the RSN Capability Information field are reserved and shall be set to zero on transmission and ignored on reception. The value of the capability information field shall be taken as 0 if the field is not available in the RSN information element. The format of the Capability Information field is as illustrated in Figure 8.

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Figure 8—RSN Capabilities

- 24 The TKIP Number of Replay Counters contains the value of dot11TKIPNumberOfReplayCounters. See
- 25 Section 8.3.2.2.4. If the field does not exist in the information element then the value of 0 is to be assumed.
- $26 \qquad \text{The meaning of dot11TKIPNumberOfReplayCounters is:} \\$
- 27 0 1 replay counters

1	1	2 replay counters
2	2	4 replay counters,
3	3	16 replay counters
4		ve Note. If a security policy does not allow particular cipher or authentication suites, then APs and
5	STAs sho	uld be configured to not advertise or select these suites in the RSN IE
6	Informati	ve Note: The following represent example information elements:
7		1X authentication, CCMP pairwise and group key cipher suites (WEP and TKIP not allowed).
8		30, // information element id, 48 expressed as Hex value
9		14, // length in octets, 20 expressed as Hex value
10		01 00, // Version 1
11		00 00 04, // CCMP as group key cipher suite
12 13		01 00, // pairwise key cipher suite count
13		00 00 04, // CCMP as pairwise key cipher suite
14		01 00, // authentication count
15		00 00 00 01 // 802.1X authentication
16		00 00 // No capabilities
17	2.	
18		30, // information element id, 48 expressed as Hex value
19		14, // length in octets, 20 expressed as Hex value
		01 00, // Version 1
21		00 00 04, // CCMP as group key cipher suite
22		01 00, // pairwise key cipher suite count
23		00 00 04, // CCMP as pairwise key cipher suite
24		01 00, // authentication count
25		00 00 00 01 // 802.1X authentication
20 21 22 23 24 25 26		80 00 // No capabilities
27 28	3.	
28		30, // information element id, 48 expressed as Hex value
29		12, // length in octets, 20 expressed as Hex value
30		01 00, // Version 1
31		00 00 00 01, // WEP as group key cipher suite
32		01 00, // pairwise key cipher suite count
31 32 33		00 00 00, // No pairwise key cipher suite
34		01 00, // authentication count
34 35		00 00 00 01 // 802.1X authentication
36		8 "Authentication and Privacy" with the following text:

8 Security

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38 8.1 Framework

- 39 This standard defines two classes of security algorithms for IEEE 802.11 networks: pre-RSN security
- 40 algorithms, and algorithms for a Robust Security Network, called RSN security algorithms. Equipment
- 41 implementing Robust Security Network algorithms are called RSN-capable, while earlier IEEE 802.11
- 42 equipment are called *pre-RSN equipment*. It also supports combinations of RSN and pre-RSN equipment in
- 43 the same WLAN. Such a network is called a Transition Security Network, or TSN, to emphasize the
- 44 transitional nature of such combinations.

1	Important Informative Security Warning. Transition means just that. A
2	TSN cannot provide the assurances of an RSN. Compromise of
3	communication between pre-RSN and RSN equipment can compromise
4	communication strictly among RSN equipment. Organizations mixing
5	RSN and pre-RSN equipment should be encouraged to migrate to
6	homogeneous RSN networks as rapidly as is feasible.

- All security algorithms are optional, but all IEEE 802.11 implementations claiming security shall implement
- 8 the mandatory RSN components.

9 8.1.1 Security components

- 10 Pre-RSN security consists of two basic subsystems:
- WEP privacy, to encapsulate data, and
- IEEE 802.11 authentication.
- 13 8.2.2.1 describes WEP, while 8.2.3.1 describes the IEEE 802.11 authentication procedures.
- 14 RSN security consists of two basic subsystems:
- Data privacy mechanism:
- 16 o TKIP, to provide minimally adequate level of data privacy for pre-RSN hardware conforming to the 1999 issue of this standard;
- 18 o WRAP, an optional AES-based protocol, to provide robust data privacy for the long term; and
- 20 o CCMP, another AES-based protocol, to provide robust data privacy. Any implementation claiming to provide security shall implement CCMP
- Security association management:
- o RSN negotiation procedures, to establish a security context;
- 24 o IEEE 802.1X authentication, replacing IEEE 802.11 authentication;
- o IEEE 802.1X key management, to provide cryptographic keys;

8.1.2 Identifying pre-RSN equipment

- 27 Pre-RSN devices conform to the 1999 issue of this standard. These devices do not include the RSN IE in
- 28 their Beacons and Probe Responses, and in Association and Reassociation Requests. Pre-RSN devices
- 29 ignore the presence or otherwise of the RSN IE in received messages.

8.1.3 Identifying RSN-capable equipment

- 31 An RSN-capable AP shall, and a non-AP STA may, include the RSN IE in all Beacons, Probe Responses,
- 32 Association Requests, and Reassociation Requests. When included, this IE advertises the sender as RSN-
- 33 capable. Including the RSN IE shall be the default for RSN-capable non-AP STAs.

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- 1 An RSN-capable STA may identify another RSN-capable STA by noting that the RSN IE is included in any
- 2 Beacon, Probe Response, Association Request, or Reassociation Request it receives from the peer. An
- 3 RSN-capable STA may identify Pre-RSN equipment by the peer's failure to include the RSN IE.
- Informative Note: There is no requirement for a non-AP STA to always include the RSN IE in all the association establishment messages. For example, if a STA migrates to an unknown ESS in a new security domain, it may not be able to communicate because it has not been issued the appropriate credentials. This forces the association, if accepted, to fall back to use pre-RSN security mechanisms only. The responding peer STA is not required to accept the association request in this instance, as doing so may violate its own security policy. Every RSN-capable AP shall include the RSN IE to participate in RSN security.

8.1.4 Mixtures of RSN and pre-RSN equipment

- An RSN-capable AP in an ESS or a STA in an IBSS may communicate with both RSN-capable and pre-
- 12 RSN equipment simultaneously. An RSN-capable STA in an ESS may communicate with either RSN-
- capable or legacy APs, but shall not do so simultaneously. These rules permit migration from deployments
- based on legacy WEP security to RSN-based security.

15 **8.1.5 Operation**

- RSN supports two models of operation. One model is based on IEEE 802.1X authentication, while the other
- depends on a global pre-shared key.
- 18 RSN-capable STAs use Beacons and Probe request to identify other RSN-capable peer STAs. When the
- 19 peer indicates it is RSN-capable, the STA shall implement the following sequence of procedures in the
- 20 IEEE 802.1X authentication model:
- 1. First it associates and negotiates the security parameters used with the association. 8.4.2 and 8.4.3 describe the RSN negotiation procedures.
- 23 2. Next it authenticates, using the agreed upon association mechanism. 8.4.6 and 8.4.7 describe the IEEE 802.11 use of IEEE 802.1X authentication.
- 25 3. Third, it executes a key exchange algorithm, based on the IEEE 802.1X EAPOL Rekey protocol. Clause 8.5 describes the IEEE 802.11 use of IEEE 802.1X key management, to obtain temporal keys.
- 4. Finally, it uses the agreed upon temporal keys and cipher suites to protect the link. 8.3.2, 8.3.3, and 8.3.4 describe the three defined data RSN encapsulation mechanisms.
- 30 If the peer fails to indicate it is RSN-capable, the STA may fall back to the following procedures:
- 1. first uses 1999 IEEE 802.11 (Pre-RSN) authentication;
- 32 2. followed by association;
- 3. optionally followed by use of legacy WEP.
- 34 8.2.3.1 describes pre-RSN authentication, while 8.2.2.1 describes WEP.
- 35 If the BSS is based on a global pre-shared key, the STA instead executes the following sequence of 36 procedures:
- 1. It runs the Clause 8.5 the key exchange, to establish pairwise and group keys and cipher suites. It uses the global pre-shared key as the pairwise master key for each such exchange

8.1.6 RSN assumptions and constraints

3 RSN assumes:

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- 1. Mutual authentication of the IEEE 802.1X AS and the STA. This assumption is intrinsic to IEEE 802.11 LANs and cannot be removed without compromising security.
- 2. In particular, the mutual authentication requirement implies an unspecified prior enrollment process, as the STA must be able to identify the ESS or IBSS as an entity that it regards as genuinely trustworthy. The non-secured IEEE 802.11 model of promiscuous roaming does not and cannot provide security in a WLAN. This assumption is intrinsic to IEEE 802.11 and cannot be removed without compromising security.
- Informative Note: This assumption complicates some business models, such as those used by IEEE 802.11 hot spot providers, but this in no way eliminates the assumption. Enrollment can be indirect, e.g., an organization might use a PKI for authentication, signing the hot spot provider's certificate with a key STAs from their organization trust. Such a signing key can only be employed for this one purpose—certifying that the bearer's is a party trusted to enforce the signer's security policy—or security of the WLAN is lost. In practice service level agreements and auditing will be needed to be able to verify that the provider actually enforces the security policy delegated in this manner.
- 3. RSN assumes that either the mutual authentication is strong or is somehow shielded from unauthorized reception. This assumption is intrinsic to IEEE 802.11 LANs and cannot be removed without compromising security.
- 4. Authentication derives a fresh—i.e., never before used—session key.
- 5. In an ESS all APs lie entirely within the security boundary surrounding the IEEE 802.1X AS. This is a very strong configuration constraint. In practice this implies that either the IEEE 802.1X server is embedded in the AP, or else the AP is physically secure (e.g., physical access to the AP is controlled; access—both physical and by network—to the DS is controlled; the AP shielded from all unauthorized radio transmissions, etc.), and the communication channel between the AS and the AP lies entirely within the security boundary as well.
 - 6. In an ESS that supports roaming, all channels between any pair of APs through the DS are within the same security boundary. This again is a very strong configuration constraint. It implies that the DS is wired, physically secured, and secured from all outside attacks, including those that might be launched via IEEE 802.1X authentication itself. Thus, RSN cannot support one of the most common home configurations, where the IEEE 802.11 LAN is itself the DS.
 - 7. Key generation of a 256-bit key at the Supplicant and Authentication Server for use by the Supplicant and Authenticator.

8.2 Pre-RSN security methods

- 36 Except for Open System Authentication, all pre-RSN security mechanisms have been deprecated, as they
- 37 fail to meet their security goals. They can be easily compromised. New implementations should support pre-
- 38 RSN methods only to aid migration to RSN methods.

8.2.2 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

2 8.2.2.1 WEP overview

- 3 WEP was defined in the 1999 issue of this standard as a means of protecting the confidentiality of data
- 4 exchanged among authorized users of a wireless LAN from casual eavesdropping. Implementation of WEP
- 5 is optional.

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
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8.2.2.2 WEP MPDU format

Figure 9 depicts the encrypted Frame Body as constructed by the WEP algorithm.



NOTE: The encipherment process has expanded the original MPDU by 8 Octets, 4 for the Initialization Vector (IV) field and 4 for the Integrity Check Value (ICV). The ICV is calculated on the Data field only.

Figure 9—Construction of Expanded WEP MPDU

- 11 The WEP ICV shall be a 32-bit field. The expanded Frame Body shall start with a 32-bit IV field. This field
- 12 shall contain three sub fields: a three-octet field that contains the initialization vector, a 2-bit key ID field,
- and a 6-bit pad field. The ordering conventions defined in 7.1.1 apply to the IV fields and its sub fields and
- 14 to the ICV field. The key ID subfield contents select one of four possible secret key values for use in
- decrypting this Frame Body. Interpretation of these bits is discussed further in 8.2.2.1.4.6. The contents of
- the pad subfield shall be zero. The key ID occupies the two msb of the last octet of the IV field, while the
- pad occupies the six lsb of this octet.

8.2.2.3 WEP state

- 19 WEP uses encryption keys only; it performs no data authentication, so does not have data integrity keys.
- WEP(-40) encryption keys shall be 40-bits in length. WEP-104 keys shall be 104-bits in length. WEP uses
- 21 two types of encryption keys: key-mapping keys and default keys.
- 22 A key-mapping key is an unnamed key corresponding to a distinct <TA,RA> pair. Implementations shall
- use the key-mapping key if it is configured for a <TA,RA> pair. This means the key-mapping key shall be
- 24 used to WEP encapsulate or decapsulate MPDUs transmitted by TA to RA, regardless of the presence of
- other key types. When a key-mapping key for an address pair is present, the WEP key ID field in the
- MPDU shall be set to zero on transmit and ignored on receive.
- 27 A default key is an item in a four-element MIB array called dot11WEPDefaultKeys, named by the value of a
- 28 related array index called dot11WEPDefaultKeyID. If a key-mapping key is not configured for a WEP
- 29 MPDU's <TA,RA> pair, WEP shall use a default key to encapsulate or decapsulate it. On transmit the key

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- selected is the element of the dot11DefaultKeys array given by the index dot11WEPDefaultKeyID—a value
- 2 of 0, 1, 2, or 3—corresponding to the first, second, third, or fourth element, respectively, of
- 3 dot11WEPDefaultKeys. The value the transmitter encodes in the WEP key ID field of the transmitted
- 4 MPDU shall be the *dot11WEPDefaultKeyID* value. The receiver shall use the key id field of the MPDU to
- 5 index into dot11WEPDefaultKeys to obtain the correct default key. All WEP implementations shall support
- 6 default keys.
- Informative Note: Many implementations also support 104-bit WEP keys. These are used exactly like 40-bit WEP keys: a 24-bit WEP IV is prepended to the 104-bit key to construct a 128-bit WEP seed, as explained
- below in 8.2.2.4.3. The resulting 128-bit WEP seed is then consumed by the RC4 stream cipher.
- This construction based on 104-bit keys affords no more assurance than the 40-bit construction and its implementation and use is in no way condoned by this standard. Rather, the 104-bit construction is noted
- only to document *de facto* practice.
- 13 This document sometimes refers to 40-bit WEP as WEP-40, and to 104-bit WEP as WEP-104.
- 14 The default value for all WEP keys shall be null. WEP implementations shall discard the containing MSDU
- 15 and generate an MA-UNITDATA-STATUS.indication with transmission status indicating that a frame may
- not be encapsulated with a null key in response to any request to encapsulate an MPDU with a null key.
- 17 **8.2.2.4 WEP procedures**
- 18 **8.2.2.4.1 WEP ICV algorithm**
- 19 The WEP ICV shall be computed using the CRC-32, as defined in 7.1.3.6, calculated over the MPDU Data
- 20 (PDU) field.
- 21 **8.2.2.4.2 WEP encryption algorithm**
- 22 A WEP implementation shall use the RC4 stream cipher from RSA Data Security, Inc., as its encryption and
- decryption algorithm. RC4 uses a PRNG to generate a key stream that it XORs with a plaintext data stream
- 24 to produce ciphertext or with a ciphertext stream to produce plaintext.
- 25 8.2.2.4.3 WEP seed construction
- 26 A WEP shall construct a per-packet key, called a seed, by concatenating an encryption key to an
- 27 initialization vector (IV).
- 28 For WEP(-40), bits 0 through 39 of the WEP key correspond to bits 24 through 63 of the seed, and bits 0
- 29 through 23 of the IV correspond to bits 0 through 23 of the seed, respectively. For WEP-104, bits 0 through
- 30 103 of the WEP key correspond to bits 24 through 127 of the seed, and bits 0 through 23 of the IV
- 31 correspond to bits 0 through 23 of the seed, respectively. The bit numbering conventions in 7.1.1 apply to
- 32 the seed. The seed shall be the input to RC4, in order to encrypt or decrypt the WEP Data and ICV fields.
- 33 The WEP implementation encapsulating an MPDU should select a new IV for every packet it WEP
- 34 encapsulates. The IV selection algorithm is unspecified. The algorithm the encapsulation uses to select the
- and encryption key used to construct the seed is also unspecified.
- 36 The WEP implementation decapsulating an MPDU shall use the IV from the received MPDU's Init Vector
- 37 subfield. Clause 8.2.2.1.4.6 specifies how the decapsulator selects the key to use to construct the per-packet
- 38 key.

8.2.2.4.4 WEP MPDU encapsulation

- 2 WEP shall apply three transformations to the plaintext MPDU to effect the WEP encapsulation. WEP
- 3 computes the ICV over the plaintext Data and then appends this after the MPDU data. WEP encrypts the
- 4 MPDU plaintext Data and ICV using RC4 with a seed constructed, as specified in Clause 8.2.2.1.4.3. WEP
 - encodes the IV and key id into the IV field, prepended to the encrypted Data field.

6 Figure 10 depicts the WEP encapsulation process. The ICV shall be computed and appended to the

plaintext data prior to encryption, but the IV encoding step may occur in any order convenient for the

8 implementation.

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


Figure 10—WEP Encapsulation Block Diagram

8.2.2.4.5 WEP MPDU decapsulation

WEP shall apply three transformations to the WEP MPDU to decapsulate its payload. WEP extracts the IV and key id from the received MPDU. The key id identifies the decryption key to use, which is combined as described in Clause 8.2.2.1.4.3 to construct the seed for this MPDU. WEP uses the constructed seed to decrypt the Data field of the WEP MPDU; this produces plaintext data and an ICV. Finally WEP recomputes the ICV and bit-wise compares it with the decrypted ICV from the MPDU. If the two are bit-wise identical, then WEP removes the IV and ICV from the MPDU, which is accepted as valid; if they differ in any bit position, WEP generates an error indication to MAC management. MSDUs with erroneous MPDUs (due to inability to decrypt) shall not be passed to LLC.

Figure 11 depicts a block diagram for WEP decapsulation. Unlike encapsulation, the decapsulation steps shall be in the indicated order.




Figure 11—WEP Decapsulation Block Diagram

8.2.2.4.6 WEP MIB attributes

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2 An MPDU of type Data with the WEP subfield of the Frame Control field equal to 1 is called a WEP 3

MPDU. Other MPDUs of type Data are called non-WEP MPDUs.

4 A STA shall not transmit WEP encapsulated MPDUs when value of the MIB variable dot11PrivacyInvoked is "false." This MIB variable does not affect MPDU or MMPDU reception. 5

6	if dot11PrivacyInvoked is "false"
7	the MPDU is transmitted without WEP encapsulation
8	else
9	if (the MPDU has an individual RA and
10	there is an entry in <i>dot11WEPKeyMappings</i> for that RA)
11	if that entry has WEPOn set to "false"
12	the MPDU is transmitted without WEP encapsulation
13	else
14	if that entry contains a key that is null
15	discard the MPDU's entire MSDU and generate an
16	MA-UNITDATA-STATUS.indication primitive to notify
17	LLC that the MSDU was undeliverable due to a null WEP key
18	else
19	encrypt the MPDU using that entry's key, setting the KeyID
20	subfield of the IV field to zero
21	else
22	if (the MPDU has a group RA and the Privacy subfield
23	of the Capability Information field in this BSS is set to 0)
24	the MPDU is transmitted without WEP encapsulation
25	else
26	if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID] is null
27	discard the MPDU's entire MSDU and generate an
28	MA-UNITDATA-STATUS.indication primitive to notify
29	LLC that the MSDU was undeliverable due to a null WEP key
30	else
31	WEP encapsulate the MPDU using the key
32	dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID],
33	setting the KeyID subfield of the IV field to
34	dot11WEPDefaultKeyID
٠.	
35	When the boolean attribute aExcludeUnencrypted is set to True, non-WEP MPDUs shall not be indicated at
36	the MAC service interface, and only MSDUs successfully reassembled from successfully decrypted MPDUs
37	shall be indicated at the MAC service interface. When receiving a frame of type Data, the values of
38	dot11PrivacyOptionImplemented, dot11WEPKeyMappings, dot11WEPDefaultKeys,
39	dot11WEPDefaultKeyID, and aExcludeUnencrypted in effect at the time the PHY-RXSTART.indication
40	primitive is received by the MAC shall be used according to the following decision tree:
41	if the Protected Frame subfield of the Frame Control Field is zero
42	if aExcludeUnencrypted is "true"
43	discard the frame body without indication to LLC and increment
44	dot11WEPExcludedCount
45	else
46	receive the frame without WEP decapsulation
47	else
48	if dot11PrivacyOptionImplemented is "true"
49	if (the MPDU has individual RA and
50	there is an entry in dot11WEPKeyMappings matching the MPDU's TA)
51	if that entry has WEPOn set to "false"

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1				discard	the	frame	body	and	increment	
2				dot11W	EPUndec	cryptableCo	ount			
3		el	lse							
4				if that er		ins a key tl				
5							ody and incr			
6 7				else	aotiiw	EPUnaecry	ptableCoun	I		
8				eise	WEP de	canculate u	vith that key,	incremer	nting	
9							orCount if th			
10		else			40111111	BI TO TETTO		e re v ene	on runs	
11			dot11V	WEPDef	aultKeys[KeyID] is 1	null			
12						body and i				
13				dot11W	EPUndec	ryptableCo	ount			
14		el	lse							
15							l WEPDefaul			
16				increme	nting dot	11WEPICV	ErrorCount/	if the ICV	V check fails	
17	else	1' 1 /1	C	11	1	1 .11117	TEDIL I	. 11.0		
18		discard the	trame	body an	d increme	ent dot11W	EPUndecryp	otableCou	int	
19	8.2.3 Security associa	ation mans	ademe	nt						
1)	0.2.0 Octobrity 0.550010	ation mane	ageine	,,,,,						
20	Pre-RSN security does no	ot have a pro	oper no	otion of a	security	association	n. Pre-RSN s	security po	ossesses only	
21	one of the attributes, an au				J			7 1	•	
22	8.2.3.1 Authentication	1								
23	8.2.3.1.1 Overview									
24	The 1999 issue of the sta	ndard defin	es two	cuhtyne	s of nre-I	QSN auther	ntication serv	vice One	n System and	
25										
26	Shared Key. Shared Key authentication is deprecated, and should not be implemented except for backward compatibility with legacy equipment. All management frames of subtype Authentication shall be unicast, as									
27	authentication is performed between pairs of stations—i.e., multicast authentication is not allowed. Management frames of subtype Deauthentication are advisory, and may be sent as group-addressed frames.									
28	Management frames of su	btype Deaut	thentica	ation are	advisory,	, and may b	e sent as gro	oup-addres	ssed frames.	
29	A mutual authentication r									
30	exchange. Authentication					s and the	AP in ar	n infrastr	ructure BSS.	
31	Authentication may be use	ea between t	two S1	As in an	IB55.					
32	8.2.3.1.2 Open systen	n authentic	cation							
32	oizioiiiz opoii oyotoii	- authoritie	Julion							
33	Open System authentica	tion is a r	null au	ıthentica	tion algo	rithm. An	y STA requ	uesting C	Open System	
34	authentication may be au	uthenticated	if dot	11Authe	ntication'	Type at the	e recipient s	station is	set to Open	
35	System authentication. A							ig STA. (Open System	
36	authentication is the defau	ılt authentica	ation al	lgorithm	for pre-R	SN equipm	nent.			
27	0 0 4 4 4 4				.1			TD1	C"	
37	Open System authenticati									
38 39	asserts identity and requeresult is "successful," the						ns the authe	nucation	resuit. If the	
37	result is successiui, the	SIAS SHAII (oc acci	arcu mu	luarry aut	nemicaica.				
40	In the following descripti	on, the STA	\ initiat	ting the a	authentica	ation excha	nge is referr	ed to as t	he <i>requeste</i> r.	
41	and the STA to which the									
								•		
42	8.2.3.1.2.1 Open System of	ıuthenticati	on (fir:	st frame,)					
43	— Message type: Manage									
44	— Message subtype: Auth	ientication								

- 1 — Information items: 2 • Authentication Algorithm Identification = "Open System" 3 • Station Identity Assertion (in SA field of header) • Authentication transaction sequence number = 1 4 5 • Authentication algorithm dependent information (none) — Direction of message: From requester to responder. 6 7 8.2.3.1.2.2 Open System authentication (final frame) — Message type: Management 8 9 — Message subtype: Authentication 10 — Information items: 11 • Authentication Algorithm Identification = "Open System" 12 • Authentication transaction sequence number = 2 13 • Authentication algorithm dependent information (none) 14 • The result of the requested authentication as defined in 7.3.1.9 15 — Direction of message: From responder to requester. 16 If dot11AuthenticationType does not include the value "Open System," the result code shall not take the 17 value "successful." 18 8.2.3.1.3 Shared key authentication 19 Shared Key authentication seeks to authenticate STAs as either a member of those who know a shared 20 secret key or a member of those who do not. Shared Key authentication fails to meet this objective, as it 21 makes public all the information required to trivially recover the key stream used by authentication. 22 Shared Key authentication requires the WEP privacy mechanism. Shared Key authentication shall be implemented if WEP is implemented. 23 24 This mechanism uses a shared key delivered to participating STAs via a secure channel that is independent of IEEE 802.11. This shared key is contained in a write-only MIB attribute in an attempt to keep the key 25 26 value internal to the MAC. 27 A STA shall not initiate a Shared Key authentication exchange unless its dot11PrivacyOptionImplemented attribute is "true." 28 29 In the following description, the STA initiating the authentication exchange is referred to as the *requester*, 30 and the STA to which the initial frame in the exchange is addressed is referred to as the responder. 31 8.2.3.1.3.1 Shared Key authentication (first frame) 32 — Message type: Management 33 — Message subtype: Authentication
- 40 8.2.3.1.3.2 Shared Key authentication (second frame)

— Direction of message: From requester to responder

- 41 Before sending the second frame in the Shared Key authentication sequence, the responder shall use WEP
- 42 to generate a string of octets to be used as the authentication challenge text.

• Station Identity Assertion (in SA field of header)

• Authentication transaction sequence number = 1

• Authentication Algorithm Identification = "Shared Key"

• Authentication algorithm dependent information (none)

43 — Message type: Management

— Information Items:

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1 2	— Message subtype: Authentication— Information Items:
3	Authentication Algorithm Identification = "Shared Key"
4	• Authentication transaction sequence number = 2
5	• Authentication algorithm dependent information = the authentication result.
6	• The result of the requested authentication as defined in 7.3.1.9.
7	If the status code is not "successful," this shall be the last frame of the transaction sequence, and
8	the content of the challenge text field is unspecified.
9	If the status code is "successful," the following additional information items shall have valid
10	contents:
11	Authentication algorithm dependent information = challenge text.
12 13 14	This authentication result shall be of fixed length of 128 octets. The field shall be filled with octets generated by the WEP pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). The actual value of the challenge field is unimportant, but the value shall not be a static value.
15	— Direction of message: From responder to requester
16	8.2.3.1.3.3 Shared Key authentication (third frame)
17	The requester shall copy the challenge text from the second frame into the third frame. The third frame shall
18	be transmitted after encapsulation by WEP, as defined in Clause 8.2.2.1, using the shared key.
19	— Message type: Management
20	— Message subtype: Authentication
21	— Information Items:
22	• Authentication Algorithm Identification = "Shared Key"
23	• Authentication transaction sequence number = 3
24	• Authentication algorithm dependent information = challenge text from the second frame
25	— Direction of message: From requester to responder
26	8.2.3.1.3.4 Shared Key authentication (final frame)
27	The responder shall WEP decapsulate the third frame as described in Clause 8.2.2.1. If the WEP ICV check
28	is successful, the responder shall compare the decrypted contents of the Challenge Text field with the
29	challenge text sent in second frame. If they are the same, then the responder shall respond with a successful
30	status code in the final frame of the sequence. If the WEP ICV check fails or challenge text comparison
31	fails, the responder shall respond with an unsuccessful status code in final frame.
32	— Message type: Management
33	Message subtype: Authentication
34	— Information Items:
35	• Authentication Algorithm Identification = "Shared Key"
36	• Authentication transaction sequence number = 4
37	• Authentication algorithm dependent information = the authentication result
38	The result of the requested authentication.
39	This is a fixed length item with values "successful" and "unsuccessful."
40	— Direction of message: From responder to requester
41	8.2.3.1.3.5 Shared key MIB attributes
42 43	To transmit a frame of type Management, subtype Authentication with an Authentication Transaction
43	Sequence Number field value of 2, the MAC shall operate according to the following decision tree:

if dot11PrivacyOptionImplemented is "false"

1 2	the MMPDU is transmitted with a sequence of zero octets in the Challenge Text field and a Status Code value of 13
3	else
4	the MMPDU is transmitted with a sequence of 128 octets generated using the WEI
5	PRNG and a key whose value is unspecified and beyond the scope of this standard and a
6	randomly chosen IV value (note that this will typically be selected by the same
7	mechanism for choosing IV values for transmitted data MPDUs) in the Challenge Tex
8	field and a status code value of 0 (the IV used is immaterial and is not transmitted). Note
9	that there are cryptographic issues involved in the choice of key/IV for this process as the
10	challenge text is sent unencrypted and therefore provides a known output sequence from
11	the PRNG.
12 13	To receive a frame of type Management, subtype Authentication with an Authentication Transaction Sequence Number field value of 2, the MAC shall operate according to the following decision tree:
14	if the Protected Frame subfield of the Frame Control field is 1
15	respond with a status code value of 15
16	else
17	if dot11PrivacyOptionImplemented is "true"
18	if there is a mapping in dot11WEPKeyMappings matching the MSDU's TA
19	if that key is null
20	respond with a frame whose Authentication Transaction
21	Sequence Number field is 3 that contains the appropriate
22	Authentication Algorithm Number, a status code value of 13
23	and no Challenge Text field, without encrypting the content
24	of the frame
25	else
26	respond with a frame whose Authentication Transaction
27 28	Sequence Number field is 3 that contains the appropriate
20 29	Authentication algorithm Number, a status code value of 0 and the identical Challenge Text field, encrypted using that key
29 30	and setting the key ID subfield in the IV field to 0
31	else
32	if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID] is null
33	respond with a frame whose Authentication Transaction
34	Sequence Number field is 3 that contains the appropriate
35	Authentication Algorithm Number, a status code value of 15
36	and no Challenge Text field, without encrypting the content
37	of the frame
38	else
39	respond with a frame whose Authentication Transaction
40	Sequence Number field is 3 that contains the appropriate
41	Authentication Algorithm Number, a status code value of (
42	and the identical Challenge Text field, WEP encapsulating the
43	frame under the key
44	dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID], and setting
45	the key ID subfield in the IV field to dot11WEPDefaultKeyID
46	else
47	respond with a frame whose Authentication Transaction Sequence Number field
48	is 3 that contains the appropriate Authentication Algorithm Number, a statu
49	code value of 13 and no Challenge Text field, without encrypting the contents o
50	the frame
51 52	When receiving a frame of type Management, subtype Authentication with an Authentication Transaction Sequence Number field value of 3, the MAC shall operate according to the following decision tree:
53	if the Protected Frame subfield of the Frame Control field is zero

1	respond with a status code value of 15
2	else
3	if dot11PrivacyOptionImplemented is "true"
4	if there is a mapping in dot11WEPKeyMappings matching the MSDU's TA
5	if that key is null
6	respond with a frame whose Authentication Transaction
7	Sequence Number field is 4 that contains the appropriate
8	Authentication Algorithm Number, and a status code value of
9	15 without encrypting the contents of the frame
10	else
11	WEP decapsulate with that key, incrementing
12	dot11WEPICVErrorCount and responding with a status code
13	value of 15 if the ICV check fails
14	else
15	if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[KeyID] is null
16	respond with a frame whose Authentication Transaction
17	Sequence Number field is 4 that contains the appropriate
18	Authentication Algorithm Number, and a status code value of
19	15 without encrypting the contents of the frame
20	else
21	WEP decapsulate with dot11WEPDefaultKeys[KeyID],
22	incrementing dot11WEPICVErrorCount and responding with a
23	status code value of 15 if the ICV check fails
24	else
25	respond with a frame whose Authentication Transaction Sequence Number field
26	is 4 that contains the appropriate Authentication Algorithm Number, and a status
27	code value of 15
28	The attribute dot11PrivacyInvoked shall not take the value "true" if the attribute
29	dot11PrivacyOptionImplemented is "false." Setting dot11WEPKeyMappings to a value that includes more
30	than dot11WEPKeyMappingLength entries is illegal and shall have an implementation-specific effect on the
31	operation of the privacy service. Note that dot11WEPKeyMappings may contain from zero to
32	dot11WEPKeyMappingLength entries, inclusive.
33	The values of the attributes in the aPrivacygrp should not be changed during the authentication sequence, as
34	unintended operation may result.
25	0.2 DCN data privacy protocolo
35	8.3 RSN data privacy protocols
26	A DON'T C. 4 1
36	An RSN defines three data privacy protocols, named TKIP, WRAP, and CCMP. This section defines these
37	protocols.
38	8.3.1 Overview
50	
39	This standard defines three RSN data privacy protocols, TKIP, WRAP, and CCMP. TKIP provides pre-
40	RSN hardware devices with a way to securely interoperate with RSN-capable devices. WRAP and CCMP
41	are both protocol based on 128-bit AES, the first in OCB mode, and the second in CCM mode.
	,
42	CCMP shall be mandatory-to-implement in all IEEE 802.11 equipment claiming RSN compliance.
43	Implementation of TKIP and WRAP is optional for RSN compliance. Pre-RSN devices may be patched to
44	implement TKIP, to interoperate with RSN-compliant devices that also implement TKIP. Use of any of the
45	privacy algorithms depends on local policies.

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Because of its weakness, IEEE 802.11 recommends not using TKIP except as a patch to pre-RSN

equipment. RSN devices should implement TKIP only to allow interoperability with pre-RSN hardware

implementing the TKIP patch.

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1 8.3.2 Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)

2 8.3.2.1 TKIP overview

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- The Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) is a cipher suite enhancing the WEP protocol on pre-RSN 3 hardware. This protocol uses WEP. TKIP surrounds WEP with new algorithms: 4
 - 1. A transmitter calculates a keyed cryptographic message integrity code, or MIC, over the MSDU source and destination addresses and the MSDU plaintext data. TKIP appends the computed MIC to the MSDU data prior to fragmentation into MPDUs. The receiver verifies the MIC after decryption, ICV checking, and reassembly of the MPDUs into an MSDU, and discards any received MSDUs with invalid MICs. This defends against forgery attacks, and allows the MIC to be computed by software on the host.
- 2. Because an adversary can compromise the TKIP MIC with relatively few messages, TKIP also 12 implements countermeasures, to rate limit key updates. The countermeasures bound the probability of a successful forgery and the amount of information an attacker can learn about a key.
 - 3. TKIP uses a packet TKIP sequence counter, or TSC, to sequence the MPDUs it sends. The receiver drops MPDUs received out of order; i.e., not received with strictly increasing sequence numbers. This provides a weak form of replay protection. TKIP encodes the packet sequence counter as a WEP IV, to communicate the TSC value from the sender to the receiver.
- 18 4. TKIP uses a cryptographic mixing function to combine a temporal key and the TSC into the WEP 19 seed, which includes the WEP IV. The receiver recovers the TSC from a received MPDU and 20 utilizes the mixing function to compute the same WEP seed needed to correctly decrypt the 21 MPDU. The key mixing function is designed to defeat weak-key attacks against the WEP key.

8.3.2.1.1 TKIP encapsulation

- 23 TKIP enhances the WEP encapsulation with several additional functions, as depicted in Figure 12 below.
- 24 TKIP computes the MIC over the MSDU source address, destination address, priority, and data, 25 and appends the computed MIC to the MSDU; TKIP discards any MIC padding prior to appending 26 the MIC.
- 27 2. TKIP fragments the MSDU into one or more MPDUs; TKIP assigns a monotonically incrementing 28 TSC value to each MPDU it generates, taking care that all the MPDUs generated from the same 29 MSDU use counter values from the same 16-bit counter space.
- 30 3. For each MPDU, TKIP uses the key mixing function to compute the WEP seed.
- 31 4. TKIP represents the WEP seed as a WEP IV and RC4 key, and passes these with each MPDU to WEP for encapsulation. WEP uses the WEP seed as a WEP default key, identified by a key id 32 33 associated with the temporal key.
- 34 In the figure TTAK denotes the intermediate key produced by the phase 1 of the TKIP mixing function (see 35 8.3.2.4.3); TTAK is short-hand for "TKIP mixed Transmit Address and Key".

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Figure 12—TKIP Encapsulation Block Diagram

4 8.3.2.1.2 TKIP decapsulation

- 5 TKIP enhances the WEP decapsulation process with the following additional steps.
 - 1. Before WEP decapsulating a received MPDU, TKIP extracts the TSC sequence number and key id from the WEP IV. TKIP discards a received MPDU that violates the sequencing rules, and otherwise uses the mixing function to construct the WEP seed.
 - 2. TKIP represents the WEP seed as a WEP IV and RC4 key and passes these with the MPDU to WEP for decapsulation.
 - 3. If WEP indicates the ICV check succeeded, the implementation reassembles the MPDU into an MSDU. If the MSDU reassembly succeeds, the receiver verifies the MIC. If it fails, then the packet is discarded.
 - 4. The MIC verification step recomputes the MIC over the MSDU source address, destination address, priority, and MSDU data (but not the MIC field), and bit-wise compares the result against the received MIC.
 - 5. If the received and the locally computed MIC are identical, the verification succeeds, and TKIP shall deliver the MSDU to the upper layer. If the two differ in any bit position, then the verification fails, the receiver discards the packet, and engages in appropriate countermeasures.

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


Figure 13—TKIP Decapsulation Block Diagram

8.3.2.2 TKIP MPDU formats

TKIP reuses pre-RSN WEP. It extends the MPDU by four (4) octets, to accommodate the an extension to the WEP IV, denoted by the Extended IV field, and extends the MSDU format by eight (8) octets, to accommodate the new MIC field. TKIP inserts the Extended IV field immediately after the WEP IV field and before the encrypted data. TKIP appends the MIC to the MSDU Data field; the MIC becomes part of the encrypted data.

- Once the MIC is appended to the MSDU data, the TKIP data encapsulation can proceed in one of two ways.
 - If the MSDU-with-MIC can be encoded within a single WEP-encapsulated MPDU, TKIP encapsulates the MSDU in a single MPDU.
 - If the MSDU-with-MIC cannot be encoded within a single WEP-encapsulated MDPU, the MSDU-with-MIC is fragmented into appropriately sized MPDUs. WEP encapsulates each MPDU. Note that the MIC may span the second to last and last MPDUs.
- Figure 14 below depicts the layout of the encrypted MPDU when using TKIP-based privacy. Note the Figure only depicts the case when the MSDU can be encapsulated

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
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Note: The encipherment process has expanded the original MPDU size by 20 octets, 4 for the Initialization vector (IV) / Key ID field, 4 for the extended IV field, 8 for the Message Integrity Code (MIC) and 4 for the Integregty Check Value (ICV).

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Figure 14—Construction of Expanded TKIP MPDU

The ExtIV bit in the KeyId octet indicates the presence or absence of an extended IV. If the ExtIV bit is '0' only the old-style non-extended IV is transferred. If the ExtIV bit is '1' an extended IV of 4 octets follows the original IV. For TKIP the ExtIV bit shall be set, and the Extended IV field shall be supplied. The ExtIV bit shall be 0 for WEP packets.

IV0 is the most significant octet of the IV and IV5 the least significant. Octets IV4 and IV5 form the IV sequence number part and are used with the TKIP phase 2 key hashing. Octets IV0 – IV3 are used in the TKIP phase 1 key hashing. It encodes the least significant 16 bits of the whole 48-bit IV. As soon as this lower 16 bit sequence number rolls over (0xFFFF \rightarrow 0x0000), the extended IV value—i.e., the upper 32 bits of the entire 48-bit IV—must be incremented by 1.

Informational note: The rationale for this construction is:

- Aligning on word boundaries eases implementation on legacy devices
- Adding 4 octets of extended IV eliminates IV exhaustion as a reason to re-key.
- Retain IV/Key-ID of 4 octets, add 4 octets and use the last 2 octets (16bits) of the IV as the sequence number.
 - Key ID octet changes Use one bit (bit 5) to indicate that an extended IV is present. This allows the receiver/transmitter to know that the extended mode is present. The receiver/transmitter processes the following 4 octets as the extended IV. The receiving/transmitting station also uses the value of IV4 and IV5 octets to detect that a key rollover has occurred. When a key rollover has occurred, a new Phase 1 value is calculated, and used to decrypt the received/transmitted frame.
- The extended IV field shall not be encrypted.
- Note that if the TSC is represented as an octet string according to the conventions of 7.1.1, then
- 25 TSC = TSC0 TSC1 TSC2 TSC3 TSC4 TSC5
- where TSC0 is the least significant octet and TSC5 the most significant. The mixing function uses the least significant octet of the TSC as RC4Key[0], and the second least significant octet at RC4[2]:
- 28 RC4Key[0] = TSC0 and RC4Key[2] = TSC1.

- 1 The effect of this construction is the TSC is encoded as a little-Endian integer in each TKIP MPDU. TKIP
- shall encrypt all the MPDUs generated from one MSDU under the same key.

3 8.3.2.3 TKIP state


- 4 TKIP augments the dot11WEPKeyMappings and dot11WEPDefaultKeyTable MIB arrays with two new
- 5 variables each, respectively dot11KeyMappingValue and dot11KeyMappingSize, and
- 6 dot11DefaultKeyValue and dot11DefaultKeySize. The variables dot11DefaultKeySize and
- 7 dot11KeyMappingSize are integers and indicate the length of the key in octets in the dot11DefaultKeyValue
- 8 and dot11KeyMappingValue variables, respectively. The variables dot11DefaultKeyValue and
- 9 dot11KeyMappingValue are 32 octet strings in size and supply the TKIP encryption key, concatenated with
- the TKIP send and receive integrity keys, as described in Annex D.

8.3.2.4 TKIP procedures

8.3.2.4.1 TKIP MIC

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- 13 Flaws in the original IEEE 802.11 WEP design caused it to fail to meet its goal of protecting data traffic
- 14 content from casual eavesdroppers. Among the most significant flaws was it lack of a mechanism to defeat
- 15 message forgeries and other active attacks. To defend against active attacks, TKIP requires a MIC, named
- 16 Michael. Michael offers only weak defenses against message forgeries, but it constitutes the best that can
- be achieved with the majority of legacy hardware.
- 18 Annex F contains a "C++" language reference implementation of the TKIP MIC. It also provides test
- 19 vectors for the MIC.
- Informative Note: Before defining the details of the Michael MIC, it is useful to review the context in which this mechanism must work. Active attacks enabled by the original WEP design include:
- Bit-flipping attacks;
- Data (payload) truncation and concatenation;
- Fragmentation attacks;
- Iterative guessing attacks against the key;
- Redirection by modifying the MPDU DA or SA fields;
- Impersonation attacks by modifying the MPDU SA or TA fields.
- The MIC makes it more difficult for any of these attacks to succeed.
- With the Michael design, all of these attacks remain at the MPDU level. The MIC, however, applies to the MSDU,
- 30 so blocks successful MPDU level attacks. TKIP applies the MIC to the MSDU at the transmitter and verifies it at
- 31 the MSDU level at the receiver. If an MIC check fails at the MSDU level, the implementation shall discard the
- 32 MSDU and invoke counter-measures.
- Figure 15 depicts different peer layers communicating:



q

Figure 15—TKIP MIC Relation to 802.11 Processing (Informative)

The figure depicts an architecture whereby the MIC is logically appended to the raw MSDU in response to the MA-UNITDATA.request primitive. That is, the TKIP MIC is computed over

- the MSDU destination address (DA);
- the MSDU source address (SA);
- the MSDU priority; and
 - the entire unencrypted MSDU data (payload).

DA SA Priority	0	Data	MIC
----------------	---	------	-----

Note the DA, SA and a one octet priority field and 3 octet reserved (0) field are used for calculating the MIC and are not transmitted. The priority field shall be 0 and reserved for future use for IEEE 802.11 traffic class.

TKIP appends the MIC at the end of the MSDU payload, reducing the maximum allowed MSDU payload size by the size of the MIC field, which is 8 bytes for Michael. The IEEE 802.11 MAC then applies its normal processing to transmit this MSDU-with-MIC as a sequence of one or more MPDUs. This means the MSDU plus MIC can be partitioned into one or more MPDUs, the WEP ICV is calculated over each MDPU, and MIC can be partitioned across the final two MPDUs. The TKIP MIC augments but does not replace the WEP ICV. TKIP protects the MIC with encryption, because it is a weak construction; the encryption then makes MIC forgeries somewhat more difficult. The WEP ICV helps prevent false positives, whereby normal operation rather than attack corrupt the transmitted MIC value.

The receiver reverses this procedure to reassemble the MSDU, and, after the MSDU has been logically reassembled, the MAC verifies the MIC prior to delivery of the MSDU to upper layers. If the MIC validation succeeds, the MAC delivers the MSDU to the appropriate IEEE 802 SAP via the MA-UNITDATA.indication primitive. If the MIC validation fails, the MAC discards the MSDU, increments a counter, and invokes counter-measures.

TKIP calculates the MIC over the MSDU rather than the MPDU for two reasons. First, it detects attacks against MPDUs more easily than can be done at the MPDU level alone. Second, it increases the implementation flexibility, allowing the MIC to be implemented either within the STA hardware or in a software driver running on either the STA or the STA's host.

It should be noted that a MIC cannot provide complete forgery protection, as it cannot defend against replay attacks. TKIP provides replay detection by IV sequencing, ICV validation, and rekeying. Furthermore, if TKIP is utilized with a group key, an "insider" STA can masquerade as any other STA belonging to the group. Hence, the protection afforded by the TKIP MIC is directly affected by the local keying policy; group keys should be avoided.

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- 1 Michael generates a 64-bit MIC, with a design goal of 20 bits of security. The Michael key consists of 64-
- bits, represented as an 8-byte sequence $k_0...k_7$. This is converted to two 32-bit little-Endian words K_0 and K_1 .
- 3 Throughout the Michael design, all conversions between bytes and 32-bit words shall use the little-Endian
- 4 conventions, given in 7.1.1.
- 5 Michael operates on MSDUs. An MSDU consists of octets $m_0...m_{n-1}$ where n is the number of MSDU
- 6 octets, including source address, destination address, and data field. The Michael algorithm does not
- 7 interpret the MSDU data field, which typically begins with an IEEE 802 SNAP header. The message is
- 8 padded at the end with a single byte with value 0x5a, followed by between 4 and 7 zero bytes. The number
- 9 of zero bytes is chosen so that the overall length of the padded MSDU is a multiple of 4. The padding is not
- 10 transmitted with the MSDU; it is used to simplify the computation over the final block. The MSDU is then
- 11 converted to a sequence of 32-bit words $M_0 ... M_{N-1}$, where $N = \lceil (n+5)/4 \rceil$, and where $\lceil a \rceil$ means to round a
- up to the nearest integer. By construction $M_{N-1} = 0$ and $M_{N-2} \neq 0$.
- The MIC value is computed iteratively by starting with the key value and applying a block function b for
- every message word, as shown in Figure 16. The algorithm loop runs a total of N times (i takes on the
- values 0 to *N*–1 inclusive), where *N* is as above, the number of 32-bit words comprising the padded MSDU.
- The algorithm results in two words (l,r), which are converted to a sequence of eight octets using the least-
- 17 significant-octet-first convention. This is the MIC value. The MIC value is appended to the MSDU as data
- 18 to be sent. Note that the padding is used in the MIC computation only, and is discarded prior to appending
- the MIC to the MSDU.

```
20
                  Input: Key (K_0, K_1) and padded MPDU (represented as 32-bit words) M_0...M_N
21
                  Output: MIC value (V_0, V_1)
22
                  MICHAEL((K_0, K_1), (M_0,...,M_N))
23
                            (l,r) \leftarrow (K_0, K_1)
                            for i = 0 to N-1 do
24
25
                                       l \leftarrow l \oplus M_i
26
                                       (l, r) \leftarrow b(l, r)
27
                            return (l,r)
```

Figure 16—Michael message processing

Figure 17 defines the Michael block function b. It is a Feistel-type construction with alternating additions and XOR operations. It uses <<< to denote the rotate-left operator on 32-bit values, >>> for the rotate-right operator, and XSWAP for a function that swaps the position of the two least significant bytes and the position of the two most significant bytes in a word.

```
33
                      Input: (l,r)
34
                      Output: (1,r)
35
                      b(L,R)
36
                                   r \leftarrow r \oplus (l <<< 17)
                                  l \leftarrow (l+r) \bmod 2^{32}
37
                                   r \leftarrow r \oplus XSWAP(l)
38
                                   l \leftarrow (l+r) \bmod 2^{32}
39
                                   r \leftarrow r \oplus (l <<< 3)
40
                                   l \leftarrow (l+r) \bmod 2^{32}
41
                                   r \leftarrow r \oplus (l >>> 2)
42
43
                                   l \leftarrow (l+r) \bmod 2^{32}
                                   return (l, r)
44
```

Figure 17—Michael block function

8.3.2.4.2 TKIP counter-measures

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- 2 Michael's design trades off security in favor of implementability on pre-RSN equipment. Michael provides
- 3 only weak protection against active attack. A failure of the MIC in a received MSDU indicates a probable
- 4 active attack. If TKIP implementation detects a probable active attack, TKIP shall take countermeasures as
- 5 specified in this clause. These counter-measures accomplish the following goals:
- The current authentication key and encryption key shall be deleted and not used again. This prevents the attacker from learning anything about those keys from the MIC failure.
- Significant effort should be made to log the event as a security-relevant matter. A MIC failure is an almost certain indication of an active attack, and warrants a follow-up by the system administrator.
- The rate of MIC failures *must* be kept below one per minute. This implies that new keys must not be generated if devices frequently receive packets with forged MICs. The slowdown makes it difficult for an attacker to make a large number of forgery attempts in a short time.
- Before verifying the MIC, the receiver shall check the CRC, ICV, and IV for all related MPDUs. MPDUs
- with invalid CRCs, ICVs, or with whose MPDUs' IVs falling before the IV window shall be discarded
- 15 before checking the MIC. This avoids unnecessary MIC failure events. Checking the IV before the MIC
- makes countermeasure-based DOS attacks harder to perform.
- 17 If an Authenticator's STA detects a MIC failure on a received TKIP-protected MSDU, it shall take the following steps:
- 19 1. For an MSDU which was protected with a Group key:
 - a. Delete the Group encryption and integrity keys in question.
- b. Wait until 60 seconds have occurred from the last MIC failure (either from an EAPOL-Key message with a MIC failure or a local MIC failure occurred).
 - c. Update the Group Transient Key to all associated stations.
 - d. Log details of the MIC failure.
- 25 2. For an MSDU which was protected with a Pairwise Key:
- a. Drop any received data messages except IEEE 802.1X messages until the Pairwise Key is deleted or changed.
- b. Wait until 60 seconds have occurred from the last MIC failure (either from an EAPOL-Key message with a MIC failure or a local MIC failure).
- 30 c. Initiate a 4-way handshake with the peer STA to reestablish a new Pairwise key.
- d. Log details of the MIC failure.
- 32 An AP shall drop any data broadcast/multicast MSDU received from a non-AP STA.
- 33 If a Supplicant's STA detects a MIC failure, it shall take the following steps:
- 1. For an MSDU which was encrypted with a Group Key:
- a. Delete the Group encryption and integrity keys in question.

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- b. Send an EAPOL-Key message requesting for a new Group key.
- c. Log details of the MIC failure at the station and AP.
 - 2. For an MSDU which was protected with a Pairwise Key:
 - a. Drop any received data messages except IEEE 802.1X messages until the Pairwise Key is deleted or changed.
 - b. Send an EAPOL-Key message requesting for a new Pairwise key.
- 7 c. Log details of the MIC failure at the peer STAs.
- 8 An EAPOL-Key message from Supplicant to Authenticator with Request bit set asks the Authenticator to change the indicated key.
- 10 After Michael failure detected either locally or is signaled by a received EAPOL-Key Request, the
- Authenticator shall generate and distribute at most one replacement key during the 60 seconds following the
- 12 error. This means that when a Michael failure occurs involving a Group key, the Authenticator generates
- and distributes a new GTK to all associated stations if a second Michael failure involving the Group Key
- has not been detected within the prior 60 seconds. If a second failure occurs within the 60 second window,
- 15 the Authenticator waits a full 60 seconds before generating and distributing another replacement key.
- 16 Similarly, if a Michael failure involving a Pairwise Key occurs, the Authenticator shall generate and
- 17 distribute a replacement PTK via a 4-way handshake if it detects no other Michael failure involving a PTK
- within 60 seconds of the Michael failure. If a second failure is detected within 60 seconds of a previous
- 19 Michael failure, the Authenticator shall wait a full 60 seconds before replacing the PTK.
- 20 Note that Michael failures delay the generation and distribution keys to STAs other than those involved in
- 21 the failure. This prevents an attacker attacking a Michael key, then forcing the STA to re-associate, and then
- repeating the attack cycle.

8.3.2.4.3 TKIP mixing function

- 24 Annex F defines the TKIP S-box, a "C" language reference implementation of the TKIP mixing function. It
- also provides test vectors for the mixing function.
- 26 The mixing function has two phases. The first phase mixes the dot11DefaultKeyValue or
- 27 dot11KeyMappingValue (TK) with the transmitter address (TA) and TSC. A STA may cache the output of
- 28 this phase to reuse with subsequent MPDUs associated with the same TK and TA. The second phase mixes
- 29 the output of the first phase with the TSC and TK to produce the WEP seed, also called the per-packet key.
- 30 The WEP seed may be computed well before it is used. The two-phase process may be summarized as:
- 31 $TTAK \leftarrow Phase1(TK, TA, TSC)$
- 32 WEP seed \leftarrow Phase2(TTAK, TSC)
- 33 Phase 1 is somewhat simpler than Phase 2. This simplicity is possible because the output of Phase 1 is not
- 34 used directly as an RC4 key.
- 35 Both Phase 1 and Phase 2 rely on an S-box, defined in Annex F. The S-box substitutes one 16-bit value
- with another 16-bit value. This function is a non-linear substitution, and may be implemented as a table look
- 37 up
- 38 **Phase 1 Definition.** The inputs to the first phase of the temporal key mixing function shall be a
- 39 dot11DefaultKeyValue or dott11KeyMappingValue (TK), the transmitter address (TA), and the TSC. The
- 40 TK shall be 128 bits in length. Only the most significant 32 bits of the TSC and the first 80 bits of TK are

- 1 used in Phase 1. The output, called TTAK, shall be 80 bits in length and is represented by an array of 16-bit
- 2 values TTAK₀ TTAK₁ TTAK₂ TTAK₃ TTAK₄.
- 3 The description of the phase 1 algorithm treats all of the following values as arrays of 8-bit values:
- 4 $TA_0...TA_5$, $TK_0...TK_{12}$. The TA byte order is represented according to the conventions from 7.1.1, and the first
- 5 three bytes represent the OUI.
- 6 The exclusive-or (\oplus) operation, the bit-wise-and (&) operation, and the addition (+) operation are used in
- 7 the Phase 1 specification. A loop counter, called i, and an array index temporary variable, called j, are also
- 8 employed.
- 9 One function, Mk16, is used in the definition of Phase 1. The function Mk16 constructs a 16-bit value from
- 10 two 8-bit inputs as $Mk16(X,Y) = 256 \cdot X + Y$.
- 11 Two steps comprise the phase 1 algorithm. The first step initializes TTAK from TSC and TA. The second
- 12 step uses an S-box to iteratively mix the keying material into the 80-bit TTAK. The second step sets the
- 13 PHASE1_LOOP_COUNT to 8.

```
14
                 Input: transmit address TA_0...TA_5, temporal key TK_0..TK_{12}, and TSC_0..TSC_2
15
                 Output: intermediate key TTAK_0..TTAK_4
16
                 PHASE1-KEY-MIXING(TA_0...TA_5, TK_0...TK_{12}, TSC_0...TSC_2)
17
                           PHASE1_STEP1:
18
                           TTAK_0 \leftarrow TSC_0
19
                           TTAK_1 \leftarrow TSC_1
20
                           TTAK_2 \leftarrow Mk16(TA_1, TA_0)
21
                           TTAK_3 \leftarrow Mk16(TA_3, TA_2)
22
                           TTAK_4 \leftarrow Mk16(TA_5, TA_4)
23
                           PHASE1_STEP2:
24
                           for i = 0 to PHASE1_LOOP_COUNT-1
25
                                    j \leftarrow 2 \cdot (i \& 1)
26
                                    TTAK_0 \leftarrow TTAK_0 + S[TTAK_4 \oplus Mk16(TK_{1+j}, TK_{0+j})]
27
                                    TTAK_1 \leftarrow TTAK_1 + S[TTAK_0 \oplus Mk16(TK_{5+j}, TK_{4+j})]
28
                                    TTAK_2 \leftarrow TTAK_2 + S[TTAK_1 \oplus Mk16(TK_{9+j}, TK_{8+j})]
29
                                    TTAK_3 \leftarrow TTAK_3 + S[TTAK_2 \oplus Mk16(TK_{13+j}, TK_{12+j})]
30
                                     TTAK_4 \leftarrow TTAK_4 + S[TTAK_3 \oplus Mk16(TK_{1+j}, TK_{0+j})] + i
31
                           end
```

Figure 18—Phase 1 key mixing

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Phase 2 Definition. The inputs to the second phase of the temporal key mixing function shall be the output of the first phase (TTAK) together with the TK and the TKIP sequence counter TSC. The TTAK is 80-bits in length. The TSC is 48 bits. Only the last 24 bits of TK are used in Phase 2. The output is the WEP seed, which is a per-packet key, and is 128-bits in length. The constructed WEP seed has an internal structure conforming to the WEP specification. That is, the first 24 bits of the WEP seed shall be transmitted in plaintext as the WEP IV. As such, these 24 bits are used to convey lower 16 bits of the TSC from the sender (encryptor) to the receiver (decryptor). The rest of the TSC shall be conveyed in the EIV field, in big-Endian order. The TK and TTAK values are represented as in Phase 1. The WEP seed is treated as an array of 8-bit values: $Seed_0...Seed_{15}$. The TSC shall be treated as an array of 16-bit value $TSC_0.TSC_1.TSC_2$.

- The pseudo code specifying the Phase 2 mixing function employs one variable: PPK. PPK is 128-bits, and
- 44 it is represented as an array of 16-bit values: $PPK_0..PPK_7$. The pseudo code also employs a loop counter,
- 45 called i. As detailed below, the mapping from the 16-bit PPK values to the 8-bit WEPseed values is
- 46 explicitly little-Endian to match the Endian architecture of the most common processors used for this
- 47 application.

- 1 The exclusive-or operation (⊕), the addition operation (+), the and operation (&), the or operation (|), and
- 2 the right bit shift operation (>>) are used the specification of Phase 2 below.
- 3 The algorithm specification relies on four functions.
- The first function, Lo8, references the least significant 8 bits of the 16-bit input value.
- The second function, *Hi*8, references the most significant 8 bits of the 16-bit value.
- The third function *RotR*1 rotates its 16-bit argument 1 bit to the right.
- The fourth function is Mk16, already used in Phase 1, defined by $Mk16(X,Y) = 256 \cdot X + Y$, and constructs a 16-bit output from two 8 bit inputs.
- Note: The rotate and addition operations in STEP2 makes Phase 2 particularly sensitive to the Endian architecture of the processor, although the performance degradation due to running this algorithm on a big-Endian processor should be minor.
- 12 The second phase is comprised of three steps.
- STEP1 makes a copy of the TTAK and brings in the TSC.
- STEP2 is a 96-bit bijective mixing, employing an S-box.
- STEP3 brings in the last of the TK bits and assigns the 24-bit WEP IV value.
- Input: intermediate key TTAK₀...TTAK₄, TK, and TKIP sequence counter TSC
 Output: WEP Seed WEPSeed₀...WEPSeed₁₅

```
18
                 PHASE2-KEY-MIXING(TTAK0...TTAK4, TK, TSC)
19
                           PHASE2_STEP1:
20
                           PPK_0 \leftarrow TTAK_0
21
                           PPK_1 \leftarrow TTAK_1
22
                           PPK_2 \leftarrow TTAK_2
23
                           PPK_3 \leftarrow TTAK_3
24
                           PPK_4 \leftarrow TTAK_4
25
                           PPK_5 \leftarrow TTAK_4 + TSC
26
                           PHASE2 STEP2:
27
                           PPK_0 \leftarrow PPK_0 + S[PPK_5 \oplus Mk16(TK_1, TK_0)]
28
                           PPK_1 \leftarrow PPK_1 + S[PPK_0 \oplus Mk16(TK_3, TK_2)]
29
                           PPK_2 \leftarrow PPK_2 + S[PPK_1 \oplus Mk16(TK_5, TK_4)]
30
                           PPK_3 \leftarrow PPK_3 + S[PPK_2 \oplus Mk16(TK_7, TK_6)]
31
                           PPK_4 \leftarrow PPK_4 + S[PPK_3 \oplus Mk16(TK_9, TK_8)]
32
                           PPK_5 \leftarrow PPK_5 + S[PPK_4 \oplus Mk16(TK_{11}, TK_{10})]
33
                           PPK_0 \leftarrow PPK_0 + RotR1(PPK_5 \oplus Mk16(TK_{13}, TK_{12}))
34
                           PPK_1 \leftarrow PPK_1 + RotR1(PPK_0 \oplus Mk16(TK_{15}, TK_{14}))
35
                           PPK_2 \leftarrow PPK_2 + RotR1(PPK_1)
36
                           PPK_3 \leftarrow PPK_3 + RotR1(PPK_2)
37
                           PPK_4 \leftarrow PPK_4 + RotR1(PPK_3)
38
                           PPK_5 \leftarrow PPK_5 + RotR1(PPK_4)
39
                           PHASE2_STEP3:
40
                           WEPSeed_0 \leftarrow Hi8(TSC)
41
                           WEPSeed_1 \leftarrow (Hi8(TSC) \mid 0x20) \& 0x7F
42
                           WEPSeed_2 \leftarrow Lo8(TSC)
43
                           WEPSeed_3 \leftarrow Lo8((PPK_5 \oplus Mk16(TK_1, TK_0)) >> 1)
44
                           for i = 0 to 5
```

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1 2 3	$WEPSeed_{4+(2\cdot i)} \leftarrow Lo8(PPK_i)$ $WEPSeed_{5+(2\cdot i)} \leftarrow Hi8(PPK_i)$ end
4	return WEPSeed ₀ WEPSeed ₁₅
5	Figure 19—Phase 2 key mixing
6 7 8 9	The WEP IV format carries three octets. Step 3 of Phase 2 determines the value of each of these three octets. The construction was selected to preclude the use of known weak keys. The recipient can reconstruct the least significant 16 bits of the TSC used by the originator by concatenating the first and third octets, ignoring the second octet. The remaining 32 bits of the TSC are obtained from the EIV.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Informative Note: S-box. The algorithm S-box utilized by the Phase 1 and Phase 2 functions is defined in Annex F. The S-box substitutes one 16-bit value with another 16-bit value. This is a non-linear substitution. The reference implementation in Annex F implements as a table look-up. The table look-up can be organized as either a single table with 65,536 entries and a 16-bit index (128 Kbytes of table) or two tables with 256 entries and an 8-bit index (1024 bytes for both tables). When the two smaller tables are used, the high-order byte is used to obtain a 16-bit value from one table and the low-order byte is used to obtain a 16-bit value from the other table; the S-box output is the exclusive-or (\oplus) of the two 16-bit values. The second S-box table is a byte-swapped replica of the first.
18 19	The sample code in Annex F uses the two smaller table approach. The S-box tables can be extracted from the AES reference implementation.
20 21 22 23 24 25 26	Informative Note: The transmitter address (TA) is mixed into the temporal key (TK) in the first phase of the hash function. Implementations can achieve a significant performance improvement by caching the output of the first phase. The Phase 1 output is the same for $2^{16} = 65,536$ consecutive packets from the same TK and TA. Consider the simple case where a station communicates only with an access point (AP). The station will perform the first phase using its own address, and it will be used to encrypt traffic sent to the access point. The station will perform the first phase using the access point address, and it will be used to decrypt traffic received from the access point.
27 28	With TSC 48 bits in size the key caches will need to be updated when the lower 16 bits of the TSC wrap and the upper 32 bits need to be updated.
29	8.3.2.4.4 TKIP replay protection
30 31	TKIP implementations shall reuse the WEP IV field to defend against replay attacks by implementing the following rules.
32	1. As with WEP IVs, TKIP TSC values shall correspond to MPDUs.
33 34 35	 The TSC (48 bit counters) shall be selected from a single pool by each transmitter for each temporal key—i.e., each transmitter has its own unique counter for each directional temporal key established.
36 37	3. The TSC shall be implemented as a 48-bit monotonically incrementing counter, <i>initialized</i> to zero when the corresponding TKIP temporal key is <i>initialized</i> or refreshed.
38 39	4. The WEP IV format carries the least significant 16 bits of the 48-bit TSC, as defined by the TKIP mixing function phase 2 step 3. The remainder of the TSC is carried in the EIV.
40 41 42	 A receiver shall maintain a separate set of TKIP replay windows for each MAC address it receives TKIP traffic from. The receiver initializes the replay window whenever it resets the temporal key for a peer.
43 44	Informative Note: The per-MAC address condition in 5 is needed to accommodate multicast/broadcast keys in the IBSS case.

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- 6. A receiver shall delay advancing a TKIP replay window until an MSDU passes the MIC check, to prevent attackers from injecting MPDUs with valid ICVs and IVs but invalid MICs.
 - 7. In order to accommodate burst ACK, the TKIP receiver shall check that the received TSC (48 bit counter) is no smaller than 15 less than the greatest TKIP replay window value for the MPDU's temporal key. When combined with the prohibition on correctly decrypting more than one MPDU under a given <temporal key, IV> pair, this provides replay protection and accommodates frames that may be delayed due to message class priority values, with a window size of 16.
- Note: This works because if an attacker modifies the IV, then this alters the encryption key and hence both the ICV and MIC will ordinarily decrypt incorrectly, causing the received MPDU to be dropped.

8.3.3 Wireless Robust Authenticated Protocol (WRAP)

- 11 A cipher suite based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Offset Codebook (OCB) mode has
- 12 been adopted. This cipher suite is called Wireless Robust Authenticated Protocol (WRAP) privacy, and this
- clause defines it. Support for this protocol is optional.

8.3.3.1 WRAP overview

- WRAP privacy consists of three parts: a key derivation procedure, an encapsulation procedure, and a decapsulation procedure. It is based on 128-bit AES in OCB mode.
- 17 a) The encapsulation procedure. Once the key has been derived and its associated state *initialized*, the 18 IEEE 802.11 MAC uses the WRAP encapsulation algorithm with the key and the state to protect all unicast MSDUs it sends to an associated station.
- b) The decapsulation procedure. Similarly, once the key has been derived and associated state *initialized*, the IEEE 802.11 MAC uses the WRAP decapsulation algorithm with the receive key and state to decapsulate all unicast MSDUs received from an associated station. Once the key is established, the MAC shall discard any MSDUs received over the association that are unprotected by the encapsulation algorithm.
- IEEE 802.1X may also assign a broadcast/multicast key. The implementation uses this key as configured, without derivation. The MAC utilizes the broadcast/multicast key to protect all broadcast/multicast MSDUs it sends, and discards any broadcast/multicast MSDUs received that are not protected by this key.
- Informative Note 1. The WRAP privacy protocol requires IEEE 802.1X authentication and key management.
- Informative Note 2.The quality of protection any key offers with any cryptographic algorithm degrades through key usage. It is impossible to estimate when the protection a key affords has been exhausted without counting the number of blocks protected. In order to avoid maintaining a history of all MSDUs used with every key, this means that a fresh, never-used-before key is required whenever a new "session" begins, so that keys cannot be used independently of some notion of a session. Similarly, the replay protection counter requires that peers synchronize a fresh key whenever they reinitialize the replay state.
- Informative Note 3. The WRAP privacy protocol architecturally lies above the IEEE 802.11 retry function.
 This is required since an MSDU may be accepted by the local IEEE 802.11 implementation but its acknowledgement lost in transit to the peer. If the WRAP privacy protocol were to lie below the IEEE 802.11
 MAC retry function, then it would be impossible to recover from this state, as the replay protection function would discard all further retries.
- 40 AES is defined by FIPS Standard 197. Annex G defines OCB Mode.

41 8.3.3.1.1 WRAP encapsulation

The following steps encapsulate MSDU plaintext data:


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1 a) Select the appropriate context based on the MSDU; 2 b) Increment block count and the appropriate replay counter, based on the MSDU service class; 3 Construct the Replay-Counter field of the final WRAP-protected MSDU payload; c) 4 d) Construct the OCB nonce using the Replay-Counter, MSDU service class, and source MAC 5 address: 6 Construct an associated data block from the destination MAC address; 7 f) AES-OCB encrypt the MSDU and associated data; 8 Construct the MSDU payload from the replay counter, OCB encrypted data, and the OCB tag. g) 9 8.3.3.1.2 WRAP decapsulation 10 The following steps decapsulate data an MSDU received over a protected association or broadcast/multicast 11 channel: 12 Select the appropriate context based on the received MSDU; a) 13 b) perform some basic sanity checks on the packet (See 8.3.3.4.8); 14 construct the OCB nonce using the Replay-Counter, QoS Traffic Class, and the source and c) 15 destination MAC addresses from the received MSDU; 16 using the constructed nonce and temporal key from the selected context, WRAP decrypt the d) 17 MSDU data; 18 If the MSDU is unicast, extract the sequence number from the MSDU Replay-Counter field 19 and verify the MSDU is not a replay. 20 Note. It is infeasible to provide replay protection for multicast/broadcast MSDUs using symmetric key 21 techniques, and asymmetric key techniques are too computationally expensive to employ for datagram traffic. 22 8.3.3.2 WRAP MSDU format 23 The WRAP privacy method encapsulates the MSDU payload. Figure 20 shows the encapsulated MSDU 24 when using WRAP privacy. 25 The data overhead of the WRAP privacy algorithm is 12 octets. This includes a 28-bit replay counter, the 26 single KeyID octet inherited from WEP, and a 64-bit Message Integrity Code (MIC) used to detect

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forgeries.



Note: The encipherment process has expanded the original MSDU by 12 Octets, 4 for the replay counter field, and 8 for the Message Integrity Check (MIC). The MIC is calculated over the Data fields only.

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Figure 20 - Construction of Expanded WRAP MSDU

- 3 The WRAP privacy protocol is invisible to entities outside the IEEE 802.11 MAC data path.
- 4 Note: The AES-OCB-protected MSDU payload may span MPDUs.

8.3.3.3 WRAP state

- 6 WRAP privacy uses a MIB array called the *dot11WrapKeyMappings*. This support zero, one, or two entries
- 7 for each MAC address pair with which the STA maintains secure associations. The size of the
- 8 dot11WrapKeyMappings array is implementation-specific. A global MIB variable
- 9 *dot11WrapKeyMappingLength* indicates the number of entries in the array.
- Each entry of the *dot11WrapKeyMappings* groups together the following state:
- 1. A *dot11WrapReceiveAddress* and a *dot11WrapTransmitAddress*, indicating that this entry applies to all MSDUs being sent between this pair of addresses;
 - 2. A dot11WrapKeyID, indicating the WEP KeyID into which this entry maps;
- 3. A 128-bit key called the *dot11AESOCBTemporalKey*, referred to informally as the temporal key.
 This is the derived key as specified in 8.3.1.3.4.1 for unicast, and the unaltered temporal key for broadcast/multicast. Both keys shall be configured by IEEE 802.1X.
 - 4. A set of 28-bit counters called the *dot11WrapTrafficClassNSequenceCounter*, for constructing the next OCB nonce. *N* ranges from 0 to15, with one traffic class defined for each QoS service class. When QoS is not used, only *dot11WrapTrafficClass0SequenceCounter* is used.
- 5. A 48-bit counter *dot11WrapBlocksSent*, counting the number of 128-bit blocks protected by the present temporal key;
- 22 6. A set of 28-bit replay windows called the *dott11WrapTrafficClassNReplayWindow*, for detecting replays. *N* ranges from 0 to15. When QoS is not used, only *dot11WrapTrafficClasse0ReplayWindow* is used.
- 7. A boolean flag called *dot11WrapEnableTransmit*, to indicate when the temporal key and MIC send key can be used for transmitting MSDUs;

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- 8. A boolean flag called *dot11WrapEnableReceive*, to indicate when the temporal key and MIC receive key can be used for receiving MSDUs.
- 9. a 32-bit counter *dot11WrapFormatErrors*, to indicate the number of MSDUs received with an invalid format, *initialized* to zero;
 - 10. a 32-bit counter *dot11WrapReplays*, to indicate the number of received unicast fragments discarded by the replay mechanism, *initialized* to zero;
 - 11. a 32-bit counter *dot11WrapDecryptErrors*, to indicate the number of received fragments discarded by the OCB decryption mechanism, *initialized* to zero; and
 - 12. a 48-bit counter dot11WrapRecvdBlocks, to track the total number of protected blocks received.
- Informative Note 1: A broadcast/multicast entry does not utilize the replay window. This is because it is impossible to detect broadcast/multicast replays using symmetric key techniques. In particular, any party holding the broadcast/multicast key can masquerade as any other member of the group, so can intrude on another's sequence space without detection.
- Informative Note 2: As an optimization, implementations may compute and maintain the AES-OCB key schedule rather than maintain the temporal key.

8.3.3.4 WRAP procedures

17 8.3.3.4.1 Transmit context selection

- 18 To encapsulate data, the transmitter first checks whether the MSDU is unicast or multicast/broadcast. It
- 19 selects the correct transmit context by mapping the destination address to an entry in the
- 20 dot11WrapKeyMappings. If an appropriate context exists, a conformant implementation shall use the entry
- 21 to protect any MSDU it sends.

22 8.3.3.4.2 Incrementing the transmit block count and replay counter

- 23 To encapsulate data, the transmitter computes the total number of blocks to be protected in the MSDU. This
- 24 is defined as

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- 25 m = [(# MSDU data octets)/AES-Block-Size],
- where $\lceil a \rceil$ means, as before, to round a up to the nearest integer, and AES-Block-Size = 16 (octets).
- 27 If adding the number of blocks m would cause the context's value of dot11WrapBlocksSent to wrap—i.e., if
- 28 $m + dot11WrapBlocksSent > 2^{48}$ —then the cryptographic protection afforded by the key are considered
- 29 exhausted, and it is a protocol error to use the key any further. In this case, the encapsulation algorithm shall
- discard all transmit datagrams until the key is replaced with a new one.
- 31 Otherwise, from the selected context and the MSDU QoS traffic class, the implementation selects
- 32 appropriate 28-bit per-service-class replay counter. If QoS traffic classes are not in use, there is only one
- 33 replay counter for the entire association.
- If the value of the selected replay counter is $2^{28}-2 = 268435454$ (or greater), then another valid nonce
- 35 cannot be constructed. That is, reusing this replay counter means that more than one MSDU would be
- 36 protected by the same <key, nonce> pair, voiding the security guarantees. Once again, the sender shall not
- 37 transmit another MSDU on this association or broadcast/multicast channel until the key is replaced, and the
- 38 encapsulation algorithm shall discard all datagrams until the key is replaced by a new one.

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Otherwise, the value of the selected replay counter is less than 268435454, and it is still feasible to construct another valid nonce. The implementation adds *m* to *dot11AESOCBBlocksSent* and 2 to the replay counter, and proceeds to the next step.

Note: The value 2^{48} was selected by the following reasoning. The proof of OCB mode security indicates the insecurity of the construction increases as $O(s^2/2^{128})$, where s is the total number of blocks protected. If A is the probability that an adversary can break the underlying block cipher AES, then the choice of $s = 2^{48}$ bounds chances of breaking AES-OCB mode to no more than approximately $A + (2^{48})^2/2^{128} = A + 1/2^{32}$; that is, using a single key in OCB mode over 2^{48} blocks does not greatly increase the adversary's chances over breaking a single block encrypted under AES. On the other hand, the replay counter is transmitted with the encrypted data, and it is necessary to minimize the number of bits transmitted through the wireless medium; further, it is desirable to use an odd number of bytes for the sequence number, so the existing WEP KeyID byte could be maintained to simplify hardware implementations. This limited the choices to 24-bits, 28-bits, 40-bits, 56-bits, etc. 24-bits is too small, but security decays too much with 56-bits. While 40-bits can be selected, it requires the counter to be interspersed in the replay sequence number field as the KeyID bits are in fixed bit positions 30 and 31. However, if we expand from 24-bits to 28-bits, it allows us to maintain a 32-bit replay sequence number field and enough blocks to be processes with a reasonable lifespan for the key.

8.3.3.4.3 Encoding the transmit Replay-Counter

- The WRAP privacy algorithm Replay Counter is a four-octet field. It is used to convey the MSDU sequence
- 19 number to the peer. The Replay Counter is utilized to construct the nonce and to detect replayed MSDUs.
- 20 The replay counter computed in 8.3.3.4.2 is encoded into the *Replay-Counter* field. This is accomplished by
- 21 first encoding the number as a 28-bit big-Endian integer BEI. Next the three most significant bytes of BEI
- 22 are encoded into the first three octets of the Replay-Counter field. Following these three octets the
- remaining 4-bits is concatenated with the 2 KeyID bits. Symbolically,
- 24 $BEI \leftarrow Big-Endian(replay counter \cdot 16)$
- Partition *BEI* into a sequence of 4 octets: $BEI = BEI_1 \parallel BEI_2 \parallel BEI_3 \parallel BEI_4$, where
- B EI₄ = BEI_{bit25} || BEI_{bit26} || BEI_{bit27} || BEI_{bit28} || 0^4 KeyID $\leftarrow 0^{68}$ || keyid_{bit1} || keyid_{bit2}
- 27 Replay-Counter $\leftarrow BEI_1 \parallel BEI_2 \parallel BEI_3 \parallel KeyID$
- 28 This format matches the WEP IV field, with the exception of the use of the first nibble in the KeyID octet.

29 8.3.3.4.4 Construct the OCB nonce

- 30 This algorithm works for both transmit and receive. OCB mode requires a unique nonce be used for each
- 31 message it encrypts for its security guarantees to be valid. Using the just-created Replay-Counter from
- 32 clause 8.3.3.4.3, the implementation shall construct the OCB nonce as the concatenation of (a) the sequence
- number encoded as a big-Endian value, i.e., with its most significant bit first and least significant bit last, (b)
- 34 its OoS traffic class, (c) the MSDU source MAC address, and (d) the MSDU destination MAC address:
- 35 nonce ← Replay Counter || QoS-Traffic-Class || Source-MAC-Address || Destination-MAC-Address
- 36 If QoS traffic classes are not in use, the QoS-Traffic-Class value shall be 0⁴, i.e., 4 bits of zero. The Source-
- 37 MAC-Address, Destination-MAC-Address, and QoS-Traffic-Class shall be encoded in the nonce in the same
- octet order as in their MSDU encoding. This nonce construction guarantees nonce unicity of these values.
- 39 Notice Source-MAC-Address may differ from the IEEE 802.11 transmit address. Similarly, the Destination-
- 40 *MAC-Address* may differ from the IEEE 802.11 receiver address.
- Note. It is feasible for an IEEE 802.11 implementation to construct a duplicate nonce by using the wrong station's MAC address as the source or destination MAC address, but such a construction is non-conformant.
- This can be a security problem for broadcast/multicast. If a deployment experiences a rash of duplicate
- 44 nonces for broadcast multicast, it may indicates either a non-conformant implementation, a "traitor" within
- 45 the BSS—*i.e.*, a party intentionally misbehaving—or a compromise of the BSS broadcast/multicast key.

8.3.3.4.5 Protect the transmit MSDU

- 2 The implementation shall use the WRAP temporal key T_K constructed in 8.6 and the *nonce* constructed in
- 3 8.3.3.4.4 to OCB encrypt the plaintext MSDU data. This results in two outputs:
- 4 a) An *OCB-ciphertext* string. This string contains the same number of octets as the MSDU plaintext data; and
- 6 b) A 64-bit *OCB-tag*.
- 7 Symbolically,

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- 8 OCB-ciphertext $\parallel OCB$ -tag \leftarrow OCB-Encrypt(T_K , nonce, MSDU-data)
- 9 where OCB-Encrypt(A, B, C) denotes encrypting its third parameter C under key A using nonce B.

10 8.3.3.4.6 Construct the MSDU transmit payload

- Finally, all the elements are assembled in the final MSDU payload. The WRAP privacy-protected MSDU
- payload consists of the concatenation of the *Relay-Counter* field (8.3.3.4.3), the OCB-ciphertext, and the
- 13 OCB-tag (8.3.3.4.5):

15

14 MSDU-Data \leftarrow Replay-Counter || OCB-ciphertext || OCB-tag.

8.3.3.4.7 Receive context selection

- 16 The recipient shall select the appropriate context for the received MSDU based on the Transmit and
- 17 Receive MAC addresses and the KeyID bits. If the Receive address is broadcast/multicast, then the selected
- 18 context becomes the broadcast context. If not, the receiver verifies there is a unicast context for the frame. If
- 19 the selected context is for the WRAP privacy algorithm, then the receiver continues with the AES-based
- 20 privacy decapsulation algorithm.
- 21 If the WRAP privacy algorithm is utilized by an association, the receiver must treat all MSDUs as
- 22 protected. Without this provision, an attacker can forge a valid message by simply sending a clear text
- 23 message. Hence all implementations must maintain some state indicating whether WRAP privacy protection
- 24 should be applied to received MSDUs, whether or not the WEP bit from the MAC header is asserted, and
- whether or not the *KeyID* bits are actually zero.

26 8.3.3.4.8 Receive sanity checks

- 27 If an applicable AES context is present, the receiver shall discard the received MSDU if it does not consist
- 28 of at least 15 octets and increment the context's dot11WrapFormatErrors counter. This includes 3 octets of
- 29 LLC header, and 12 octets of AES-based protocol overhead octets.
- 30 A second check is the total number of blocks. The implementation computes the total number of blocks
- 31 protected in the MSDU. This is defined as
- 32 $m = [(\# MSDU \text{ data octets} 12)/AES-Block-Size}]$
- where |a| means to round a up to the nearest integer, and AES-Block-Size = 16.. The 12 is removed to
- 34 account for the MSDU Replay Counter field and the OCB-tag field.
- 35 If adding the number of blocks m will cause the value of dot11WrapRecvdBlocks from the context selected
- 36 in 8.3.1.3.4.3 to wrap—i.e., if $m + dot11WrapRecvdBlocks > 2^{48}$ —then the cryptographic protection

- 1 afforded by the key are considered exhausted, and it is a protocol error to use the key any further. The
- 2 receiver shall discard the MSDU and increment the context's dot11WrapSpentKeyErrors counter.

3 8.3.3.4.9 Decrypting the MSDU data

- 4 Use the nonce constructed in 8.3.3.4.4 and the AES key from the context selected in 8.3.3.4.7 to OCB
- 5 decrypt the received MSDU. By definition, this consists of
- 6 $data-to-decrypt \leftarrow MSDU-ciphertext \parallel OCB-tag.$
- 7 The OCB decryption algorithm will result in two one of outputs:
- 8 a) A verification of the tag, and the decrypted plaintext;
- 9 b) Failure, because the decryption algorithm detected a change in the underlying data.
- 10 If the OCB decryption reports failure, the receiver shall increment the context's 802dot11AesDecryptErrors
- 11 counter, and discard the MSDU.

12 **8.3.3.4.10** Unicast replay verification

- 13 If the received MSDU was unicast, the receiver also determines whether it is fresh or represents a replay.
- 14 The receiver shall skip this step for broadcast/multicast MSDUs.
- 15 The MSDU sequence number is needed to provide replay protection. The little-Endian encoding of the
- MSDU sequence number can be extracted from the *Replay-Counter* field by dropping the last four bits of
- the *Key-ID* octet:
- 18 if Replay- $Counter = RC_1 || RC_2 || RC_3 || RC_4$ then 19 Big-Endian(SeqNum) $\leftarrow RC_1 || RC_2 || RC_3 || (RC_4 \wedge 1^40^4)$
- 20 where "\" denotes bit-wise AND. To determine whether a unicast represents a replay, the receiver shall test
- 21 whether the MSDU replay counter SeqNum extracted from the MSDU Replay Counter field is a fresh
- value. It is fresh if the pair < QoS-Service-Class, SeqNum> has never been received in a valid MSDU for the
- 23 context's key, and is declared a replay otherwise. If the MSDU's sequence number is a replay, the receiver
- shall discard the MSDU, increments the *dot11WrapReplays* counter, and halts the decapsulation. Note that
- 25 the AES transmit encapsulation implies that MSDUs sent from the STA to the AP always use even values
- for the sequence number, and MSDUs sent from the AP to the STA always use odd values for the sequence
- 27 number. Hence, the sequence number checking at an AP shall verify that the constructed SeqNum value is
- even, and at the STA that the constructed SeqNum value is odd; the implementation shall increment the
- 29 dot11WrapReplays counter and halt the decapsulation of this check fails. The IEEE 802.11 implementation
- may use any suitable technique to guarantee that the pair < QoS-Traffic-Class, SeqNum> is fresh—e.g., it
- 31 might maintain a sliding replay window, or it can maintain a list of all MSDU sequence numbers correctly
- 32 received, etc.

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8.3.3.4.11 Completing reception

- 34 If the MSDU has not been discarded due to the processing described above, then the receiver must update
- 35 the 802dot11RecvdBlocks counter by adding to it the value b computed in 8.3.3.4.2, to indicate the number
- of blocks decapsulated, and the decapsulation completed successfully.

8.3.4 The Counter-Mode/CBC-MAC protocol (CCMP)

- A protocol based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Counter-Mode/CBC-MAC (CCM)
- 39 mode has been adopted. This protocol is called the Counter-Mode/CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP), and this
- 40 clause defines it. Implementation of this protocol is mandatory for RSN compliance.

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8.3.4.1 CCMP overview

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- 2 The CCMP protocol is based on AES using the CCM mode of operation. The CCM mode combines
- 3 Counter (CTR) mode privacy and Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC)
- 4 authentication. These modes have been used and studied for a long time, have well-understood
- 5 cryptographic properties, and no known patent encumbrances. They provide good security and performance
- 6 in both hardware or software.
- 7 CCM uses the same temporal key for both CTR mode and the CBC-MAC. Using a key for more than one
- 8 function usually introduces a weakness. Jakob Jonsson has proved that this cannot occur in this particular
- 9 case, as the construction of different IVs for CTR-mode and CBC-MAC eliminates the problems usually
- 10 associated with this. Indeed, all the encryption IVs are different, and they are different from the
- 11 authentication initial block. If the block cipher behaves like a random permutation, then the outputs are
- independent of each other, up to the insignificant limitation that they are all different. The only places where
- the inputs to the block cipher can overlap is an overlap between an intermediate value in the CBC-MAC and
- one of the other encryptions. As all the intermediate values of the CBC-MAC computation are essentially
- 15 random (because the block cipher behaves like a random permutation) the probability of such a collision is
- very small. Even if there is a collision, these values only affect MIC, which is encrypted so that an attacker
- 17 cannot deduce any information, or detect any collision.
- 18 CCM assumes a fresh temporal key for every session. Reuse of a temporal key and packet number voids all
- 19 security guarantees.
- 20 Annex F provides test vectors for CCM mode.

21 8.3.4.1.1 CCMP encapsulation

- 22 Figure 21 depicts the CCMP encapsulation process. CCMP encapsulates a plaintext MPDU using the
- 23 following steps:




Figure 21—CCMP encapsulation block diagram

It first increments the Packet Number (PN), to obtain a fresh PN for each MPDU.

- 4 5
- 2. It encodes the fresh PN into the MPDU.

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- 3. It constructs the CCM initial block from the PN, the MPDU TA, and from the MPDU data length (Dlen).
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- 4. With the initial block constructed, it MICs the MPDU using AES with CBC-MAC.
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- 5. It constructs the CCM CTR-mode counter from the PN and the MPDU TA.

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6. Finally, it encrypts the MPDU data and MIC using AES in CTR-mode.

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- 12 Figure 22 depicts the CCMP decapsulation process. CCMP decapsulates a plaintext MPDU using the
 - following steps:

8.3.4.1.2 CCMP decapsulation

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
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Figure 22—CCMP decapsulation block diagram

- 1. It first decodes the PN and Dlen.
- 4 Informative Note: The PN can be removed from the MPDU at this or any other step.
- 5 Informative Note: Dlen must be at least eight (16) octets, to account for the MIC and the encoded PN.
 - 2. It applies replay filtering. If the PN indicates out-of-sequence arrival, the MPDU is discarded as a replay.
 - 3. The CCM CTR-mode counter is constructed from the TA and PN.
 - 4. The counter and Temporal key are used to CTR-mode decrypt the MPDU data. Note this operation is the same as CTR-mode encryption.
 - 5. It constructs the initial block used to form the CCM CBC-MAC IV from the PN, TA, and Dlen.
- Informative Note: Dlen must be decremented by sixteen (16) octets, as the MIC and the encoded PN are not considered part of the plaintext data being protected.
 - 6. It uses the initial block and temporal key to re-compute a MIC' of the decrypted MPDU, using AES with CBC-MAC.
 - 7. It finally compares the MIC' it computed with the received MIC. If the two do not match, the MPDU is discarded as a forgery.

8.3.4.2 CCMP MPDU format

19 Figure 23 depicts the MPDU when using CCMP.



Note: The encipherment process has expanded the original MPDU size by 16 octets, 4 for the PN0-1 / Key ID field, 4 for the PN2-5 field and 8 for the Message Integrity Code (MIC).

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Figure 23—Expanded CCMP MPDU

- The IV/KeyID and Extended IV fields together are called the *encoded PN*. This is a slight abuse of language, since the encoding includes the Key Id as well as the PN.
- 6 The CCMP formats are invisible to entities outside the IEEE 802.11 MAC data path.
- 7 Bit 5 of the KeyID octet signals an Extended Packet number field of 6 octets. For standard length Packet
- 8 number/ IV fields this bit shall be set to zero (0), for extended packet number field the bit shall be set to
- 9 one. The Extended IV bit (bit 5) is always set for CCMP.
- 10 The reserved bits shall be set to zero (0).

8.3.4.3 CCMP state

- CCMP privacy uses a MIB array called the *dot11CcmpKeyMappings*. This supports zero, one, or two entries for each MAC address pair with which the STA maintains secure associations. The size of the *dot11CcmpKeyMappings* array is implementation-specific. A global MIB variable *dot11CcmpKeyMappingLength* indicates the number of entries in the array.
 - Each entry of the *dot11CcmpKeyMappings* groups together the following state:
 - 1. A *dot11CcmpReceiveAddress* and a *dot11CcmpTransmitAddress*, indicating that this entry applies to all MPDUs being sent between this pair of addresses.
 - 2. A *dot11CcmpKeyID*, indicating the KeyID into which this entry maps.
 - 3. A 128-bit key called the *dot11CcmpTemporalKey*, referred to informally as the temporal key. This is the TK1 subfield portion of the Pairwise Transient Key as defined in 8.5.1.2, or the TK1 subfield of the Group Transient Key as defined in 8.5.1.3. This key is often called the temporal key.
- 4. A set of 48-bit counters called the *dot11CcmpTrafficClassNPacketNumber*, for constructing the next initial block. *N* ranges from 0 to 15, with one traffic class defined for each QoS service class. When QoS is not used, only *dot11CcmpTrafficClass0PacketNumber* is used.
- 27 5. A set of 48-bit replay windows called the dott11CcmpTrafficClassNReplayWindow, for detecting 28 replays. N ranges from to15. When OoS is used. not only 29 dot11CcmpTrafficClasse0ReplayWindow is used.

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- 1 6. A boolean flag called *dot11CcmpEnableTransmit*, to indicate when the temporal key can be used for transmitting MPDUs.
 - 7. A boolean flag called *dot11CcmpEnableReceive*, to indicate when the temporal key can be used for receiving MPDUs.
 - 8. A 32-bit counter *dot11CcmpFormatErrors*, to indicate the number of MPDUs received with an invalid format, *initialized* to zero.
 - 9. A 32-bit counter *dot11CcmpReplays*, to indicate the number of received unicast MPDUs discarded by the replay mechanism, *initialized* to zero.
- 9 10. A 32-bit counter *dot11CcmpDecryptErrors*, to indicate the number of received MPDUs discarded by the CCMP decryption mechanism, *initialized* to zero.
- 11. A 48-bit counter dot11CcmpRecvdMPDU, to track the total number of protected MPDUs received.
- Informative Note 1: A broadcast/multicast entry does not utilize the replay window. This is because it is impossible to detect broadcast/multicast replays using symmetric key techniques. In particular, any party holding the broadcast/multicast key can masquerade as any other member of the group, so can intrude on another's sequence space without detection.
- Informative Note 2: As an optimization, implementations may compute and maintain the AES-CCM key schedule rather than maintain the temporal key.

8.3.4.4 CCMP procedures

19 **8.3.4.4.1** Increment the PN

This procedure increments the Packet Number (PN) by 1:

 $PN \leftarrow PN + 1$

such that the resulting $PN < 2^{48}$.

Informative Note: When the PN space is exhausted, the choices available to an implementation are to replace the temporal key with a new one, to end communications, or to send further traffic unprotected. Reuse of any PN value compromises already sent traffic. The PN is large enough, however, that PN space exhaustion should not be an issue.

8.3.4.4.2 CCM initial block construction

Informative Note: CCM is a big-Endian algorithm. This section therefore explicitly represents data structures as big-Endian quantities instead of the conventions of 7.1.1.

30 The CCM initial block shall have the format

Bit Number within field	В7	В0	B103	3											В0	В7	В0
Octet Index	()	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15

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Contents	Flag	Nonce	Dlen
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Figure 24—CCM Initial Block Format

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- The Flags field occupies bits 127-120 of the CCM Initial Block. Flags is a bit field assuming the value 0x59 (hex). The bits shall be interpreted as follows:
- 5 \circ 7: reserved: value = 0
- 6 o 6: Include header: value = 1, meaning yes
- 7 o 3-5: MIC size: value = 3, meaning use an 8-octet MIC
- 8 o 0-2: Dlen size: value = 1, meaning use a 2-octet Dlen

9	bit:	В7	B6	B5		В3	B2		B0
		0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1

Figure 25—CCM Initial Block: Flag Field

- The Nonce field occupies bits 119-16 of the CCM Initial Block. The Nonce has an internal structure QoS-TC || A2 || PN, where
 - o QoS-TC occupies bits 103-96 of the Nonce (bits 119-112 of the Initial Block). This field is reserved for the QoS traffic class and shall be set to the fixed value 0 (0x00 hex).
 - MPDU address A2 occupies bits 95-48 of the Nonce (bits 111-64 of the Initial Block).
 This shall be encoded with the octets ordered with A2 octet 0 at octet index 2 and A2 octet 5 at octet index 7.
 - o PN occupies bits 47-0 of the Nonce (bits 63-16 of the Initial Block). This field shall encode the MPDU sequence number associated with the temporal key. The octets of PN shall be ordered such that PN0 is at octet index 13 and PN5 is at octet index 8.

Octet Index	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Content	0x00		A2							P	N		

Figure 26—CCM Initial Block: Nonce Field

- The Dlen field occupies bits 15-0 of the CCM Initial Block. Dlen represents the length of the plaintext MPDU length in octets. This shall be encoded using the reverse bit ordering from the usual conventions from 7.1.1, with the Dlen msb first and the Dlen lsb last.
- Informative Note: Dlen is the length of the data proper, and does not include the length of the MIC, nor of the encoded PN.
- Informative Note: The initial block construction was chosen to permit the same temporal key to be used for both encryption and the MICing operation, and to protect traffic in both directions over an IEEE 802.11 link.

8.3.4.4.3 CCMP MIC computation

- 9 CCMP uses AES in the CBC-MAC mode to compute a MIC for the MPDU.
- The input to this algorithm is

- 1. The plaintext MPDU.
- 12 2. The Initial Block for this MPDU, as constructed in 8.3.4.4.2.
- 3. The temporal key. 8.6.5 defines this key for pairwise communication, and 8.6.6 defines this key for group communications.
- The output of the algorithm is a MIC value. This can be appended to the MPDU on transmit, and compared
- with a received MIC at the receiver.
- 17 The algorithm first encrypts the Initial Block to produce the CBC mode IV. Next it computes the CBC-
- 18 MAC over the IEEE 802.11 header length (Hlen), selected parts of the IEEE 802.11 MPDU header, and the
- 19 plaintext MDPU data.
- The algorithm represents the header length Hlen as a big-Endian (i.e., msb first) unsigned integer value. The
- 21 algorithms decrements the genuine Hlen by 2 (length of the omitted duration field) prior to encoding.
- When the number of octets in the Hlen together with the parts of the IEEE 802.11 header protected is not a
- 23 multiple of the AES block size, the header data shall be zero padded to a multiple of the AES block size (16
- 24 octets). This padding is used only by the algorithm, and is not included in the transmitted MPDU.
- Informative Example. When A3 is not present, for instance, the total data being protected by the MIC is 18 octets. In this case 14 zero octets are appended to the header data for the MIC computation and then
- 27 discarded.
- 28 The portions of the header included in the computation include
- FC MPDU Frame Control field, with Retry bit masked to zero.
- A1 − MDPU Address 1.
- A2 MPDU Address 2...
- A3 MPDU Address 3, if present.
- A4 MPDU Address, if present.
- SC MPDU Sequence Control.
- QC The Quality of Service Control, if present.

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Informative Note: The algorithm skips the header Duration field, because it value is mutable, i.e., it can change due to normal IEEE 802.11 operation. Similarly, the computation masks the FC Retry bit to zero, as the value of this bit is mutable.

Informative Note: In spite of being mutable, the MIC computation includes the Sequence Control field. This is CCMP's means of defending against fragmentation attacks. Fragmentation attacks against the protocol are always possible, given that CCMP protects MPDUs instead of MSDUs.

When the MPDU plaintext data is not a multiple of the AES block size, zero padding shall be added to extend the plaintext data length to be the first multiple of the AES block size larger than the real length. This padding is present only for the computation, and shall not be part of the transmitted data.

Informative Examples. If the plaintext data field consists of 96 octets, no padding is require as 96 = 6.16. If the plaintext data field length consists of 100 octets, then 12 octets of zero padding are appended to the plaintext data for the MIC computation and then discarded once it completes.

The CBC-MAC computation produces in a 128-bit tag value. CCMP truncates the tag to its most significant 64 bits (bits 127-64) to form the MIC. Figure 27 depicts the entire process for an example MPDU with an arbitrarily chosen payload length of 58 octets.




Figure 27—CCMP MIC computation block diagram

19 The construction of the MIC_IV referred to in Figure 27 is summarized below in Figure 28.

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


Figure 28—MIC IV Construction

- 3 The second block to be included in the MIC computation is formed from fields within the MPDU header.
- 4 The construction of this block is summarized in Figure 29.




Figure 29—MIC HEADER1 Construction

- The third block to be included in the MIC computation is formed from fields of the header, if necessary with padding to bring the block size to 16 octets. The construction of the third MIC generation header block
- 9 is summarized in Figure 30.

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


Figure 30—MIC HEADER2 Construction

8.3.4.4.4 CCMP MIC verification

- On transmit the MIC computed in 8.3.4.4.3 is appended to the plaintext MPDU data. Thus, the MIC
- 5 becomes the final 64-bits of plaintext MPDU data. Note that CCMP appends the MIC to the plaintext data
- 6 prior to encryption.

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- 7 To verify the MIC, after decrypting the data, the receiver computes the MIC using the procedure in
- 8 8.3.4.4.3 and bit-wise compares the result against the last 64-bits of plaintext MPDU data. If any bits of the
- 9 computed MIC differ from those received, it discards the MPDU as a forgery. If all of the bits are identical,
- then the receiver interprets the MPDU as genuine, and strips the 64-bit MIC from the end of the MPDU.

8.3.4.4.5 CCM CTR-mode counter construction

Informative Note: CCM is a big-Endian algorithm. This section therefore explicitly represents data structures as big-Endian quantities instead of the conventions of 7.1.1.

The CCM CTR-mode counter shall have the format




Figure 31—CCM Counter Format

16 Here

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- The Flags field occupies bits 127-120 of the counter. Flags represents a bit field assuming the value 0x01 (hex). The bits shall be interpreted as follows:
- \circ 7: reserved: value = 0

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- 6: Include header: value = 0, meaning no
- 5 o 3-5: MIC size: value = 0, meaning none
- 6 o 0-2: counter size: value = 1, meaning use a 2-octet C field

bit:	B7	B6	B5	B3	B2		B0
	0	0	0 0	0	0	0	1

Figure 32—CCM Counter: Flags Field

- The CCM Counter Nonce format is identical to that for the CCM Initial Block, defined in 8.3.4.4.2.
 - Ctr represents the lower 16-bits of the CTR-mode counter, and takes the value of 0x0000.
- Informative Note. The counter format permits CTR-mode to be used with MPDU plaintext payloads of up to $(2^{16} 1) \cdot 16 + 8 = 1048568$ octets in length.
- Informative Note: The counter construction was chosen to permit the same temporal key to be used for both encryption and the MICing operation, and to protect traffic in both directions over an IEEE 802.11 link.
- The detailed construction of the CCM counter is described below in Figure 33.




Figure 33—CCM Counter Nonce Construction

1 8.3.4.4.6 CCM CTR-mode encryption

- 2 CCMP uses AES in Counter mode to encrypt and decrypt the MPDU data and MIC.
- 3 The input to this algorithm is

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- 1. The MPDU data field, with MIC appended. On transmission, the data field with MIC is plaintext, while on reception bother are ciphertext.
- 6 2. The Counter for this MPDU, as constructed in 8.3.4.4.5.
- 7 3. The temporal key. 8.6.5 defines this key for pairwise communication, and 8.6.6 defines this key for group communications.
- 9 The output of the algorithm is an encrypted MPDU data field on transmit and a decrypted MPDU data field with MIC on reception.
- Figure 27 depicts the encryption process for an example MPDU with an arbitrarily chosen payload length of 58 octets. Figure 35 depicts the decryption process for the same MPDU.




Figure 34—CCMP CTR-mode encryption block diagram

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Figure 35—CCMP CTR-mode decryption block diagram

Counter mode operates by encrypting a counter value. The data field is partitioned into contiguous blocks $D_1...D_n$ each of whose length equals the AES block size (16 octets); the final block D_n may be shorter if the entire data field is not a multiple of the block size. Each Di is then encrypted (decrypted) as

Counter.Ctr \leftarrow BigEndian(i); AES_Encrypt_K(Counter) \oplus D_i

where " \oplus " denotes the exclusive OR operation, AES_Encrypt_K(·) denotes AES encryptions of its argument under the key K, and BigEndian(i) denotes the big-Endian (msb first) encoding of its argument as a unsigned integer. The key K denotes the temporal key associated with the current security association.

Informative Note: If the final block to be encrypted (decrypted) is not a multiple of the AES block size (16 octets), then the final encrypted counter value is truncated to match the length of the final block; since the Counter is Big-Endian, the least significant bytes are dropped. In particular, counter mode requires no padding.

Informative Note: Because an IEEE 802.11 MPDU can convey 0-2304 octets of data, this implies that a CCMP protected MPDU will convey between 1 and 145 blocks of encrypted data. Thus the value of i above ranges from 1 to n, where $n \le 145$.

Informative Note: Encrypting the MIC avoids collision attacks on the CBC-MAC. If the block cipher behaves as a pseudo-random permutation then the key stream is indistinguishable from a random string. This implies that the attacker gets no information about the CBC-MAC results. The only known avenue of attack that is left is a differential-style attack, which has no significant chance of success if the block cipher is a pseudo-random permutation.

1 **8.3.4.4.7 Encoding the PN**

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- 2 The PN is encoded in the IV/Key ID and Extended IV fields. When the PN is represented according to the
- 3 conventions of 7.1.1, bits 0-7 of the PN are encoded as IV0, bits 8-15 as IV1, bits 16-23 as IV2, bits 24-31
- 4 as IV3, bits 32-39 as IV4, and bits 40-47 as IV5.

8.3.4.4.8 CCMP replay detection

- 1. CCM Packet Number (PN) values shall correspond to MPDUs.
 - 2. The PN (48 bit counter) shall be selected from a single pool by each transmitter for each temporal key. Each transmitter has its own unique counter for each temporal key established.
 - 3. The PN shall be implemented as a 48-bit monotonically incrementing counter, *initialized* to zero when the corresponding CCMP temporal key is *initialized* or refreshed.
- 11 4. The CCMP format carries the least significant 16 bits of the 48-bit PN. The remainder of the PN is carried in the Extended IV.
 - 5. The recipient shall maintain a separate replay window for each IEEE 802.11 Traffic Class, and shall use the PN recovered from a received frame to detect replayed frames. A replayed frame occurs when the PN extracted from a received frame is repeated or not greater than the current Traffic Class replay window value for the frame's traffic class. The replay window accommodates frames that may be delayed due to traffic class priority values.
 - 6. A receiver shall maintain a separate set of PN replay windows for each MAC address it receives CCMP traffic from. The receiver initializes the replay window whenever it resets the temporal key for a peer.
 - 7. In order to accommodate burst ACK, the CCMP receiver shall check that the received PN (48 bit counter) is no smaller than 15 less than the greatest CCMP replay window value for the MPDU's temporal key. When combined with the prohibition on correctly decrypting more than one MPDU under a given <temporal key, PN> pair, this provides replay protection and accommodates frames that may be delayed due to message class priority values, with a window size of 16.

8.4 RSN security association management

8.4.1 Security association life cycle

- 28 IEEE 802.11 uses the notion of a security association to describe secure operation. Secure communications
- 29 are possible only within the context of a security association, as this is the context providing the state—
- 30 cryptographic keys, counters, sequence spaces, etc.—needed for correct operation of the IEEE 802.11
- 31 cipher suites.
- 32 The life cycle of a security association is naturally intertwined with the other IEEE 802.11 mechanisms. A
- 33 STA can operate in either an ESS or in an IBSS, and a security association has a distinct life cycle for each.
- In an ESS there are two cases: initial contact between the STA and the ESS, and roaming by the STA within
- 35 the ESS. A STA and AP establish an initial security association via the following steps:
- 1. The STA selects an authorized ESS by selecting among APs that advertise an appropriate SSID.
- Informative note: Advertising the SSID plays a crucial security function. If the STA does not know the SSID of some AP, it either must decline communication, or it has to guess the ESS of the AP. When the AP is not authorized, then the STA might present all of its credentials in an effort to find some that allow it to
- 40 authenticate. This can result in unintended identity disclosure of the STA to the unauthorized AP.

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- Advertising the SSID also provides an important performance optimization. Without advertisements, if the AP is indeed authorized, the STA on average must present half its credentials before locating the correct ones at initial contact.
- 4 2. The STA may then use IEEE 802.11 Open System Authentication followed by association to the chosen AP. Negotiation of security parameters takes place during association.
- 6 Informative Note: An attack altering the security parameters will be detected by the key derivation procedure.
- Informative Note: IEEE 802.11 Open System Authentication provides no security, but is included to maintain backward compatibility of the state machine.
 - 3. After the association completes, the STA and AP shall initiate filtering of non-IEEE 802.1X class 3 MPDUs, and the AP's Authenticator shall initiate IEEE 802.1X authentication. The authentication will be mutual, as the STA needs assurance that the AP belongs to the authorized network and is not a rogue.
- Informative Note: Any secure network cannot support promiscuous association as in unsecured operation of IEEE 802.11. A trust relationship must exist between the STA and the target SSID prior to association and secure operation, in order for the association to be trustworthy. The reason is that an attacker can deploy a rogue access point just as easily as a legitimate network provider, so some sort of prior enrollment procedure is necessary to establish credentials between the ESS and the STA.
- 4. The last step is key exchange. The authentication process creates cryptographic keys shared between the IEEE 802.1X AS and the STA. The AS distributes these keys to the AP, and the AP and STA use two key confirmation handshakes, called the 4-way handshake and group key handshake, to complete security association establishment. The key confirmation handshakes indicate when the link has been secured by the keys, so is safe to allow normal data traffic. If key handshakes complete successfully, STAs (including APs) shall terminate the filtering of class 3 MPDUs other than IEEE 802.1X, allowing normal data to flow.
- Informative note: The Supplicant of a STA should silently discard IEEE 802.1X messages not received from the AP.
- 27 A STA roaming within an ESS establishes a new security association by one of two schemes:
 - 1. (Re-)Associating followed by IEEE 802.1X authentication. In this case the station repeats the same actions as for an initial contact association, but it also uses the MLME-DELETEKEYS.request to remove the cryptographic key from the IEEE 802.11 MAC when it roams from the old AP. The STA also deletes the cryptographic keys when it disassociates/deauthenticates from all BSSIDs in the ESS.
 - 2. A STA already associated with the ESS can instead request its IEEE 802.1X Management Entity to authenticate with a new AP before associating to that new AP. In this case the Management Entity can request its IEEE 802.1X Supplicant to send an AuthenticationRequest to an AP with which it is not associated. The normal operation of the DSS via the old AP provides the communication between the STA and the new AP. The STA's IEEE 802.11 Management Entity delays Reassociation with the new AP until IEEE 802.1X authentication completes via the DSS. If IEEE 802.1X authentication completes, then cryptographic keys shared between the new AP and the STA will be installed, creating an environment where Reassociation without a subsequent IEEE 802.1X full authentication makes sense.
- The MLME-DELETKEYS.request terminates a security association on the local STA. This primitive destroys the cryptographic keys established for the security association, so that they cannot be used to protect further IEEE 802.11 traffic. A STA's IEEE 802.11 Management Entity uses this primitive in one of
- 45 two situations: when it disassociates or deauthenticates from an AP in an ESS, and when it associates to a
- 46 new AP.

- The life cycle of a security association is different in an IBSS. When explicit authentication is not used, a STA sets the AuthenticationRequest variable to request that its IEEE 802.1X implementation initiate the 4-way handshake of 8.5 with a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) with each IBSS peer STAs it encounters. A STA
- should use this primitive when it encounters another STA belonging to the IBSS with which it has no
- 5 security association.
- Informative Note: A STA can receive IEEE 802.1X messages from a previously unknown MAC address.

 Membership in the IBSS is determined by the peer STA's ability to use the correct PSK.
- 8 Informative Note: Any STA targeted from the IBSS may decline to form a security association with the 9 joining STA. An attempt to form a security association may also fail because, e.g., the peer uses a different 10 pre-shared key from that which the STA expects.
- In an IBSS each STA defines its own group key to secure its broadcast/multicast transmissions. After
- 12 establishing a security association, each STA shall use the Group Key Handshake to distribute its transmit
- 13 Group Key to its new peer STA.
- 14 A security association terminates in an IBSS in the same way it does in an ESS, by the IEEE 802.11
- 15 Management Entity invoking the MLME-DELETEKEYS.request primitive.
- Informative Note: A STA should remove all association state and send a deauthenticate message if it receives an MLME-DELETEKEYS.request.

8.4.1.1 IEEE 802.11 ESS authentication and key management primer (Informative)

- 19 There are three authentication and key management architectures in IEEE 802.11, namely "Open System"
- and "Shared Key", which were defined for use in the context of WEP in IEEE 802.11-1999, and the newer
- 21 IEEE 802.1X-based authentication mechanisms that are defined for use in the context of a Robust Security
- Network (RSN). In fact, the terms RSN and an IEEE 802.11 LAN using IEEE 802.1X and CCMP, WRAP,
- or TKIP are synonymous.

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- 24 IEEE 802.1X "Port-Based Network Authentication" was originally designed for switched networks, in
- 25 which eavesdropping is at least somewhat challenging. The original IEEE 802.1X standard assumes that
- tapping in to the communication link between a station and a switch is non-trivial, and relatively easy to
- detect. When the standard first appeared, networks were rapidly adopting switched topologies, abandoning
- 28 shared hubs, so there was no strong demand for IEEE 802.1X to support shared-media LANs, although the
- 29 standard does not prohibit operation over shared LAN topologies. As IEEE 802.11 LANs increased in
- 30 popularity, the need for a proper authentication and key management presented itself, and it was natural to
- 31 want to leverage mechanisms already been defined in another IEEE 802 standard.
- 32 IEEE 802.1X-2001 defines a framework based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)¹ over
- 33 LANs, also known as EAPoL. IEEE 802.1X extensions need to be defined to ensure that the network
- 34 authentication services are secure in shared-medium networks such as those based on IEEE 802.11.
- 35 EAPoL is used to exchange EAP messages. EAP messages perform authentication between a STA and an
- 36 EAP entity known as the Authentication Server (AS). A STA seeking to be authenticated uses EAPoL to
- 37 communicate with a device that enforces the authentication, for example, an Ethernet switch or an IEEE
- 38 802.11 AP. The EAPoL exchange takes place between two entities, one associated with the station desiring
- 39 to be authenticated, known as the "Supplicant," and the other associated with the device that enforces the
- 40 access to the network, e.g., the switch or AP, known as the "Authenticator". Besides restricting network
- 41 access only to authenticated stations, the Authenticator also acts as a mediator in the EAP conversation
- 42 between the EAP Client and the AS.

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The EAP was originally designed to support authentication over the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP), and is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).

- 1 EAP packets are encapsulated in EAPoL frames to enable them to cross the LAN medium. EAPoL also
- 2 provides some control features—e.g., an EAPoL-Start message was defined to initiate authentication;
- 3 similarly, an EAPoL-Logoff message was defined to terminate a connection. IEEE 802.1X-2001 also
- 4 defined an optional capability to use the EAPoL-Key message to exchange encryption keys, but did not
- 5 define a secure key exchange. Note that the format of the EAPoL-Key message in IEEE 802.11 is different
- 6 from that in IEEE 802.1X-2001.
- 7 Figure 36 depicts the relationships among the Supplicant, associated with the STA, Authenticator,
- 8 associated with the AP, and the Authentication Server (AS). While EAP messages are used between the
- 9 Supplicant and AS, these messages are encapsulated in EAPoL frames as they are transmitted from
- 10 Supplicant to Authenticator. Similarly, the EAP message may also be encapsulated over a "secure channel"
- between the Authenticator and AS. This secure channel is outside the scope of this specification. A typical
- 12 implementation in practice, for example, might be based on Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
- 13 (RADIUS). Note that RADIUS is not mandated by the IEEE 802.11 or IEEE 802.1X standards, but
- 14 RADIUS is a convenient protocol that may be used for this purpose. Like EAPoL, RADIUS has messages
- 15 to augment EAP, for example, RADIUS may be used to transmit the pairwise master key (PMK) from the
- Authentication Server to the Authenticator, over the secure channel being provided by RADIUS or a
- 17 protocol with similar attributes. The transmission of the PMK to the Authenticator is not accomplished
- 18 using EAP messages, since EAP is an end-to-end protocol between the Supplicant and the AS.




Figure 36—Authentication and key management overview

- 21 The EAP is not tied to any particular authentication algorithm, hence its extensibility. It defines a small
- 22 number of messages used to communicate between the AS and the EAP Client. This design allows the two
- 23 peer entities to mutually determine whether or not the newly connected device should be granted access to
- 24 the network, based on the algorithm-specific authentication credentials, such as the user's identification and
- 25 password. The Authenticator is able to interpret the outcome of the negotiation without being required to
- 26 participate in the negotiation itself, by simply recognizing an EAP-Success or EAP-Failure message.
- 27 EAPoL carries EAP messages between the Supplicant and the Authenticator. The Authenticator acts as a
- 28 relay for EAP packets by extracting them from within the EAPoL frames and sending those EAP packets to
- the Authentication Server over the secure channel.
- 30 All EAPoL frames are normal IEEE 802.11 data frames, thus they follow the format of IEEE 802.11
- 31 MSDUs and MPDUs. With reference to the IEEE 802.11 frame format defined in clause 7.1.2, an MPDU
- may be up to 2346 octets in length, which encapsulates an MSDU payload that is up to 2312 octets in
- 33 length. The remaining 34 octets in the MPDU comprise the IEEE 802.11 header (30 octets) and the four-
- octet Frame Check Sequence that concludes the frame.

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- 35 EAPoL messages are just like any other data packet (MSDU) that might be transmitted over an IEEE
- 36 802.11 LAN, and as such are de-multiplexed using information contained in the LLC/SNAP header, which
- 37 comprises the first eight octets after the MPDU header. The following figure illustrates an MPDU that
- 38 contains an EAP packet, encapsulated in an EAPoL (IEEE 802.1X) header.

	802.2 LLC SNAP		802.1X EAP			AΡ	Г	EAP Data																																			
			LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		LLC		SNA	Header		Header Header			Header			ader	
	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1																															
IEEE 802.11 MPDU Header (34 octets)	D S	S	С	OUI	т	P V		PBL	0	I D	Len	т	Type-Data (up to 2295 octets)	IEEE 802.11 MPDU Trailer (FCS; 4 octets)																													

Figure 37—Full 802.11 MPDU format

The IEEE 802.2 LLC header's DS (Destination Service Access Point, or DSAP) and SS (Source Service Access Point, or SSAP) fields are both set to a value of 0xAA, which indicates that an IEEE 802.2 Sub-

- 5 Network Access Protocol (SNAP) header follows the LLC header. The IEEE 802.2 LLC header's Control
- field is set to 0x03, indicating that this is an unnumbered information frame. To indicate that a standard
- 7 Ethernet type is being used in the IEEE 802.2 SNAP header's Type field, the IEEE 802.2 SNAP OUI field
- Ethernet type is being used in the IEEE 802.2 SINAP header's Type field, the IEEE 802.2 SINAP OUT field
 - is set to a value of 0x000000. A value of 0x888E in the SNAP header's Type field indicates that an IEEE
- 9 802.1X frame header is next.

The IEEE 802.1X header begins after SNAP's Type field, starting with the IEEE 802.1X Protocol Version (PV) field, the value of which is defined in the current IEEE 802.1X specification.. The next field is the one-octet IEEE 802.1X Packet Type (PT), which can take one of the five values, whose meanings are described in the following table.

0x0 0	EAP-Packet	Indicates that an EAPoL frame contains an EAP packet
0x0 1	EAPoL-Start	Used to initiate EAP protocol processing
0x0 2	EAPoL-Logoff	Not recommended for use with IEEE 802.11
0x0 3	EAPoL-Key	Used by the Authenticator and Supplicant to derive or exchange cryptographic keying information
0x0 4	EAPoL-Encapsulated-ASF-Alert	Used by a Supplicant to send ASF alerts prior to being fully authenticated

The IEEE 802.1X Packet Body Length (PBL) follows the Packet Type. Because the LLC/SNAP header is eight octets long, and the IEEE 802.1X header is an additional four octets, consuming a total of 12 octets of the MSDU, the IEEE 802.1X Packet Body Length (PBL) value can be at most 2300 octets (since the MSDU can be at most 2312 octets). The limit of 2300 is for unencrypted EAPoL-KEY messages. Note that in cases where the EAPoL-Key message is encrypted—using WEP, CCMP, TKIP, or WRAP—additional octets will be consumed which will effectively reduce the maximum MPDU payload capacity, hence the maximum PBL will not be able to be as large.

When the Packet Type field in an EAPoL packet is set to a value of 0x00 (meaning EAP-Packet), an EAP packet header follows the IEEE 802.1X header. The EAP packet header begins with a one-octet Code field that defines the function of the EAP packet. The EAP packet format is as follows:




Figure 38—802.2 format

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
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- 1 There are four EAP Codes: 0x01 (Request), 0x02 (Response), 0x03 (Success), and 0x04 (Failure). For
- 2 EAP-Request or -Response packets, the one-octet Identifier field contains a value that is used to match
- 3 Responses to Requests.
- 4 An EAP packet need not have a Data field, but a Data field will be present if the Code is set to Request or
- 5 Response. For such EAP-Request and EAP-Response packets, the first octet of the Data field is a Type field
- 6 that indicates which authentication algorithm is in use (e.g., EAP-TLS, PEAP, TTLS, etc.). The remainder
- 7 of the Data field will be algorithm-specific data.
- 8 The STA initiates the association process. Once the STA and AP associate, the AP and STA will indicate
- 9 success via one of the following APIs:
- MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication,
- MLME-ASSOCIATE.confirm,
- MLME-REASSOCIATE.indication, or
- MLME-REASSOCIATE.confirm.
- 14 If the AP is RSN-capable and configured with RSN is enabled, the EAPoL-Start message is sent by the AP,
- 15 which is triggered once the STA and the AP complete their association. The completion of the association is
- detected by one of the APIs above. The AP advertises its RSN capabilities in its own configuration-
- dependent RSN IE. The AP constructs the IE based on the subset of its RSN capabilities enabled, and the
- AP then includes the RSN IE in its Beacon and Probe Response frames. The Supplicant's STA also
- 19 constructs an RSN Information Element (RSN IE) that represents its configured RSN capabilities in the
- 20 management frames that are used to facilitate association, which lets the Authenticator's STA (in the AP)
- 21 know that this particular STA desires to join the RSN.
- 22 After the association first forms, only IEEE 802.1X protocol messages (i.e., EAP and its associated
- 23 authentication method) flow across the link until authentication completes; the Supplicant's IEEE 802.1X
- 24 Port Access Entity (PAE) filters all non-EAP traffic during this period. Until authentication completes with
- 25 the distribution of a Pairwise Master Key (PMK), the PAE ensures that only EAP packets are sent or
- 26 received between this STA and the wireless medium.
- 27 The authentication process allows the Authenticator and the Supplicant to prove to each other that they both
- 28 know the PMK and it is essential that this be done without divulging the PMK to eavesdroppers. Even
- 29 though the EAP Supplicant has been successfully authenticated by the Authentication Server, it cannot use
- 30 the link until it has successfully derived the necessary encryption and authentication keys, which depend on
- 31 the cipher suite chosen in the RSN IE in the AP's Beacon and Probe Response frames. The format of the
- 32 RSN IE is as follows:



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Figure 39—RSN Information Element

An EAP authentication method is negotiated as follows. One peer proposes an EAP authentication method to the other by sending an EAP-Request packet with the Type field's value set to the assigned number of the desired authentication method. If the receiving peer supports that authentication method, it will respond with an EAP-Response using the same Type as was proposed by the first peer. If the receiving peer does not support this authentication method, its EAP-Response packet will have the Type set to "NAK", and the original peer may then attempt to authenticate using a different method by proposing a different Type. A successful EAP authentication message flow is documented in the following figure.




Figure 40—IEEE 802.1X authentication exchange

At the completion of a successful EAP authentication exchange, the AS informs the EAP Supplicant that the authentication has succeeded by sending an EAP-Success packet (Code = 0x03). The Authenticator is able to detect the EAP-Success code, and registers the fact that this EAP Supplicant now represents an authenticated station. Using the secure channel between the AS and the Authenticator, the AS also sends one other essential piece of information to the Authenticator, the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) that has been generated by both the EAP Supplicant and the AS. By virtue of the EAP Supplicant's authentication exchange with the AS, the EAP Supplicant already knows the PMK.

The Supplicant and the Authenticator cannot trust each other until they have securely determined that each party knows the PMK. In order to establish that trust relationship, the Authenticator and Supplicant use a "four-way handshake" to convince each other that they are who they claim to be, and to mutually derive the necessary encryption and authentication keys from the PMK. The four-way handshake does not reveal any

necessary encryption and authentication keys from the PMK. The four-way handshake does not reveal any essential keying information to eavesdroppers, but does provide each party with proof that they both know the PMK.

The following diagram depicts the four-way handshake, composed of EAPoL-Key messages. The parenthetical items next to each message are the "interesting" parts of each EAPoL-Key Descriptor. There are always nine elements in the EAPoL-Key Descriptor, but not all are relevant to each message:




Figure 41—4-Way Handshake

A replay counter is part of each EAPoL-Key message, and enables detection (and thus prevention) of replay attacks. The replay counter is incremented by 1 for each successive message in the four-way handshake. Each retransmission of a given message uses the same replay counter value as was used when the message

6 was first transmitted.

- 7 The first EAPoL-Key message of the four-way handshake is sent from the Authenticator to the Supplicant.
- 8 The main purpose of the first message is to carry the randomly generated Authenticator Nonce (ANonce).
- 9 Any observer could eavesdrop on this message and learn the Authenticator's chosen ANonce. Upon
- 10 receiving the first message, the Supplicant has learned the ANonce. Subsequent messages in the four-way
- 11 handshake ensure that only the legitimate Authenticator is in communication with the Supplicant.
- 12 Once the Supplicant has received the first message and generated its own SNonce, it has sufficient
- 13 information to generate keys used for directed packet transmission and reception. Also, derived keys
- 14 protecting (i.e., providing message integrity and confidentiality to) the remainder of the key exchange are
- derived from the ANonce contained in this first message, as well as the SNonce and the STA's RSN IE.
- Any eavesdropper could also have attempted to impersonate the Authenticator by forging an EAPoL-Key
- message after it saw the EAP-Success packet. However, such an impostor would not know the PMK, thus it
- will not be able to successfully forge future EAPoL-Key messages, so the only exposure at this point is
- 19 possibly to denial-of-service attacks.
- 20 The second EAPoL-Key message is from the Supplicant to the Authenticator, which acknowledges receipt
- 21 of the first message. The second message contains a payload known as the RSN Information Element (RSN
- 22 IE) that the Supplicant's STA has constructed based on the cipher suites it supports, and is the same RSN IE
- that the STA used during the association process. The AP has created its own RSN IE that defines which
- 24 cipher suites are allowed to be used within this ESS. By sending its RSN IE to the Authenticator, the
- 25 Supplicant informs the Authenticator of which cipher suites it supports, which controls how the keys are
- derived. Of the set of cipher suites that are supported by the STA and the set that is supported by the AP, a
- valid cipher suite is chosen from the intersection of those two sets.
- 28 The second message of the four-way handshake also transmits the Supplicant's Nonce (SNonce) to the
- 29 Authenticator. Once the Supplicant has randomly generated its SNonce, it now has sufficient information to
- derive the necessary encryption and authentication keys that will be used during this security association,
- 31 pending successful completion of the four-way handshake.
- 32 Finally, the second message also contains a digital signature that protects (i.e., is computed over) the entire
- 33 EAPoL-Key packet, using one of the keys that the Supplicant has derived from the PMK and the two

- 2 EAPoL-Key Descriptor. The Authenticator will be able to verify this digital signature once it has received
- 3 the second message from the Supplicant, and has itself derived the key that was used to compute this MIC
- field value. Only a Supplicant that knew both of the nonces and the PMK could have sent this message,
- 5 since it contains a digital signature that could only have been computed if the PMK were known.
- 6 Like the first message, the second message is also sent in the clear (but as noted above, it is protected by the
- 7 digital signature that is computed over the EAPoL-Key message and included in the EAPoL-Key
- Descriptor). The second message can also be observed by third parties, who also could have seen the 8
- ANonce and SNonce in the first and second message, as well as the Supplicant's RSN IE, but who
- 10 nonetheless cannot forge the digital signature (MIC) in the EAPoL-Key message without knowledge of the
- 11
- 12 The key derivation process alluded to above, in both the Supplicant and the Authenticator, is known as the
- "Pairwise Key Hierarchy". The Pairwise Key Hierarchy defines how to combine the ANonce, the SNonce, 13
- 14 the Authenticator's MAC address (AA), the Supplicant's MAC address (SA), and a specific ASCII string,
- 15 as well as the PMK, as input to a pseudo-random function (PRF). The PRF outputs a large number of bits
- 16 sufficient to define the EAPoL-Key encryption and message integrity check keys and the pairwise temporal
- 17 key(s) for protecting unicast data traffic (the temporal keys are used for authentication and encryption). The
- 18 length of the output of the PRF depends on the cipher suite that was determined based on comparing the
- 19 RSN IEs in the association process.
- Specifically, the PRF output is separated into the following components: the EAPoL-Key MIC Key 20
- 21 (abbreviated MK; used to digitally sign the EAPoL-Key message), the EAPoL-Key Encryption Key
- 22 (abbreviated EK; used to encrypt the EAPoL-Key Descriptor's Key Material field during the Group Key
- 23 Exchange, but it is not used in the four-way handshake that implements the pairwise key exchange; the EK
- 24 is used to encrypt the EAPoL-Key Key Material field of the EAPoL-Key Descriptor in the Group Key
- 25 Exchange), and the temporal key(s) for the cipher suite defined in the RSN IE. The Pairwise Key Hierarchy
- 26 is illustrated in the following figure.




Figure 42—Pairwise key hierarchy

- 29 The complete output of the pseudo-random function (PRF) is known as the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), of which
- 30 bits 0 - 127 are the MK, bits 128 - 255 are the EK, and bits 256 - 383 represent temporal key number 1 (TK1).
- 31 Temporal key number 2 (TK2), if present (which depends on the needs of the cipher suite defined in the RSN IE), is
- 32 found in bits 384 - 511.
- 33 Note that the Authenticator cannot perform the PTK derivation until it has received the SNonce from the Supplicant,
- 34 since the SNonce is part of the input in the PTK derivation. In other words, the Authenticator cannot execute the

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- Pairwise Key Hierarchy until after it has received the second message of the four-way handshake. The Authenticator
- 2 and the Supplicant both derive identical temporal keys because they both compute the Pairwise Key Hierarchy using
- 3 the same inputs. Because only this Supplicant and this Authenticator (and the Authentication Server) are presumed to
- 4 know the PMK, no eavesdropper can learn enough information from simply observing the four-way handshake to
- 5 impersonate the Supplicant or the Authenticator.
- 6 The third EAPoL-Key message of the four-way handshake is sent by the Authenticator to the Supplicant, and it is used
- 7 to direct the Supplicant to install the temporal encryption key(s) in the Supplicant's STA. The third message sets the
- 8 "Install" bit for the first time in the four-way handshake, as well as the ANonce (the same randomly chosen value that
- 9 was sent in the first message), the RSN IE (must be identical to the RSN IE that was sent in the AP's Beacons and/or
- 10 Probe Responses), and a digital signature computed over the third message's EAPoL-Key packet by the Authenticator
- using the MK that it has now derived.
- 12 When set, the EAPoL-Key message's Install bit directs the receiver to configure its local STA with the derived
- 13 temporal key(s). In the case of the third message the Supplicant is the receiver of the message, so the Authenticator is
- using the Install bit to tell the Supplicant to prepare to receive encrypted unicast traffic. The third message is similar to
- 15 the first message, but it conveys much more information, built on what has been learned in the first and second
- 16 messages.
- 17 The final EAPoL-Key message of the four-way handshake is very similar to the second message. In this
- 18 message, the Supplicant is directing the Authenticator to install the per-association temporal key(s) into the
- Authenticator's STA. The fourth message is stating that the Supplicant has installed the temporal encryption
- 20 key(s) in its STA and is ready to receive unicast data encrypted using the cipher suite specified in the RSN
- 21 IE. As with the second and third messages, the fourth message contains a digital signature that is computed
- 22 over the EAPoL-Key message using the MK. Since the fourth message acknowledges the third message, it
- tells the Authenticator that the temporal keys have been installed on the Supplicant's STA. Furthermore, by
- virtue of the Install bit being set in the fourth message, the Supplicant is directing the Authenticator to
- 25 install the temporal keys for this security association into its STA (i.e., in the AP). The entire fourth
- 26 message is encrypted using the temporal keys and the cipher suite that has been negotiated prior to this
- point in the four-way handshake.
- Once the keys have been installed, the AP's STA can send encrypted unicast traffic to the Supplicant's
- 29 STA. The fourth message's EAPoL-Key Descriptor contains a digital signature over the EAPoL-Key
- 30 message, which is digitally signed (i.e., MIC'ed) using the MK. This MIC field was computed as in the
- 31 second and third messages. In contrast to the previous messages, the fourth message is not sent in the clear,
- 32 but is encrypted using the derived temporal key(s) using whatever unicast cipher suite was defined in the
- RSN IE. Thus, the fourth message will be encrypted using CCMP, TKIP, or WRAP.
- 34 If the fourth message does not reach the Authenticator, the Supplicant's STA must still be prepared to accept
- unencrypted traffic from the Authenticator (which would most probably be a re-transmission of the third message, since
- 36 the Authenticator will not have received the fourth message from the Supplicant, which, among other functions, serves
- 37 to acknowledge the third message from the Authenticator). Provided the fourth message has been properly received and
- 38 interpreted by the Authenticator, the per-association keys are installed on the Authenticator's STA, and future unicast
- data is encrypted using TK1 and/or TK2, as required by the RSN IE. Once the four-way handshake is complete, the Authenticator's and Supplicant's IEEE 802.1X PAE permits unicast traffic to flow through their respective STAs,
- which encapsulates the packets according to the cipher suite(s) indicated in the RSN IE.
- 42 The "Install" bit in the third and fourth messages directs the IEEE 802.1X entity in the Supplicant or the Authenticator,
- respectively, to configure its local STA with the keying information derived from the PTK. The API that is used to
- convey this information from the 802.1X entity to the STA is the MLME-SETKEYS.request. In the event that an Authenticator or Supplicant decides to terminate an association, the MLME-DELETEKEYS.request API is used.
- Now that the unicast pairwise key hierarchy calculations have been completed, unicast traffic must be sent in encrypted
- form, using the derived temporal keys. However, multicast and broadcast traffic would still need to be sent in the clear,
- 48 which is why there is a small additional handshake (two messages) in which the Authenticator transmits the Group
- 49 Transient Key (GTK) to the Supplicant.
- 50 All the STAs in an ESS use the same Group Transient Key, but the Authenticator securely delivers it to each
- 51 authenticated Supplicant, in a process that is protected by the unicast temporal encryption keys that have now been

- 1 derived. The EAPoL-Key messages of the GTK exchange are encrypted using unicast key(s) derived from the PTK.
- 2 The *encrypted* Group Key exchange is illustrated in the following diagram:

Figure 43—Group key handshake

- The Group Key Hierarchy involves a similar calculation to the Pairwise Key Hierarchy, in which the Authenticator derives the Group Transient Key from the Group Master Key, the Authenticator's [MAC]
- Address (AA), and the GNonce, as shown in the following diagram:




Figure 44—Group key hierarchy

- As noted in the diagram, when TKIP is the cipher suite indicated in the RSN IE, the PRF is set to output 256 bits of GTK, so that the Group Temporal Key 2 will also be derived, which is the second 128 bits of the
- 256 bits of GTK, so that the Group Temporal Key 2 will also be derived, which is the second 128 bits of the output of the PRF. Otherwise (e.g., in the cases of CCMP and WRAP), the GTK is only 128 bits long. In
- such cases, the PRF's output is just 128 bits long, and those 128 bits are directly mapped into the Group
- 14 Temporal Key 1.

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- Based on the contents of the RSN IE (i.e., whether or not TKIP is in use), a Supplicant that receives the
- encrypted GTK from the Authenticator is able to decipher one or two Temporal Keys from the GTK that it
- 17 receives from the Authenticator. Both of the EAPoL-Key messages in the Group Key Exchange are digitally
- 18 signed by the MK, after the EK has been used to encrypt the Key Material field of the EAPoL-Key
- 19 Descriptor, which holds the GTK. The Group TK1 (and possibly also TK2), are subsequently configured
- 20 into the Supplicant's STA and the Authenticator's STA via the MLME-SETKEYS.request API. When this
- 21 procedure is complete, the Supplicant's STA can now send encrypted broadcast and multicast traffic, in
- addition to the prior ability to send encrypted unicast traffic.

8.4.2 RSN selection

- 2 In an RSN or a TSN STAs (including APs) shall advertise their capabilities by asserting the Robust Security
- 3 bit of the Capabilities Information Field in Beacon and Probe Response messages. In an RSN a STA may
- 4 also include the RSN Information Element (RSN IE, see 7.3.2.17) in Beacons, and Probe Responses. When
- 5 doing so, the included RSN IE shall specify all the authentication and cipher suites enabled by its policy. An
- 6 RSN-capable STA operating as part of a TSN may omit the RSN IE from its Beacons and Probe Responses.
- A STA shall not advertise any authentication or cipher suite that is not enabled and that it will not agree to
- 8 use.

- 9 The STA's IEEE 802.11 Management Entity shall utilize the MLME-SCAN.request to identify neighboring
- 10 STAs that assert Robust Security and advertise an SSID identifying an authorized ESS or IBSS. A STA
- 11 may decline to communicate with STAs that do not assert Robust Security, or do not advertise an
- 12 authorized SSID. A STA may also decline to communicate with other STAs that do not advertise authorized
- authentication and cipher suites with its RSN IE.
- 14 A STA shall advertise the same RNSE in both its Beacons and Probe Responses.
- Informative Note: Whether or not a STA may attempt to communicate with another STA that asserts Robust Security but which does not advertise an authorized SSID is a matter of policy.
- 17 Informative Note: Whether a STA with Robust Security enabled may attempt to communicate with a STA that does not assert RSN is a policy question.
- 19 Informative Note: It should be possible to independently enable or disable the following in an RSN AP:
- 20 RSN
- 21 TSN
- WEP using pre-RSN IEEE 802.1X key management
- WEP without key management.
- For RSN an AP should support TKIP as well as CCMP.
- 25 Informative Note: It should be possible to independently enable or disable the following in an RSN STA:
- 26 RSN
- WEP using pre-RSN IEEE 802.1X key management
- WEP without key management.
- Informative Note: As a practical matter, the multicast cipher suite must be the weakest unicast cipher suite enabled.
- Informative Note: An AP should support pre-shared keys.
- 32 In an IBSS a STA may also identify another STA as belonging to the same IBSS by receiving a protected
- 33 message with A3 asserting the BSSID of the IBSS. If a STA does not already have a security association
- 34 with the message source, the receiver will not have cryptographic keys to decapsulate messages it receives
- 35 from that STA. On receiving a protected message from such a STA, the receiver should attempt to initiate a
- security association, as described in 8.4.1.
- Informative Note: Typically this sort of message will be broadcast/multicast. It is also possible to receive a protected unicast message after a STA has reset in a way that is undetectable to the message source.

- 1 Similarly, if a STA in an IBSS receives the first message of a 4-way handshake from an unknown STA
- 2 asserting the IBSS BSSID as A3, the STA's IEEE 802.1X implementation should respond, in an attempt to
 - establish a security association.

8.4.3 RSN policy selection in an ESS

- 5 RSN policy selection in an ESS utilizes the normal IEEE 802.11 association procedure. RSN policy
- 6 selection is performed by the associating STA. The STA does this by including an RSN IE in its
- 7 (Re)Association Requests.

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- 8 In an RSN an AP shall not associate with pre-RSN STAs, i.e., STAs that fail to assert RSN.
- 9 Informative Note: This can be enforced by configuring the AP to use only RSN cipher and authentication suites, i.e., by disabling WEP and pre-RSN IEEE 802.1X key management.
- 11 The STA initiating an association shall insert an RSN IE into its (Re)Association Request whenever the
- 12 targeted AP indicates RSN support. The initiating STA's RSN IE shall include one authentication and
- pairwise cipher suite from among those advertised by the targeted AP in its Beacons and Probe Responses.
- 14 It shall also specify the group key cipher suite specified by the targeted AP. If at least one RSN IE field
- 15 from the AP's RSN IE fails to overlap with any value the STA supports, the STA shall decline to associate
- with that AP. It is invalid in an RSN to specify "None" as the Pairwise cipher.
- 17 If an RSN-capable AP receives a (Re)Association Request including an RSN IE, and if it chooses to accept
- 18 the association, the AP shall, to secure this association use the authentication and pairwise key cipher suites
- the RSN IE in the (Re)Association Request specifies.
- 20 A STA shall observe the following rules when processing an RSN IE:
- A STA shall advertise the highest Version it supports.
- A STA shall request the highest Version field value it supports among all those a peer STA advertises.
- STAs without overlapping supported Version field values shall not use RSN methods to secure their communication.
- A STA shall ignore OUI values it does not recognize.
- 27 In order to accommodate local security policy, a STA may choose not to associate with an AP that does not
- support any pairwise key cipher suite.

8.4.3.1 TSN policy selection

- 30 If the AP includes the RSN IE in its Beacons or Probe Response messages, the forgoing applies in a TSN—
- 31 RSN STAs shall act as if it is operating in an RSN, by including the RSN IE in its (Re)association requests.
- 32 A STA may omit the RSN IE from (Re)association Requests it transmits to APs that fail to include the RSN
- 33 IE in their Beacon and Probe Response messages, and the STA shall not use RSN methods with such an
- 34 AP; instead, it shall use a pre-configured WEP key to secure its communication.
- 35 An RSN-capable AP configured to operate in a TSN may include the RSN IE, and shall associate with both
- 36 RSN and pre-RSN STAs. This means that an RSN-capable AP shall respond to an associating STA that
- includes the RSN IE just as in an RSN.
- 38 If an AP operating within a TSN receives a (Re)association request without an RSN IE, it shall allow
- 39 communications only if a WEP key has been configured to secure communication. If a WEP key is not

- 1 installed, the AP shall reject the association request; if a WEP key is configured, the AP may accept the
- 2 request.
- 3 An AP cannot support multiple group key cipher suites simultaneously within an ESS. In particular, a TSN
- 4 must use the cipher suite supported by the least capable STA it admits as the group key cipher suite.

8.4.4 RSN policy selection in an IBSS

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- 7 The IEEE 802.1X implementations of two directly communicating STAs negotiate pairwise key cipher
- suites using the 4-way handshake. Thus, each pair of STAs within an IBSS may use IEEE 802.1X to
- 9 negotiate its own pairwise key cipher suite. As specified in 8.5.2, Messages 2 and 3 of the 4-way handshake
- 10 convey an RSN IE. The Message 2 RSN IE includes a list of allowed pairwise key cipher suites, and the
- 11 RSN IE in Message 3 reports the selected the pairwise key cipher suite; the Message 3 RSN IE shall specify
- 12 a pairwise key cipher suite from those suggested in Message 2, or else the 4-way handshake shall fail.
- 13 Beacons and Probe Responses within an IBSS shall specify an empty list of pairwise key cipher suites.
- Informative Note. An IBSS does not use the Beacon/Probe Response negotiation mechanism, as knowledge of a peer STA within an IBSS may not come from the Beacon or Probe Response source.
- 16 The IEEE 802.1X implementations shall check that the group key cipher suite and authenticated key
- management protocol match those in the Beacons and Probe Responses for the IBSS. IEEE 802.1X can
- extract this information from IEEE 802.11.
- Informative Note: The RSN information elements in message 2 and 3 are not the same as in the MAC messages, the multicast cipher and AKMP are the same but the unicast ciphers may be different.
- 21 Informative Note: When an IBSS network uses pre-shared keys, STAs can negotiate a unicast cipher.
- However, any STA in the IBSS can derive the pairwise keys of any other that uses the same pre-shared key
- by capturing the first two messages of the 4-way handshake.

24 8.4.4.1 TSN policy selection

- 25 Non-RSN STAs generate Beacons and Probe Responses without an RSN IE, and will ignore the RSN IE,
- 26 while RSN stations will include the RSN IE in Beacons and Probe Responses. This allows an RSN STA to
- 27 identify the non-RSN STAs from which it has received Beacons and Probe Responses. If an RSN STA
- 28 instead identifies another IBSS member on the basis of a received broadcast/multicast message, it cannot
- 29 make this judgment directly.
- 30 If an RSN STA in a TSN IBSS cannot identify a newly identified peer as RSN, it may treat the new STA as
- 31 non-RSN and attempt to communicate with it using WEP and a default WEP key.

32 **8.4.5 MPDU filtering**

- When the policy selection process chooses IEEE 802.1X authentication, a STA (including AP) shall filter
- 34 all non-IEEE 802.1X class 3 MPDUs after association completes but prior to the completion of IEEE
- 35 802.1X authentication and key management.
- 36 Informative Note. Filtering class 3 MPDUs is not required during pre-authentication.
- 37 Explicitly, the STA shall begin this filtering when the MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication, MLME-
- 38 ASSOCIATE.confirm, MLME-REASSOCIATE.indication, or MLME-ASSOCIATE.confirm indicates it
- 39 has formed a new association with a peer STA.




Figure 45—Sequence of Filtering-related Events

- The STA shall relax this filtering to permit authorized unicast MPDUs when IEEE 802.1X uses the MLME-SETKEYs.request to initialize pairwise temporal keys for the association. The STA shall relax this filtering to permit authorized broadcast/multicast MPDUs when IEEE 802.1X uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request to initialize the group temporal key for the association.
- 19 By definition, authorized MPDUs shall be
 - 1. received IEEE 802.1X messages.
- Informative Note. It is assumed that the IEEE 802.1X Supplicant or Authenticator will discard received IEEE 802.1X messages that are not relevant to the current state, e.g., ones not protected by the current pairwise master key.
 - 2. received unicast class 3 MPDUs successfully protected by the agreed-upon temporal key;
- 25 3. received multicast/broadcast class 3 MPDUs successfully protected by the agreed upon temporal group key.
- 4. once a temporal key is configured, any class 3 MPDU to be transmitted as a unicast;
- 5. once a group temporal key is configured, any class 3 MPDU to be transmitted as a multicast or broadcast.
- Informative Note: In a TSN the group key may be used for unicast communication as well as broadcast/multicast communication. In this case IEEE 802.1X does not configure the pairwise key.
- 32 Figure 45 depicts a time-sequence diagram of the events related to filtering.

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8.4.6 RSN authentication in an ESS

When IEEE 802.1X authentication is an authentication option, an RSN-capable STA may use IEEE 802.11
Open System Authentication prior to association or Reassociation.

Informative Note: IEEE 802.1X authenticates in a layer above the IEEE 802.11 MAC. It removes authentication processing from the IEEE 802.11 MAC and delegates this function to IEEE 802.1X. A STA may become authenticated via IEEE 802.1X if *dot11AuthenticationType* at the recipient STA is set to IEEE 802.1X authentication. IEEE 802.1X authentication may fail, as a STA may decline to authenticate with any other STA.

- 9 IEEE 802.1X authentication is initiated by any one of the following mechanisms:
- 1. If a STA negotiates to use IEEE 802.1X authentication during (re)association, the STA's management entity can respond to the MLME-ASSOCIATE.confirm (resp. indication) by requesting the STA's Supplicant (resp. AP's Authenticator) to initiate IEEE 802.1X authentication. Thus, in this case, authentication is driven by the STA's decision to associate and the AP's decision to access the association.
- 2. If a STA's MLME-SCAN.indication finds another AP within the current ESS, a STA may signal its Supplicant to use IEEE 802.1X to pre-authenticate with that AP.
- Informative Note: The IEEE 802.1X Supplicant of a roaming STA initiates pre-authentication by sending an EAP-Start message to a new AP via its old AP and the DS.
- 19 3. If a STA receives an IEEE 802.1X message, it delivers this to its Supplicant or Authenticator, which may initiate a new IEEE 802.1X authentication.
- Informative Note: The IEEE 802.1X Authenticator of an AP initiate authentication by sending an EAP-Request/Identity message to the Supplicant of a STA.
- Informative Note: When a STA (re)associates with an AP without a (recent enough) pre-authentication, the AP has no cryptographic keys configured for the STA. In this case, the AP's Authenticator will force a full IEEE 802.1X authentication. In the case where the STA has recently pre-authenticated with the AP, the AP will retain the STA's IEEE 802.1X identity and cryptographic keys from the pre-authentication. In this case, the AP's Authenticator may proceed directly to key management in response to the STA's Supplicant's EAP-Response/Identity.
- Informative Note: Pre-authentication completes when the AP's IEEE 802.1X Authenticator sends the first message of the 4-way handshake to the STA's IEEE 802.1X Supplicant.
- Informative Note: If IEEE 802.1X authentication completes successfully, the AP's Authenticator forwards an EAP-Success message to the STA's Supplicant and then initiates the 4-way handshake, to complete key management. If IEEE 802.1X authentication fails, the AP's Authenticator uses the MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request primitive to inform IEEE 802.11 of the problem.
- The AP shall respond to an IEEE 802.1X authentication failure by sending the STA a Disassociation message.
- A STA (including an AP) shall pass IEEE 802.1X data frames. Being data frames, they shall be sent in the clear if no pairwise keys have been established by key management, and the established pairwise keys shall protect the IEEE 802.1X data frames otherwise.
- Informative Note: There is a potential race condition with the final IEEE 802.1X message when an association begins, in that it may be sent unencrypted. Accordingly the filtering rules in 8.4.5 require the MAC to pass all IEEE 802.1X messages even if keys have been configured. This sort of race condition is inherent in all key management schemes, and cannot be removed by "clever" design.

- 1 If a STA is associated with an AP, it shall disassociate if IEEE 802.1X authentication with that AP's
- 2 Authenticator fails. If IEEE 802.1X authentication fails, a non-AP STA may associate again with the same
- 3 to reinitiate the process, or attempt to associate with another AP.
- Informative Note: IEEE 802.1X uses the MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request primitive to inform the 802.11 MAC when authentication failed.
- Informative Note: There is no requirement to disassociate with the associated AP if pre-authentication with a different AP fails.

8.4.6.1 Pre-authentication and key management (Informative)

- 9 A STA shall not use pre-authentication except when pairwise keys are employed.
- When pre-authentication is used, then

- 1. Authentication is independent of roaming.
- 12 2. the STA's Supplicant may be authenticate with multiple APs at a time.
- Informative Note. Pre-authentication can be useful as a performance enhancement, as Reassociation will not include the cost of a full reauthentication when it is used.
- 15 Pre-authentication relies on IEEE 802.1X. A STA can initiate pre-authentication whenever it has a link
- established with an AP. To effect pre-authentication, the STA sends an IEEE 802.1X EAP-Start message as
- 17 a data frame to the BSSID of a targeted AP via the AP with which it is associated. Thus, the STA sets the
- 18 To DS subfield in the Frame Control Field. It is the responsibility of the associated AP to forward the data
- 19 frame to the targeted AP via the DS.
- 20 An AP's Authenticator that receives an EAP-Start message via the DS may initiate 802.1X authentication
- 21 by sending an EAP-Request/Identity to the STA via the DS. The DS will be configured to forward this
- 22 message to the AP with which the STA is associated. The pre-authentication exchange ends when the
- 23 Authenticator sends the first message of the 4-way handshake.
- 24 A STA may initiate pre-authentication with any AP within its present ESS with pre-authentication enabled,
- whether or not the targeted AP is within radio range.
- Informative Note: Pre-authentication is a MAC level mechanism, so cannot be used across, .e.g., IP subnet boundaries.
- 28 If pre-authentication is not used, the STA must make a roaming decision prior to authentication. Data
- transfer will halt during the IEEE 802.11 authentication and association, the IEEE 802.1X authentication,
- and IEEE 802.1X key management.
- 31 When pre-authentication is used, the STA's IEEE 802.1X Supplicant must cache the PMK for some period,
- 32 in case the STA associates with the AP with which the STA's Supplicant has pre-authenticated.
- 33 Similarly, the AP's IEEE 802.1X Authenticator must cache the PMK key for some period in case the pre-
- 34 authenticated STA associates with the AP. If during authentication the AP's Authenticator finds it has
- 35 cached the PMK for the associated STA, it may respond with an immediate EAP-Success message and then
- initiate the 4-way handshake.
- 37 Both the Supplication and the Authenticator may delete a cached PMK if the pre-authenticated STA does
- not associate with the selected AP after some time interval.

- Informative Note: Even if a STA has pre-authenticated, it is still possible that it may have to undergo a full IEEE 802.1X authentication, as the AP's Authenticator may have purged its PMK due to, e.g., unavailability of resources, or slowness of the STA to authenticate, etc.
- 4 Pre-authentication can fail, and an AP's Authenticator or STA's Supplicant can destroy keys established by
- 5 pre-authentication prior to association. If the AP's Authenticator loses pre-authentication keys in this
- 6 manner, it shall send an IEEE 802.11 Deauthentication message on receiving any encrypted packets from
- 7 the station.
- 8 Pre-authentication introduces new opportunities for denial-of-service attack. To limit the efficacy of these
- 9 attacks, STAs (including APs) shall rate-limit IEEE 802.1X messages. STAs shall ignore IEEE 802.1X
- from APs with which it is neither associated nor pre-authenticating.

11 8.4.7 RSN authentication in an IBSS

- 12 When authentication is used in an IBSS, it is driven by the STA wishing to establish communications. The
- 13 Management Entity of this STA chooses a set of STAs with which it may want to authenticate, and then
- may cause the MAC to send an IEEE 802.11 Open System Authentication message to each targeted STA.
- 15 Targeted STAs that wish to respond will return an IEEE 802.11 Open System Authentication message to
- the initiating STA. The STA Management Entity will then request its local IEEE 802.1X Supplicant to
- authenticate to the Authenticator of each responding STA. The STA's Supplicant begins the authentication
- process by sending an EAP-Start message to the Authenticator.
- 19 When it receives an MLME-Authentication.indicate due to an Open System Authentication Request, the
- 20 IEEE 802.11 Management Entity on a targeted STA shall respond with an Open System Authentication
- 21 Response and then request its Authenticator to begin IEEE 802.1X authentication, i.e., to send an EAP-
- 22 Request/Identity message to the Supplicant.
- 23 The IEEE 802.1X messages are sent as IEEE 802.11 data messages. The data messages are sent with the
- 24 FromDS and ToDS bits set to 0 and they are sent unencrypted since no keys are available.
- 25 The EAPOL-Key message is used to exchange information between the Supplicant and the Authenticator to
- 26 negotiate a fresh pairwise temporal key. There is a single Pairwise key between the Supplicant and
- 27 Authenticator produced by the 4-way handshake. The Pairwise key is used to transfer Group key updates
- and may be used as a Pairwise transient key.

29 8.4.8 RSN key management in an ESS (Informative)

- 30 When the IEEE 802.1X authentication per se completes, the STA's IEEE 802.1X Supplicant and the IEEE
- 31 802.1X AS will share a secret, called a *Pairwise Master Key (PMK)*. The PMK acts as a master session key.
- 32 The final step of security association set up occurs when the AS transfers the PMK to the AP with which the
- 33 STA is associated, followed by a key confirmation handshake between the STA and the AP. The key
- 34 confirmation handshake effectively replaces the function played by the IEEE 802.1X Success message in a
- 35 secure wired network.
- 36 The key confirmation handshake is effected by an IEEE 802.1X protocol called the 4-way handshake. The
- purposes of the 4-way handshake are
- 1. to confirm the existence of the PMK at the peer;
- 39 2. to insure that the security association keys are fresh, and
- 40 3. to synchronize the installation of session keys into the MAC.
- 41 The first message of the 4-way handshake is also utilized to signal the successful completion of a pre-
- 42 authentication exchange.

- 1 The 4-way handshake is implemented using EAPOL-Key messages, described in 8.5.
- Informative Note. Neither the AP nor the STA can use the PMK for any purpose but the one specified herein without compromising the key. If the AP uses it for another purpose, then the STA can masquerade as the AP; similarly if the STA reuses the PMK in another context, then the AP can masquerade as the STA. These problems are possible because the IEEE 802.1X architecture as currently formulated does not explicitly bind the PMK to this particular session between the AP and the STA.
- 7 IEEE 802.1X signals the completion of key management by utilizing the MLME-SETKEYS.request to configure the agreed-upon temporal pairwise key into the 802.11 MAC.
- 9 A second key exchange is also defined, to distribute a temporal group key. This is called the *group key*
- 10 handshake. When the 4-way handshake completes, the AP's Authenticator can use the group key
- 11 handshake to transfer the temporal group key for the Group Key cipher suite to the STA's Supplicant, to
- allow the STA to receive "secure" broadcast/multicast traffic. The group key handshake uses the EAPOL-
- 13 Key messages for this exchange. When it completes, the STA can use the MLME-SETKEYS.request
- primitive to configure the temporal group key into the IEEE 802.11 MAC.
- 15 The AP may queue a Group key update message it cannot immediately send. If the AP later deletes this
- message prior to its transmission, the AP should disassociate the STA.

17 8.4.9 RSN key management in an IBSS

- To establish a security association between two STAs in an IBSS, each STA shall support an IEEE 802.1X
- 19 Authenticator and Supplicant, and each Authenticator initiates the 4-way handshake with the other STA's
- 20 Supplicant.
- 21 The 4-way handshake is used to negotiate the pairwise key cipher suites. This is accomplished by include an
- 22 RSN IE in the exchange initiated by the Authenticator whose STA has the lower MAC address. Message 2
- 23 of this exchange contains a list of pairwise key cipher suites, and Message 3 contains a single unicast
- 24 cipher. If this exchange negotiates a pairwise key cipher suite, IEEE 802.1X installs the temporal key
- 25 portion of the Pairwise Transient Key into the IEEE 802.11 MAC. Each Authenticator also uses the PTK
- 26 negotiated by the exchange it initiates to distribute its own Group Transient Key. Each Authenticator
- 27 generates its own Group keys, and uses the Group Key handshake to transfer the GTK to other STAs with
- whom it has completed a 4-way handshake.
- 29 A STA's IEEE 802.1X implementation shall check that the multicast cipher and AKMP matches that in
- 30 Beacons and Probe Response received for the IBSS.

8.4.10 RSN security association termination

- 32 When a STA disassociates or deauthenticates, it shall delete any pairwise or group keys configured.
- 33 Similarly, if a non-AP STA receives the MLME-ASSOCIATE request or MLME-REASSOCIATE request
- 34 primitive when pairwise or group keys are configured, it shall delete them, If an AP receives a
- 35 (Re)Association Request message from a STA that is already associated, it shall delete any pairwise keys
- associated with that STA.

8.4.10.1 Disassociate and Deauthentication message handling

- 38 Since key management is independent of the IEEE 802.11 state, keys may or may not be available in each
- 39 of these states, so Deauthentication and Disassociate messages may or may not be sent when keys are
- 40 available.

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- 41 There are a number of abnormal situations that can cause a STA or AP to lose state. For example, a STA
- may be in State 3 when its associated AP is in State 1. The STA will protect data messages it sends to the
- 43 AP. Then the AP cannot decapsulate messages it receives from the STA. The AP needs to send a
- Deauthentication message to the STA to force it into State 1.

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- 1 Under normal circumstances STAs do not send Disassociate or Deauthentication messages, because the
- 2 roam out of range or their user powers them off. Instead, APs commonly use a timeout to remove
- 3 association state. A common case occurs when a STA, wanting to form a new association, is in State 1 and
- 4 the AP is in State 3, timing out a prior association. This action needs to clear the AP's association state for
- 5 this STA.

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- 6 The following cases occur:
 - 1. The AP needs to accept authenticate messages without being able to validate them, to handle STAs moving out of range.
- 9 2. The AP needs to accept associate messages without being able to validate them, to handle the first time associate.
 - 3. A STA needs to accept Deauthentication messages without being able to validate them, to handle an AP restarting or otherwise losing the STA's association. APs also time out association state when no traffic is received from the STA.
- 14 The APs response to Disassociate and Deauthentication messages are in the following table:

Table 4—AP response to Disassociate and Deauthentication messages

AP state	IEEE 802.1X portSecure	AP response to Disassociate or Deauthentication messages	AP response to other messages
1	N	Process message	Process message
1	Y	Process message	Process message
2	N	Process message	Process message
2	Y	IEEE 802.1X indicate to MLME	Process message
3	N	Process message	Process message
3	Y	IEEE 802.1X indicate to MLME	Process message

- 16 This changes the handling of received Deauthentication and Disassociate messages when keys are available.
- 17 This does not affect the procedures for the MLME-Deauthentication and MLME-Disassociate interfaces. In
- the received message case, an IEEE 802.1X re-authentication is requested. Failure of the IEEE 802.1X
- 19 authentication returns the AP to State 1, generating a Deauthentication message by calling the MLME-
- 20 Deauthenticate.Request interface.
- 21 The MLME SAP interface shall still indicate disassociate or Deauthentication indications but the MLME
- 22 should not change the STA state. The MLME may initiate an IEEE 802.1X re-authentication depending on
- 23 its knowledge of the IEEE 802.1X authentication state.
 - Table 5—non-AP STA response to Disassociate and Deauthentication messages

STA state	802.1X portSecure	STA response to Disassociate or Deauthentication messages	STA response to other messages
1	N	Process message	Process message
1	Y	Process message	Process message
2	N	Process message	Process message
2	Y	IEEE 802.1X indicate to MLME	Process Message
3	N	Process message	Process message
3	Y	IEEE 802.1X indicate to MLME	Process message

- 1 This changes the handling of receiving Deauthentication and Disassociate messages when keys are
- 2 available. In this case, an IEEE 802.1X re-authentication is requested. If IEEE 802.1X authentication fails,
- 3 this returns the STA to State 1 and causes it to send a Deauthentication message.
- 4 The MLME SAP interface shall still indicate disassociate or Deauthentication indications, but the MLME
 - should not change the STA state. The MLME may initiate an IEEE 802.1X re-authentication depending on
- 6 its knowledge of the IEEE 802.1X authentication state.

8.4.10.2 Illegal data transfer

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- In an RSN a STA and an AP transfer only protected data packets, with the only unprotected data packets allowed being unicast IEEE 802.1X message; these are permitted only when no Pairwise key is shared between the STA and the AP. If the STA and AP key state gets out of synchronization the following rules apply:
 - 1. If an AP receives a unicast protected packet when it does not have keys to decapsulate, it shall send a Disassociate message to the STA and discard the data packet.
 - 2. If a non-AP STA receives a unicast protected packet when it does not have keys to decapsulate the packet, it shall discard the data packet and send a Disassociate message to the AP; if the STA wants communications to continue, it should follow the Disassociate message with an immediate associate request to the AP.
 - 3. On receiving a Disassociate or Deauthentication message, a STA shall delete the Pairwise key and, if it wants to continue communications, Reassociate to an AP of the same ESS.

8.5 Keys and key distribution

21 **8.5.1 Key hierarchy**

- 22 RSN defines two key hierarchies:
- 23 1. Pairwise key hierarchy, to protect unicast traffic; and
- 24 2. Group key hierarchy, to protect multicast traffic.
- Informative Note: Pairwise key support with TKIP, WRAP, or CCMP allows a receiving STA to detect MAC address spoofing and data forgery. The RSN architecture binds the transmit and receive addresses to the

- pairwise key. If an attacker creates an MPDU with the TA, then the decapsulation procedure at the receiver will generate an error. Group keys do not have this property.
- 3 The description of the key hierarchies uses the following two functions:
- L (*Str*, *F*, *L*) From *Str* starting from the left, extract bits *F* through *F*+*L* bits, using the 802.11 bit conventions from 7.1.1.
- PRF-*n* Pseudo-random function producing *n* bits of output, defined in 8.5.1.
- 7 The symbol AA denotes the IEEE 802.1X Authenticator MAC Address, and SA denotes the Supplicant's
- 8 MAC Address. In an ESS, AA is the wireless MAC address of the AP, and SA the MAC address of the
- 9 STA.
- 10 A STA shall support a single pairwise key for any TA/RA pair. The TA/RA identifies the pairwise key,
- 11 which does not correspond to any WEP key id. Group keys shall not use WEP key id 0. Instead, a group
- key is identified by WEP key id 1 or 2 and the TA/RA pair.

13 **8.5.1.1 PRF**

- 14 A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) is used in a number of places in this document. Depending on its use it
- may need to output 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits or 512 bits. This section defines five functions:
- PRF-128, which outputs 128 bits,
- PRF-192, which outputs 192 bits,
- PRF-256, which outputs 256 bits,
- PRF-384, which outputs 384 bits, and
- PRF-512 which outputs 512 bits.
- In the following, A is a unique label for each different purpose of the PRF; Y is a single octet containing 0,
- 22 X is a single octet containing the parameter, and || denotes concatenation as usual.

```
23
                 H-SHA-1(K, A, B, X) \leftarrow HMAC-SHA-1(K, A \parallel Y \parallel B \parallel X)
24
                 PRF-128(K, A, B) = PRF(K, A, B, 128)
                 PRF-192(K, A, B) = PRF(K, A, B, 192)
25
26
                 PRF-256(K, A, B) = PRF(K, A, B, 256)
27
                 PRF-384(K, A, B) = PRF(K, A, B, 384)
28
                 PRF-512(K, A, B) = PRF(K, A, B, 512)
29
                 PRF(K, A, B, Len)
30
                      for i \leftarrow 0 to (Len+159)/160 do
31
                           R \leftarrow R \parallel \text{H-SHA-1}(K, A, B, i)
```

8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy

return L(R, 0, Len)

- 34 The Pairwise key hierarchy utilizes PRF-384 or PRF-512 to derive session specific session keys from a
- 35 PMK, as depicted in Figure 46. The PMK shall be 256 bits. The Pairwise key hierarchy takes a Pairwise
- 36 Master Key and generates a Pairwise Transient Key. The PTK is partitioned into EAPOL-Key MIC and
- 37 Encryption keys, and temporal keys used by the MAC to protect unicast communication between the
- Authenticator's and Supplicant's respective STAs. Pairwise keys are used between a single Supplicant and a
- 39 single Authenticator.

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Informative Note: In an ESS, the Pairwise Master Key results from authentication between the Supplicant and Authentication Server involved. This is often but not always a fresh key. An EAP authentication method normally has a Master Key generated by the authentication. In this case the PMK is derived from the Master Key. This key generation is normally carried out independently and simultaneously on the Authentication Server and the Supplicant, based on information that was communicated between the Authentication Server and the Supplicant during authentication. Each EAP method may derive the PMK from the Master Key in a different way.

If the protocol between the Authenticator or AP and Authentication Server is RADIUS then the MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attribute (vendor-id = 17; see RFC 2548 Section 2.4.3) is used to transport the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) to the AP. If the RADIUS Session-Timeout value is defined, the PMK and any derived keys shall not be used any longer than

Session-Timeout + (reAuthMax \times dot1xAuthTxPeriod)

seconds. dot1xAuthTxPeriod is defined by IEEE 802.1X, while reAuthMax is an IEEE 802.11 MIB variable defined in Annex D. When RADIUS is used, and when the Radius Session-Timeout attribute is not in the RADIUS Accept message, the PMK lifetime is infinite.

Informative Note: If the authenticated key management protocol is RSN-PSK then a 256-bit pre-shared key is configured into the STA and AP. The method used to configure the PSK is outside this specification, but one method is via user interaction. The pre-shared key is used directly as the PMK.




Figure 46—Pairwise key hierarchy

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- 31 SNonce shall be a random or pseudo-random value contributed by the IEEE 802.1X Supplicant;.
- 32 ANonce shall be a random or pseudo-random value contributed by the IEEE 802.1X 33 Authenticator.
- 34 The Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) shall be derived from the PMK by
- 35 $PTK \leftarrow PRF-X(PMK, "Pairwise key expansion", Min(AA,SA) || Max(AA, SA) ||$ Min(ANonce,SNonce) || Max(ANonce,SNonce)) 36

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1 2 3	TKIP uses $X = 512$, while CCMP, WRAP, and WEP use $X = 384$. The Min and Max operations are with respect to lexicographic ordering of IEEE 802 addresses and the bit strings comprising the nonces, represented as in 7.1.1.
4 5 6	Informative Note: ANonce is taken from the Key Counter on the Authenticator whenever a new Pairwise TK is derived. ANonce is used so the inputs to PRF are different for each PMK. If a station re-associates to the same AP, a different ANonce value is used for the derivation of a new TK set.
7 8	Informative Note: SNonce is a nonce taken from the Key Counter on the Supplicant; its value is taken when a PTK is instantiated and is sent to the PTK Authenticator.
9 10 11 12	Informative Note: The Authenticator and Supplicant normally derive a PTK only once per association. A Supplicant or an Authenticator may use the 4-way handshake to derive a new PTK. This is required only after a TKIP data integrity failure. Both the Authenticator and Supplicant create a new nonce value for each 4-way handshake instance.
13	• The EAPOL-Key MIC key (MK) shall be computed as the first 128 bits (bits 0-127) of the PTK:
14	$MK \leftarrow L(PTK, 0, 128)$
15 16	The MK is used by IEEE 802.1X to provided data origin authenticity in the 4-way handshake and Group key distribution messages.
17	• The EAPOL-Key Encr. Key (EK) shall be computed as bits 128-255 of the PTK:
18	$EK \leftarrow L(PTK, 128, 128)$
19 20	The EK is used by IEEE 802.1X to provide confidentiality in the 4-way handshake and Group key distribution messages.
21	• Temporal Key 1 (TK1) shall be computed as bits 256-383 of the PTK:
22	$TK1 \leftarrow L(PTK, 256, 128)$
23 24	TK1 shall be configured by IEEE 802.1X into IEEE 802.11 via the MLME-SETKEYS.request, to be consumed in the pairwise key cipher suite; interpretation of this value is cipher suite specific.
25	• Temporal Key 2 (TK2), if derived, shall be computed as bits 384-511 of the PTK:
26	$TK2 \leftarrow L(PTK, 384, 128)$
27 28	TK2 shall be configured by IEEE 802.1X into IEEE 802.11 via the MLME-SETKEYS.request, to be consumed in the pairwise key cipher suite; interpretation of this value is cipher suite specific.
29	8.5.1.3 Group key hierarchy
30 31 32 33 34 35	The Group key hierarchy uses PRF-128 or PRF-256 to derive a group key. Figure 47 depicts the relationship among the keys of the Group key hierarchy. The Group key hierarchy takes a Group Master Key and generates a Group Transient key. The GTK is partitioned into temporal keys used by the MAC to protect broadcast/multicast communication. Group Keys are used between a single Authenticator and all Supplicants authenticated to that Authenticator. The Authenticator may derive new Group Transient Keys when it wants to update the Group temporal keys.
36 37	The Group Master Key (GMK) shall be 256 bits. It is used to derive the Group key hierarchy. The GMK shall be initialized using a cryptographically secure random number.

Any GMK must be re-initialized at a time interval configured into the AP, to reduce the exposure of data if the GMK is ever compromised.




Figure 47—Group key hierarchy

15 Here

13 14

- GNonce shall be a random or pseudo-random value contributed by the IEEE 802.1X Authenticator.
- The *Group Transient Key (GTK)* shall be derived from the GMK by
- 19 GTK ← PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion" || AA || GNonce)
- TKIP uses X = 256, while CCMP, WRAP, and WEP use X = 128. AA is represented as an IEEE 802 address and GNonce as a bit string as defined in 7.1.1.
- Temporal Key 1 (TK1) shall be bits 0-127 of the GTK:
- 23 $TK1 \leftarrow L(GTK, 0, 128)$
- 24 IEEE 802.1X configures TK1 into IEEE 802.11 via the MLME-SETKEYS.request, and IEEE 802.11 uses this key. Its interpretation is cipher suite specific.
- Temporal Key 2 (TK2), if derived, shall be bits 128-255 of the GTK:
- 27 $TK2 \leftarrow L(GTK, 128, 128)$
- IEEE 802.1X configures TK1 into IEEE 802.11 via the MLME-SETKEYS.request, and IEEE 802.11 uses this key. Its interpretation is cipher suite specific.
- 30 Informative Note: The Authenticator may update the Group key for a number of reasons:

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- 1 1. The Authenticator may change the GTK on disassociation or Deauthentication of a STA..
- 2 2. A TKIP integrity failure shall trigger a Group key update.
- 3. A management event can trigger a Group key update.

4 8.5.2 EAPOL-KEY messages

- 5 IEEE 802.11 uses EAPOL-Key messages to exchange information between STAs' Supplicants and
- Authenticators that result in cryptographic keys and synchronization of security association state. EAPOL-
- 7 Key messages are used to implement two different exchanges:
 - 4-way handshake, to confirm that the PMK between associated STAs are the same and is live.
- The group key handshake, to update the GTK at the STA.
- 10 When used by an RSN, the RSN key descriptor carried by EAPOL-Key messages differs from IEEE
- 11 802.1X Clause 7.6, because it needs to convey different information and replaces the IEEE 802.1X Key
- descriptor.

8

14

13 The bit and octet convention for fields in the EAPOL-Key message are defined in IEEE 802.1X Clause 7.1.

Descriptor Type – 1 octet

Key Information – 2 octets

Replay Counter – 8 octets

Key Nonce – 32 octets

EAPOL-Key IV – 16 octets

Key RSC – 8 octets

Key ID – 8 octets

Key MIC – 16 octets

Key Material Length – 2 octets

Key Data – n octets

15 16

Figure 48—EAPOL-Key descriptor

- 17 **Descriptor Type.** This field is one octet and has a value of 254, identifying RSN Key Descriptor.
- 18 **Key Information**. This field is two octets and specifies characteristics of the key.

3 bits Key	1 bit	2 bits	1 bit						
Descriptor	Key	Key	Install	1 bit	1 bit	1 bit	1 bit	1 bit	4 bits
Version	Type	Index		Key	Key	Secure	Error	Request	Reserved
				Ack	MIC			·	

1 2 Figure 49—Key information bit layout 3 The bit convention used is as in 7.1 of IEEE 802.1X. 4 Key Description Version Number (bits 0-2): specifies the Key descriptor version type. 5 1. Type 1 indicates 6 HMAC-MD5 is the EAPOL-Key MIC; 7 RC4 is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm used to protect the distributed GTK. 8 Type 2 indicates. 9 AES-CBC-MAC is the EAPOL-Key MIC; 10 HMAC-SHA1 is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm used to protect the b) distributed GTK. HMAC is defined in RFC 2104, and SHA1 by FIPS-180-1. The 11 12 output of the HMAC-SHA1 shall be truncated to 128-bits. 13 Key Type (bit 4): specifies whether this EAPOL-Key message represents a Pairwise or a Group 14 key. 15 The value 1 indicates a Pairwise key The value 0 indicates a Group key. 16 17 Key Index (bits 5 and 6): specifies the key id of the temporal key of the key derived from the message. The value of this shall be zero (0) if the value of Key Type (bit 4) is Pairwise (1). The 18 Key Type and Key Index shall not both be 0 in the same message. 19 20 Group keys shall not use key id 0. This means that key ids 1 to 3 are available to be used to 21 identify Group keys. This document recommends that implementations reserve key ids 1 and 2 for Group Keys, and that key id 3 is not used. 22 23 The Key Type and Key Index shall not both be 0 in the same message. 24 Bit 7 is the Install flag. 25 1. If the value of Key Type (bit 4) is Pairwise (1), then 26 The value 1 means the IEEE 802.1X component shall configure the temporal keys 27 TK1 and TK2 derived from this message into its IEEE 802.11 STA. The value 0 means the IEEE 802.1X component shall not configure the temporal 28 29 keys into the IEEE 802.11 STA.

1		2. If the value of Key Type (bit 4) is Group (0), then
2 3 4		a. The value 1 means the IEEE 802.1X component shall configure the temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from this message into its IEEE 802.11 STA for both transmission and reception.
5 6		 b. The value 0 means IEEE 802.1X component shall configure the temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from this message into its IEEE 802.11 STA for reception only.
7 8 9	•	Ack (bit 8): This bit is set in messages from the Authenticator if an EAPOL-Key message is required in response to this message, and clear otherwise. The Supplicant's response to this message shall use the same replay counter as this message.
10 11	•	MIC (bit 9): this bit is set if a MIC is in this EAPOL-Key message, and it is clear if this message contains no MIC.
12 13 14 15	•	Secure (bit 10): this bit is set once the initial key exchange is complete. That is, the secure bit in the EAPOL-Key message is used to inform when the pairwise key exchange is complete and the first Group Key Handshake is complete. It shall be initialized to 0 or not secure at the beginning of any 4-Way Handshake.
16 17 18		The Authenticator shall set this bit to 1 in the final EAPOL-Key message that the Supplicant with the data needed to complete its initialization. At this point the Authenticator shall set the bit in all EAPOL-Key messages it sends until it no longer considers the link secure.
19 20 21 22 23		The Supplicant will set the secure bit when it considers the link secure, which is when it has accepted enough keys to initialize the link. The number of keys should match the negotiated ciphers e.g. if a unicast and multicast cipher is negotiated then a Pairwise and Group key must be sent before the link is considered secure. The Supplicant shall clear the secure bit when it considers the link no-longer secure.
24 25		The Supplicant and Authenticator shall consider the link insecure after a TKIP integrity error but prior to keys being re-established.
26 27 28 29 30		Informative Note: The Supplicant and Authenticator initialize the secure bit to zero. Normally the Authenticator sets the secure bit when it sends the first Group key message to the Supplicant and the Supplicant sets the secure bit on receiving the first Group key message. The Supplicant clears the secure bit on receiving a TKIP integrity error from the MAC or on receiving an EAPOL-Key message with the secure bit cleared. The Authenticator clears the secure bit on receiving a TKIP integrity error from the Supplicant or from its STA.
32 33	•	Error (bit 11): A Supplicant sets this bit to report that a MIC failure occurred in a TKIP MSDU. A Supplicant shall set this bit only when the Request (bit 12) is set.
34 35 36 37	•	Request (bit 12): The Supplicant sets this bit to request that the Authenticator initiate either a 4-way or group key handshake. The Supplicant shall not set this bit in on-going 4-way handshakes, i.e., the Ack bit (bit 8) shall not be set in any message with the Request bit set. The Authenticator shall never set this bit.
38 39 40 41		If the EAPOL-Key message with request bit set has a Key Type of Pairwise key, the authenticator shall initiate a 4-way handshake. If the EAPOL-Key message with request bit set has a key type of Group key, the authenticator shall change the Group key, initiate a 4-way handshake with the Supplicant and then execute the Group key handshake to all Supplicants.
42		Informative Note: The Supplicant shall request a new key in response to any TKIP MIC failure.

1 2	• Reserved (bits 13-15). The sender shall set them to 0, and the receiver shall ignore the value of these bits.
3 4	Key Length . This field is two (2) octets in length, represented as an unsigned binary number. The value defines the length in octets of the key to configure into IEEE 802.11.
5 6	Informative Note: The rationale for this design is to hide from IEEE 802.1X the structure of the keys consumed by IEEE 802.11.
7 8	Informative Note: For Group Keys, the Key Data Length will be the same as the Key Length field for Key Descriptor Version 1 and Key Length + 8 octets for Key Descriptor Version 2.
9 10 11 12	Key Replay Counter . This field is eight (8) octets, represented an unsigned binary number, and is initialized to 0 when the PMK is established. The Supplicant shall use the replay counter in the received EAPOL-Key message when responding to an EAPOL-Key message. It carries a sequence number that the protocol uses to detect replayed EAPOL-Key messages.
13 14 15	The Supplicant and Authenticator shall track the Replay Counter per association. The replay counter shall be initialized to 0 on (re)association. The Authenticator shall increment the replay counter on each EAPOL-Key message.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	When replying to a message from the Authenticator the Supplicant should use the replay counter received from the Authenticator. The Authenticator should use this to identify invalid messages to silently discard. The Supplicant should also use the replay counter and ignore EAPOL-Key messages with a replay counter smaller than any received in a valid message. The local replay counter should not be updated until the after EAPOL-Key MIC is checked and is valid. This means that the Supplicant never updates the replay counter for the first message in the 4-way handshake, as it includes no MIC. This implies the Supplicant must allow for re-transmission of the first message when checking for the replay counter of the third message.
24 25 26	The Supplicant shall maintain a separate replay counter for sending request EAPOL-Key messages to the Authenticator; the Authenticator also shall enforce monotonicity of a separate replay counter to filter received EAPOL-Key Request messages.
27 28 29	Informative Note: The Replay Counter does not play any role beyond a performance optimization in the 4-way handshake. In particular, replay protection is provided by selecting a never-before-used nonce value to incorporate into the PTK. It does, however, play a useful role in the Group key handshake.
30 31	Key Nonce . This field is thirty two (32) octets. It conveys the ANonce or GNonce from the Authenticator and the SNonce from the Supplicant. It may contain 0 if a Nonce is not required to be sent.
32 33 34 35	Key IV . This field is sixteen (16) octets. It contains the IV used with the key encrypting the Group Key. It may contain 0 when an IV is not required, i.e., when the message specifies a pairwise key. It should be initialized by taking the current value of the global Counter and then incrementing the counter. Note that only the lower sixteen octets of the counter value will be used.
36 37 38 39 40	Key RSC . This field is eight octets in length. It contains the receive sequence counter (RSC) for the key being installed in IEEE 802.11. It is only used in message 3 of the 4-way handshake and the first message of the Group key update, where it is used to synchronize the replay state. It shall contain 0 in other messages. If the key RSC is less than eight octets in length the remaining octets shall be set to 0. The least significant octet of the IV should be in the first octet of the Key RSC.
41	Informative Note: The Key RSC for TKIP is the TSC in the first 6 octets.
42	

KeyRSC 0	KeyRSC 1	KeyRSC 2	KeyRSC 3	KeyRSC 4	KeyRSC 5	KeyRSC 6	KeyRSC 7
TSC0	TSC1	TSC2	TSC3	TSC4	TSC5	0	0

Informative Note: The Key RSC for WEP should be 0.

- 2 **Key ID**. This field is eight (8) octets in length. It is reserved and set to 0.
- 3 **Key MIC.** This field is sixteen octets (16) in length when the Key Descriptor Version field is 1 or 2. The 4 EAPOL-Key MIC is a MIC of the EAPOL packet, from and including the EAPOL protocol version 5 field, to and including the EAPOL-Key Material field with the EAPOL-Key MIC field set to 0 after 6 any key material field is encrypted. If the Key data field contains a Group Key, the GTK is encrypted prior to calculation of the MIC. 7
- 8 Key Descriptor Version 1: HMAC-MD5; RFCs 2104 and 1321 together define this function, and Annex F.3 provides a reference implementation for it.
- 10 **Key Descriptor Version 2**: HMAC-MD5.
- 11 Key Data Length. This field is two (2) octets in length, taken to represent an unsigned binary number. This 12 represents the length of the Key Data field in octets.
- 13 For Pairwise Keys, the Key Data Length value will be zero (0) in messages 1 and 4 of the 4-way 14 handshake, and will be the length in octets of RSN IEs conveyed in the Key Data field in messages 2 15 and 3.
- 16 For Group Keys, the Key Data Length will be the same as the Key Length field.
- 17 **Key Data**. For EAPOL-Key messages specifying Pairwise Keys the Key Data field will contain the RSN 18 information element in message 2 and 3 of the 4-way handshake and nothing for message 1 and 4.
- 19 For Pairwise keys this field contains the RSN information element contents (from and including the 20 RSN element id) and the Key Data Length is set to the length of the information element contents for 21 message 2 and 3 in the 4-way handshake. In message 1 and 4 this field is empty and the Key Data 22 Length is 0. The RSN information element will not be encrypted when it is sent in the EAPOL-Key 23 message.
- 24 The Supplicant should insert the RSN IE it sent in its (re)associate request into the second message 25 of the 4-way handshake. On receipt of the second message the Authenticator shall bit-wise compare 26 this against the RSN IE received in the IEEE 802.11 request.
- 27 The Authenticator should insert the RSN IE it sent in its Beacon or Probe Response into the third 28 message of the 4-way handshake. On receiving the third message, the Supplicant shall bit-wise 29 compare the RSN IE against the RSN IE received in the Beacon or Probe Response.
- 30 In either case, if the values do not match, then the receiver shall consider the RSN IE modified and 31 shall use the MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request to break the association. A security error should 32 be logged at this time.
- 33 For Group TKs this field contains the encrypted GTK.

- Note that when checking the RSN information element the length of the RSN information element received in the beacon or probe response and sent in the associate request must be checked against the length of the RSN information element specified in EAPOL-Key Data Length.
- **Key Descriptor Version 1**: RC4 is used to encrypt the Key Data field using the EK field from the derived PTK. No padding shall be used. The encryption key is generated by concatenating the EAPOL-Key IV field and the EK. The first 256 bytes of the RC4 key stream shall be discarded following RC4 stream cipher initialization with the EK, and encryption begins using the 257th key stream byte.
- Wey Descriptor Version 2: AES Key Wrap, defined in RFC 3394, shall be used to encrypt the key material field using the EK field from the derived PTK. The key wrap default initial value shall be used.

8.5.2.1 EAPOL-Key message notation (Informative)

- 13 The following notation will often be used throughout to represent EAPOL-Key messages:
- 14 EAPOL-Key(S, M, A, T, N, K, KeyRSC, ANonce/SNonce, GNonce, MIC, GTK)
- where the arguments are:

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- S: Initial Key exchange is complete. This is the EAPOL-Key Information Secure bit.
- M: MIC is available in message. This should be set in all messages except the first 4-way handshake message. This is the EAPOL-Key Information Key MIC bit.
- A: Response is required to this message. Used when the receiver should respond to this message.

 This is the EAPOL-Key Information Key Ack bit.
- T: Tx/Rx for Group key and Install/Not install for Pairwise key. This is the EAPOL-Key Information Tx/Rx Flag bit.
- N: Key Index. Specifies which index should be used for this Group Key. Index 0 shall not be used for Group keys. This is the EAPOL-Key Information key index bits.
- K: Key type P (Pairwise), G (Group). This is the EAPOL-Key Information Key Type bit.
- KeyRSC: Key RSC. This is the EAPOL-Key KeyRSC field.
- ANonce/SNonce/GNonce: Authenticator/Supplicant/Group Nonce. This is the EAPOL-Key Key Nonce field.
- MIC: Integrity check which is generated using the EAPOL-Key MIC Key. This is the EAPOL-30 Key MIC field.
- GTK: Group temporal key which is encrypted using the EAPOL-Key Encryption Key. This is the EAPOL-Key Data field.

33 **8.5.3 4-way handshake**

- 34 RSN defines an IEEE 802.1X protocol called the 4-way handshake. The 4-way handshake confirms the
- 35 liveness of the STAs communicating directly with each other over the IEEE 802.11 link, guarantees the
- 36 freshness of the their shared session key, binds the PMK to the MAC addresses of the communicating
- 37 STAs, and synchronizes the usage of the key to secure the IEEE 802.11 link. The handshake completes the
- 38 IEEE 802.1X authentication process. The information flow of the 4-way handshake is

1 1. Authenticator \rightarrow Supplicant: EAPOL-Key(0,0,1,0,0,P,0,ANonce,0,0) 2 2. Supplicant \rightarrow Authenticator: EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,0,P,0,SNonce,MIC,RSN IE) 3 3. Authenticator \rightarrow Supplicant: EAPOL-Key(0,1,1,1,0,P,IV,ANonce,MIC,RSN IE) 4 4. Supplicant \rightarrow Authenticator: EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,0,P,0,0,MIC,0) 5 Here EAPOL-Key(·) denotes an EAPOL-Key message conveying the specified argument list, using the 6 notation introduced in 8.5.2.1. 7 8 ANonce is a nonce the Authenticator contributes. ANonce has the same value in messages 1 and 3. 9 SNonce is a nonce from the Supplicant. It assumes the same values in messages 2 and 4. 10 P means the pairwise bit is set. MIC is computed over the body of the containing EAPOL-Key message (with the MIC field first 11 12 zeroed before the computation) using the key MK defined in 8.5.1.2. 13 RSN IE represents the appropriate RSN IEs. 14 Informative Note: While the MIC calculation is the same in each direction the Ack bit is different in each 15 direction It is set in messages from the Authenticator and not set in messages from the Supplicant. 4-way 16 handshake requests from the Supplicant have the Request bit set. The Authenticator and Supplicant must check 17 these bits to stop reflection attacks. 18 8.5.3.1 Message 1 19 Message 1 uses of the following values for each of the EAPOL-Key message fields 20 Descriptor Type = 25421 Key Information. 22 Version = 1 (RC4 encryption with HMAC-MD5) or 2 (AES-128-CBC encryption with 23 AES-128-CBC-MAC) 24 Key Type = 1 (Pairwise) Key Index = 0 – Pairwise keys use KeyID 025 26 Install flag = 027 Kev Ack = 128 Key MIC = 029 Secure = 030 Error = 031 Request = 032 Reserved = 0 – unused by this protocol version 33 Key Length = $16 - all\ 802.11$ keys are 16 octets in length 34 Key Replay Counter = n – to allow Authenticator to match the right Message 2 from Supplicant 35 Key Nonce = ANonce 36 Key IV = 0 – unused by the 4-way handshake

37

38

Key RSC = 0

Key ID = 0 - reserved

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Message 1. If not, it silently discards the message. Otherwise, the Authenticator

1. derives PTK and

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- 1 2. verifies the Message 2 MIC. If the MIC is not valid, the Authenticator silently discards the packet.
 2 If the MIC is valid, the Authenticator
- 3 3. checks that the RSN IE bit-wise matches that from the (re)association request message. If these are not exactly the same, the Authenticator uses MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request to terminate the association. If they do match bit-wise, the Authenticator
- 6 4. constructs message 3.

8.5.3.3 Message 3

- 8 Message 3 uses of the following values for each of the EAPOL-Key message fields
- 9 Descriptor Type = 254
- 10 Key Information.

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- Version = 1 (RC4 encryption with HMAC-MD5) or 2 (AES-128-CBC encryption with
- 12 AES-128-CBC-MAC) same as Message 1
- 13 Key Type = 1 (Pairwise) same as Message 1
- 14 Key Index = 0 Same as Message 1
- Install = 0/1 0 only if AP does not support key mapping keys
- 16 Key Ack = 1
- 17 Key MIC = 1
- 18 Secure = 0 (Group key handshake to come) or 1 (no group key handshake)
- 19 Error = 0 same as Message 1
- Request = 0 same as Message 1
- Reserved = 0 unused by this protocol version
- 22 Key Length = 16
- 23 Key Replay Counter = n which transaction does this belong to?
- 24 Key Nonce = ANonce same as Message 1
- Key IV = 0 unused by the 4-way handshake
- Key RSC = starting sequence number Authenticator's STA will use in packets protected by PTK
- 27 (normally 0)
- 28 Key ID = 0 reserved
- Key MIC = MIC(MK, EAPOL) MIC computed over the body of this EAPOL-Key message with the Key MIC field first initialized to 0.
- 31 Key Data Length = length in octets of included RSN IE
- 32 Key Data = included RSN IE in a BSS, the AP's Beacon/Probe RSN IE
- 33 The Authenticator sends Message 3 to the Supplicant.
- 34 On reception of message 3, the Supplicant verifies the Replay Counter is not an already used value or the
- 35 ANonce differs from that in Message 1. If so, it silently discards the message. Otherwise, the Supplicant
- verifies the Message 3 MIC. If this is invalid, the Supplicant silently discards. Otherwise the
 Supplicant
- 38 2. updates the last-seen value of the Replay Counter,
- 39 3. constructs Message 4,
- 4. sends Message 4 to the Authenticator, and

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- 1 5. uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request to configure the IEEE 802.11 to send and receive class 3 unicast MPDUs protected by the PTK,
- Informative Note: after configuring the PTK into the IEEE 802.11 MAC, the STA must still be able to receive Message 3 in the clear, to handle the case where its Message 4 does not arrive at the AP.
- Informative Note: If Message 4 is lost and the Authenticator retries Message 3, then the STA will resend the response protected by the temporal key as well as the MK.

8.5.3.4 Message 4

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Message 4 uses of the following values for each of the EAPOL-Key message fields

```
9
               Descriptor Type = 254
10
               Key Information.
                       Version = 1 (RC4 encryption with HMAC-MD5) or 2 (AES-128-CBC encryption with
11
12
                       AES-128-CBC-MAC) - same as Message 1
13
                       Key Type = 1 (Pairwise) – same as Message 1
14
                       Key Index = 0
15
                       Install = 0
16
                       Key Ack = 0 – This is the last message
                       Key MIC = 1
17
18
                       Secure = 0 or 1 – same as Message 3
19
                       Error = 0
20
                       Request = 0
21
                       Reserved = 0 – unused by this protocol version
22
               Kev Length = 16
23
               Key Replay Counter = n – which transaction does this belong to?
24
               Key Nonce = 0 - \text{not used in Message 4}.
25
               Key IV = 0 – unused by the 4-way handshake
26
               Key RSC = starting sequence number Supplicant's STA will use in packets protected by PTK
27
               (normally 0)
28
               Kev ID = 0 - reserved
29
               Key MIC = MIC(MK, EAPOL) – MIC computed over the body of this EAPOL-Key message with
30
                     the Key MIC field first initialized to 0.
               Key Data Length = 0
31
32
               Key Data = 0.
```

- The Supplicant sends Message 4 to the authenticator. Note that it is protected by the agreed upon temporal key as well as the PTK.
- On receipt, the Authenticator verifies that the Replay Counter value is one that it used on this 4-way handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. Otherwise, the Authenticator
- 1. checks the MIC, and if invalid, silently discards the packet; if it is valid, the Authenticator otherwise
- 39 2. uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request to configure the PTK into the IEEE 802.11 MAC.
- 40 3. The Authenticator finally updates the Replay Counter, so that it will use a fresh value if a rekey becomes necessary.

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8.5.3.5 4-way handshake implementation considerations

If the Authenticator does not receive a reply to its messages, its AP shall retry up to three times at one second intervals; if it still has not received a response after these retries, then the Authenticator's AP should disassociate the STA.

If the STA does not receive the initial message when it expects to, it should disassociate, deauthenticate, and try another AP/STA.

Informative Note: The timeout should be larger than the short retry timeout.

The Authenticator should ignore EAPOL-Key messages it is not expecting in reply to messages it has sent or EAPOL-Key messages with the Ack bit set. This stops an attacker from sending the first message to the supplicant who responds to the Authenticator.

- An implementation should save the EAPOL-Key MIC key MK and EAPOL-Key encryption key TK beyond the 4-way handshake, as they are needed by the Group Key handshake and to recover from TKIP MIC failures.
- The Supplicant uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request to configure the temporal keys TK1, TK2, ... from 8.5.1 into its STA after sending Message 4 to the Authenticator.
- Informative Note: If the RSN IE check for the second or third message fails, IEEE 802.1X should log an error and deauthenticate the peer.
- Informative Note: The Supplicant should check that if the RSN IE specifies a unicast cipher is used then the 4-way handshake did specify that the Pairwise key is configured to the encryption/integrity engine.

8.5.3.6 Example 4-way handshake (Informative)




Figure 50—Example 4-way handshake

After IEEE 802.1X authentication per se completes by the AP sending an EAP-Success, the AP initiates two Key exchanges: the 4-way handshake and the Group key handshake. The 4-way handshake consists of:

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- 1. The Authenticator sending an EAPOL-Key message containing an ANonce.
- 2 2. The Supplicant derives a PTK from ANonce and SNonce.
 - 3. The Supplicant sends an EAPOL-Key message containing SNonce, the RSN information element from the (Re)associate request, and a MIC.
 - 4. The Authenticator derives PTK from ANonce and SNonce and validates the MIC in the EAPOL-Key message.
 - 5. The Authenticator sends an EAPOL-Key message containing ANonce, the RSN IE from its Beacon or Probe Response messages, MIC, and whether to install the temporal keys.
 - 6. The Supplicant sends an EAPOL-Key message to confirm that the temporal keys are installed.
- 10 The AP typically follows this with the initial Group key update.
- Informative Note: Step 6 could be eliminated from the protocol when Pairwise keys are not being used for encryption/integrity, but for consistency it has been included in all cases.
- Informative Note: The "Initial exchange complete" bit is set in the last message from the Authenticator to the Supplicant to inform the Supplicant that the last key required to initialize the Supplicant has been sent. Once set the "Initial exchange complete" bit should be set in any EAPOL-Key messages from the Authenticator until a 4-way handshake is initiated.

8.5.3.7 4-way handshake analysis (Informative)

- 18 First we want to make the trust assumptions explicit. The protocol assumes the PMK is known only by the
- 19 Supplicant's STA and the Authenticator's STA, and that the Supplicant's STA uses IEEE 802 address SA,
- 20 and the Authenticator's STA uses IEEE 802 address AA. In many instantiations the RSN architecture
- 21 immediately breaks the first assumption, since the IEEE 802.1X AS also knows the PMK. Therefore, we
- require additional assumptions (a) the AS does not expose the PMK to other parties, (b) the AS does not
- 23 masquerade as the Supplicant to the Authenticator, (c) the AS does not masquerade as the Authenticator to
- 24 the Supplicant, (d) the AS does not masquerade as the Supplicant's STA, and (e) the AS does not
- 25 masquerade as the Authenticator's STA. The protocol also assumes this particular Supplicant/Authenticator
- pair are authorized to know this PMK and to use it in the 4-way handshake. If any of these assumptions are
- broken, then the protocol fails to provide any security guarantees.
- 28 The protocol also assumes that the AS delivers the correct PMK to the AP with IEEE 802 address AA, and
- that the non-AP STA with IEEE 802 address AP hosts the Supplicant that negotiated the PMK with the AS.
- 30 None of the protocols defined by IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1X permit the AS, the Authenticator, the
- 31 Supplicant, or either STA to verify these assumptions.
- 32 The protocol supplies no mechanism to identify the correct PMK to use. This implies that a STA must
- negotiate a new PMK each time it visits an AP.
- 34 The PTK derivation step
- 35 PTK ← PRF-X(PMK, "Pairwise key expansion" || Min(AA,SA) || Max(AA, SA) ||
 36 Min(ANonce,SNonce) || Max(ANonce,SNonce))
- 37 performs a number of functions:
- Including the AA and SA in the computation (1) binds the PTK to the communicating STAs and (2) prevents undetected man-in-the-middle attacks against 4-way handshake messages between the STAs with these two IEEE 802 addresses.

- If ANonce is randomly selected, including ANonce (1) guarantees the STA at IEEE 802 address AA that PTK is fresh, (2) that Messages 2 and 4 are live, and (3) uniquely identifies PTK as <AA, ANonce>.
- If SNonce is randomly selected, including SNonce (1) guarantees the STA at IEEE 802 address SA that PTK is fresh, (2) that Message 3 is live, and (3) uniquely identifies PTK as <SA, SNonce>.
- 6 Choosing the nonces randomly helps prevent pre-computation attacks. With unpredictable nonces, a man-
- 7 in-the-middle attack that uses the Supplicant to pre-compute messages to attack the Authenticator cannot
- 8 progress beyond Message 2, and a similar attack against the Supplicant cannot progress beyond Message 3.
- 9 The protocol can be executed further if predictable nonces are used.
- 10 Message 1 delivers ANonce to the Supplicant and initiates negotiation for a new PTK. It identifies AA as
- 11 the peer STA to the Supplicant's STA. If an adversary modifies either of the addresses or ANonce, the
- 12 Authenticator will detect the result when validating the MIC in Message 2. Message 1 does not carry a
- 13 MIC, as it is impossible for the Supplicant to distinguish this message from a replay without maintaining
- state of all security associations through all time (PMK might be a static key).
- 15 Message 2 delivers SNonce to the Authenticator, so it can derive the PTK. If the Authenticator selected
- ANonce randomly, Message 2 also demonstrates to the Authenticator that the Supplicant is live, the PTK is
- 17 fresh, and that there is no man-in-the-middle, as the PTK includes the IEEE 802 MAC addresses of both.
- 18 Inclusion of ANonce in the PKT derivation also protects against replay. The MIC prevents undetected
- 19 modification of Message 2 contents.
- 20 Message 3 confirms to the Supplicant that there is no man-in-the-middle. If the Supplicant selected SNonce
- 21 randomly, it also demonstrates that the PTK is fresh and that the Authenticator is live. The MIC again
- prevents undetected modification of Message 2.
- 23 Message 4 serves no cryptographic purpose.
- 24 Then the 4-way handshake uses a correct but unusual mechanism to guard against replay. As noted above,
- 25 ANonce provides replay protection to the Authenticator, and SNonce to the Supplicant. In most session
- 26 initiation protocols, replay protection is accomplished explicitly by selecting a nonce randomly and
- 27 requiring the peer to reflect the received nonce in a response message. The 4-way handshake instead mixes
- ANonce and SNonce into the PTK, and replays are detected implicitly by MIC failures. In particular, the
- 29 Replay Counter field appears to serve no cryptographic purpose in the 4-way handshake. Its presence is not
- detrimental, however, and it seems to play a useful role as a minor performance optimization for processing
- 31 stale instances of Message 2. This replay mechanism is correct, but its implicit nature makes the protocol
- 32 harder to understand than an explicit approach.
- 33 It is critical to the correctness of the 4-way handshake that at least one bit differs in each message. Within
- 34 the 4-way handshake, Message 1 can be recognized as the only one with the MIC bit clear, meaning
- 35 Message 1 does not include the MIC, while Messages 2-4 do. Message 3 differs from Message 2 by not
- asserting the Ack bit and from Message 4 by asserting the Ack Bit. Message 2 differs from Message 4 by
- including the RSN IE.
- 38 Request messages cannot be confused with 4-way handshake messages, since the former asserts the Request
- 39 bit and 4-way handshake messages do not. Group key handshake messages cannot be mistaken for 4-way
- 40 handshake messages, since they assert a different Key Type.

8.5.4 Group key handshake

- 42 The Authenticator uses the Group Key handshake to send a new Group Transient Key (GTK) to the
- 43 Supplicant. The Authenticator may initiate this as the final stage of authenticating a Supplicant.

- 1 If the Authenticator is the GTK authenticator, and if the group key cipher suite is TKIP, the authenticator
- 2 shall initiate the exchange if its AP detects a TKIP data integrity failure using the GTK, when a Supplicant
- disassociates or deauthenticates, or on a management event.
- 4 Authenticator \rightarrow Supplicant: EAPOL(1,1,1,0,Key Id,G, RSC, GNonce, MIC,GTK)
- 5 Supplicant \rightarrow Authenticator: EAPOL(1,0,0,0,G,0,0,MIC,0)
- 6 Here
- KeyId identifies the WEP key id the Authenticator's STA will use when sending traffic protected by the GTK.
- RSC denotes the last packet sequence number sent using the GTK.
- GTK denotes the GTK encrypted using the key EK defined in 8.5.1.
- MIC is computed over the body of the containing EAPOL-Key message (with the MIC field zeroed for the computation) using the key MK defined in 8.5.1.
- Informative Note: The Supplicant may trigger a Group Key Update by sending an EAPOL-Key message with the Request bit set to 1 and by the type of the Group key bit.
- 15 An Authenticator shall do a 4-way handshake before a Group Key Update if both are required to be done.
- Informative Note: The Supplicant does not require the GNonce but the Authenticator should send the Nonce it used to derive the GTK to help with interoperable issues. Rather, GNonce is useful for debugging.
- Informative Note: The Authenticator cannot initiate the Group Key handshake until the 4-way handshake completes successfully.
- 20 If an AP cannot send the EAPOL-Key message containing a Group Key to a STA, the AP may queue the
- 21 message. If the AP deletes the message, the AP should send a Deauthentication message and then delete the
- 22 association state by setting the L2Failure event in the Authenticator state machine.

23 **8.5.4.1 Message 1**

24 Message 1 uses of the following values for each of the EAPOL-Key message fields

```
25
              Descriptor Type = 254
26
              Key Information.
27
                      Version Number = 1 (RC4 encryption with HMAC-MD5) or 2 (AES-128-CBC
28
                      encryption with AES-128-CBC-MAC)
29
                      Key Type = 0 (Group)
30
                      KeyID = 1, 2, or 3
31
                      Install flag = 1
32
                      Key Ack = 1
33
                      Kev MIC = 1
34
                      Secure = 1
35
                      Error = 0
                      Request = 0
36
37
                      Reserved = 0
              Key Length = 16
38
```

Key Replay Counter = n

```
1
                Key Nonce = GNonce
 2
                Key IV = version specific
 3
                Key RSC = last transmit sequence number for the GTK.
 4
                \text{Key ID} = 0 - \text{reserved}
 5
                Key\ MIC = MIC(MK, EAPOL)
 6
                Key Material Length = 32
 7
                Key Material = version specific
 8
       The Authenticator sends Message 1 to the supplicant.
 9
                Informative Note: To prevent replay attacks of packets sent prior to joining the BSS, the KeyRSC is sent with
10
                the GTK so that newly associated STAs start with the current value of the Group Key sequence counter. It
11
                may take a short time for the STA to get the current RSC from the AP, so packets affecting the value of the
12
                RSC may be sent between the current value and that obtained from the AP. Therefore some small window of
13
                vulnerability to replay attack necessarily exists.
14
       On reception of Message 1, the Supplicant
15
               verifies that the Replay counter has not yet been seen before, i.e., its value is strictly larger than
                that in any other EAPOL-Key message received thus far during this session.
16
17
               verifies that the MIC is valid, i.e., it uses the MK that is part of the PTK to verify that there is no
18
                data integrity error.
19
               uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request to configure the temporal GTK into its IEEE 802.11 MAC,
20
                and responds by creating and sending Message 2 of the Group Key handshake to the Authenticator
21
                and increment the Replay Counter.
22
                Informative Note: The Authenticator must increment and use a new Replay Counter value on every Message
23
                1 instance, even retries, because the Message 2 responding to an earlier Message 1 may have been lost. If the
24
                Authenticator did not increment the Replay Counter, the Supplicant will discard the retry, and no responding
25
                Message 2 will ever arrive.
26
       8.5.4.2 Message 2
27
       Message 2 uses of the following values for each of the EAPOL-Key message fields
28
                Descriptor Type = 254
29
                Key Information.
30
                         Version number = 1 (RC4 encryption with HMAC-MD5) or 2 (AES-128-CBC encryption
31
                         with AES-128-CBC-MAC) - same as Message 1
32
                         Key Type = 0 (Group) – same as Message 1
                         KevID = 1, 2, or 3 – same as Message 1
33
34
                         Install = 0
35
                         Key Ack = 0
36
                         Key MIC = 1
37
                         Secure = 1
38
                         Error = 0
39
                         Request = 0
40
                         Reserved = 0
41
                Key Length = 16
```

Key Replay Counter = n - same as Message 1

Key Nonce = 0
 Key IV = 0
 Key MIC = MIC(MK, EAPOL)
 Key Material Length = 0

5

7

8

10

15

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6 On reception of Message 2, the Authenticator


Key Material = 0.

- 1. verifies that the Replay Counter matches one it has used in the Group Key handshake.
- 2. verifies that the MIC is valid, i.e., it uses the MK that is part of the PTK to verify that there is no data integrity error.

8.5.4.3 Group key distribution implementation considerations

- If the authenticator does not receive a reply to its messages, its AP should retry up to three times at one
- 12 second intervals; if it still has not received a response after this, then the Authenticator's AP should
- disassociate/deauthenticate the STA.

14 8.5.4.4 Example Group key distribution (Informative)



- The Group key handshake state machine changes the Group key in use by the network. The following steps occur:
- 1. The Authenticator generates a new GTK. It encrypts the GTK and sends an EAPOL-Key message containing the GTK (Message 1), along with the last sequence number used with the GTK (RSC).
- 2. On receiving the EAPOL-Key message, the Supplicant validates the MIC, decrypts the GTK, and uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request primitive to configure the GTK and the RSC in its STA.
- 23 3. The Supplicant then constructs and sends an EAPOL-Key message in acknowledgement to the Authenticator.
- 4. On receiving the EAPOL-Key message, the Authenticator validates the MIC. If the GTK is not already configured into IEEE 802.11, after it has delivered the GTK to all associated STAs, it uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request primitive to configure the GTK into 802.11.

7 8

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8.5.5 Supplicant key management state machine

- 2 There is one state machine for Supplicants. The Supplicant shall reinitialize the Supplicant state machine
- 3 whenever its system initializes. A Supplicant enters the AUTHENICATION state on an event from the
- 4 MAC that requests another STA to be authenticated. A Supplicant enters the STAKEYSTART state on
- 5 receiving an EAPOL-Key messages from the Authenticator. If the MIC on any of the EAPOL-Key
 - messages fails, the Supplicant silently discards the packet.




Figure 52—Supplicant key management state machine

UCT means the event triggers an immediate transition.

- 10 This state machine does not use timeouts, etc. The IEEE 802.1X state machine has timeouts that recover
- 11 from Authentication failures, etc.
- 12 The Management entity will send an AuthenticationRequest event when it wants an Authenticator
- 13 authenticated, this can be before or after the station associates to the AP. In an IBSS environment the event
- will be generated when a Probe Response is received.

8.5.5.1 Supplicant state machine states

- 16 **DISCONNECTED**: A STA's supplicant enters this state when IEEE 802.1X authentication fails. The
- supplicant executes StaDisconnect and enters the INITIALIZE state.
- 18 INITIALIZE: A STA's supplicant enters this state from the DISCONNECTED state, when it receives
- 19 disassociate or Deauthentication messages, or when the STA initializes, causing the STA's supplicant to
- 20 initialize the key state variables.
- 21 **AUTHENTICATION**: A STA's supplicant enters this state when it sends an IEEE 802.1X
- 22 AuthenticationRequest to authenticate an SSID.

- 1 STAKEYSTART: A STA's supplicant enters this state when it receives an EAPOL-Key message. All the
- 2 information to process the EAPOL-Key message is in the message and is described in procedure
- 3 StaProcessEAPOL-Key.
- 4 **KEYUPDATE**: A STA's supplicant enters this state when its STA requires a key update from the
- 5 authenticator. This may be because of a management event or because of a data integrity failure occurs.
- 6 From this state the supplicant sends an EAPOL-Key message to the authenticator to update the transient
- 7 keys. The Request bit shall be set.

8 8.5.5.2 Supplicant state machine variables

- 9 DeauthenticationRequest The Supplicant set this variable to TRUE if the Supplicant's STA reports it has
- 10 received disassociate or Deauthentication messages.
- 11 AuthenticationRequest The Supplicant sets this variable to TRUE if its STA's IEEE 802.11 Management
- 12 Entity reports it wants an SSID authenticated. This can be on association or at other times.
- 13 AuthenticationFailed The Supplicant sets this variable to TRUE if the IEEE 802.1X authentication failed.
- 14 The Supplicant uses the MLME-DISASSOCIATE request to cause its STA to disassociate from the
- authenticator's STA.
- 16 EAPOLKeyReceived The Supplicant sets this variable to TRUE when it receives an EAPOL-Key
- 17 message.
- 18 IntegrityFailed The Supplicant sets this variable to TRUE when its STA reports that a fatal data integrity
- 19 error (e.g. Michael failure) has occurred.
- 20 Informative Note: A Michael failure is not the same as MICVerified since IntegrityFailed is generated if the
- 21 MAC integrity check fails, MICVerified is generated from validating the EAPOL-Key MIC. Note also the
- 22 STA does not generate this event for CCMP or WRAP, since countermeasures are not required.
- 23 MICVerified The Supplicant sets this variable to TRUE if the MIC on the received EAPOL-Key message
- 24 verifies as correct. The Supplicant silently discards any EAPOL-Key message received with an invalid
- 25 MIC.
- 26 Counter The Supplicant uses this variable as a global counter used for generating nonces.
- 27 *SNonce* This variable represents the Supplicant's nonce.
- 28 *PTK* This variable represents the current PTK.
- 29 TPTK This variable represents the current PTK until the third message of the 4-way handshake arrives
- 30 and is verified.
- GTK/J This variable represents the current GTKs for each group key index.
- 32 *PMK* This variable represents the current PMK.
- 33 802.1X::XXX denotes another IEEE 802.1X state variables XXX not specified herein.
- **8.5.5.3 Procedures**
- 35 STADisconnect. The Supplicant invokes this procedure to disassociate and deauthenticate its STA from the
- 36 AP.
- 37 **RemoveGTK** The Supplicant invokes this procedure to remove the GTK from its STA.

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- 1 $\mathbf{MIC}(x)$ The Supplicant invokes this procedure to compute a Message Integrity Code of the data x.
- 2 **CheckMIC()** The supplicant invokes this procedure to verify a MIC computed by the MIC() function.
- 3 **StaProcessEAPOL-Key** The Supplicant invokes this procedure to process a received EAPOL-Key message. The pseudo code for this procedure is:

```
5
               StaProcessEAPOL-Key (S, M, A, T, N, K, RSC, ANonce, GNonce, MIC, GTK)
                         TPTK \leftarrow PTK
 6
 7
                         TSNonce \leftarrow 0
                         UpdatePTK \leftarrow 0
 8
 9
                         State \leftarrow UNKNOW
10
                         if M = 1 then
                                 if Check MIC(PTK, EAPOL-Key message) fails then
11
12
                                          State \leftarrow FAILED
13
                                 else
                                          State \leftarrow MICOK
14
                                  endif
15
16
                         endif
17
                         if K = P then
                                 if State ≠ FAILED then
18
19
                                          if PSK exists then – PSK is a pre-shared key
20
                                                   PMK \leftarrow PSK
21
                                          else
22
                                                   PMK \leftarrow Master Session Key from 1X
23
                                          endif
24
                                          TSNonce \leftarrow SNonce
25
                                          TPTK \leftarrow Calc \ PTK(ANonce, TSNonce)
                                 endif
26
27
                                 if State = MICOK then
28
                                          PTK \leftarrow TPTK
29
                                           UpdatePTK \leftarrow TRUE
30
                                 endif
31
                         else if State = MICOK then --K = G
32
                                 if GTK[N] \leftarrow Decrypt GTK succeeds then
33
                                          if Set GTK(N, T, RSC, GTK[N]) fails then
34
                                                   invoke MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request
35
                                          endif
36
                                 else
37
                                          State \leftarrow FAILED
38
                                  endif
39
                         else
40
                                  State \leftarrow FAILED
41
                         endif
42
                         if A = 1 and State \neq FAILED then
43
                                  Send EAPOL(0, 1, 0, 0, 0, K, 0, TSNonce, 0, MIC(TPTK), 0)
44
                         endif
45
                         if UpdatePTK = 1 then
46
                                 if Set PTK(N, TRUE, RSC, PTK) fails then
47
                                          invoke MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request
48
                         endif
49
                         if State = MICOK and S = 1 then
50
                                  802.1X::VirtualSecure = TRUE
51
                         endif
```

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Here UNKNOWN, MICOK and FAILED are values of the variable State used in the Supplicant pseudo

handshake, tear-down, and general clean-up.

instance of this state machine exists for each association and handles the initialization, 4-way

38

1 2 3	2.	The second state machine (PTK Group Key state machine) uses the REKEYNEGOTIATING, KEYERROR and REKEYESTABLISHED states. An instance of this state machine exists for each association and handles transfer of the GTK to the associated client.
4 5 6 7	3.	The third state machine (Group Key state machine) uses the SETKEYS and SETKEYSDONE states. A single instance of this state machine exists on the Authenticator. It changes the Group key when required, triggers all the PTK Group Key state machines and updates the IEEE 802.11 MAC in the Authenticator's AP when all STAs have the updated Group key.
8		
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


Figure 53—Authenticator state machine

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- 1 Since there are two GTKs, responsibility for updating these keys is given to the Group Key state machine.
- 2 That is, this state machine determines which GTK is in use at any time. When a first STA associates, the
- Group Key state machine has not been started and is started by GlnitAKeys variable when the 4-way
- handshake completes. The Group Key state machine initializes the value of the Group Key and then triggers
- the PTK Group Key state machine, which actually sends the Group Key to the associated station.
- 6 When a second STA associates, the Group Key state machine is already initialized, and a Group Key is
- already available and in use. The PTK Group Key state machine is immediately triggered from the 7
- PTKINITDONE state and sends the current Group Key to the new station. 8
- 9 When the GTK is to be updated the GTKReKey variable is set. The SETKEYS state updates the Group Key
- 10 and triggers all the PTK Group Key state machines that current exist—one per associated STA). Each PTK
- Group Key state machine sends the Group Key to its station. When all the stations have received the Group 11
- Key (or failed to receive the key), the SETKEYSDONE state is executed which updates the APs 12
- 13 encryption/integrity engine with the new key.
- 14 Both the PTK state machine and the PTK Group Key state machine both use received EAPOL-Key
- 15 messages as an event to change states. The PTK state machine only uses EAPOL-Key messages with the
- 16 key type set to Pairwise key and the PTK Group Key state machine only uses EAPOL-Key messages with
- 17 the key type set to Group key.

8.5.6.1 Authenticator state machine states 18

- 19 **DEAUTHENTICATE:** This state is entered is an EAPOL-Key message is received and fails its MIC
- 20 check. It sends a Deauthentication message to the Access Point and enters the INITIALIZE state.
- 21 **DISCONNECTED:** The Authenticator enters this state when disassociate or Deauthentication messages is
- 22 received.
- 23 INITIALIZE: The Authenticator enters this state from the DISCONNECTED state, when
- 24 DeauthenticationRequest event occurs or when the STA initializes. This state initializes the key state
- 25 variables.
- 26 AUTHENTICATION: The Authenticator enters this state when the STA's management entity sends an
- 27 AuthentiationRequest to authenticate an SSID.
- 28 INITMSK: The authenticator enters this state when the IEEE 802.1X AS signals a successful
- 29 authentication, or it a pre-shared key is available. If a RadiusKey is supplied it goes to the PTKSTART
- 30 state, otherwise it goes to the DISCONNECTED state.
- 31 Informative Note. An Authenticator should not allow itself to negotiate IEEE 802.1X if it is not fully 32 configured.
- 33 **PTKSTART:** The Authenticator enters this state from **INITMSK** to start the 4-way handshake, or if no
- 34 response to the 4-way handshake occurs.
- 35 PTKINITNEGOTIATING: The Authenticator enters this state when it receives the second EAPOL-Key
- message of the 4-way handshake. 36
- 37 **UPDATEKEYS:** The Authenticator enters this state when it receives an EAPOL-Key message is received
- 38 from the Supplicant to initiate the 4-way handshake. The key type in the EAPOL-Key message must be set
- 39 to Pairwise key and the Request bit must be set.
- 40 MICFAILURE: The Authenticator enters this state when EAPOL-Key MIC failure occurs—detected
- either locally, or signaled by peer Supplicant—when the key type indicates a Pairwise key and the Request 41
- 42 and Error bits are both set.

1	REKEYNEGOTIATING: The Authenticator enters this state when a GTK is to be sent to the Supplicant.
2 3 4	Informative Note: The TxRx flag for sending a Group Key is always the opposite of whether the Pairwise Key is used for data encryption/integrity or not. If a Pairwise key is used for encryption/integrity then the station never transmits with the Group Key otherwise the station uses the Group Key for transmit.
5 6	REKEYESTABLISHED: The Authenticator enters this state when it receives an EAPOL-Key message from the supplicant with the key type set to Group key.
7 8	KEYERROR: The Authenticator enters this state if the EAPOL-Key acknowledgement for the Group key update is not received before a timeout.
9	SETKEYS: The Authenticator enters this state when the GTK is to be updated at all Supplicants.
10	SETKEYSDONE: The Authenticator enters this state when the Group key update has completed.
11 12	Informative Note: SETKEYSDONE calls SetGTK to set the Group key for all associated stations if this fails all communication via this key will fail and the AP needs to detect and recover from this situation.
13	8.5.6.2 Authenticator state machine variables
14 15	<i>AuthenticationRequest</i> – This variable is set TRUE if the STA's IEEE 802.11 Management Entity wants an SSID to be authenticated. This can be set when the STA associates or at other times.
16 17	ReAuthenticationRequest – This variable is set TRUE if the IEEE 802.1X Authenticator received an eapStart or 802.1X::reAuthenticate is set.
18 19	DeauthenticationRequest – This variable is set TRUE if a disassociation or Deauthentication message is received.
20	RadiusKeyAvailable – This variable is True is a Radius key was supplied.
21 22 23 24 25 26 27	EAPOLKeyReceived – This variable is set TRUE when an EAPOL-Key message is received. EAPOL-Key messages that are received in respond to an EAPOL-Key message sent by the Authenticator must contain the same Replay Counter as the Replay Counter in the transmitted message. EAPOL-Key messages that contain different Replay Counters should be discarded. An EAPOL-Key message that is sent by the Supplicant in response to an EAPOL-Key message from the Authenticator must not have the Ack bit set. EAPOL-Key messages sent by the Supplicant not in response to an EAPOL-Key message from the Authenticator must have the Request bit set.
28 29	Informative Note: EAPOL-Key messages with Key Type of Pairwise and a non-zero key index should be ignored.
30 31	Informative Note: EAPOL-Key messages with Key Type of Group and an invalid key index should be ignored.
32 33 34 35 36	Informative Note: When an EAPOL-Key message with the Ack bit not set is received then it is expected as a reply to a message that the Authenticator sent and the replay counter is checked against the replay counter used in the sent EAPOL-Key message. When an EAPOL-Key message with the Request bit set is received then a replay counter for these messages is used, which is a different replay counter than the replay counter used for sending messages to the Supplicant.
37 38	<i>TimeoutEvt</i> - This variable is set TRUE if the EAPOL_Key packet sent out fails to obtain a response from the Supplicant. The variable may be set by management action, or by the operation of a timeout while in the

PTKSTART and REKEYNEGOTIATING states.

- 1 TimeoutCtr This variable maintains the count of EAPOL-Key receive timeouts. It is incremented each
- 2 time a timeout occurs on EAPOLKeyRcvd event and is initialized to 0. Clause 8.6.5.3 contains details of
- 3 the timeout values. The Replay Counter for the EAPOL-Key message shall be incremented on each
- 4 transmission of the EAPOL-Key message.
- 5 L2Failure. This variable is set if IEEE 802.11 fails to send the EAPOL-Key message containing the
- 6 Group key to the station.
- 7 MICVerified This variable is set to TRUE if the MIC on the received EAPOL Key packet is verified and
- 8 is correct. Any EAPOL-Key messages with an invalid MIC will be dropped and ignored.
- 9 GTKAuthenticator This is TRUE if the Authenticator is on an AP or it is the designated Authenticator for
- an IBSS.
- 11 Integrity Failed This is set to TRUE when a data integrity error (i.e. Michael failure) occurs.
- 12 Information Note: This is not the same as MICVerified since IntegrityFailed is generated if the MAC
- integrity check fails, MICVerified is generated from validating the EAPOL-Key MIC.
- 14 GKeyDoneStations Count of number of stations left to have their Group key updated.
- 15 *GTKRekey* This variable is set to TRUE when a Group key update is required.
- 16 GInitAKeys This variable is set to TRUE when the Group key update state machine is required.
- 17 GInitDone This variable is set to TRUE when the Group key update state machine has been initialized.
- 18 GUpdateStationKeys This variable is set to TRUE when a new Group key is available to be sent to
- 19 Supplicants.
- 20 GNoStations This variable counts the number of Authenticators so it is known how many Supplicants
- 21 need to be sent the Group key.
- 22 GkeyReady This variable is set to TRUE when a Group key has been sent to all current Supplicants. This
- is used by new Authenticator state machines to decide whether a Group key is available to immediately send
- to its Supplicant.
- 25 PInitAKeys This variable is set to TRUE when the Authenticator is ready to send a Group key to its
- 26 Supplicant after initialization.
- 27 *Counter* This variable is the global station Key Counter used for generating Nonces.
- 28 ANonce This variable holds the current Nonce to be used if the station is an Authenticator.
- 29 GNonce This variable holds the current Nonce to be used if the station is a Group key Authenticator.
- 30 GN, GM These are the current key indexes for Group keys. Swap(GM, GN) means that the global key
- 31 index in GN is swapped with the global key index in GM, so now GM and GN are reversed.
- 32 *PTK* This variable is the current Pairwise transient key.
- 33 *GTK*[]– This variable is the current Group transient keys for each Group key index.
- 34 *PMK* PMK is the buffer holding the current Pairwise Master Key.
- 35 *802.1X::XXX* the IEEE 802.1X state variable *XXX*.

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8.5.6.3 Authenticator state machine procedures

- 2 **STADisconnect**() Execution of this procedure disassociates and deauthenticates the station.
- 3 CalcGTK(x). Calculates the Group Transient Key(GTK) using GNonce as the nonce input to the PRF.
- 4 **RemoveGTK**(x)/**Remove PTK** Deletes GTK or PTK from encryption/integrity engine.
- 5 **MIC**(x) Computes a Message Integrity Code over the plaintext data.
- 6 **CheckMIC**(). Verifies the MIC computed by MIC() function.
- 7 Waitupto60() This procedure should stop the Authenticator state machines for all stations at this point if
- 8 the state machines enter this procedure until 60 seconds have gone by from the last exit from this procedure;
- 9 i.e. the first time this state machine is entered, it can return immediately. The next time it must stop here
- 10 until at least 60 seconds from the last time someone has left has gone by. If multiple state machines enter
- this procedure at the same time then 60 seconds must go by for each state machine to leave this procedure.

12 **8.5.7** Nonce generation (Informative)

- 13 All stations contain a global Key Counter which is 256 bits in size. It should be initialized at system boot up
- 14 time to a fresh cryptographic quality random number. Refer to Annex F.9 on random number generation.
- When the IEEE 802.1X initializes, it is recommended that IEEE 802.1X set the counter value to:
- PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter", Local MAC Address || Time)
- 17 The Local MAC Address should be AA on the Authenticator and SA on the Supplicant.
- 18 Random number should be the best possible random number possible and 256 bits in size. Time should be
- 19 the current time (from NTP or another time in NTP format) whenever possible. This initialization is to
- 20 ensure that different initial Key Counter values occur across system restarts whether a real-time clock is
- 21 available or not. The Key Counter must be incremented (all 256 bits) each time a value is used as a nonce or
- 22 IV. The Key Counter must not be allowed to wrap to the initialization value, and should be reinitialized
- using a new random number if this happens.

24 8.6 Mapping EAPOL keys to 802.11 keys

- 25 **8.6.1 Mapping PTK to TKIP keys**
- 26 8.5.1.2 defines the EAPOL temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from PTK.
- 27 A STA shall use TK1 as its input to the TKIP Phase 1 Mixing Function.
- 28 A STA shall use bits 0-63 of TK2 as the Michael key for MSDUs from the Authenticator's STA to the
- 29 Supplicant's STA.
- 30 A STA shall use bits 64-127 of TK2 as the Michael key for MSDUs from the STA with the larger MAC
- address to the STA with the smaller MAC address.
- 32 8.6.2 Mapping GTK to TKIP keys
- 33 8.5.1.3 defines the EAPOL temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from GTK.
- A STA shall use TK1 as the input to the TKIP Phase 1 Mixing Function.

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- A STA shall use bits 0-63 of TK2 as the Michael key for MSDUs from the Authenticator's STA to the STA
- 2
- 3 A STA shall use bits 64-127 of TK2 as the Michael key for MSDUs from the Supplicant's STA to the
- 4 Authenticator's STA.
- 5 8.6.3 Mapping PTK to WRAP keys
- 6 8.5.1.2 defines the EAPOL temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from PTK.
- 7 A STA shall use TK1 as the WRAP key for MSDUs between the two communicating STAs.
- 8 A STA shall not use TK 2 with WRAP.
- 9 8.6.4 Mapping GTK to WRAP keys
- 10 8.5.1.3 defines the EAPOL temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from GTK.
- 11 A STA shall use TK1 as the WRAP key for MSDUs between the two communicating STAs.
- 12 A STA shall not use TK2 with WRAP.
- 13 8.6.5 Mapping PTK to CCMP keys
- 14 8.5.1.2 defines the EAPOL temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from PTK.
- 15 A STA shall use TK1 as the CCMP key for MSDUs between the two communicating STAs.
- 16 A STA shall not use TK 2 with CCMP.
- 17 8.6.6 Mapping GTK to CCMP keys
- 18 8.5.1.3 defines the EAPOL temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from GTK.
- 19 A STA shall use TK1 as the CCMP key for MSDUs between the two communicating STAs.
- 20 A STA shall not use TK2 with CCMP.
- 21 8.6.7 Mapping GTK to WEP-40 keys
- 22 8.5.1.3 defines the EAPOL temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from GTK.
- A STA shall use bits 0-39 of TK1 as the WEP-40 key for MSDUs between the two communicating STAs.
- A STA shall not use TK2 with WEP-40.
- 25 8.6.8 Mapping GTK to WEP-104 keys
- 26 8.5.1.3 defines the EAPOL temporal keys TK1 and TK2 derived from GTK.
- 27 A STA shall use bits 0-103 of TK1 as the WEP-104 key for MSDUs between the two communicating
- 28 STAs.
- 29 A STA shall not use TK2 with WEP-104.

1 8.7 Temporal key processing

- Since IEEE 802.1X provides MSDU filtering based on port status, , the 802.11 MAC need not apply filtering except to support legacy WEP behavior in a TSN:
- 4 1. dott11PrivacyInvoked shall be true in order for a STA to apply RSN protections.
- 5 2. STAs protect all MSDUs when temporal keys are configured, and send and receives all MSDUs in the clear when temporal keys not configured.
- 7 3. STAs protect IEEE 802.1X messages only with a key-mapping key; STAs shall not protect IEEE 802.1X messages with default keys.
 - 4. STAs must always be prepared to send or receive IEEE 802.1X data messages in the clear.
- 5. An AP should disassociate and/or deauthenticate a station on receiving an IEEE 802.1X authFail event for the STA.

8.7.1 Per-MSDU Tx pseudo-code

9

12

on the meson is peculiar and
if dot11PrivacyInvoked = FALSE then
transmit the MSDU without protections
else
// If we find a suitable unicast or group key for the mode we are in
if (MSDU has an individual RA and dot11WEPKeyMappings has an entry for that RA
and dot11WEPKeyMappingsKeyBroadcast is false) or (the MDPU has a multicast RA
and the network type is IBSS and the network is RSN and there is an entry in
dot11KeyMapppings for the TA and dot11WEPKeyMappingsKeyBroadcast is true) then
if entry has $WEPOn = FALSE$ then
transmit the MSDU without protections
else
if that entry contains a null key then
discard the entire MSDU and generate an
MA-UNITDATA-STATUS.indication primitive to
notify LLC that the MSDU was undeliverable due to
a null WEP key
else
// Note that it is assumed that no entry will be in the key // mapping table of a cipher type that is unsupported.
Set the KeyID subfield of the IV field to zero.
if cipher type of entry is AES-CCM
Transmit the MSDU, to be protected after fragmentation
using AES-CCM and
dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID]
else if cipher type of entry is AES-OCB.
Protect MSDU with AES-OCB cipher and entry's key
Transmit the protected MSDU
else if cipher type of entry is TKIP
Compute MIC using Michael algorithm and entry's Tx
MIC key.
Append MIC to MSDU
Transmit the MSDU, to be protected with TKIP and
dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID]
else if cipher type of entry is WEP and dot11RSNEnabled = "false". Transmit the MSDU, to be protected with WEP and
dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID]
end if
endif

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1	endif
2 3	else // Else we didn't find a key but we are protected, so handle the default key case or discard
3	// But 1st, the following covers the case of an AP in a BSS with encryption, that accepts
4	// non-protected STAs into the BSS and so must transmit broadcasts as plaintext.
5	if MPDU has a group RA and the Privacy subfield of the Capability Information
6	field in this BSS is set to 0 then
7	the MPDU is transmitted without protections
8	else // No key found so try either default WEP
9	if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID] = null then
10	if Ethertype is 802.1X then
11	transmit the MPDU without protection
12	else
13	discard the MSDU and generate an
14	MA-UNITDATA-STATUS.indication primitive to
15	notify LLC that the entire MSDU was undeliverable
16	due to a null WEP key
17	else if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID] is not null
18	Set the KeyID subfield of the IV field to dot11WEPDefaultKeyID.
19	if cipher type of entry is AES-CCM
20	Transmit the MSDU, to be protected after fragmentation
21	using AES-CCM and
22	dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID]
23	else if cipher type of entry is AES-OCB.
24	Protect MSDU with AES-OCB cipher and entry's key
25	Transmit the protected MSDU
26	else if cipher type of entry is TKIP
27	Compute MIC using Michael algorithm and entry's Tx
28	MIC key.
29	Append MIC to MSDU
30	
31	Transmit the MSDU, to be protected with TKIP and
	dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID]
32	else if cipher type of entry is WEP and dot11RSNEnabled = "false".
33 34	Transmit the MSDU, to be protected with WEP and
	dot11WEPDefaultKeys[dot11WEPDefaultKeyID]
35	end if
36	endif
37	endif
38	endif
39	endif
40	8.7.2 Per MPDU Tx pseudo-code
	CITE TO THE DO TA POSSES ONLY
41	
41	if MDDII is marrhay of an MCDII that is to be two with a with out worth at
42	if MPDU is member of an MSDU that is to be transmitted without protections
43	transmit the MPDU without protections
44	else if MSDU that MPDU is a member of was protected using AES-OCB
45	Transmit the MPDU unaltered
46	else if MSDU that MPDU is a member of is to be protected using AES-CCM
47	Protect the MPDU using entry's key and AES-CCM
48	Transmit the MPDU
49	else if MSDU that MPDU is a member of is to be protected using TKIP
50	Protect the MPDU using TKIP encryption
51	Transmit the MPDU
52	else if MSDU that MPDU is a member of is to be protected using WEP
53	Encrypt the MPDU using entry's key and WEP
54	Transmit the MPDU
55	else
56	// should not arrive here
57	endif

8.7.3 Per MPDU Rx pseudo-code

2 3		if the Protected Frame subfield of the Frame Control Field is zero then
		Receive the unencrypted MPDU without protections
4		else
5		if (dot11PrivacyOptionImplemented = "true" and the MPDU has individual RA and there is a
6		entry in dot11WEPKeyMappings matching the MPDU's TA an
7		dot11WEPKeyMappingsKeyBroadcast is false) or (the MPDU has a multicast RA and the network
8		type is IBSS and the network is RSN and there is an entry in dot11KeyMappings for the TA an
9		dot11WEPKeyMappingsKeyBroadcast is true) then
10		if entry has an AES-OCB key
11		receive the frame unaltered
12		else if entry has an AES-CCM key
13		decrypt frame using AES-CCM key
14		discard the frame if the integrity check fails
15		else if entry has a TKIP key
16		prepare a temporal key from the TA, TKIP key and PN
17		decrypt the frame using RC4
18		discard the frame if the ICV fails
19		else if entry has a WEP key
20		decrypt the frame using WEP decryption
21		discard the frame if the ICV fails and increment
22		
		dot11WEPUndecryptableCount
23		endif
24		discard the frame body and increment dot11WEPUndecryptableCount
25		else if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[KeyID] is null then
26		discard the frame body and increment dot11WEPUndecryptableCount
27		else if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[KeyID] is a CCM key
28		decrypt and authenticate MPDU using CCMP
29		else if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[KeyID] is a WRAP key
30		Receive the MPDU, since decryption will take place at MSDU level
31		
		else if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[KeyID] is a TKIP key
32		Decrypt the MPDU using TKIP
33		else if dot11WEPDefaultKeys[KeyID] is a WEP key
34		attempt to decrypt with dot11WEPDefaultKeys[KeyID],
35		incrementing dot11WEPICVErrorCount if the ICV check fails
36		end if
37		endif
38	8.7.4	Per MSDU Rx pseudo-code
39		if the frame was not protected
40		if MPDU has a group RA and aHaveGTK ="false" and dot11RSNEnabled = "true" then
41		Receive the frame unencrypted
42		else if aHavePTK = "false" and dot11RSNEnabled = "true" then //Unicast
43		Receive frame unencrypted
44		else if dot11RSNEnabled = "false" and aExcludeUnencrypted = "false"
45		Receive the frame without applying protections
46		else
47		discard the frame body without indication to LLC and
48		increment dot11WEPExcludedCount
49		endif
50		
		else // Have a protected MSDU
51		if dot11PrivacyOptionImplemented = TRUE then
52		if dot11WEPKeyMappings entry has WEPOn set to FALSE then
53		discard the frame body and increment
54		dot11WEPUndecryptableCount
55		else if dot11WEPKeyMappings entry contains a key that is null then
56		discard the frame body and increment
57		dot11WEPUndecryptableCount
58		else if dot11WEPKeyMappings has an AES-OCB key then
59		
57		Decrypt the frame using AES-OCB

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P802.11i/D3.0, November 2002

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	else // (endif endif	else if dot11WEPKeyMapping Accept the MSDU s else if dot11WEPKeyMapping Compute the MIC u Compare the receive discard the frame if otherwise accept the else if dot11WEPKeyMapping	of the OCB decryption and a gs has an AES-CCM key the since the decryption took plays has a TKIP key then using the Michael algorithm and MIC against the compute the MIC fails and invoke company with the MIC fails and invoke the MIC fails and invoke company with the MIC fails and the MIC fails	ed MIC ountermeasures if appropriate,
17 18				
19	[Editorial note: end o	f Clause 8]		
20	In clause 10.3.11.1.2:			
21	Rename SharedID to Ke	yID		
22	Change description for S	SharedID to		
23 24	This parameter is valid this Key.	only when the Use of the Ke	ey includes ENCRYPT.	The KeyID to be assigned to
25				
26 27		of the service primitive vs at the end of the BSSDe	escription in Clause 10	0.3.2.2.2:
	RSN Information Element	RSN Information Element	As defined in frame format.	A description of the cipher suites and authenticated key management suites supported in the BSS.
28				
29 30 31		of the service primitive cameters to the MLME-AS	SSOCIATE.request pri	imitive in Clause
32 33 34	Authenticated Key Management selector, Pairwise Key Cipher Suite selector			
35	Add the following rows at the end of the table in Clause 10.3.6.1.2 defining the MLME-			

Authenticated	Key	Integer	As defined in RSN IE	Authenticated	Key	Management

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36

ASSOCIATE.request:

Management selector		format	Suite requested for this association
Pairwise Key Cipher Suite selector	Integer	As defined in RSN IE format	The Pairwise Key Cipher Suite requested for this association

2

3

40 2 6 2 2 6 -			
10.3.0.3.2 30	mantics of the	service	brillitive

Add the following parameters to the MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication primitive in Clause

4 10.3.6.3.2:

Authenticated Key Management selector, Pairwise Key Cipher Suite selector

6 7 8

5

Add the following rows at the end of the table in Clause 10.3.6.3.2 defining the MLME-

ASSOCIATE.indication:

Authenticated Key Management selector	Integer	As defined in RSN IE format	The Authenticated Key Management Suite requested for this association
Pairwise Key Cipher Suite selector	Integer	As defined in RSN IE format	The Pairwise Key Cipher Suite requested for this association

10

11

10.3.7.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive

12 Add the following parameters to the MLME-REASSOCIATE.request primitive in Clause

13 **10.3.7.1.2**:

14 Authenticated Key Management selector, 15 Pairwise Key Cipher Suite selector

16 17

Add the following rows at the end of the table in Clause 10.3.7.1.2 defining the MLME-

18 **REASSOCIATE.request:**

Authenticated Key Management selector	Integer	As defined in RSN IE format	The Authenticated Key Management Suite requested for this association
Pairwise Key Cipher Suite selector	Integer	As defined in RSN IE format	The Pairwise Key Cipher Suite requested for this association

19

20 **10.3.7.3.2 Semantics of the service primitive**

21 Add the following parameters to the MLME-REASSOCIATE.indication primitive in Clause

22 **10.3.7.3.2:**

Authenticated Key Management selector, Pairwise Key Cipher Suite selector

25

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Add the following rows at the end of the table in Clause 10.3.7.3.2 defining the MLME-

2 **REASSOCIATE.indication:**

Authenticated Key Management selector	Integer	As defined in RSN IE format	The Authenticated Key Management Suite requested for this association
Pairwise Key Cipher Suite selector	Integer	As defined in RSN IE format	The Pairwise Key Cipher Suite requested for this association

- 3 10.3.8.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive
- 4 Add the following Clauses after Clause 10.3.10.2.4, but prior to Clause 10.4, renumbering as
- 5 appropriate:
- 6 10.3.11 SetKeys
- 7 10.3.11.1 MLME-SETKEYS.request
- 8 10.3.11.1.1 Function
- 9 This primitive causes the keys identified in the parameters of the primitive to be set in the MAC and enabled for use.
- 11 10.3.11.1.2 Semantics of the Service Primitive
- 12 The primitive parameters are as follows:

13	MLME-SETKEYS.request	(
14		Keylist
15)

16

Name	Type Valid range		Description
Keylist	A set of KeyIdentifiers	N/A	The list of keys to be used by the MAC.

17

18

Each Keyldentifier consists of the following elements:

Zakin Treystackiniter consists of the following clotheries.				
Name	Туре	Valid range	Description	
Key	Bit string	N/A	The key value	
Length	Integer	N/A	The number of bits in the Key to be used.	
Index	Integer	N/A	Key Index	
Туре	Integer	Group, Pairwise	Defines whether this key is a Group or Pairwise key.	

Tx	Boolean	TRUE, FALSE	This parameter indicates if this key is to be used for transmission and reception or just reception.
Address	MAC Address	Any valid individual MAC address	This parameter is valid only when the key type is Pairwise and contains an IEEE 802 address
Receive Sequence Count	8 octets	N/A	Value the receive sequence counter should be initialized to
Authenticator/Supplicant	Boolean	TRUE, FALSE	Whether the key is set by the Authenticator or Supplicant. IEEE 802.11 uses this to select the correct integrity key when Michael is used.

1 10.3.11.1.3 When Generated

- 2 This primitive is generated by the SME at any time when one or more keys are to be set in the MAC.
- 3 10.3.11.1.4 Effect of Receipt
- 4 Receipt of this primitive causes the MAC to set the appropriate keys and to begin using them as indicated. If
- 5 the AES-based privacy algorithm is being used for unicast traffic over this association, the MAC derives the
- 6 keys as specified in 8.3.2.3.4.
- 7 10.3.11.2 MLME-SETKEYS.confirm
- 8 10.3.11.2.1 Function
- 9 This primitive confirms that the action of the associated MLME-SETKEYS.request has been completed.
- 10 10.3.11.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
- 11 This primitive has no parameters.
- 12 **10.3.11.2.3** When Generated
- 13 This primitive is generated by the MAC in response to receipt of a MLME-SETKEYS.request primitive.
- 14 This primitive is issued when the action requested has been completed.
- 15 **10.3.11.2.4 Effect of Receipt**
- 16 The SME is notified that the requested action of the MLME-SETKEYS.request is completed.
- 17 **10.3.12 DeleteKeys**
- 18 10.3.12.1 MLME-DELETEKEYS.request
- 19 **10.3.12.1.1 Function**
- 20 This primitive causes the keys identified in the parameters of the primitive to be deleted from the MAC and
- 21 thus disabled for use.

The Control of the Co

1 10.3.12.1.2 Semantics of the Service Primitive

2 The primitive parameters are as follows:

3	MLME-DELETEKEYS.request	(
4		Keylist,
5)

6

Name	Туре	Valid range	Description
Keylist			
	A set of	N/A	The list of keys to be deleted from the
	KeyIdentifiers		MAC

7

8 Each Keyldentifier consists of the following elements:

Name	Туре	Valid range Description		Description
Address	MAC Address			This parameter is valid only when the key type is Pairwise and contains an 802 address

9 **10.3.11.1.3 When Generated**

- This primitive is generated by the SME at any time when keys for a security association are to be deleted in the MAC.
- 12 **10.3.11.1.4** Effect of Receipt
- 13 Receipt of this primitive causes the MAC to
- 14 1. Delete the appropriate keys, both group and pairwise and to cease using them.
- 15 2. Set aHaveGTK to FALSE
- 16 3. Set aHavePTK to FALSE
- 17 **10.3.12.2 MLME-DELETEKEYS.confirm**
- 18 **10.3.12.2.1 Function**
- 19 This primitive confirms that the action of the associated MLME-DELETEKEYS.request has been
- 20 completed.
- 21 10.3.12.2.2 Semantics of the service primitive
- This primitive has no parameters.
- 23 **10.3.12.2.3** When Generated
- 24 This primitive is generated by the MAC in response to receipt of a MLME-DELETEKEYS.request
- 25 primitive. This primitive is issued when the action requested has been completed.

- 2 The SME is notified that the requested action of the MLME-DELETEKEYS.request is completed.
- 4 Insert the following clause:

- 5 11.3.1 Stations association procedures
- 6 Change the text of Clause 11.3.1 from:
- 7 Upon receipt of an MLME-ASSOCIATE.request, a STA shall associate with an AP via the following procedure:
- 9 a) The STA shall transmit an association request to an AP with which that STA is authenticated.
- b) If an Association Response frame is received with a status value of "successful," the STA is now associated with the AP and the MLME shall issue an MLME-ASSOCIATE.confirm indicating the successful completion of the operation.
 - c) If an Association Response frame is received with a status value other than "successful" or the AssociateFailureTimeout expires, the STA is not associated with the AP and the MLME shall issue an MLME-ASSOCIATE.confirm indicating the failure of the operation.
- 16 *to*:

13

14

15

25

26

27

- Upon receipt of an MLME-ASSOCIATE.request, a STA shall associate with an AP via the following procedure:
- 19 a) The STA shall transmit an association request to an AP with which that STA is authenticated. If the STA is operating in an RSN, the STA shall include the RSN IE with only one pairwaise key cipher suite and only one authenticated key suite.
- b) If an Association Response frame is received with a status value of "successful," the STA is now associated with the AP and the MLME shall issue an MLME-ASSOCIATE.confirm indicating the successful completion of the operation.
 - c) If an Association Response frame is received with a status value other than "successful" or the AssociateFailureTimeout expires, the STA is not associated with the AP and the MLME shall issue an MLME-ASSOCIATE.confirm indicating the failure of the operation.
- 28 11.3.2 AP association procedures
- 29 Change the text of Clause 11.3.2 from:
- 30 An AP shall operate as follows in order to support the association of STAs.
- a) Whenever an Association Request frame is received from a STA and the STA is authenticated, the AP shall transmit an association response with a status code as defined in 7.3.1.9. If the status value is "successful," the Association ID assigned to the STA shall be included in the response. If the STA is not authenticated, the AP shall transmit a Deauthentication frame to the STA.
- b) When the association response with a status value of "successful" is acknowledged by the STA, the STA is considered to be associated with this AP.

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1 c) The AP shall inform the distribution system (DS) of the association and the MLME shall issue an MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication.

3 *to:*

- 4 An AP shall operate as follows in order to support the association of STAs.
- Whenever an Association Request frame is received from a STA and the STA is authenticated, the AP shall transmit an association response with a status code as defined in 7.3.1.9. If the AP is operating as an RSN, the AP will check the values received in the RSN IE, to see if the values received match the APs security policy. If the status value is "successful," the Association ID assigned to the STA shall be included in the response. If the STA is not authenticated, the AP shall transmit a Deauthentication frame to the STA.
- b) When the association response with a status value of "successful" is acknowledged by the STA, the STA is considered to be associated with this AP.
- 13 c) The AP shall inform the distribution system (DS) of the association and the MLME shall issue an MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication.

11.3.4 AP Reassociation procedures

- 16 Change the text of Clause 11.3.4 from:
- An AP shall operate as follows in order to support the Reassociation of STAs.
- a) Whenever a Reassociation Request frame is received from a STA and the STA is authenticated, the AP shall transmit a Reassociation response with a status value as defined in 7.3.1.9. If the status value is "successful," the Association ID assigned to the STA shall be included in the response. If the STA is not authenticated, the AP shall transmit a Deauthentication frame to the STA.
- b) When the Reassociation response with a status value of "successful" is acknowledged by the STA, the STA is considered to be associated with this AP.
 - c) The AP shall inform the DS of the Reassociation and the MLME shall issue an MLME-REASSOCIATE, indication.

27 *to*:

25 26

- An AP shall operate as follows in order to support the Reassociation of STAs.
- a) Whenever a Reassociation Request frame is received from a STA and the STA is authenticated, the AP shall transmit a Reassociation response with a status value as defined in 7.3.1.9. If the AP is operating as an RSN, the AP will check the values received in the RSN IE, to see if the values received match the APs security policy. If the status value is "successful," the Association ID assigned to the STA shall be included in the response. If the STA is not authenticated, the AP shall transmit a Deauthentication frame to the STA.
- b) When the Reassociation response with a status value of "successful" is acknowledged by the STA, the STA is considered to be associated with this AP.
- 37 c) The AP shall inform the DS of the Reassociation and the MLME shall issue an MLME-38 REASSOCIATE, indication.

Annex A (normative) Protocol Implementation Conformance Statements (PICS)

Add the following text to this annex, where "X" in PCX is the next number for the protocol

4 capabilities:

3

Item	Protocol Capability	References	Status	Support
	Are the following MAC protocol capabilities supported?			
PCX	Robust Security Network		0	Yes o No o
PCX.1	RSN IE	7.3.2.17	PCX:M.	Yes o No o
1 01111		7.10.2.17	FT1:M, FR1:M,	10001100
			FT3:M, FR3:M,	
			FT6:M, FR6:M,	
			FT7:M, FR7:M	
PCX.1.1	Group Key Cipher Suite	7.3.2.17	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2	Pairwise Key Cipher Suite List	7.3.2.17	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.1	CCMP data privacy protocol	8.3.4	PCX:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.1.1	CCMP encapsulation procedure	8.3.4.1.1	PCX.1.2.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.1.2	CCMP decapsulation procedure	8.3.4.1.2	PCX.1.2.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.1.3	CCMP Security Serv. Mng.		M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.2	TKIP data privacy protocol	8.3.2	0	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.2.1	TKIP encapsulation procedure	8.3.2.1.1	PCX.1.2.2:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.2.2	TKIP decapsulation procedure	8.3.2.1.2	PCX.1.2.2:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.2.3	TKIP counter measures	8.3.2.4.2	PCX.1.2.2:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.2.4	TKIP Security Serv. Mng.		M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.3	WRAP data privacy protocol	8.3.3	0	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.3.1	WRAP encapsulation procedure	8.3.3.1.1	PCX.1.2.3:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.3.2	WRAP decapsulation procedure	8.3.3.1.2	PCX.1.2.3:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.2.3.3	WRAP Security Serv. Mng.		M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.3	Auth. Key Mng. Suite List	7.3.2.17	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.3.1	Unspec. EAP/802.11i Key Mng.	7.3.2.17	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.3.2	Preshard key/802.11i Key Mng.	7.3.2.17	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.3.3	802.11i Key Mng.	8.5	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.3.3.1	Key Hierarchy	8.5	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.3.3.1.1	Pairwise Key Hierarchy	8.5.1.2	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.3.3.1.2	Group Key Hierarchy	8.5.1.3	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.3.3.2	4 way handshake	8.5.3	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.3.3.3	Group key handshake	8.5.4	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o
PCX.1.4	RSN Capabilities	7.3.2.17	PCX.1:M	Yes o No o

6 End of annex A text changes

7 Annex C (normative) Formal description of MAC operation

8 Delete the text of this annex.

10 Annex D (normative) ASN.1 encoding of the MAC and PHY MIB

11 Update following MIB entries in Annex D:

12 Add the following attribute to the dot11StationConfigTable in Annex D:

5

```
dot11RSNOptionImplemented OBJECT-TYPE
 1
2
3
4
                                  TruthValue
                    SYNTAX
                    MAX-ACCESS
                                  read-only
                    STATUS
                                  current
                    DESCRIPTION
                           "This variable indicates whether the entity is RSN-capable."
 6
 7
                    ::= { dot11StationConfigEntry 24 }
 8
     Add the following attribute to the dot11PrivacyTable in Annex D:
9
             dot11RSNEnabled OBJECT-TYPE
10
                    SYNTAX
                                  TruthValue
                    MAX-ACCESS
11
                                  read-write
12
                    STATUS
                                  current
13
                    DESCRIPTION
14
                           "When this object is set to TRUE, this shall indicate that
                           RSN is enabled on this entity. The entity will advertise the RSN Information Element in its Beacons and Probe Responses.
15
16
17
                           Configuration variables for RSN operation are found in the
18
                           dot11RSNConfigTable.
19
                           This object requires that dot11PrivacyInvoked also be set to
20
                           TRUE. '
21
                    ::= { dot11PrivacyEntry 7 }
\overline{22}
23
     Change the DESCRIPTION clause of object dot11PrivacyInvoked in Annex D from:
24
             "When this attribute is true, it shall indicate that the IEEE 802.11\ \mbox{WEP}
25
            mechanism is used for transmitting frames of type Data. The default value
26
            of this attribute shall be false."
27
     to:
28
             "When this attribute is TRUE, it shall indicate that some level of
29
             security is invoked for transmitting frames of type Data. For 802.11-
30
            1999 clients, the security mechanism used is WEP.
31
            For RSN-capable clients, an additional variable dot11RSNEnabled indicates
32
            whether RSN is enabled. If dot11RSNEnabled is FALSE, the security
33
            mechanism invoked is WEP; if dot11RSNEnabled is TRUE, RSN security
34
            mechanisms invoked are configured in the dot11RSNConfigTable. The default
35
            value of this attribute shall be FALSE. "
36
37
     Add to dot11StationConfigEntry
38
            dot11TKIPNumberOfReplayCounters
                                                Integer
39
40
     Add definition of dot11TKIPNumberOfReplayCounters
41
            dot11TKIPNumberOfReplayCounters
42
                    SYNTAX INTEGER
43
44
                    MAX-ACCESS read-only
                    STATUS current
45
                    DESCRIPTION
46
                           "Specifies the number of replay counters: 0 - 1 replay
47
                           counter, 1 - 2 replay counters, 2 - 4 replay counters, 3 -
48
                           16 replay counters"
49
                    ::= { dot11StationConfigEntry 2 }
50
51
     Incorporate the following text as the IEEE 802.11i MIB (in the correct Annex: D)
52
53
                 IEEE 802.11i MIB
54
55
```

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```
12
             IEEE802dot11i-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
                    TMPORTS
 3
                           MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, Integer32, Unsigned32,
 4
                           Counter32
 5
                                  FROM SNMPv2-SMI
 6
                           DisplayString, MacAddress, TruthValue
 7
                                  FROM SNMPv2-TC
 8
                           ieee802dot11
 9
                                  FROM IEEE802dot11-MIB
10
                           InterfaceIndexOrZero
11
                                  FROM IF-MIB;
12
             ieee802dot11i MODULE-IDENTITY
13
                    LAST-UPDATED "0209100000Z"
14
                    ORGANIZATION "IEEE 802.11"
15
                    CONTACT-INFO
16
                           "WG E-mail: stds-802-11@ieee.org
17
18
                    Chair:
                                  Stuart J. Kerry
19
                                  Philips Semiconductors, Inc.
                    Postal:
20
                                  1109 McKay Drive
21
22
23
24
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                    Tel:
                    Fax:
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                                  jesse.walker@intel.com
                    Email:
39
40
            DESCRIPTION
41
                    "The MIB module for 802.11 entities implementing 802.11i
42
                    (RSN/TSN)."
43
             ::= { ieee802dot11 7 }
44
45
46
                Robust Security Network (RSN (and TSN)) Configuration
47
48
49
            dot11RSNConfigTable OBJECT-TYPE
50
                                  SEQUENCE OF Dot11RSNConfigEntry
                    SYNTAX
51
52
                    MAX-ACCESS
                                  not-accessible
                    STATUS
                                  current
53
                    DESCRIPTION
54
55
                           "The table containing RSN/TSN configuration objects."
                    ::= { ieee802dot11i 1 }
56
57
            dot11RSNConfigEntry OBJECT-TYPE
58
                          Dot11RSNConfigEntry
            SYNTAX
59
                    MAX-ACCESS
                                  not-accessible
60
                    STATUS
                                  current
61
                    DESCRIPTION
62
                           "An entry in the dot11RSNConfigTable."
                    INDEX { dot11RSNConfigIndex }
63
```

```
1
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigTable 1 }
 2
            Dot11RSNConfigEntry ::=
 3
                   SEQUENCE {
 4
                          dot11RSNConfigIndex
                                                             InterfaceIndexOrZero,
 5
                          dot11RSNConfigVersion
                                                                    Integer32,
 6
                          dot11RSNConfigPairwiseKeysSupported
                                                                    Unsigned32,
 7
                          dot11RSNConfigMulticastCipher
                                                                    OCTET STRING,
 8
                          dot11RSNConfigGroupRekeyMethod
                                                                    INTEGER,
 9
                          dot11RSNConfigGroupRekeyTime
                                                                    Unsigned32.
10
                          dot11RSNConfigGroupRekeyPackets
                                                                    Unsigned32,
11
                          dot11RSNConfigGroupRekeyStrict
                                                                    TruthValue,
12
                          dot11RSNConfigPSKValue
                                                                    OCTET STRING,
13
                          dot11RSNConfigPSKPassPhrase
                                                                    DisplayString,
14
                          dot11RSNConfigTSNEnabled
                                                                    TruthValue,
15
                          dot11RSNConfigGroupMasterRekeyTime
                                                                    Unsigned32,
16
                          dot11RSNConfigGroupUpdateTimeOut
                                                                    Unsigned32,
17
                          dot11RSNConfigGroupUpdateCount
                                                                    Unsigned32,
18
                          dot11RSNConfigPairwiseUpdateTimeOut
                                                                    Unsigned32,
19
                          dot11RSNConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
                                                                    Unsigned32
20
                   }
21
22
23
24
            dot11RSNConfigIndex OBJECT-TYPE
                   SYNTAX
                                 InterfaceIndexOrZero
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 not-accessible
                   STATUS
                                 current
25
26
27
                   DESCRIPTION
                          "Each 802.11 interface is represented by an entry in the
                          ifTable. If this index is zero, the information in this
28
                          table shall apply to all 802.11 interfaces."
29
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 1 }
30
            dot11RSNConfigVersion OBJECT-TYPE
31
                   SYNTAX
                                 Integer32
32
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
33
                   STATUS
                                 current
34
                   DESCRIPTION
35
                          "The highest RSN version this entity supports."
36
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 2 }
37
            dot11RSNConfigPairwiseKeysSupported OBJECT-TYPE
38
                   SYNTAX
                                 Unsigned32 (0..4294967295)
39
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
40
                   STATUS
                                 current
41
                   DESCRIPTION
42
                          "This object indicates how many pairwise keys the entity
43
                          supports for RSN. When zero, it only supports (four) default
44
                          keys."
45
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 3 }
46
            dot11RSNConfigMulticastCipher OBJECT-TYPE
47
                   SYNTAX
                                 OCTET STING (SIZE(4))
48
                                 read-write
                   MAX-ACCESS
49
                   STATUS
                                 current
50
                   DESCRIPTION
51
52
                          "This object indicates the multicast cipher suite selector
                          the entity must use. The multicast cipher suite in the RSN
53
                          Information Element shall take its value from this variable.
54
                          It consists of an OUI (the three most significant octets)
55
                          and a cipher suite identifier (the least significant octet).
56
                          The network administrator can always override the
57
                          automatically selected multicast cipher suite by writing
58
                          this object.'
59
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 4 }
60
            dot11RSNConfigGroupRekeyMethod OBJECT-TYPE
61
                   SYNTAX
                                 INTEGER { disabled(1), timeBased(2), packetBased(3) }
62
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
```

```
12
                   STATUS
                   DESCRIPTION
 3
                          "This object selects a mechanism for rekeying the RSN Group
 4
                          Key. The default is time-based, once per day. Rekeying the
                          Group key is only applicable to an entity acting in the
                          Authenticator role (an AP in an ESS)."
                                 { timeBased }
                   DEFVAL
 8
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 5 }
 9
            dot11RSNConfigGroupRekeyTime OBJECT-TYPE
10
                   SYNTAX
                                 Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
11
                                 "seconds"
                   UNITS
12
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
13
                   STATUS
                                 current
14
                   DESCRIPTION
                          "The time in seconds after which the RSN group key must be
15
16
                          refreshed. The timer shall start at the moment the group key
17
                          was set using the MLME-SetKeys primitive.
18
                          The fine granularity (seconds) also enables the network
19
                          Administrator to 'immediately' refresh the group key."
20
                   DEFVAL
                                 { 86400 } -- once per day
21
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 6 }
22
            dot11RSNConfigGroupRekeyPackets OBJECT-TYPE
23
                                 Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
                   SYNTAX
24
                                 "1000 packets"
                   UNTTS
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
                   STATUS
                                 current
                   DESCRIPTION
                          "A packet count (in 1000s of packets) after which the RSN
                          group key shall be refreshed. The packet counter shall start
                          at the moment the group key was set using the MLME-SetKeys
                          primitive and it shall count all packets encrypted using the
                          current group key."
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 7 }
34
            dot11RSNConfigGroupRekeyStrict OBJECT-TYPE
35
                   SYNTAX
                                 TruthValue
36
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
37
                   STATUS
                                 current
38
                   DESCRIPTION
39
                          "This object signals that the group key shall be refreshed
40
                          whenever a Station leaves the BSS.'
41
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 8 }
42
            dot11RSNConfigPSKValue OBJECT-TYPE
43
                   SYNTAX
                                 OCTET STRING (SIZE(32))
44
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
45
                   STATUS
                                 current
46
                   DESCRIPTION
47
                          "The Pre-Shared Key (PSK) for when RSN in PSK mode is the
                          selected authentication suite. In that case, the PMK will
48
49
                          obtain its value from this object.
50
                          This object is logically write-only. Reading this variable
51
                          shall return unsuccessful status or null or zero."
52
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 9 }
53
            dot11RSNConfigPSKPassPhrase OBJECT-TYPE
54
                                 DisplayString
                   SYNTAX
55
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
56
                   STATUS
57
                   DESCRIPTION
58
                          "The PSK, for when RSN in PSK mode is the selected
59
                          authentication suite, is configured by
60
                          dot11RSNConfigPSKValue.
61
                          An alternative manner of setting the PSK uses the password-
62
                          to-key algorithm defined in section XXX. This variable
```

```
provides a means to enter a pass phrase. When this object is
 2
                          written, the RSN entity shall use the password-to-key
 3
                          algorithm specified in section XXX to derive a pre-shared
 4
                          and populate dot11RSNConfigPSKValue with this key.
 5
                          This object is logically write-only. Reading this variable
 6
                          shall return unsuccessful status or null or zero."
 7
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 10 }
 8
            dot11RSNConfigTSNEnabled OBJECT-TYPE
9
                   SYNTAX
                                 TruthValue
10
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
11
                   STATUS
                                 current
12
                   DESCRIPTION
13
                          "When dot11PrivacyInvoked and dot11RSNEnabled are both set
14
                          to TRUE, signaling that RSN is enabled on this entity, this
15
                          object shall indicate the entity also supports pre-RSN
16
                          clients (with or without an IEEE 802.1X supplicant), also
17
                          referred to as a Transitional Security Network (TSN)."
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 11 }
18
19
            dot11RSNConfigGroupMasterRekeyTime OBJECT-TYPE
20
                   SYNTAX
                                 Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
21
22
23
                   UNITS
                                 "seconds"
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
                   STATUS
                                 current
24
                   DESCRIPTION
25
                          "The time in seconds after which the RSN group master key
26
27
                          must be changed. The timer shall start at the moment the
                          group master key was set.
28
                          A group key refresh will occur on a group master key change.
29
                          The fine granularity (seconds) also enables the network
30
                          Administrator to 'immediately' refresh the group master
31
32
                   DEFVAL
                                 \{7604800\} - 604800 = 7*86400, once per week
33
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 12 }
34
            dot11RSNConfigGroupUpdateTimeOut OBJECT-TYPE
35
                   SYNTAX
                                 Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
36
                   UNITS
                                 "mili-seconds"
37
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
38
                   STATUS
                                 current
39
                   DESCRIPTION
40
                          "The time in mili-seconds after which the RSN group update
41
                          handshake will be retried. The timer shall start at the
42
                          moment the group update message is sent."
43
                   DEFVAL
                                 { 100 } --
44
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 13 }
45
            dot11RSNConfigGroupUpdateCount OBJECT-TYPE
46
                   SYNTAX
                                 Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
47
                                 read-write
                   MAX-ACCESS
48
                   STATUS
                                 current
49
                   DESCRIPTION
50
                          "The number of times the RSN Group update will be retried."
51
                   DEFVAL
                                 { 3 } --
52
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 14 }
53
            dot11RSNConfigPairwiseUpdateTimeOut OBJECT-TYPE
54
                   SYNTAX
                                 Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
55
                                 "mili-seconds"
                   UNITES
56
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
57
                   STATUS
                                 current
58
                   DESCRIPTION
59
                          "The time in mili-seconds after which the RSN 4-way
60
                          handshake will be retried. The timer shall start at the
61
                          moment a 4-way message is sent."
62
                   DEFVAL
                                 { 100 } --
```

```
1
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 15 }
 2
            dot11RSNConfigPairwiseUpdateCount OBJECT-TYPE
 3
                                 Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
                   SYNTAX
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
 5
                   STATUS
                                 current
 6
                   DESCRIPTION
 7
                          "The number of times the RSN 4-way handshake will be
 8
                          retried."
 9
                   DEFVAL
                                { 3 }
10
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigEntry 16 }
11
12
                Unicast Cipher Suite configuration table
13
14
            dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersTable OBJECT-TYPE
15
                   SYNTAX
                                 SEQUENCE OF Dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersEntry
16
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 not-accessible
17
                   STATUS
                                 current
18
                   DESCRIPTION
19
                          "This table lists the unicast ciphers supported by this
20
                          entity. It allows enabling and disabling of each unicast
21
22
                          cipher by network management. The Unicast Cipher Suite list
                          in the RSN Information Element is formed using the
23
                          information in this table."
24
                   ::= { ieee802dot11i 2 }
25
            dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersEntry OBJECT-TYPE
26
27
28
                                 Dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersEntry
                                 not-accessible
                   MAX-ACCESS
                   STATUS
                                 current
29
                   DESCRIPTION
30
31
                          "The table entry, indexed by the interface index (or all
                          interfaces) and the unicast cipher."
32
                   INDEX { dot11RSNConfigIndex, dot11RSNConfigUnicastCipherIndex }
33
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersTable 1 }
34
            Dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersEntry ::=
35
                   SEQUENCE {
36
                          dot11RSNConfigUnicastCipherIndex Unsigned32,
37
                          dot11RSNConfigUnicastCipher
                                                                    OCTET STRING,
38
                          dot11RSNConfigUnicastCipherEnabled
                                                                    TruthValue
39
            dot11RSNConfigUnicastCipherIndex OBJECT-TYPE
40
                   SYNTAX
                                 Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
41
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 not-accessible
42
                   STATUS
                                 current
43
                   DESCRIPTION
44
                          "The auxiliary index into the
45
                          dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersTable."
46
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersEntry 1 }
47
            dot11RSNConfigUnicastCipher OBJECT-TYPE
48
                                 OCTET STRING (SIZE(4))
                   SYNTAX
49
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
50
                   STATUS
                                 current
51
52
                   DESCRIPTION
                          "The selector of a supported unicast cipher. It consists of
53
                          an OUI (the three most significant octets) and a cipher
54
                          suite identifier (the least significant octet)."
55
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersEntry 2 }
            dot11RSNConfigUnicastCipherEnabled OBJECT-TYPE
57
                                 TruthValue
                   SYNTAX
58
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-write
59
                   STATUS
                                 current
60
                   DESCRIPTION
61
                          "This object enables or disables the unicast cipher."
62
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigUnicastCiphersEntry 3 }
```

```
2
                The Authentication Suites Table
            dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable OBJECT-TYPE
                                SEQUENCE OF Dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesEntry
                   SYNTAX
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                not-accessible
                   STATUS
                                 current
 8
                   DESCRIPTION
 9
                          "This table lists the authentication suites supported by
10
                          this entity. Each authentication suite can be individually
11
                          enabled and disabled. The Authentication Suite List in the
12
                          RSN IE is formed using the information in this table."
13
                   ::= { ieee802dot11i 3 }
14
            dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesEntry OBJECT-TYPE
15
                   SYNTAX
                                Dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesEntry
16
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 not-accessible
17
                   STATUS
                                 current
18
                   DESCRIPTION
19
                          "An entry (row) in the
20
                          dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable."
21
22
                   INDEX { dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuiteIndex }
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable 1 }
23
            Dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesEntry ::=
24
                   SEQUENCE {
25
26
27
                          {\tt dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuiteIndex}
                                                                          Unsigned32,
                                                                   OCTET STRING,
                          dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuite
                          dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuiteEnabled
                                                                          TruthValue }
28
            dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuiteIndex OBJECT-TYPE
                                 Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
                   SYNTAX
30
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                not-accessible
31
32
33
                   STATUS
                                 current
                   DESCRIPTION
                          "The auxiliary variable used as an index into the
34
                          dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable."
35
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesEntry 1 }
36
            dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuite OBJECT-TYPE
37
                   SYNTAX
                                 OCTET STRING (SIZE(4))
38
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                read-only
39
                   STATUS
                                 current
40
                   DESCRIPTION
41
                          "The selector of an authentication suite. It consists of an
42
                          OUI (the three most significant octets) and a cipher suite
43
                          identifier (the least significant octet). "
44
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesEntry 2 }
45
            dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuiteEnabled OBJECT-TYPE
46
                   SYNTAX
                                TruthValue
47
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                read-write
48
                   STATUS
                                 current
49
                   DESCRIPTION
50
                          "This variable indicates whether the corresponding
51
                          authentication suite is enabled/disabled."
52
                   ::= { dot11RSNConfigAuthenticationSuitesEntry 3 }
53
54
                RSN/TSN statistics
55
56
            dot11RSNStatsTable OBJECT-TYPE
57
                                SEQUENCE OF Dot11RSNStatsEntry
                   SYNTAX
58
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                not-accessible
59
                   STATUS
                                 current
60
                   DESCRIPTION
61
                          "This table maintains per-STA statistics for SN. The entry
62
                          with dot11RSNStatsSTAAddress set to FF-FF-FF-FF-FF shall
63
                          contain statistics for broadcast/multicast traffic."
```

```
::= { ieee802dot11i 4 }
1
2
           dot11RSNStatsEntry OBJECT-TYPE
                  SYNTAX Dot11RSNStatsEntry
3
                  MAX-ACCESS
                               not-accessible
                  STATUS
                               current
                  DESCRIPTION
6
                         "An entry in the dot11RSNStatsTable."
                  INDEX { dot11RSNConfigIndex, dot11RSNStatsIndex }
8
9
                  ::= { dot11RSNStatsTable 1 }
10
           Dot11RSNStatsEntry ::=
11
                  SEQUENCE {
12
                        dot11RSNStatsIndex
                                                                 Unsigned32,
13
                                                                MacAddress,
                         dot11RSNStatsSTAAddress
14
                         dot11RSNStatsVersion
                                                                Unsigned32,
                         dot11RSNStatsSelectedUnicastCipher
15
                                                                OCTET STRING,
16
                         dot11RSNStatsTKIPICVErrors
                                                                Counter32,
17
                         dot11RSNStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
                                                                Counter32.
18
                         dot11RSNStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
                                                                Counter32,
19
                         dot11RSNStatsTKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked Counter32,
20
21
22
23
                         dot11RSNStatsWRAPFormatErrors
                                                                Counter32,
                         dot11RSNStatsWRAPReplays
                                                                Counter32,
                         dot11RSNStatsWRAPDecryptErrors
                                                                Counter32,
                         dot11RSNStatsCCMPFormatErrors
                                                                Counter32,
\frac{24}{24}
                        dot11RSNStatsCCMPReplays
                                                                Counter32,
25
                        dot11RSNStatsCCMPDecryptErrors
                                                               Counter32 }
26
27
           dot11RSNStatsIndex OBJECT-TYPE
                  SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
28
                  MAX-ACCESS
                               not-accessible
29
                  STATUS
                               current
30
                  DESCRIPTION
31
                         "An auxiliary index into the dot11RSNStatsTable."
32
                  ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 1 }
33
           dot11RSNStatsSTAAddress OBJECT-TYPE
34
                              MacAddress
                  SYNTAX
35
                  MAX-ACCESS
                               read-only
36
                  STATUS
                               current
37
                  DESCRIPTION
38
                         "The MAC address of the station the statistics in this
39
                         conceptual row belong to."
40
                  ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 2 }
41
           dot11RSNStatsVersion OBJECT-TYPE
42
                              Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
                  SYNTAX
43
                  MAX-ACCESS
                              read-only
44
                  STATUS
                               current
45
                  DESCRIPTION
46
                         "The RSN version which the station associated with."
47
                  ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 3 }
48
           dot11RSNStatsSelectedUnicastCipher OBJECT-TYPE
49
                  SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(4))
50
                  MAX-ACCESS
                              read-only
51
52
                  STATUS
                               current
                  DESCRIPTION
53
                        "The Authentication Suite the station selected during
54
                         association. The value consists of a three octet OUI
55
                         followed by a one octet Type as follows:
56
57
                         Value Authentication Type
                                                              Key Management Type
58
                  _____
                                                              _____
                  00:00:00 0 Reserved
59
                                                              Reserved
60
                  00:00:00 1
                               Unspecified authentication
                                                             802.1X Key Management
61
                                                              over 802.1X
62
                  00:00:00 2
                                                              802.1X Key Management
                                 None
63
                                                              using pre-shared Key
```

```
00:00:00 3-255 Reserved
                                                                 Reserved
 2
                   Vendor any
                                                                 Vendor Specific
                                  Vendor Specific
                   other
                            any
                                  Reserved
                                                                 Reserved"
 4
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 4 }
 5
            dot11RSNStatsTKIPICVErrors OBJECT-TYPE
 6
                   SYNTAX
                                Counter32
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
 8
                   STATUS
                                 current
 9
                   DESCRIPTION
10
                          "Counts the number of TKIP ICV errors encountered when
                          decrypting packets for the station."
11
12
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 5 }
13
            dot11RSNStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures OBJECT-TYPE
14
                   SYNTAX
                                 Counter32
15
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
16
                   STATUS
                                 current
17
                   DESCRIPTION
18
                          "Counts the number of Michael MIC failure encountered when
19
                          checking the integrity of packets received from the station
20
                          at this entity."
21
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 6 }
22
            dot11RSNStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures OBJECT-TYPE
23
                   SYNTAX
                                 Counter32
24
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
25
26
27
                   STATUS
                                 current
                   DESCRIPTION
                          "Counts the number of Michael MIC failures encountered by
28
                          the station identified by dot11StatsSTAAddress and reported
29
                          back to this entity. "
30
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 7 }
31
            dot11RSNStatsTKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked OBJECT-TYPE
32
                   SYNTAX
                                 Counter32
33
34
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
                   STATUS
                                 current
35
                   DESCRIPTION
36
37
                          "Counts the number of times a MIC failure occurred two times
                          within 60 seconds and counter-measures were invoked. This
38
                          variables counts this for both local and remote. It counts
39
                          every time countermeasures are invoked. "
40
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 8 }
41
            dot11RSNStatsWRAPFormatErrors OBJECT-TYPE
42
                   SYNTAX
                                 Counter32
43
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
44
                   STATUS
                                 current
45
                   DESCRIPTION
46
                          "The number of MSDUs received with an invalid WRAP format."
47
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 9 }
48
            dot11RSNStatsWRAPReplays OBJECT-TYPE
49
                   SYNTAX
                                 Counter32
50
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
51
52
                   STATIIS
                                 current
                   DESCRIPTION
53
                          "The number of received unicast fragments discarded by the
54
                          replay mechanism."
55
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 10 }
56
            dot11RSNStatsWRAPDecryptErrors OBJECT-TYPE
57
                   SYNTAX
                                 Counter32
58
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                 read-only
59
                   STATUS
                                 current
60
                   DESCRIPTION
61
                          "The number of received fragments discarded by the OCB
62
                          decryption mechanism."
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 11 }
63
```

```
12
            dot11RSNStatsCCMPFormatErrors OBJECT-TYPE
                               Counter32
                   SYNTAX
                               read-only
                   MAX-ACCESS
                   STATUS
                                current
                   DESCRIPTION
                          "The number of MSDUs received with an invalid CCMP format."
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 12 }
 8
            dot11RSNStatsCCMPReplays OBJECT-TYPE
 9
                                Counter32
                   SYNTAX
10
                   MAX-ACCESS
                                read-only
11
                   STATUS
                                current
12
                   DESCRIPTION
13
                          "The number of received unicast fragments discarded by the
14
                         replay mechanism."
15
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 13 }
16
            dot11RSNStatsCCMPDecryptErrors OBJECT-TYPE
17
                                Counter32
                   SYNTAX
18
                   MAX-ACCESS
                               read-only
19
                   STATUS
                                current
20
                   DESCRIPTION
21
22
                          "The number of received fragments discarded by the CCMP
                          decryption algorithm."
23
                   ::= { dot11RSNStatsEntry 14 }
24
25
                 TBD: OBJECT-GROUPs and MODULE-COMPLIANCE statements
26
27
            END
28
```

29 Annex F (informative) RSN reference implementations and test vectors

F.1 TKIP Temporal Key Mixing Function reference implementation and test vector

31 This clause provides a "C" language reference implementation of the temporal key mixing function.

```
32
33
34
          /* 802.11 TKIP Key Mixing Test Vector Generator
                                                                   * /
          /*
35
36
37
          /\,{}^{\star} The author has put this code in the public domain.
38
          /* Author: David Johnston
39
          /* Email: dj@mobilian.com
40
          /* Version 0.1
41
          /*
          42
43
44
          #include <stdlib.h>
45
          #include <stdio.h>
46
47
          /***********
48
          /* Test Cases
                                                 * /
49
          /* An array of test cases
50
          /***********************************
51
          #define NUM_TEST_CASES 8
52
53
54
          unsigned long int test_case_pnl[] = { /* 2 lsbs of pn */
55
                0x0000,
```

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30

```
0 \times 0001,
 1
2
3
                     0xffff,
                     0x0000,
 4
                     0x058c,
                     0x058d,
                     0x30f8,
                     0x30f9
             };
 9
             unsigned long int test_case_pnh[] = { /* 4 msbs of pn */
10
                     0 \times 000000000.
11
                     0x00000000,
12
                     0x20dcfd43,
13
                     0x20dcfd44,
14
                     0xf0a410fc,
15
                     0xf0a410fc,
16
                     0x8b1573b7,
17
                     0x8b1573b7
18
             };
19
20
             unsigned char keys[] =
21
22
                     0 \times 00, 0 \times 01, 0 \times 02, 0 \times 03, 0 \times 04, 0 \times 05, 0 \times 06, 0 \times 07,
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
                     0x08,0x09,0x0A,0x0B,0x0C,0x0D,0x0E,0x0F,
                     0 \times 00, 0 \times 01, 0 \times 02, 0 \times 03, 0 \times 04, 0 \times 05, 0 \times 06, 0 \times 07,
                     0x08,0x09,0x0A,0x0B,0x0C,0x0D,0x0E,0x0F,
                     0x63,0x89,0x3B,0x25,0x08,0x40,0xB8,0xAE,
                     0x0B,0xD0,0xFA,0x7E,0x61,0xD2,0x78,0x3E,
                     0x63,0x89,0x3B,0x25,0x08,0x40,0xB8,0xAE,
                     0x0B,0xD0,0xFA,0x7E,0x61,0xD2,0x78,0x3E,
                     0x98,0x3A,0x16,0xEF,0x4F,0xAC,0xB3,0x51,
                     0xAA,0x9E,0xCC,0x27,0x1D,0x73,0x09,0xE2,
                     0x98,0x3A,0x16,0xEF,0x4F,0xAC,0xB3,0x51,
                     0xAA,0x9E,0xCC,0x27,0x1D,0x73,0x09,0xE2,
                     0xC8,0xAD,0xC1,0x6A,0x8B,0x4D,0xDA,0x3B,
                     0x4D,0xD5,0xB6,0x54,0x38,0x35,0x9B,0x05,
                     0xC8,0xAD,0xC1,0x6A,0x8B,0x4D,0xDA,0x3B,
                     0x4D,0xD5,0xB6,0x54,0x38,0x35,0x9B,0x05
38
39
             };
40
             unsigned char transmitter_addr[] =
41
             {
42
                     0x10,0x22,0x33,0x44,0x55,0x66,
43
                     0x10,0x22,0x33,0x44,0x55,0x66,
44
                     0x64,0xF2,0xEA,0xED,0xDC,0x25,
45
                     0x64,0xF2,0xEA,0xED,0xDC,0x25,
46
                     0x50,0x9C,0x4B,0x17,0x27,0xD9,
47
                     0x50,0x9C,0x4B,0x17,0x27,0xD9,
48
                     0x94,0x5E,0x24,0x4E,0x4D,0x6E,
49
50
                     0x94,0x5E,0x24,0x4E,0x4D,0x6E
             };
51
52
53
             /* The Sbox is reduced to 2 16-bit wide tables, each with 256 entries. */
             /* The 2nd table is the same as the 1st but with the upper and lower
54
55
             /* bytes swapped. To allow an endian tolerant implementation, the byte */
             /* halves have been expressed independently here.
57
             unsigned int Tkip_Sbox_Lower[256] =
58
59
                     0xA5,0x84,0x99,0x8D,0x0D,0xBD,0xB1,0x54,
60
                     0x50,0x03,0xA9,0x7D,0x19,0x62,0xE6,0x9A,
61
                     0x45,0x9D,0x40,0x87,0x15,0xEB,0xC9,0x0B,
62
                     0xEC, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xEA, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x96, 0x5B,
63
                     0xC2,0x1C,0xAE,0x6A,0x5A,0x41,0x02,0x4F,
64
                     0x5C,0xF4,0x34,0x08,0x93,0x73,0x53,0x3F,
65
                     0x0C,0x52,0x65,0x5E,0x28,0xA1,0x0F,0xB5,
66
                     0x09,0x36,0x9B,0x3D,0x26,0x69,0xCD,0x9F,
67
                     0x1B,0x9E,0x74,0x2E,0x2D,0xB2,0xEE,0xFB,
```

```
1
2
3
4
5
                   0xF6,0x4D,0x61,0xCE,0x7B,0x3E,0x71,0x97,
                   0xF5,0x68,0x00,0x2C,0x60,0x1F,0xC8,0xED,
                    0xBE, 0x46, 0xD9, 0x4B, 0xDE, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x4A,
                   0x6B,0x2A,0xE5,0x16,0xC5,0xD7,0x55,0x94,
                   0xCF,0x10,0x06,0x81,0xF0,0x44,0xBA,0xE3,
                   0xF3,0xFE,0xC0,0x8A,0xAD,0xBC,0x48,0x04,
                   0xDF,0xC1,0x75,0x63,0x30,0x1A,0x0E,0x6D,
                   0x4C,0x14,0x35,0x2F,0xE1,0xA2,0xCC,0x39,
 9
                   0x57,0xF2,0x82,0x47,0xAC,0xE7,0x2B,0x95,
10
                   0xA0,0x98,0xD1,0x7F,0x66,0x7E,0xAB,0x83,
11
                   0xCA, 0x29, 0xD3, 0x3C, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x1D, 0x76,
12
                   0x3B,0x56,0x4E,0x1E,0xDB,0x0A,0x6C,0xE4,
13
                   0x5D,0x6E,0xEF,0xA6,0xA8,0xA4,0x37,0x8B,
14
                   0x32,0x43,0x59,0xB7,0x8C,0x64,0xD2,0xE0,
15
                   0xB4,0xFA,0x07,0x25,0xAF,0x8E,0xE9,0x18,
16
                   0xD5,0x88,0x6F,0x72,0x24,0xF1,0xC7,0x51,
17
                   0x23,0x7C,0x9C,0x21,0xDD,0xDC,0x86,0x85,
18
                   0x90,0x42,0xC4,0xAA,0xD8,0x05,0x01,0x12,
19
                   0xA3,0x5F,0xF9,0xD0,0x91,0x58,0x27,0xB9,
20
                   0x38,0x13,0xB3,0x33,0xBB,0x70,0x89,0xA7,
21
22
                   0xB6,0x22,0x92,0x20,0x49,0xFF,0x78,0x7A,
                   0x8F, 0xF8, 0x80, 0x17, 0xDA, 0x31, 0xC6, 0xB8,
23
24
25
26
27
                   0xC3,0xB0,0x77,0x11,0xCB,0xFC,0xD6,0x3A
            };
            unsigned int Tkip_Sbox_Upper[256] =
28
                   0xC6,0xF8,0xEE,0xF6,0xFF,0xD6,0xDE,0x91,
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
                   0x60,0x02,0xCE,0x56,0xE7,0xB5,0x4D,0xEC,
                   0x8F,0x1F,0x89,0xFA,0xEF,0xB2,0x8E,0xFB,
                   0x41,0xB3,0x5F,0x45,0x23,0x53,0xE4,0x9B,
                   0x75,0xE1,0x3D,0x4C,0x6C,0x7E,0xF5,0x83,
                   0x68,0x51,0xD1,0xF9,0xE2,0xAB,0x62,0x2A,
                   0x08,0x95,0x46,0x9D,0x30,0x37,0x0A,0x2F,
                   0x0E,0x24,0x1B,0xDF,0xCD,0x4E,0x7F,0xEA,
                   0x12,0x1D,0x58,0x34,0x36,0xDC,0xB4,0x5B,
                   0xA4,0x76,0xB7,0x7D,0x52,0xDD,0x5E,0x13,
38
39
                   0xA6,0xB9,0x00,0xC1,0x40,0xE3,0x79,0xB6,
                   0xD4,0x8D,0x67,0x72,0x94,0x98,0xB0,0x85,
40
                   0xBB, 0xC5, 0x4F, 0xED, 0x86, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x11,
41
                   0x8A,0xE9,0x04,0xFE,0xA0,0x78,0x25,0x4B,
42
                   0xA2,0x5D,0x80,0x05,0x3F,0x21,0x70,0xF1,
43
                   0x63,0x77,0xAF,0x42,0x20,0xE5,0xFD,0xBF,
44
                   0x81,0x18,0x26,0xC3,0xBE,0x35,0x88,0x2E,
45
                   0x93,0x55,0xFC,0x7A,0xC8,0xBA,0x32,0xE6,
46
                   0xC0,0x19,0x9E,0xA3,0x44,0x54,0x3B,0x0B,
47
                   0x8C,0xC7,0x6B,0x28,0xA7,0xBC,0x16,0xAD,
48
                   0xDB,0x64,0x74,0x14,0x92,0x0C,0x48,0xB8,
49
50
                   0x9F,0xBD,0x43,0xC4,0x39,0x31,0xD3,0xF2,
                   0xD5,0x8B,0x6E,0xDA,0x01,0xB1,0x9C,0x49,
51
                   0xD8,0xAC,0xF3,0xCF,0xCA,0xF4,0x47,0x10,
52
53
                   0x6F,0xF0,0x4A,0x5C,0x38,0x57,0x73,0x97,
                   0xCB, 0xA1, 0xE8, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x61, 0x0D, 0x0F,
54
55
56
57
                   0xE0,0x7C,0x71,0xCC,0x90,0x06,0xF7,0x1C,
                   0xC2,0x6A,0xAE,0x69,0x17,0x99,0x3A,0x27,
                   0xD9,0xEB,0x2B,0x22,0xD2,0xA9,0x07,0x33,
                   0x2D,0x3C,0x15,0xC9,0x87,0xAA,0x50,0xA5,
58
                   0x03,0x59,0x09,0x1A,0x65,0xD7,0x84,0xD0,
59
                   0x82,0x29,0x5A,0x1E,0x7B,0xA8,0x6D,0x2C
60
            };
61
62
63
64
            /**** Function Prototypes ****/
            /**********
65
66
            unsigned int tkip_sbox(unsigned int index);
```

```
12
            unsigned int rotr1(unsigned int a);
             /* Mixes key from TA, TK and TSC */
            void mix_key(
                   unsigned char *key,
                    unsigned char *ta,
                   unsigned long int pnl, /* Least significant 16 bits of PN */ unsigned long int pnh, /* Most significant 32 bits of PN */
9
10
                    unsigned char *rc4key,
                    unsigned int *plkout
11
12
            );
13
             14
15
            /* tkip_sbox()
            /* Returns a 16 bit value from a 64K entry table. The Table */
16
17
            /* is synthesized from two 256 entry byte wide tables.
18
19
20
            unsigned int tkip_sbox(unsigned int index)
21
22
                    unsigned int index_low;
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
                    unsigned int index_high;
                    unsigned int left, right;
                    index_low = (index % 256);
                    index_high = ((index >> 8) % 256);
                    left = Tkip_Sbox_Lower[index_low] + (Tkip_Sbox_Upper[index_low] *
                    right = Tkip_Sbox_Upper[index_high] + (Tkip_Sbox_Lower[index_high]
                           * 256);
                    return (left ^ right);
            };
             38
            /* mix_key()
39
            /* Takes a key, PN and TK. Calculates an RC4 key.
40
41
42
            unsigned int rotrl(unsigned int a)
43
44
45
                    unsigned int b;
46
                    if ((a \& 0x01) == 0x01)
47
48
                           b = (a >> 1) \mid 0x8000;
49
50
                    else
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
                    {
                          b = (a >> 1) \& 0x7fff;
                    b = b % 65536;
                   return b;
            }
58
            void mix_key(
59
                    unsigned char
                                     *key,
                                   *ta,
60
                    unsigned char
                   unsigned long int pnl, /* Least significant 16 bits of PN */ unsigned long int pnh, /* Most significant 32 bits of PN */
61
62
63
                    unsigned char
                                    *rc4key,
64
                    unsigned int *plk
65
66
                    unsigned int ttak0; /* 16 bit numbers */
```

```
unsigned int ttak1;
 2
                    unsigned int ttak2;
 3
                    unsigned int ttak3;
 4
                    unsigned int ttak4;
                    unsigned int tsc0;
 7
                    unsigned int tsc1;
 8
                    unsigned int tsc2;
 9
10
                    unsigned int ppk0;
11
                    unsigned int ppk1;
12
                    unsigned int ppk2;
13
                    unsigned int ppk3;
14
                    unsigned int ppk4;
15
                    unsigned int ppk5;
16
17
                    int i;
18
                    int j;
19
20
                    tsc0 = (unsigned int)((pnh >> 16) % 65536); /* msb */
21
22
                    tsc1 = (unsigned int)(pnh % 65536);
                    tsc2 = (unsigned int)(pnl % 65536); /* lsb */
23
24
25
26
27
                    /* Phase 1, step 1 */
                    p1k[0] = tsc1;
                    p1k[1] = tsc0;
                    p1k[2] = (unsigned int)(ta[0] + (ta[1]*256));
28
                    p1k[3] = (unsigned int)(ta[2] + (ta[3]*256));
29
30
31
                    p1k[4] = (unsigned int)(ta[4] + (ta[5]*256));
                    /* Phase 1, step 2 */
32
                    for (i=0; i<8; i++)
33
34
                    {
                           j = 2*(i \& 1);
35
                           p1k[0] = (p1k[0] + tkip_sbox((p1k[4] ^ ((256*key[1+j]) +
36
37
                           key[j])) % 65536 )) % 65536;
                                     (p1k[1] + tkip\_sbox((p1k[0] ^ ((256*key[5+j]) +
38
                           key[4+j])) % 65536 )) % 65536;
39
                           p1k[2] = (p1k[2] + tkip\_sbox((p1k[1] ^ ((256*key[9+j]) +
40
                           key[8+j])) % 65536 )) % 65536;
41
                           p1k[3] = (p1k[3] + tkip\_sbox((p1k[2] ^ ((256*key[13+j]) +
42
                           key[12+j])) % 65536 )) % 65536;
43
                           p1k[4] = (p1k[4] + tkip\_sbox((p1k[3] ^ (((256*key[1+j]) + key[j])))) % 65536 )) % 65536;
44
45
                           p1k[4] = (p1k[4] + i) % 65536;
46
47
48
                    /* Phase 2, Step 1 */
49
                    ppk0 = p1k[0];
50
                    ppk1 = p1k[1];
51
                    ppk2 = p1k[2];
52
53
                    ppk3 = p1k[3];
                    ppk4 = p1k[4];
54
                    ppk5 = (p1k[4] + tsc2) % 65536;
55
56
                    /* Phase2, Step 2 */
57
                    ppk0 = ppk0 + tkip\_sbox((ppk5 ^ ((256*key[1]) + key[0])) %
58
                           65536);
59
                    ppk1 = ppk1 + tkip\_sbox((ppk0 ^ ((256*key[3]) + key[2])) %
60
                           65536);
61
                    ppk2 = ppk2 + tkip\_sbox((ppk1 ^ ((256*key[5]) + key[4])) %
62
                           65536);
63
                    ppk3 = ppk3 + tkip\_sbox((ppk2 ^ ((256*key[7]) + key[6])) %
64
                           65536);
65
                    ppk4 = ppk4 + tkip\_sbox((ppk3 ^ ((256*key[9]) + key[8])) %
66
                           65536);
```

```
ppk5 = ppk5 + tkip_sbox( (ppk4 ^ ((256*key[11]) + key[10])) %
 2
                          65536);
 3
 4
                   ppk0 = ppk0 + rotr1(ppk5 ^ ((256*key[13]) + key[12]));
                   ppk1 = ppk1 + rotr1(ppk0 ^ ((256*key[15]) + key[14]));
                   ppk2 = ppk2 + rotr1(ppk1);
                   ppk3 = ppk3 + rotr1(ppk2);
 8
                   ppk4 = ppk4 + rotr1(ppk3);
9
                   ppk5 = ppk5 + rotr1(ppk4);
10
11
                   /* Phase 2, Step 3 */
12
                   rc4key[0] = (tsc2 >> 8) % 256;
13
                   rc4key[1] = (((tsc2 >> 8) % 256) | 0x20) & 0x7f;
14
                   rc4key[2] = tsc2 % 256;
15
                   rc4key[3] = ((ppk5 ^ ((256*key[1]) + key[0])) >> 1) % 256;
16
17
                   rc4key[4] = ppk0 % 256;
18
                   rc4key[5] = (ppk0 >> 8) % 256;
19
20
                   rc4key[6] = ppk1 % 256;
21
22
                   rc4key[7] = (ppk1 >> 8) % 256;
23
24
25
26
27
                   rc4key[8] = ppk2 % 256;
                   rc4key[9] = (ppk2 >> 8) % 256;
                   rc4key[10] = ppk3 % 256;
                   rc4key[11] = (ppk3 >> 8) % 256;
28
29
30
31
                   rc4key[12] = ppk4 % 256;
                   rc4key[13] = (ppk4 >> 8) % 256;
32
                   rc4key[14] = ppk5 % 256;
33
34
                   rc4key[15] = (ppk5 >> 8) % 256;
            }
35
36
37
            /***********************************
            /* main()
38
            /* Iterate through the test cases, passing them
39
            /* through the TKIP algorithm to produce test
40
            /* vectors and verify decryption against encryption */
41
42
43
            int main()
44
45
                   int length;
46
                   int test_case;
47
                   int header_length;
48
                   int payload_length;
49
50
                   int a4_exists;
                   int qc exists;
51
                   unsigned char plaintext_mpdu[3000];
52
53
                   unsigned char ciphertext_mpdu[3000];
                   /*unsigned char decrypted_mpdu[3000];*/
54
55
                   unsigned char *key;
                   unsigned char *ta;
56
                   unsigned char rc4key[16];
57
                   unsigned int plk[5];
58
                   unsigned long int iv32;
59
                   unsigned int iv16;
60
61
                   unsigned int i;
62
63
                   for (i=0; i<16;i++) rc4key[i] = 0x00;
64
65
                   for (test_case = 1; test_case < (NUM_TEST_CASES+1); test_case++)</pre>
66
                   {
67
                          printf ("\nTest vector #%d:\n",test_case);
```

```
key = keys + (16 * (test_case-1));
 1
2
3
                            ta = transmitter_addr + (6 * (test_case-1));
 4
                            mix_key(key,
                                    ta,
                                    test_case_pnl[test_case-1],
 7
                                    test_case_pnh[test_case-1],
 8
                                    rc4key,
 9
                                    p1k
10
                                    );
11
12
                            printf("TK
                                          =");
13
                             for (i=0; i<16; i++)
14
15
                                    printf(" %02X", key[i]);
16
17
                            printf(" [LSB on left, MSB on right]\n");
18
19
                            printf("TA
                                            =");
20
                            printf(" %02X", ta[0]);
21
22
                             for (i=1; i<6; i++)
23
24
25
26
27
                                    printf("-%02X", ta[i]);
                            printf("\n");
                            printf("PN
                                            = %08X%04X [transmitted as: ",
28
                                    test_case_pnh[test_case-1],
29
30
31
                                    test_case_pnl[test_case-1]);
                            printf(" %02X %02X %02X DefKeyID",
                                    (test_case_pnl[test_case-1] % 256),
32
                                    (rc4key[1]),
33
34
                                    ((test_case_pnl[test_case-1] >> 8) % 256)
35
36
37
                            printf(" %02X %02X %02X %02X]\n",
                                    (test_case_pnh[test_case-1] % 256),
                                    ((test_case_pnh[test_case-1] >> 8) % 256),
38
39
                                    ((test_case_pnh[test_case-1] >> 16) % 256),
                                    ((test_case_pnh[test_case-1] >> 24) % 256)
40
41
                            printf("IV32 = %08X\n", test_case_pnh[test_case-1]);
printf("IV16 = %04X\n", test_case_pnl[test_case-1]);
42
43
44
45
46
                            printf("P1K =");
47
                             for (i=0; i<5; i++)
48
                             {
49
                                    printf(" %04X", p1k[i]);
50
51
                            printf("\n");
52
53
                            printf("RC4KEY=");
54
55
                            for (i=0; i<16; i++)
56
                                    printf(" %02X", rc4key[i]);
57
58
                            printf("\n");
59
60
                     }
61
62
                     return 0;
63
             }
64
```

1 F.1.2 Test Vectors

```
2
     The following output is provided to test implementations of the temporal key hash algorithm. All input and
     output values are shown in hexadecimal.
 3
     Test vector #1:
           = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F [LSB on left, MSB on right]
 6
           = 10-22-33-44-55-66
           = 000000000000 [transmitted as: 00 20 00 DefKeyID 00 00 00]
 8
                        [transmitted as 00 00 00 00]
9
     IV16 = 0000
10
          = 3DD2 016E 76F4 8697 B2E8
     RC4KEY= 00 20 00 33 EA 8D 2F 60 CA 6D 13 74 23 4A 66 0B
11
12
13
     Test vector #2:
           = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F [LSB on left, MSB on right]
14
     ΤK
           = 10-22-33-44-55-66
15
     TA
16
           = 000000000001 [transmitted as: 01 20 00 DefKeyID 00 00 00 00]
17
     IV32 = 00000000
                        [transmitted as 00 00 00 00]
18
     IV16 = 0001
19
          = 3DD2 016E 76F4 8697 B2E8
20
21
22
23
     RC4KEY= 00 20 01 90 FF DC 31 43 89 A9 D9 D0 74 FD 20 AA
     Test vector #3:
          = 63 89 3B 25 08 40 B8 AE 0B D0 FA 7E 61 D2 78 3E [LSB on left, MSB on right]
     TK
24
           = 64-F2-EA-ED-DC-25
25
           = 20DCFD43FFFF [transmitted as: FF 7F FF DefKeyID 43 FD DC 20]
26
27
28
     IV32 = 20DCFD43
                       [transmitted as 20 DC FD 43]
     IV16 = FFFF
     P1K = 7C67 49D7 9724 B5E9 B4F1
29
     RC4KEY= FF 7F FF 93 81 0F C6 E5 8F 5D D3 26 25 15 44 CE
30
31
     Test vector #4:
32
33
          = 63 89 3B 25 08 40 B8 AE 0B D0 FA 7E 61 D2 78 3E [LSB on left, MSB on right]
     TK
           = 64-F2-EA-ED-DC-25
     TA
34
           = 20DCFD440000 [transmitted as: 00 20 00 DefKeyID 44 FD DC 20]
     PN
35
                       [transmitted as 20 DC FD 44]
     IV32 = 20DCFD44
36
     IV16 = 0000
37
          = 5A5D 73A8 A859 2EC1 DC8B
38
     RC4KEY= 00 20 00 49 8C A4 71 FC FB FA A1 6E 36 10 F0 05
39
40
     Test vector #5:
41
           = 98 3A 16 EF 4F AC B3 51 AA 9E CC 27 1D 73 09 E2 [LSB on left, MSB on right]
42
     TA
           = 50-9C-4B-17-27-D9
43
     PN
           = F0A410FC058C [transmitted as: 8C 25 05 DefKeyID FC 10 A4 F0]
44
     IV32 = F0A410FC
                        [transmitted as F0 A4 10 FC]
45
     IV16 = 058C
46
          = F2DF EBB1 88D3 5923 A07C
47
     RC4KEY= 05 25 8C F4 D8 51 52 F4 D9 AF 1A 64 F1 D0 70 21
48
49
     Test vector #6:
50
           = 98 3A 16 EF 4F AC B3 51 AA 9E CC 27 1D 73 09 E2 [LSB on left, MSB on right]
     TK
51
           = 50-9C-4B-17-27-D9
52
           = F0A410FC058D [transmitted as: 8D 25 05 DefKeyID FC 10 A4 F0]
53
     IV32 = F0A410FC [transmitted as F0 A4 10 FC]
54
     IV16 = 058D
55
           = F2DF EBB1 88D3 5923 A07C
56
     RC4KEY= 05 25 8D 09 F8 15 43 B7 6A 59 6F C2 C6 73 8B 30
57
58
     Test vector #7:
59
           = C8 AD C1 6A 8B 4D DA 3B 4D D5 B6 54 38 35 9B 05 [LSB on left, MSB on right]
60
           = 94-5E-24-4E-4D-6E
61
           = 8B1573B730F8 [transmitted as: F8 30 30 DefKeyID B7 73 15 8B]
62
     IV32 = 8B1573B7 [transmitted as 8B 15 73 B7]
63
     IV16 = 30F8
64
           = EFF1
                   3F38 A364 60A9 76F3
     RC4KEY= 30 30 F8 65 0D A0 73 EA 61 4E A8 F4 74 EE 03 19
```

```
1
2
3
4
    Test vector #8:
          = C8 AD C1 6A 8B 4D DA 3B 4D D5 B6 54 38 35 9B 05 [LSB on left, MSB on right]
          = 94-5E-24-4E-4D-6E
          = 8B1573B730F9 [transmitted as: F9 30 30 DefKeyID B7 73 15 8B]
                       [transmitted as 8B 15 73 B7]
    IV32 = 8B1573B7
7
    IV16 = 30F9
8
    P1K
         = EFF1 3F38 A364 60A9 76F3
    RC4KEY= 30 30 F9 31 55 CE 29 34 37 CC 76 71 27 16 AB 8F
```

F.2 Michael reference implementation and test vectors 11

12 F.2.1 Michael test vectors

- 13 To ensure correct implementation of Michael, here are some test vectors. These test vectors still have to be
- 14 confirmed by an independent implementation.

F.2.1.1 Block function

Here are some test vectors for the block function. 16

Input	# times	output
(00000000, 00000000)	1	(00000000, 00000000)
(00000000, 00000001)	1	(c00015a8, c0000b95)
(00000001, 00000000)	1	(6b519593, 572b8b8a)
(01234567, 83659326)	1	(441492c2, 1d8427ed)
(00000001, 00000000)	1000	(9f04c4ad, 2ec6c2bf)

- 17 The first four rows give test vectors for a single application of the block function b. The last row gives a test
- vector for 1000 repeated applications of the block function. Together these should provide adequate test 18
- 19 coverage.

10

15

20 F.2.1.2 Michael

21 Here are some test vectors for Michael.

Key	message	output
000000000000000	""	82925c1ca1d130b8
82925c1ca1d130b8	"M"	434721ca40639b3f
434721ca40639b3f	"Mi "	E8f9becae97e5d29
e8f9becae97e5d29	"Mic"	90038fc6cf13c1db
90038fc6cf13c1db	"Mich"	d55e100510128986
d55e100510128986	"Michael"	0a942b124ecaa546

Note that each key is the result of the previous line, which makes it easy to construct a single test out of all 22 23 of these test cases.

F.2.2 Example code

```
24
25
26
27
             // Michael.h
                              Reference implementation for Michael
                              written by Niels Ferguson
```

```
2
             // The author has put this code in the public domain.
            //
            // A Michael object implements the computation of the Michael MIC.
            //
            // Conceptually, the object stores the message to be authenticated.
 9
            // At construction the message is empty.
10
            // The append() method appends bytes to the message.
11
            // The getMic() method computes the MIC over the message and returns the
12
13
            // As a side-effect it also resets the stored message
14
            // to the empty message so that the object can be re-used
15
            // for another MIC computation.
16
17
            class Michael
18
                   {
19
20
            public:
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
                    // Constructor requires a pointer to 8 bytes of key
                   Michael( Byte * key );
                    // Destructor
                    ~Michael();
                    // Clear the internal message,
                   // resets the object to the state just after construction.
                   void clear();
                    // Set the key to a new value
                   void setKey( Byte * key );
                    // Append bytes to the message to be MICed
                   void append( Byte * src, int nBytes );
                    // Get the MIC result. Destination should accept 8 bytes of
                   result.
                   // This also resets the message to empty.
40
                   void getMIC( Byte * dst );
41
42
                    // Run the test plan to verify proper operations
43
                    static void runTestPlan();
44
45
46
                    // Copy constructor declared but not defined,
47
                    //avoids compiler-generated version.
48
                   Michael (const Michael & );
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
                    // Assignment operator declared but not defined,
                    //avoids compiler-generated version.
                    void operator=( const Michael & );
                    // A bunch of internal functions
                    // Get UInt32 from 4 bytes LSByte first
                    static UInt32 getUInt32( Byte * p );
59
                    // Put UInt32 into 4 bytes LSByte first
60
                    static void putUInt32( Byte * p, UInt32 val );
61
62
                    // Add a single byte to the internal message
63
                    void appendByte( Byte b );
64
65
66
                    // Conversion of hex string to binary string
67
                    static void hexToBin( char *src, Byte * dst );
```

```
1
2
3
                    // More conversion of hex string to binary string
                    static void hexToBin( char *src, int nChars, Byte * dst );
 4
 5
                    // Helper function for hex conversion
 6
7
                    static Byte hexToBinNibble( char c );
 8
                    // Run a single test case
9
                    static void runSingleTest( char * cKey, char * cMsg, char *
10
                    cResult );
11
12
13
                    UInt32 KO, K1;
                                               // Key
14
                    UInt32 L, R;
                                               // Current state
15
                                               // Message accumulator (single word)
                    UInt32 M;
16
                                               // # bytes in M
                    int
                             nBytesInM;
17
                    };
18
19
20
21
22
             // Michael.cpp Reference implementation for Michael
             //
                               written by Niels Ferguson
23
24
25
26
27
28
             // The author has put this code in the public domain.// All rights
             reserved,
             //
             // Adapt these typedefs to your local platform
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
             typedef unsigned long UInt32;
             typedef unsigned char Byte;
             #include <assert.h>
             #include <stdio.h>
             #include <stdlib.h>
             #include <string.h>
             #include "Michael.h"
38
39
             // Rotation functions on 32 bit values
40
             #define ROL32( A, n ) \
41
                       ( \ ((A) << (n)) \ \big| \ (\ ((A)>>(32-(n))) \ \& \ (\ (1UL << (n)) \ - \ 1 \ ) \ ) \ ) \\
42
             #define ROR32( A, n ) ROL32( (A), 32-(n) )
43
44
45
             UInt32 Michael::getUInt32( Byte * p )
46
                    // Convert from Byte[] to UInt32 in a portable way
47
48
                    UInt32 res = 0;
49
50
                    for( int i=0; i<4; i++ )
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
                            res |= (*p++) << (8*i);
                    return res;
             }
             void Michael::putUInt32( Byte * p, UInt32 val )
58
                    // Convert from UInt32 to Byte[] in a portable way
59
60
                    for( int i=0; i<4; i++ )
61
62
                            *p++ = (Byte) (val & 0xff);
63
                            val >>= 8;
64
65
66
```

67

```
12
             void Michael::clear()
                     // Reset the state to the empty message.
                    L = K0;
                    R = K1;
                    nBytesInM = 0;
                    M = 0;
9
10
11
             void Michael::setKey( Byte * key )
12
13
                    // Set the key
                    K0 = getUInt32(key);
14
15
                    K1 = getUInt32(key + 4);
16
                    // and reset the message
17
                    clear();
18
19
20
21
22
             Michael::Michael( Byte * key )
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
                    setKey( key );
             Michael::~Michael()
                     // Wipe the key material
                    K0 = 0;
                    K1 = 0;
                    // And the other fields as well.
                    //Note that this sets (L,R) to (K0,K1) which is just fine.
                    clear();
38
39
             void Michael::appendByte( Byte b )
40
41
                    // Append the byte to our word-sized buffer
42
                    M \mid = b \ll (8*nBytesInM);
43
                    nBytesInM++;
44
45
                    // Process the word if it is full.
                    if( nBytesInM >= 4 )
46
47
                            L ^= M;
48
                            R ^= ROL32( L, 17 );
49
50
                            L += R;
                            R ^= ((L & 0xff00ff00) >> 8) | ((L & 0x00ff00ff) << 8);
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
                            L += R;
                            R = ROL32(L, 3);
                            L += R;
                            R ^= ROR32(L, 2);
                            L += R;
                            // Clear the buffer
                            M = 0;
                            nBytesInM = 0;
59
                            }
60
                    }
61
62
63
             void Michael::append( Byte * src, int nBytes )
64
                     // This is simple
65
66
                    while( nBytes > 0 )
67
```

```
appendByte( *src++ );
 1
2
3
                            nBytes--;
 4
             void Michael::getMIC( Byte * dst )
9
                    // Append the minimum padding
10
                    appendByte( 0x5a );
                    appendByte( 0 );
11
12
                    appendByte(0);
13
                    appendByte( 0 );
14
                    appendByte(0);
15
                    // and then zeroes until the length is a multiple of 4
16
                    while( nBytesInM != 0 )
17
18
                            appendByte(0);
19
20
                    // The appendByte function has already computed the result.
21
22
                    putUInt32( dst, L );
                    putUInt32( dst+4, R );
23
24
25
26
27
28
                    // Reset to the empty message.
                    clear();
             void Michael::hexToBin( char *src, Byte * dst )
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
                     // Simple wrapper
                    hexToBin( src, strlen( src ), dst );
             void Michael::hexToBin( char *src, int nChars, Byte * dst )
                    assert( (nChars & 1) == 0 );
38
39
                    int nBytes = nChars/2;
40
                    // Straightforward conversion
41
                    for( int i=0; i<nBytes; i++ )</pre>
42
43
                            dst[i] = (Byte)((hexToBinNibble( src[0] ) << 4)</pre>
44
45
                                    hexToBinNibble( src[1] ));
                            src += 2;
46
                            }
47
                    }
48
49
50
             Byte Michael::hexToBinNibble( char c )
51°52
53
54
55
56
                    if( '0' <= c && c <= '9' )
                            return (Byte)(c - '0');
                    // Make it upper case
57
                    c \&= \sim ('a'-'A');
58
59
                    assert( 'A' <= c && c <= 'F' );
60
                    return (Byte)(c - 'A' + 10);
61
62
63
64
             void Michael::runSingleTest( char * cKey, char * cMsg, char * cResult )
65
66
                    Byte key[ 8 ];
67
                    Byte result[ 8 ];
```

```
12
                    Byte res[ 8 ];
 3
                    // Convert key and result to binary form
 4
                    hexToBin( cKey, key );
                    hexToBin( cResult, result );
 7
                    // Compute the MIC value
 8
                    Michael mic( key );
9
                    mic.append( (Byte *)cMsg, strlen( cMsg) );
10
                    mic.getMIC( res );
11
12
                    // Check that it matches
13
                    assert( memcmp( res, result, 8 ) == 0 );
14
15
16
17
            void Michael::runTestPlan()
18
                    // As usual, test plans can be quite tedious but this should
19
                    // ensure that the implementation runs as expected.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
                    Byte key[8];
                    Byte msg[12];
                    int i;
                    // First we test the test vectors for the block function
                    // The case (0,0)
                    putUInt32( key, 0 );
29
                    putUInt32( key+4, 0 );
30
31
                    putUInt32( msg, 0 );
32
                    Michael mic( key );
33
34
                    mic.append( msg, 4 );
35
                    assert( mic.L == 0 && mic.R == 0 );
36
37
                    // The case (0,1)
38
                    putUInt32( key, 0 );
39
                    putUInt32( key+4, 1 );
40
                    mic.setKey( key );
41
                    mic.append( msg, 4 );
42
43
                    assert( mic.L == 0xc00015a8 \&\& mic.R == 0xc0000b95 );
44
45
                    // The case (1,0)
46
                    putUInt32( key, 1 );
47
                    putUInt32( key+4, 0 );
48
                    mic.setKey( key );
49
50
                    mic.append( msg, 4 );
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
                    assert( mic.L == 0x6b519593 \&\& mic.R == 0x572b8b8a );
                    // The case (01234567, 83659326)
                    putUInt32( key, 0x01234567 );
                    putUInt32( key+4, 0x83659326 );
                    mic.setKey( key );
                    mic.append( msg, 4 );
58
59
                    assert( mic.L == 0x441492c2 \&\& mic.R == 0x1d8427ed );
60
61
                    // The repeated case
62
                    putUInt32( key, 1 );
63
                    putUInt32( key+4,0 );
64
                    mic.setKey( key );
65
66
                    for( i=0; i<1000; i++ )
67
```

```
12
                          mic.append( msg, 4 );
 3
                   assert( mic.L == 0x9f04c4ad \&\& mic.R == 0x2ec6c2bf );
                   // And now for the real test cases
                   runSingleTest( "000000000000000", ""
                                                                   , "82925c1ca1d130b8"
 8
9
                   runSingleTest( "82925c1ca1d130b8", "M"
                                                                   , "434721ca40639b3f"
10
                   );
11
                   runSingleTest( "434721ca40639b3f", "Mi"
                                                                   , "e8f9becae97e5d29"
12
13
                   runSingleTest( "e8f9becae97e5d29", "Mic"
                                                                   , "90038fc6cf13c1db"
14
15
                   runSingleTest( "90038fc6cf13c1db", "Mich"
                                                                   , "d55e100510128986"
16
17
                   runSingleTest( "d55e100510128986", "Michael" , "0a942b124ecaa546"
18
                   );
19
20
```

F.3 HMAC-MD5 reference implementation and test vectors

F.3.1 Reference code

21

22

```
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
             #include "stdafx.h"
             #define ULONG unsigned long
             #include <md5.h>
              * Function: hmac_md5 from rfc2104; uses an MD5 library
             void hmac_md5(
                    unsigned char *text, int text_len,
                    unsigned char *key, int key_len,
                    void * digest)
             {
                    MD5_CTX context;
38
                    unsigned char k_ipad[65]; /* inner padding - key XORd with ipad */
39
                    unsigned char k_opad[65]; /* outer padding - key XORd with opad */
40
                    int i;
41
42
                    /* if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key=MD5(key) */
43
                    if (key_len > 64) {
44
                           MD5 CTX tctx;
45
46
                           MD5Init(&tctx);
47
                           MD5Update(&tctx, key, key_len);
48
                           MD5Final(&tctx);
49
50
                           key = tctx.digest;
51
52
                           key_len = 16;
                    }
53
54
55
                     * the HMAC_MD5 transform looks like:
56
57
                         MD5(K XOR opad, MD5(K XOR ipad, text))
58
59
                     * where K is an n byte key
60
                     * ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times
61
                     * opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times
```

```
* and text is the data being protected
 1
2
3
4
                     /* start out by storing key in pads */
                    memset(k_ipad, 0, sizeof k_ipad);
                    memset(k_opad, 0, sizeof k_opad);
                    memcpy(k_ipad, key, key_len);
                    memcpy(k_opad, key, key_len);
 9
10
                     /* XOR key with ipad and opad values */
11
                    for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
12
                            k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
13
                            k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
14
15
16
                     /* perform inner MD5 */
17
                    MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 1st pass */
                    MD5Update(&context, k_ipad, 64); /* start with inner pad*/
18
19
                    MD5Update(&context, text, text_len); /* then text of datagram */
20
                    MD5Final(&context); /* finish up 1st pass */
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
                    memcpy(digest, context.digest, 16);
                     /* perform outer MD5 */
                    MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 2nd pass */
                    MD5Update(&context, (const unsigned char*)k_opad, 64);
                            /* start with outer pad */
                    MD5Update(&context, (const unsigned char*)digest, 16);
28
                           /* then results of 1st hash */
29
                    MD5Final(&context); /* finish up 2nd pass */
30
                    memcpy(digest, context.digest, 16);
31
32
      F.3.2 Test vectors
33
      Test case 1
34
      Key
                     0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
35
      Key length
36
      Data
                     "Hi There"
37
      data_length
                    0x9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d
38
      digest
39
      Test case 2
                    "Jefe"
40
      Key
41
      Key length
42
      Data
                     "what do ya want for nothing?"
43
      Data length
44
      Digest
                    0x750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738
45
      Test case 3
46
      Key
                    0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
47
      Key length
                    16
48
      Data
                    0xdd repeated 50 times
49
      Data length
50
      Digest
                    0x56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6
51
      Test case 4
                    0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819
52
      Key
53
      Key length
                    25
54
      Data
                    0xcd repeated 50 times
55
      Data length
56
                    0x697eaf0aca3a3aea3a75164746ffaa79
      Digest
```

```
1
      Test case 5
 2
                      0x0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c
      Key
 3
      Key length
                      "Test With Truncation"
      Data
 5
      Data length
      Digest
                      0x56461ef2342edc00f9bab995690efd4c
      Digest-96
                      0x56461ef2342edc00f9bab995
 8
      Test case 6
 9
      Kev
                      0xaa repeated 80 times
10
      Key length
11
      Data
                      "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"
12
      Data length
13
      Digest
                      0x6b1ab7fe4bd7bf8f0b62e6ce61b9d0cd
14
      Test case 7
15
      Key
              0xaa repeated 80 times
16
      Key length
                      80
              "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data"
17
      Data
18
      Data length
19
      Digest 0x6f630fad67cda0ee1fb1f562db3aa53e
```

20 F.4 HMAC-SHA1 reference implementation and test vectors

F.4.1 HMAC-SHA1 Reference code

21

```
#include "stdafx.h"
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
             #define ULONG unsigned long
             #include <sha.h>
             void hmac_sha1(
                    unsigned char *text, int text_len,
                    unsigned char *key, int key_len,
                    unsigned char *digest)
             {
                    A_SHA_CTX context;
33
34
35
                    unsigned char k_ipad[65]; /* inner padding - key XORd with ipad */
                    unsigned char k_opad[65]; /* outer padding - key XORd with opad */
36
37
38
                    /* if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key=SHA1(key) */
                    if (key_len > 64) {
39
40
                           A_SHA_CTX
                                            tctx;
41
                           A_SHAInit(&tctx);
42
43
                           A_SHAUpdate(&tctx, key, key_len);
                           A_SHAFinal(&tctx, key);
44
45
                           key_len = 20;
46
                    }
47
49
                     * the HMAC_SHA1 transform looks like:
50
51
52
                       SHA1(K XOR opad, SHA1(K XOR ipad, text))
53
                     * where K is an n byte key
54
                       ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times
55
                     * opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times
```

```
* and text is the data being protected
 1
2
3
4
                    /* start out by storing key in pads */
                    memset(k_ipad, 0, sizeof k_ipad);
                    memset(k_opad, 0, sizeof k_opad);
                    memcpy(k_ipad, key, key_len);
                    memcpy(k_opad, key, key_len);
 9
10
                    /* XOR key with ipad and opad values */
11
                    for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
12
                           k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
13
                           k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
14
15
16
                    /* perform inner SHA1*/
                    A_SHAInit(&context); /* init context for 1st pass */
17
18
                    A_SHAUpdate(&context, k_ipad, 64); /* start with inner pad */
19
                    A_SHAUpdate(&context, text, text_len); /* then text of datagram */
20
                    A_SHAFinal(&context, digest); /* finish up 1st pass */
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
                    /* perform outer SHA1 */
                    A_SHAInit(&context); /* init context for 2nd pass */
                    A_SHAUpdate(&context, k_opad, 64); /* start with outer pad */
                    A_SHAUpdate(&context, digest, 20); /* then results of 1st hash */
A_SHAFinal(&context, digest); /* finish up 2nd pass */
             }
     F.4.2 HMAC-SHA1 Test vectors
28
29
     Test case 1
30
     Key
                    31
     Key length
                    "Hi There"
32
     Data
33
     Data length
34
     Digest
                    0xb617318655057264e28bc0b6fb378c8ef146be00
35
     Test case 2
36
                    "Jefe"
     Key
37
     Key length
                    4
                    "what do ya want for nothing?"
38
     Data
39
     Data length
40
                    0xeffcdf6ae5eb2fa2d27416d5f184df9c259a7c79
     Digest
41
     Test case 3
42
     Key
                   43
     Key length
                   20
44
     Data
                   0xdd repeated 50 times
45
     Data length
46
     Digest
                   0x125d7342b9ac11cd91a39af48aa17b4f63f175d3
47
     Test case 4
                    0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819
48
     Key
49
     Key length
                    25
50
     Data
                    0xcd repeated 50 times
51
     Data length
                    0x4c9007f4026250c6bc8414f9bf50c86c2d7235dane 7
52
     Digest
53
     Test case 5
54
     Kev
                    55
     Key len
                    20
```

```
"Test With Truncation"
 1
      Data
 2
      Data len
                      0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1d58bb9324a9a5a04
      Digest
      Digest-96
                      0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1
 5
      Test case 6
 6
      Key
                      0xaa repeated 80 times
 7
      Key length
                       "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"
 8
      Data
 9
      Data length
10
      Digest
                      0xaa4ae5e15272d00e95705637ce8a3b55ed402112
11
      Test case 7
12
      Key
                      0xaa repeated 80 times
13
      Key length
14
                       "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data"
      Data
15
      Data length
       digest = 0xe8e99d0f45237d786d6bbaa7965c7808bbff1a91
16
17
      Data length
                      20
18
                      0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1d58bb9324a9a5a04
      Digest
19
      Digest-96
                      0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1
20
      Test case 6
21
      Key
                      0xaa repeated 80 times
22
      Key length
23
      Data
                       "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"
24
      Data length
25
      Digest
                      0xaa4ae5e15272d00e95705637ce8a3b55ed402112
26
      Test case 7
27
      Key
                      0xaa repeated 80 times
28
      Key length
29
                      "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data"
      Data
30
      Data length
31
                      0xe8e99d0f45237d786d6bbaa7965c7808bbff1a91
      Digest
```

32 F.5 PRF reference implementation and test vectors

F.5.1 PRF Reference code

```
35
36
37
                PRF -- Length of output is in octets rather than bits
                     since length is always a multiple of 8 output array is
38
39
                     organized so first N octets starting from O contains PRF output
40
                     supported inputs are 16, 32, 48, 64
41
42
                     output array must be 80 octets to allow for shal overflow
              * /
43
             void PRF(
44
45
                    unsigned char *key, int key_len,
                    unsigned char *prefix, int prefix_len,
                    unsigned char *data, int data_len, unsigned char *output, int len)
46
47
48
             {
49
50
                    unsigned char input[1024]; /* concatenated input */
51
                    int currentindex = 0;
```

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33

int total_len;

```
1
2
3
4
                     memcpy(input, prefix, prefix_len);
input[prefix_len] = 0; /* single octet 0 */
                     memcpy(&input[prefix_len+1], data, data_len);
                     total_len = prefix_len + 1 + data_len;
                     input[total_len] = 0; /* single octet count, starts at 0 */
                     total_len++;
                     for(i = 0; i < (len+19)/20; i++) {
   hmac_shal(input, total_len, key, key_len,</pre>
 9
10
11
                                    &output[currentindex]);
12
                            currentindex += 20; /* next concatenation location */
13
                            input[total_len-1]++; /* increment octet count */
14
15
             }
      F.5.2 PRF Test vectors
16
17
      Test case 1
18
      Key
                     19
      Key length
                     20
20
      Prefix
                     "prefix"
21
      Prefix length
                     6
22
                     "Hi There"
      Data
23
      Data length
24
      PRF-512
25
                     0xbcd4c650b30b9684951829e0d75f9d54b862175ed9f00606e17d8da35402ffee75df78c3
26
                     d31e0f889f012120c0862beb67753e7439ae242edb8373698356cf5a
27
      Test case 2
                     "Jefe"
28
      Key
29
      Key length
30
      Prefix
                     "prefix"
31
      Prefix length
                     6
32
      Data
                     "what do ya want for nothing?"
33
      Data length
34
     PRF-512
35
                     0x51f4de5b33f249adf81aeb713a3c20f4fe631446fabdfa58244759ae58ef9009a99abf4eac
36
                     2ca5fa87e692c440eb40023e7babb206d61de7b92f41529092b8fc
37
      Test case 3
38
      Key
                     39
      Key length
                     20
40
      Prefix
                     "prefix"
      Prefix length
41
42
                     0xdd repeated 50 times
     Data
43
     Data length
      PRF-512
44
45
                     0xe1ac546ec4cb636f9976487be5c86be17a0252ca5d8d8df12cfb0473525249ce9dd8d177
46
                     ead710bc9b590547239107aef7b4abd43d87f0a68f1cbd9e2b6f7607
```

F.6. OCB Mode 47

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F.6.1 OCB Definition

2 F.6.1.1 Notation

1

- 3 NOTATION. If a and b are integers, $a \le b$, then [a..b] is the set $\{a, a+1, ..., b\}$. If $i \ge 1$ is an integer then
- 4 $\mathsf{ntz}(i)$ is the number of trailing 0-bits in the binary representation of i (equivalently, $\mathsf{ntz}(i)$ is the largest
- 5 integer z such that 2^z divides i. So, for example, ntz(7)=0 and ntz(8)=3.
- 6 A string is a finite sequence of symbols, each symbol being 0 or 1. The string of length 0 is called the *empty*
- string and is denoted ε . Let $\{0, 1\}^*$ denote the set of all strings. If $A, B \in \{0, 1\}^*$ then $A, B, O, O, A \parallel B$, is their 7
- concatenation. If $A \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $A \neq \varepsilon$ then firstbit(A) is the first bit of A and lastbit(A) is the last bit of A.
- Let i, n be nonnegative integers. Then 0^i and 1^i denote the strings of i 0's and 1's, respectively. Let $\{0, 1\}^n$
- 10 denote the set of all strings of length n. If $A \in \{0, 1\}^*$ then |A| denotes the length of A, in bits, while $||A||_n =$
- $\max\{1, \lceil |A|/n \rceil\}$ denotes the length of A in n-bit blocks, where the empty string counts as one block. For $A \in$ 11 $\{0, 1\}^*$ and $|A| \le n$, padd_n(A) is the string $A 0^{n-|A|}$. With n understood we will write pad $\{A\}$ for padd_n(A).
- 12
- If $A \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $\tau \in [0, |A|]$ then A[first τ bits] and A[last τ bits] denote the first τ bits of A and the last τ 13 bits of A, respectively. Both of these values are the empty string if $\tau = 0$. If A, $B \in \{0, 1\}^*$ then $A \oplus B$ is the 14
- bit-wise xor of A[first l bits] and B[first l bits], where $l = \min\{|A|, |B|\}$ (where $\epsilon \oplus A = A \oplus \epsilon = \epsilon$). So, for 15
- example, $1001 \oplus 11 = 01$. If $A = a_{n-1} \dots a_1 a_0 \in \{0, 1\}^n$ then str2num(A) is the number $2^{n-1} \cdot a_{n-1} + \dots + a_{n-$ 16
- $2^1 \cdot a_1 + 2^0 \cdot a_0$. If $a \in [0..2^n 1]$ then $num2str_n(a)$ is the *n*-bit string A such that str2num(A) = a. Let $len_n(A) = a$. 17
- 18 $num2str_n(|A|)$. We omit the subscript when n is understood.
- 19 If $A = a_{n-1} a_{n-2} \dots a_1 a_0 \in \{0, 1\}^n$ then A << 1 is the *n*-bit string $a_{n-2} \dots a_1 a_0 0$ which is a left shift of A by
- 20 one bit (the first bit of A disappearing and a zero coming into the last bit), while A >> 1 is the n-bit string 0
- 21 $a_{n-1} a_{n-2} \dots a_1 a_0$ which is a right shift of A by one bit (the last bit disappearing and a zero coming into the
- 22 first bit).
- In pseudo code we write "Partition M into $M[1] \dots M[m]$ " as shorthand for "Let m = len(M) and let M[1], 23
- 24 ..., M[m] be strings such that M[1] ... M[m] = M and |M[i]| = n for $1 \le i < m$." We write "Partition C into
- 25 $C[1] \dots C[m]$ T' as shorthand for "if $|C| < \tau$ then return INVALID. Otherwise, let $C = C[\text{first } |C| - \tau \text{ bits}]$, T
- 26 $=C[\text{last }|C|-\tau \text{ bits}], \text{ let } m=\|C\|_n, \text{ and let } C[1], \ldots, C[m] \text{ be strings such that } C[1], \ldots C[m]=C \text{ and } |C[i]|=n$
- for $1 \le i < m$." Recall that $||M||_n = \max\{1, \lceil |M|/n \rceil\}$, so the empty string partitions into m = 1 block, that one 27
- 28 block being the empty string.
- 29 THE FIELD WITH 2^n POINTS. Let $GF(2^n)$ denote the field with 2^n points. We interchangeably think of a
- point a in $GF(2^n)$ in any of the following ways: (1) as an abstract point in a field; (2) as an n-bit string a_{n-1} ... $a_1 a_0 \in \{0, 1\}^n$; (3) as a formal polynomial $a(x) = a_{n-1}x^{n-1} + ... + a_1x + a_0$ with binary coefficients; (4) 30
- 31
- as an integer between 0 and 2^{n-1} , where the string $a \in \{0, 1\}^n$ corresponds to the number str2num(a). For 32
- example, one can regard the string $a = 0^{125}$ 101 as a 128-bit string, as the number 5, as the polynomial $x^2 + 1$, 33
- 34 or as an abstract point in $GF(2^{128})$. We write a(x) instead of a if we wish to emphasize that we are thinking
- 35 of a as a polynomial.
- 36 To add two points in $\mathsf{GF}(2^n)$, take their bit-wise xor. We denote this operation by $a \oplus b$. To multiply two
- 37 points in the field, first fix an irreducible polynomial $p_n(x)$ having binary coefficients and degree n: say the
- 38 lexicographically first polynomial among the irreducible degree n polynomials having a minimum number
- of nonzero coefficients. For n = 128, the indicated polynomial is $p_{128}(x) = x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$. A few other $p_n(x)$ -values are $x^{64} + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ and $x^{96} + x^{10} + x^9 + x^6 + 1$ and $x^{160} + x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$ and $x^{192} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$ and $x^{224} + x^9 + x^8 + x^3 + 1$ and $x^{256} + x^{10} + x^5 + x^2 + 1$. To multiply $a, b \in GF(2^n)$, which we denote 39
- 40
- 41
- $a \cdot b$, regard a and b as polynomials $a(x) = a_{n-1}x^{n-1} + ... + a_1x + a_0$ and $b(x) = b_{n-1}x^{n-1} + ... + b_1x + b_0$, form 42
- their product c(x) over GF(2), and take the remainder one gets when dividing c(x) by $p_n(x)$. 43
- It is computationally simple to multiply $a \in \{0, 1\}^n$ by x. We illustrate the method for n = 128, in which 44
- case multiplying $a = a_{n-1}x^{n-1} + \dots + a_1x + a_0$ by x yields $a_{n-1}x^n + \dots + a_1x^2 + a_0x$. Thus, if the first bit of a is 45

- 0, then $a \cdot x = a << 1$. If the first bit of a is 1 then we must add x^{128} to a << 1. Since $p_{128}(x) = x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 = 0$ we know that $x^{128} = x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$, so adding x^{128} means to xor by $x^{120} = x^{120} = x^{120$ 1 2
- 3 when n = 128,

4 if firstbit(a) = 0
5
$$a \cdot x = \begin{cases} a << 1 & \text{if firstbit}(a) = 0 \\ (a << 1) \oplus 0^{120} 10000111 & \text{if firstbit}(a) = 1 \end{cases}$$

- It is similarly easy to divide $a \in \{0, 1\}^{128}$ by x (i.e., to multiply a by the multiplicative inverse of x). If the 7
- last bit of a is 0, then $a \cdot x^{-1}$ is a >> 1. If the last bit of a is 1 then we must add (xor) to a >> 1 the value x^{-1} . 8
- Since $x^{128} = x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$ we have that $x^{-1} = x^{127} + x^6 + x + 1 = 10^{120}$ 1000011. In summary, when n = 128, 9

10
11
12
$$a \cdot x^{-1} = \begin{cases} a << 1 & \text{if lastbit}(a) = 0 \\ (a << 1) \oplus 10^{120}1000011 & \text{if lastbit}(a) = 1 \end{cases}$$

- if lastbit(a) = 112
- 13 If $L \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $i \ge -1$, we write L(i) as shorthand for $L \cdot x^i$. Using the equations just given, we have an
- easy way to compute from L the values L(-1), L(0), L(1), ..., $L(\mu)$, where μ is small number. 14
- GRAY CODES. For $l \ge 1$, a Gray code is an ordering $\gamma' = (\gamma'_0, \gamma'_1, ..., \gamma'_k)$ of $\{0, 1\}^l$, where $k = 2^l 1$, such 15
- that successive points differ (in the Hamming sense) by just one bit. For n a fixed number, OCB makes use 16
- of the "canonical" Gray code $\gamma = \gamma^{l}$ constructed by $\gamma^{l} = (0 \ 1)$ and, for l > 0, 17

18
$$\gamma^{l+1} = (0\gamma_0^l \quad 0\gamma l_1 \dots 0\gamma_k^l \quad 1\gamma_0^l \quad 1\gamma_1^l \dots \quad 1\gamma_k^l), \quad k = 2^l - 2$$

- It is easy to see that γ is a Gray code. What is more, for $1 \le i \le 2^n 1$, $\gamma_i = \gamma_{i-1} \oplus (0^{n-1} 1 << \mathsf{ntz}(i))$. This 19
- 20 makes it easy to compute successive points.
- 21 We emphasize the following characteristics of the Gray-code values $\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_k$, where $k = 2^n - 1$: that they
- 22 are distinct and different from 0; that $\gamma_i = 1$; and that $\gamma_i < 2i$.
- 23 Let $L \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and consider the problem of successively forming the strings $\gamma_1 \cdot L$, $\gamma_2 \cdot L$, $\gamma_3 \cdot L$, ..., $\gamma_m \cdot L$.
- Of course $\gamma_1 \cdot L = 1 \cdot L = L$. Now, for $i \ge 2$, assume one has already produced $\gamma_{i-1} \cdot L$. Since $\gamma_i = \gamma_{i-1} \oplus 1$ 24
- $(0^{n-1}1 \ll \mathsf{ntz}(i))$ we know that 25

26
$$\gamma_{i} \cdot L = (\gamma_{i-1} \oplus (0^{n-1}1 << \mathsf{ntz}(i))) \cdot L$$
27
$$= (\gamma_{i-1} \cdot L) \oplus (0^{n-1}1 << \mathsf{ntz}(i)) \cdot L$$
28
$$= (\gamma_{i-1} \cdot L) \oplus (L \cdot x^{\mathsf{ntz}(i)})$$
29
$$= (\gamma_{i-1} \cdot L) \oplus L(\mathsf{ntz}(i))$$


- 30 That is, the *i*th word in the sequence $\gamma_1 \cdot L$, $\gamma_2 \cdot L$, $\gamma_3 \cdot L$, ... is obtained by xoring the previous word with
- 31 $L(\mathsf{ntz}(i))$. Had the sequence we were considering been $\gamma_1 \cdot L \oplus R$, $\gamma_2 \cdot L \oplus R$, $\gamma_3 \cdot L \oplus R$, ..., the *i*th word
- 32 would be formed in the same way for $i \ge 2$, but the first word in the sequence would have been $L \oplus R$
- 33 instead of L.

34

F.6.1.2 The Scheme

- 35 PARAMETERS. To use OCB one must specify a block cipher and a tag length. The block cipher is a
- function $E: K \times \{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}^n$, for some number n, where each $E(K, \cdot) = E_K(\cdot)$ is a permutation on $\{0, 1\}^n$ 36

- 1 1 n. Here K is the set of possible keys and n is the block length. Both are arbitrary, though we insist that $n \ge n$
- 2 64, and we discourage n < 128. The *tag length* is an integer $\tau \in [0..n]$. By trivial means, the adversary will
- 3 be able to forge a valid ciphertext with probability $2^{-\tau}$. The popular block cipher to use with OCB is likely
- 4 to be AES [34]. As for the tag length, a suggested default of $\tau = 64$ is reasonable. Tags of 32 bits are
- 5 standard in retail banking. Tags of 96 bits are used in IPsec. Using a tag of more than 80 bits adds
- 6 questionable security benefit, though it does lengthen each ciphertext.
- 7 We let OCB-E denote the OCB mode of operation using block cipher E and an unspecified tag length. We
- let $OCB[E, \tau]$ denote the OCB mode of operation using block cipher E and tag length τ .
- 9 NONCES. Encryption under OCB mode requires an *n*-bit nonce, *N*. The nonce would typically be a counter
- 10 (maintained by the sender) or a random value (selected by the sender). Security is maintained even if the
- 11 adversary can control the nonce, subject to the constraint that no nonce may be repeated within the current
- 12 session (that is, during the period of use of the current encryption key). The nonce need not be random,
- 13 unpredictable, or secret.
- The nonce N is needed both to encrypt and to decrypt. Typically it would be communicated, in the clear,
- 15 along with the ciphertext. However, it is out-of-scope how the nonce is communicated to the party who will
- decrypt. In particular, we do not regard the nonce as part of the ciphertext.
- 17 DEFINITION OF THE MODE. See Figure 54 for a definition and illustration of OCB. The figure defines
- OCB encryption and decryption. The key space for OCB is the key space K for the underlying block cipher
- 19 E.
- 20 AN EQUIVALENT DESCRIPTION. The following description may clarify what a typical implementation
- 21 might do.
- 22 Key generation. Choose a random key $K \leftarrow_R K$ for the block cipher. The key K is provided to both the
- entity that encrypts and the entity that decrypts.
- 24 Key setup. For the party that encrypts, do any key setup associated to block-cipher enciphering. For the
- 25 party that decrypts, do any key setup associated to block-cipher enciphering and deciphering. Let $L \leftarrow$
- 26 $E_{\kappa}(0^n)$. Let m bound the maximum number of n-bit blocks that any message which will be encrypted or
- decrypted may have. Let $\mu \leftarrow \lceil \log_2 m \rceil$. Let $L(0) \leftarrow L$ and, for $i \in [1.. \mu]$, compute $L(i) \leftarrow L(i-1) \cdot x$ using a
- shift and a conditional xor, as described in Section G.2. Compute $L(-1) \leftarrow L \cdot x^{-1}$ using a shift and a
- conditional xor, as described in Section G.2. Save the values L(-1), L(0), L(1), ..., $L(\mu)$ in a table.



```
\overline{Algorithm} \overline{OCB.Enc_{\mathbf{K}}} (N, M)
 Partition M into M[1] \dots M[m]
 L \leftarrow E_K(0^n)
 R \leftarrow E_K(N \oplus L)
 for i \leftarrow 1 to m do Z[i] \leftarrow \gamma_i \cdot L \oplus R
 for i \leftarrow 1 to m-1 do
         C[i] \leftarrow E_K(M[i] \oplus Z[i]) \oplus Z[i]
 X[m] \leftarrow \operatorname{len}(M[m]) \oplus L \cdot x^{-1} \oplus Z[m]
 Y[m] \leftarrow E_K(X[m])
 C[m] \leftarrow Y[m] \oplus M[m]
 C \leftarrow C[1] \dots C[m]
 Checksum \leftarrow M[1] \oplus ... \oplus M[m-1] \oplus C[m]0^* \oplus
 T \leftarrow E_K(\text{Checksum} \oplus Z[m])[\text{first } \tau \text{ bits}]
 return C \leftarrow C \parallel T
```

```
Algorithm OCB.Dec_K(N, M)
 Partition C into C[1] \dots C[m] T
 L \leftarrow E_K(0^n)
 R \leftarrow E_K(N \oplus L)
 for i \leftarrow 1 to m do Z[i] \leftarrow \gamma_i \cdot L \oplus R
 for i \leftarrow 1 to m-1 do
        M[i] \leftarrow E_K^{-1}(C[i] \oplus Z[i]) \oplus Z[i]
 X[m] \leftarrow \operatorname{len}(C[m]) \oplus L \cdot x^{-1} \oplus Z[m]
 Y[m] \leftarrow E_K(X[m])
 M[m] \leftarrow Y[m] \oplus C[m]
 M \leftarrow M[1] \dots M[m]
 Checksum \leftarrow M[1] \oplus ... \oplus M[m-1] \oplus C[m]0^* \oplus
 T' \leftarrow E_K(\text{Checksum} \oplus Z[m])[\text{first } \tau \text{ bits}]
 if T' = T then return M
              else return INVALID
```

5 6

7 8

9

10

11

Figure 54—OCB Encryption. The message to encrypt is M and the key is K. Message M is written as M = $M[1] M[2] \dots M[m-1] M[m]$, where $m = \max\{1, \lceil |M|/n \rceil\}$ and $|M[1]| = |M[2]| = \dots = |M[m-1]| = n$. Nonce N is a non-repeating value selected by the party that encrypts. It is sent along with ciphertext C = C[1] C[2] $C[3] \dots C[m-1]$ C[m] T. The Checksum is $M[1] \oplus \dots \oplus M[m-1] \oplus C[m]$ $0^* \oplus Y[m]$. Offset $Z[1] = L \oplus R$ while, for $i \ge 2$, $Z[i] = Z[i-1] \oplus L(\mathsf{ntz}[i])$. String L is defined by applying E_K to a fixed string, 0^n . For Y[m] \oplus M[m] and Y[m] \oplus C[m], truncate Y[m] if it is longer than the other operand. By C[m]0* we mean C[m] padded on the right with 0-bits to get to length n. The function len represents the length of its argument as an *n*-bit string.

12 13

14

15 16

17 18 Encryption. To encrypt plaintext $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ using key K and nonce $N \in \{0, 1\}^n$, obtaining a ciphertext C, do the following. Let $m \leftarrow \lceil |M|/n \rceil$. If m = 0 then let $m \leftarrow 1$. Let M[1], ..., M[m] be strings such that M[1]... M[m] = M and |M[i]| = n for $i \in [1..m-1]$. Let Offset $\leftarrow E_K(N \oplus L)$. Let Checksum $\leftarrow 0^n$. For $i \leftarrow 1$ to m-1, do the following: let Checksum \leftarrow Checksum \oplus M[i]; let Offset \leftarrow Offset \oplus $L(\mathsf{ntz}(i))$; let $C[i] \leftarrow E_K(M[i])$ \oplus Offset) \oplus Offset. Let Offset \leftarrow Offset \oplus $L(\mathsf{ntz}(m))$. Let $Y[m] \leftarrow E_K(\mathsf{len}(M[m]) \oplus L(-1) \oplus \mathsf{Offset}$. Let $C[m] \leftarrow M[m]$ xored with the first |M[m]| bits of Y[m]. Let Checksum \leftarrow Checksum $\oplus Y[m] \oplus C[m]0^*$. Let

19 20

T be the first τ bits of E_K (Checksum \oplus Offset). The ciphertext is $C = C[1] \dots C[m-1]$ C[m] T. It must be

21 communicated along with the nonce N.

22 Decryption. To decrypt ciphertext $C \in \{0, 1\}^*$ using key K and nonce $N \in \{0, 1\}^n$, obtaining a plaintext M

23 $\in \{0, 1\}^*$ or an indication INVALID, do the following. If $|\mathcal{C}| < \tau$ then return INVALID (the ciphertext has been rejected). Otherwise let C be the first $|C| - \tau$ bits of C and let T be the remaining τ bits. Let $m \leftarrow \lceil |C|/n \rceil$. 24

25 If m = 0 then let m = 1. Let $C[1], \ldots, C[m]$ be strings such that $C[1], \ldots, C[m] = C$ and |C[i]| = n for $i \in C[n]$

[1..*m*-1]. Let Offset $\leftarrow E_K(N \oplus L)$. Let Checksum $\leftarrow 0^n$. For $i \leftarrow 1$ to *m*-1, do the following: let Offset \leftarrow 26

Offset \oplus $L(\mathsf{ntz}(i))$; let $M[i] \leftarrow E_K^{-1}(C[i] \oplus \mathsf{Offset}) \oplus \mathsf{Offset}$; let Checksum $\leftarrow \mathsf{Checksum} \oplus M[i]$. Let Offset 1 \leftarrow Offset \oplus $L(\mathsf{ntz}(m))$. Let $Y[m] \leftarrow E_K(\mathsf{len}(C[m]) \oplus L(-1) \oplus \mathsf{Offset})$. Let $M[m] \leftarrow C[m]$ xored with the first 2 |C[m]| bits of Y[m]. Let Checksum \leftarrow Checksum \oplus Y[m] \oplus $C[m]0^*$. Let T' be the first τ bits of 4 E_{κ} (Checksum \oplus Offset). If $T \neq T'$ then return INVALID (the ciphertext has been rejected). Otherwise, the plaintext is $M=M[1] \dots M[m-1] M[m]$. 5

F.6.2. OCB reference implementation

```
6
 8
9
             * ocb.h
10
             * Author: Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)
11
             * History: 1 April 2000 - first release (TK) - version 0.9
12
13
14
             * OCB-AES-n reference code based on NIST submission "OCB Mode"
15
             * (dated 1 April 2000), submitted by Phillip Rogaway, with
             * auxiliary submitters Mihir Bellare, John Black, and Ted Krovetz.
17
18
             * This code is freely available, and may be modified as desired.
19
             * Please retain the authorship and change history.
20
21
22
             * Note that OCB mode itself is patent pending.
             * This code is NOT optimized for speed; it is only
23
             * designed to clarify the algorithm and to provide a point
24
             * of comparison for other implementations.
25
26
27
             ^{\star} Limitiations: Assumes a 4-byte integer and pointers are
             * 32-bit aligned. Acts on a byte string of less than 2^{36} - 16 bytes.
28
29
             * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
30
             * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
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             * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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             * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
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             * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
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             * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
38
             * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
39
             * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
40
41
42
            #ifndef __OCB__H
43
            #define __OCB__H
44
45
            #ifndef AES KEY BITLEN
46
            #define AES_KEY_BITLEN
                                     128 /* Must be 128, 192, 256 */
47
            #endif
48
49
            #if ((AES_KEY_BITLEN != 128) && \
50
                   (AES_KEY_BITLEN != 192) && \
51
52
                   (AES_KEY_BITLEN != 256))
            #error Bad -- AES_KEY_BITLEN must be one of 128, 192 or 256!!
53
54
55
            /* Opaque forward declaration of key structure */
56
57
            typedef struct _keystruct keystruct;
58
59
             * "ocb_aes_init" optionally creates an ocb keystructure in memory
60
             * and then initializes it using the supplied "enc_key". "tag_len"
61
             * specifies the length of tags that will subsequently be generated
62
             * and verified. If "key" is NULL a new structure will be created, but
             * if "key" is non-NULL, then it is assumed that it points to a
63
64
             * previously allocated structure, and that structure is initialized.
```

```
12
             * "ocb_aes_init" returns a pointer to the initialized structure, or NULL
             * if an error occurred.
             * /
                                            /* Init'd keystruct or NULL /* AES key
            keystruct *
                                                                                * /
            ocb_aes_init(void *enc_key,
                                                                               * /
                   unsigned tag_len,
                                            /* Length of tags to be used
                                            /* OCB key structure. NULL means */
                   keystruct *key);
                                             /* Allocate/init new, non-NULL
                                                                               * /
 9
                                             /* means init existing structure */
10
11
            /* "ocb_done deallocates a key structure and returns NULL */
12
            keystruct *
13
            ocb_done(keystruct *key);
14
15
             \mbox{\ensuremath{^{*}}} "ocb_aes_encrypt takes a key structure, four buffers and a length
16
17
             * parameter as input. "pt_len" bytes that are pointed to by "pt" are
18
             * encrypted and written to the buffer pointed to by "ct". A tag of
19
             * length "tag_len" (set in ocb_aes_init) is written to the "tag" buffer.
20
             * "nonce" must be a 16-byte buffer which changes for each new message
21
22
             * being encrypted. "ocb_aes_encrypt" always returns a value of 1.
             * /
23
            void
24
25
26
27
            ocb_aes_encrypt(keystruct *key,
                                               /* Initialized key struct
                              *nonce, /* 16-byte nonce
                   void
                                      /* Buffer for (incoming) plaintext
                              *pt,
                   void
                               pt_len, /* Byte length of pt
                   unsigned
28
                              *ct, /* Buffer for (outgoing) ciphertext
                   void
29
30
                                       /* Buffer for generated tag
                   void
                              *taq);
31
32
33
             * "ocb_aes_decrypt takes a key structure, four buffers and a length
34
             * parameter as input. "ct_len" bytes that are pointed to by "ct" are
35
             * decrypted and written to the buffer pointed to by "pt". A tag of
36
             * length "tag_len" (set in ocb_aes_init) is read from the "tag" buffer.
37
             * "nonce" must be a 16-byte buffer which changes for each new message
38
             * being encrypted. "ocb_aes_decrypt" returns 0 if the supplied
39
             * tag is not correct for the supplied message, otherwise 1 is returned
40
             * if the tag is correct.
             * /
41
42
            int
                                                 /* Returns 0 iff tag is incorrect
                                                /* Initialized key struct
43
            ocb_aes_decrypt(keystruct *key,
44
                              *nonce, /* 16-byte nonce
                   biov
45
                              *ct,
                                   /* Buffer for (incoming) ciphertext */
                   void
                              ct_len, /* Byte length of ct
46
                   unsigned
47
                                      /* Buffer for (outgoing) plaintext
                   void
                              *pt,
48
                   void
                              *tag);
                                      /* Tag to be verified
49
50
51
            pmac_aes (keystruct *key,
                                       /* Initialized key struct
                              *in, /* Buffer for (incoming) message in_len, /* Byte length of message
52
                   void
53
                   unsigned
54
                                      ^{'*} 16-byte buffer for generated tag */
                   void
                              *taq);
55
56
            #endif /* __OCB__H */
57
58
59
             * rijndael-alg-fst.h
60
61
             * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
62
63
             * Optimized ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) \,
64
65
             * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
             * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
```

```
* @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
 2
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             * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
14
             * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
15
             * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
16
17
            #ifndef __RIJNDAEL_ALG_FST_H
18
            #define __RIJNDAEL_ALG_FST_H
19
20
            #define MAXKC (256/32)
21
22
            #define MAXKB(256/8)
            #define MAXNR14
23
24
25
26
27
            typedef unsigned char
                                         u8;
            typedef unsigned short
                                         u16;
            typedef unsigned int
                                         u32;
28
            int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(
29
30
                    u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits);
            int rijndaelKeySetupDec(
31
                    u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits);
32
            void rijndaelEncrypt(
33
34
                    const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]);
            void rijndaelDecrypt(
35
                    const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]);
36
37
            #ifdef INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT
38
            void rijndaelEncryptRound(
39
                    const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, u8 block[16], int rounds);
40
            void rijndaelDecryptRound(
41
                    const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, u8 block[16], int rounds);
42
             #endif /* INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT */
43
             #endif /* __RIJNDAEL_ALG_FST_H */
45
46
              * ocb.c
47
48
49
              * Author: Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)
50
              * History: 1 April 2000 - first release (TK) - version 0.9
51
52
             * OCB-AES-n reference code based on NIST submission "OCB Mode"
53
              * (dated 1 April 2000), submitted by Phillip Rogaway, with
54
              * auxiliary submitters Mihir Bellare, John Black, and Ted Krovetz.
55
56
             * This code is freely available, and may be modified as desired.
57
              \mbox{\ensuremath{^{\circ}}} Please retain the authorship and change history.
58
              * Note that OCB mode itself is patent pending.
59
60
             * This code is NOT optimized for speed; it is only
61
             * designed to clarify the algorithm and to provide a point
62
             * of comparison for other implementations.
63
64
             * Limitiations: Assumes a 4-byte integer type and pointers that are
65
              * 32-bit aligned. Acts on a byte string of at most 2^36-16 bytes.
66
```

```
* Rijndael source available at www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/
   2
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                                            * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
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   9
                                            * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
 10
                                           * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
11
                                           * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
12
                                            * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
13
                                            * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
14
15
                                         #include "ocb.h"
16
17
                                         #include "rijndael-alg-fst.h"
18
                                         #include <stdlib.h>
                                         #include <string.h>
19
20
                                         #include <limits.h>
21
22
                                         #if (INT MAX != 0x7fffffff)
23
24
25
26
27
                                         #error -- Assumes 4-byte int
                                         #endif
                                           * This implementation precomputes L(-1), L(0), L(1), L(PRE_COMP_BLOCKS),
28
                                           * where L(0) = L and L(-1) = L/x and L(i) = x*L(i) for i>0.
29
                                            * Normally, one would select PRE_COMP_BLOCKS to be a small number
30
                                            * (like 0-6) and compute any larger L(i) values "on the fly", when they
31
                                           * are needed. This saves space in _keystruct and needn't adversely
* impact running time. But in this implementation, to keep things as
32
33
34
                                             * simple as possible, we compute all the L(i)-values we might ever see.
                                            * /
35
                                         #define PRE_COMP_BLOCKS 31
                                                                                                                                                     /* Must be between 0 and 31 */
36
37
                                         #define AES_ROUNDS (AES_KEY_BITLEN / 32 + 6)
38
39
                                         typedef unsigned char block[16];
40
41
                                         struct _keystruct {
                                                      unsigned rek[4*(AES_ROUNDS+1)]; /* AES encryption key */
unsigned rdk[4*(AES_ROUNDS+1)]; /* AES decryption key */
42
43
44
                                                       unsigned tag_len;
                                                                                                                                                              /* Sizeof tags to generate/validate */
45
                                                                                                                                                             /* Precomputed L(i) values, L[0] = L */
                                                       block L[PRE_COMP_BLOCKS+1];
46
                                                       block L_inv;
                                                                                                                                                                /* Precomputed L/x value */
47
                                         };
48
49
                                          /******************************
50
                                             * xor block
51
                                             52
                                         static void xor_block(void *dst, void *src1, void *src2)
53
54
                                            * 128-bit xor: *dst = *src1 xor *src2. Pointers must be 32-bit aligned
55
                                            * /
56
                                          {
57
                                                                 ((unsigned *)dst)[0] = ((unsigned *)src1)[0] ^ ((unsigned *)src1)[0] ^ ((unsigned *)dst)[0] ^ ((unsigned *)dst)[
58
                                                                                        *)src2)[0];
59
                                                                  ((unsigned *)dst)[1] = ((unsigned *)src1)[1] ^ ((unsigned
60
                                                                                        *)src2)[1];
61
                                                                 ((unsigned *)dst)[2] = ((unsigned *)src1)[2] ^ ((unsigned *)src1)[2] ^ ((unsigned *)dst)[2] ^ ((unsigned *)dst)[
62
                                                                                        *)src2)[2];
63
                                                                 ((unsigned *)dst)[3] = ((unsigned *)src1)[3] ^ ((unsigned *)src1)[3] ^ ((unsigned *)dst)[3] ^ ((unsigned *)dst)[4] ^ ((unsigned *)dst)[
64
                                                                                        *)src2)[3];
65
                                          }
66
```

67

```
/***************************
2
           * shift_left
           static void shift_left(unsigned char *x)
           * 128-bit shift-left by 1 bit: *x <<= 1.
          * /
8
          {
9
                int i;
               for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) { x[i] = (x[i] << 1) | (x[i+1] & 0x80 ? 1 : 0);
10
11
12
13
               x[15] = (x[15] \ll 1);
14
          }
15
16
17
           * shift_right
           18
19
          static void shift_right(unsigned char *x)
20
21
22
          * 128-bit shift-right by 1 bit: *x >>= 1
23
24
25
26
27
          {
                int i;
               for (i = 15; i > 0; i--) {
 x[i] = (x[i] >> 1) | (x[i-1] & 1 ? 0x80u : 0);
28
               x[0] = (x[0] >> 1);
29
          }
30
31
          32
33
34
          static int ntz(unsigned i)
35
36
37
          * Count the number of trailing zeroes in integer i.
38
39
          #if (MSC_VER && _M_IX86) /* Only non-C sop */
40
               asm bsf eax, i
41
          #elif (__GNUC__ && __i386__)
42
                int rval;
43
                asm volatile("bsf %1, %0" : "=r" (rval) : "g" (i));
44
               return rval;
45
          #else
46
                int rval = 0;
47
                while ((i \& 1) == 0) {
48
                     i >>= 1;
49
                     rval++;
50
                }
51
               return rval;
52
          #endif
53
54
          /****************************
55
56
           * ocb_aes_init
57
           ************************
58
                                        /* Init'd keystruct or NULL
                                                                     * /
          keystruct *
59
                                        /* AES key
/* Length of tags to be used
          ocb_aes_init(void
                             *enc_key,
                                                                     * /
60
                     unsigned tag_len,
                                                                     * /
61
                     keystruct *key)
                                        /* OCB key structure. NULL means */
                                         /* Allocate/init new, non-NULL
62
                                                                    * /
63
                                         /* means init existing structure */
64
          {
65
               unsigned char tmp[16] = \{0,\};
66
               unsigned first_bit, last_bit, i;
67
```

```
if (key == NULL)
2
                         key = (keystruct *)malloc(sizeof(keystruct));
3
                  if (key != NULL) {
4
                         memset(key, 0, sizeof(keystruct));
                         /* Initialize AES keys. (Note that if one is only going to
                         encrypt, key->rdk can be eliminated */
8
                         rijndaelKeySetupEnc(key->rek, (unsigned char *)enc_key,
9
                                AES_KEY_BITLEN);
10
                         rijndaelKeySetupDec(key->rdk, (unsigned char *)enc_key,
11
                                AES KEY BITLEN);
12
13
                         /* Precompute L[i]-values. L[0] is synonym of L */
14
                         rijndaelEncrypt (key->rek, AES_ROUNDS, tmp, tmp);
15
                         for (i = 0; i <= PRE_COMP_BLOCKS; i++) {</pre>
                                memcpy(key->L + i, tmp, 16); /* Copy tmp to L[i] */
16
17
                                first_bit = tmp[0] & 0x80u; /* multiply tmp by x */
18
                                shift_left(tmp);
                                if (first_bit)
19
20
                                      tmp[15] ^= 0x87;
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
                         /* Precompute L_inv = L . x^{-1} */
                         memcpy(tmp, key->L, 16);
                         last\_bit = tmp[15] \& 0x01;
                         shift_right(tmp);
                         if (last_bit) {
28
                                tmp[0] ^= 0x80;
29
30
31
                                tmp[15] ^= 0x43;
                         memcpy(key->L_inv, tmp, 16);
32
33
34
                         /* Set tag length used for this session */
                         key->tag_len = tag_len;
35
                  }
36
37
                  return key;
38
            }
39
40
            /************************
41
             * ocb_aes_encrypt
            *****************************
42
43
           void
44
           ocb_aes_encrypt(keystruct *key, /* Initialized key struct
45
                                     *nonce, /* 16-byte nonce
                                     *pt, /* Buffer for (incoming) plaintext pt_len, /* Byte length of pt
46
                            void
47
                            unsigned
                                             /* Buffer for (outgoing) ciphertext */
48
                            void
                                      *ct,
49
                                              /* Buffer for generated tag
                            biov
                                      *tag)
50
            {
51
                                               /* Block counter
                  unsigned i;
                                              /* temporary buffers
52
53
                  block tmp, tmp2;
                                              /* block-typed aliases for pt / ct */
                  block *pt_blk, *ct_blk;
54
55
                  block Offset;
                                               /* Offset (Z[i]) for current block */
                                               /* Checksum for computing tag
                  block checksum;
56
57
58
                   * Initializations
59
                   * /
60
                                              /* Start with first block
                  i = 1;
61
                  pt_blk = (block *)pt - 1;
                                             /* These are adjusted so, e.g.,
                  ct_blk = (block *)ct - 1; /* pt_blk[1] refers to 1st block */
62
63
                  memset(checksum, 0, 16);
                                              /* Zero the checksum
64
65
                  /* Calculate R, aka Z[0] */
66
                  xor_block(Offset, nonce, key->L);
67
                  rijndaelEncrypt (key->rek, AES_ROUNDS, Offset, Offset);
```

```
2
 3
                    * Process blocks 1 .. m-1
 4
                   while (pt_len > 16) {
                          /* Update the Offset (Z[i] from Z[i-1]) */
                          xor_block(Offset, key->L + ntz(i), Offset);
 8
 9
                          /* xor the plaintext block with Z[i] */
10
                          xor_block(tmp, Offset, pt_blk + i);
11
12
                          /* Encipher the block */
13
                          rijndaelEncrypt (key->rek, AES_ROUNDS, tmp, tmp);
14
15
                          /* xor Z[i] again, writing result to ciphertext pointer */
16
                          xor_block(ct_blk + i, Offset, tmp);
17
18
                          /* Update checksum */
19
                          xor_block(checksum, checksum, pt_blk + i);
20
21
22
                          /* Update loop variables */
                          pt_len -= 16;
23
24
25
26
27
                          i++;
                   }
                    * Process block m
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
                   / \ \mbox{$^{\prime}$ Update Offset (Z[m] from Z[m-1]) $^{\prime}$} \label{eq:condition}
                   xor_block(Offset, key->L + ntz(i), Offset);
                   /* xor L . x^{-1} and Z[m] */
                   xor_block(tmp, Offset, key->L_inv);
35
36
37
                   /* Add in final block bit-length */
                   tmp[15] ^= (pt_len << 3);</pre>
38
39
                   rijndaelEncrypt (key->rek, AES_ROUNDS, tmp, tmp);
40
41
                   /* xor 'pt' with block-cipher output, copy valid bytes to 'ct' */
                   memcpy(tmp2, pt_blk + i, pt_len);
xor_block(tmp2, tmp2, tmp);
42
43
44
                   memcpy(ct_blk + i, tmp2, pt_len);
45
46
                   /* Add to checksum the pt_len bytes of plaintext followed by */
47
                   /* the last (16 - pt_len) bytes of block-cipher output */
48
                   memcpy(tmp, pt_blk + i, pt_len);
49
50
                   xor_block(checksum, checksum, tmp);
51
52
53
                    * Calculate tag
                    * /
54
                   xor_block(checksum, checksum, Offset);
55
                   rijndaelEncrypt(key->rek, AES_ROUNDS, checksum, tmp);
56
                   memcpy(tag, tmp, key->tag_len);
57
            }
58
            59
60
             * ocb_aes_decrypt
61
            *******************
                                                /* Returns 0 iff tag is incorrect
62
            int
63
            ocb_aes_decrypt(keystruct *key,
                                               /* Initialized key struct
                                        *nonce, /* 16-byte nonce
64
                             void
                                       *ct, /* Buffer for (incoming) ciphertext */
ct_len, /* Byte length of ct */
65
                             void
66
                             unsigned
                                                 /* Buffer for (outgoing) plaintext
67
                                        *pt,
```

```
void
                                         *tag)
                                                   /* Tag to be verified
 2
             {
 3
                                                                                           * /
                    unsigned i;
                                                    /* Block counter
                    block tmp, tmp2;
                                                    /* temporary buffers
                    block *ct_blk, *pt_blk;
                                                    /* block-typed aliases for ct / pt */
                    block Offset;
                                                    /* Offset (Z[i]) for current block */
                                                    /* Checksum for computing tag
                    block checksum;
9
10
                     * Initializations
11
                     * /
                    i = 1;
12
                                                  /* Start with first block
13
                    ct_blk = (block *)ct - 1;  /* These are adjusted so, e.g.,
                                                                                           * /
14
                    pt_blk = (block *)pt - 1;  /* ct_blk[1] refers to 1st block
15
16
                    /* Zero checksum */
17
                    memset(checksum, 0, 16);
18
19
                    /* Calculate R, aka Z[0] */
20
                    xor_block(Offset, nonce, key->L);
21
22
                    rijndaelEncrypt (key->rek, AES_ROUNDS, Offset, Offset);
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
                     * Process blocks 1 .. m-1
                     * /
                    while (ct_len > 16) {
                           /* Update Offset (Z[i] from Z[i-1]) */
                           xor_block(Offset, key->L + ntz(i), Offset);
                            /* xor ciphertext block with Z[i] */
                           xor_block(tmp, Offset, ct_blk + i);
                            /* Decipher the next block-cipher block */
                           rijndaelDecrypt (key->rdk, AES_ROUNDS, tmp, tmp);
                           /* xor Z[i] again, writing result to plaintext pointer */
xor_block(pt_blk + i, Offset, tmp);
38
39
                            /* Update checksum */
40
                           xor_block(checksum, checksum, pt_blk + i);
41
42
                            /* Update loop variables */
43
                           ct_len -= 16;
44
45
                           i++;
                    }
46
47
48
                     * Process block m
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
                    /* Update Offset (Z[m] from Z[m-1]) */
                    xor_block(Offset, key->L + ntz(i), Offset);
                    /* xor L . x^{-1} and Z[m] */
                    xor_block(tmp, Offset, key->L_inv);
57
                    /* Add in final block bit-length */
58
                    tmp[15] ^= (ct_len << 3);</pre>
59
60
                    rijndaelEncrypt (key->rek, AES_ROUNDS, tmp, tmp);
61
62
                    /* Form the final ciphertext block, C[m] */
63
                    memset(tmp2, 0, 16);
64
                    memcpy(tmp2, ct_blk + i, ct_len);
65
                    xor_block(tmp, tmp2, tmp);
66
                    memcpy(pt_blk + i, tmp, ct_len);
67
```

```
/* After xor above, tmp will have ct_len bytes of plaintext */
 1
2
3
                    /* then (16 - ct_len) block-cipher bytes, perfect for chksum. */
                   xor_block(checksum, checksum, tmp);
 4
                     * Calculate tag
                     * /
                   xor_block(checksum, checksum, Offset);
                   rijndaelEncrypt(key->rek, AES_ROUNDS, checksum, tmp);
return (memcmp(tag, tmp, key->tag_len) == 0 ? 1 : 0);
 9
10
11
            }
12
13
             /*********************
14
               ocb done
15
16
            keystruct *ocb_done(keystruct *key)
17
18
                   if (key) {
19
                          memset(key, 0, sizeof(keystruct));
20
                           free(key);
21
22
                   return NULL;
23
            }
     F.6.3 OCB test vectors
24
25
26
     Test case OCB-AES-128-0B
27
     Key
                   000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
28
     Nonce
                   29
     Plaintext
                   <empty string>
30
     Ciphertext
                   <empty string>
31
     Tag
                   15d37dd7c890d5d6acab927bc0dc60ee
32
     Test case OCB-AES-128-3B
                   000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f\\
33
     Key
     Nonce
                   34
35
     Plaintext
                   000102
36
     Ciphertext
                   fcd37d
37
     Tag
                   02254739a5e3565ae2dcd62c659746ba
38
     Test case OCB-AES-128-16B
39
                   000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
                   000000000000000000000000000000001\\
40
     Nonce
41
     Plaintext
                   000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
42
     Ciphertext
                   37df8ce15b489bf31d0fc44da1faf6d6
                   dfb763ebdb5f0e719c7b4161808004df
43
     Tag
44
     Test case OCB-AES-128-20B
                   000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
45
     Key
                   0000000000000000000000000000000001\\
     Nonce
46
47
     Plaintext
                   000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213
48
     Ciphertext
                   01a075f0d815b1a4e9c881a1bcffc3eb7003eb55
49
     Tag
                   753084144eb63b770b063c2e23cda0bb
50
     Test case OCB-AES-128-32B
51
     Key
                   000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
52
     Nonce
                   53
     Plaintext
                   000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
54
     Ciphertext
                   01a075f0d815b1a4e9c881a1bcffc3eb4afcbb7fedc08ca8654c6d304d1612fa
```

```
1
                 c14cbf2c1a1f1c3c137eadea1f2f2fcf
    Tag
2
    Test case OCB-AES-128-34B
3
                 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f\\
4
    Nonce
                 Plaintext
                 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f2021
6
    Ciphertext
                 01a075f0d815b1a4e9c881a1bcffc3ebd4903dd0025ba4aa837c74f121b0260fa95d
7
    Tag
                 cf8341bb10820ccf14bdec56b8d7d6ab
8
    Test case OCB-AES-128-1000B
9
                 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f\\
    Key
10
                 Nonce
    Plaintext
                 11
    Ciphertext
                 4c9b676705ff2df05503 ... 2f8d1496a60048e2b971 [1000 bytes]
12
13
                 ab335f725475e33e90ab8c1e4891596d
    Tag
14
```

15 **F.7. CCM**

16

F.7.1. CCM reference implementation

```
17
18
           19
            * Proposed AES CTR/CBC-MAC mode test vector generation
20
21
            * 11-02-001r2-I-AES-Encryption & Authentication
22
23
24
25
            * Using-CTR-Mode-with-CBC-MAC
            * Author: Doug Whiting, Hifn (dwhiting@hifn.com)
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
            * This code is released to the public domain, on an as-is basis.
            * /
           #include <stdio.h>
           #include <stdlib.h>
           #include <string.h>
33
34
           #include <time.h>
           #include <assert.h>
35
36
37
           #include "aes_defs.h"
                                     /* AES calling interface*/
                                      /* NIST AES test vectors*/
           #include "aes vect.h"
38
39
           typedef int BOOL;
                                      /* boolean */
40
41
           enum {
42
                           = 16, /* # octets in an AES block */
                  BLK_SIZE
43
                  MAX_PACKET = 3*512, /* largest packet size */
                 N_RESERVED = 0, /* reserved nonce octet value */
44
45
                            = 0x40,
                                     /* the Adata bit in the flags */
                  A DATA
                            = 3, /* how much to shift the 3-bit M field */
= 0, /* how much to shift the 3-bit L field */
46
                  M_SHIFT
                            = 0,
47
                  L SHIFT
48
                  L SIZE
                            = 2
                                    /* size of the l(m) length field (in octets) */
49
50
           };
51
           union block {
                                    /* AES cipher block */
52
                  u32b x[BLK_SIZE/4]; /* access as 8-bit octets or 32-bit words */
53
                  u08b b[BLK SIZE];
54
           };
55
56
           struct packet {
```

```
encrypted; /* TRUE if encrypted */
 1
2
3
                    u08b TA[6];
                                    /* xmit address */
                          micLength; /* # octets of MIC appended to plaintext (M) */
                    int
 4
                          clrCount;  /* # cleartext octets covered by MIC */
                    int
                    u32b pktNum[2]; /* unique packet sequence number (like WEP IV) */
                                     /* the encryption key (K) */
                    block key;
                                      /* # octets in data[] */
                          length;
                    int
                    u08b data[MAX_PACKET+2*BLK_SIZE]; /* packet contents */
9
            };
10
11
            struct {
12
                    int
                                           /* how many words left in ct */
13
                   block ptCntr;
                                           /* the counter input */
14
                   block ct;
                                           /* the ciphertext (prng output) */
15
            } prng;
16
17
            /* return the 32-bit value read to be stored as a big-endian word */
18
            u32b BigEndian(u32b x)
19
            {
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
                    static block b = \{0,0,0,0,0\};
                    if (b.x[0] == 0)
                                           /* first time, figure out endianness */
                           b.x[0] = 0xFF000001;
                    if (b.b[0] == 0xFF) /* is this a big-endian CPU? */
                           return x;
                                           /* if so, just return x */
                    if (b.b[0] != 0x01) /* not big-Endian; check it's little-Endian */
                           assert(0);
                                          /* if not, bomb! */
                    /* little-endian: do the byte swapping */
                    return (x >> 24) + (x << 24) +
                           ((x >> 8) & 0x00FF00) + ((x << 8) & 0xFF0000);
            }
            void InitRand(u32b seed)
38
39
                    memset(prng.ptCntr.b,0,BLK_SIZE);
                   prng.ptCntr.x[(BLK_SIZE/4)-1] = seed*17;
40
                    prng.cnt = 0; /* the pump is dry */
41
            }
42
43
            /* prng: does not use C rand(), so should be usable across platforms */
44
            u32b Random32(void)
45
46
                    if (prng.cnt == 0) { /* use whatever key is currently defined */
47
                           prng.cnt = BLK_SIZE/4;
48
                           prng.ptCntr.x[0]++;
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
                           if (prng.ptCntr.x[0] == 0) /* ripple carry? */
                                  prng.ptCntr.x[1]++; /* stop at 64 bits */
                           AES_Encrypt(prng.ptCntr.x, prng.ct.x);
                    --prng.cnt;
                    return BigEndian(prng.ct.x[prng.cnt]);
            }
57
            /* display a block */
58
            void ShowBlock(
59
                    const block *blk,
60
                    const char *prefix,
                   const char *suffix,
61
62
                    int a)
63
            {
64
                    int i, blkSize = BLK_SIZE;
65
                    printf(prefix,a);
66
                    if (suffix == NULL) {
67
                           suffix = "\n";
```

```
blkSize = a;
 1
2
3
                   for (i = 0; i < blkSize; i++)
 4
                          printf("%02X%s", blk->b[i], ((i&3)==3) ? " ":" ");
                   printf (suffix);
            }
            void ShowAddr(const packet *p)
9
10
                   int i;
11
12
                   printf("
                                TA = ");
13
                   for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
14
                          printf("%02X%s",p->TA[i],(i==3)?" ":" ");
15
                   printf(" 48-bit pktNum = %04X.%08X\n",p->pktNum[1],p->pktNum[0]);
16
            }
17
18
            /* display a packet */
19
            void ShowPacket(const packet *p, const char *pComment, int a)
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
                   printf("Total packet length = %4d. ", p->length);
                   printf(pComment, a);
                   if (p->encrypted)
                          printf("[Encrypted]");
                   for (i = 0; i < p->length; i++) {
                          if ((i \& 15) == 0)
                                 printf("\n%11s","");
                          printf("%02X%s", p->data[i], ((i&3)==3) ? " ":" ");
                   printf("\n");
            }
35
36
37
            /* make sure that encrypt/decrypt work according to NIST vectors */
            void Validate_NIST_AES_Vectors(int verbose)
            {
38
39
                   int i;
                   block key,pt,ct,rt;
40
41
                   42
                   /* variable text (fixed-key) tests */
43
                   memcpy(key.b,VT_key,BLK_SIZE);
44
45
                   AES_SetKey(key.x,BLK_SIZE*8);
                   for (i = 0; i < sizeof(VT_pt_ct_pairs); i += 2 * BLK_SIZE) {</pre>
46
                          memcpy(pt.b, VT_pt_ct_pairs+i, BLK_SIZE);
47
                          AES_Encrypt(pt.x, ct.x);
48
                          if (memcmp(ct.x, VT_pt_ct_pairs+i+BLK_SIZE, BLK_SIZE)) {
49
50
                                 printf("Vector miscompare at VT test #%d", i);
                                 exit(1);
51
52
53
54
55
56
                          AES_Decrypt(ct.x, rt.x); /* sanity check on decrypt */
                          if (memcmp(pt.b, rt.b, BLK_SIZE)) {
                                 printf("Decrypt miscompare at VT test #%d", i);
                                 exit(1);
57
                          if (verbose) { /* only do a little if we're "debugging" */
58
                                 printf("\n");
59
                                 break;
60
                          \} else if (i==0) { /* display the first vector */
                                                           ","\n",0);
","\n",0);
61
                                 ShowBlock(&key, "Key:
                                 ShowBlock(&pt, "PT:
62
63
                                 ShowBlock(&ct ,"CT:
                                                             ","\n\n",0);
64
                          }
65
66
67
                   /* variable key (fixed-text) tests */
```

```
12
                    memcpy(pt.b, VK_pt, BLK_SIZE);
                    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(VK_key_ct_pairs); i += 2*BLK_SIZE) {</pre>
 3
                           memcpy(key.b, VK_key_ct_pairs+i, BLK_SIZE);
 4
                            AES_SetKey(key.x, BLK_SIZE*8);
                            AES_Encrypt(pt.x, ct.x);
                            if (memcmp(ct.x, VK_key_ct_pairs+i+BLK_SIZE, BLK_SIZE)) {
 7
                                   printf("Vector miscompare at VK test #%d", i);
 8
                                   exit(1);
9
10
                            AES_Decrypt(ct.x, rt.x); /* sanity check on decrypt */
11
                            if (memcmp(pt.b, rt.b, BLK_SIZE)) {
12
                                   printf("Decrypt miscompare at VK test #%d",i);
13
                                   exit(1);
14
15
                            if (verbose) { /* only do a little if we're "debugging" */
16
                                   printf("\n");
17
                                   break;
18
                            } else if (i==0) { /* display the first vector */
                                                                 ", "\n", 0);
", "\n", 0);
19
                                   ShowBlock(&key, "Key:
20
                                   ShowBlock(&pt , "PT:
ShowBlock(&ct , "CT:
21
22
                                                                  ", "\n\n", 0);
                            }
23
24
25
26
27
                    printf("NIST AES Vectors: OK\n"); /* ok if we got here */
             }
             /* assumes AES_SetKey is called elsewhere */
28
             void Generate_CTR_CBC_Vector(packet *p, int verbose)
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
                    int i, j, len, needPad, blkNum;
                    block
                           m, x, T;
                    assert(p->length >= p->clrCount && p->length <= MAX_PACKET);</pre>
                    assert(p->micLength > 0 && p->micLength <= BLK_SIZE);</pre>
                    len = p->length - p->clrCount; /* l(m) */
                    ShowPacket(p,"[Input (%d cleartext header octets)]", p->clrCount);
38
39
                    /* ---- generate the first AES block for CBC-MAC */
                    m.b[0] = (u08b) (((p->clrCount)?A_DATA:0) +
40
                            (((p-\text{smicLength}-2)/2 << M\_SHIFT)) +
41
                            ((L_SIZE-1) << L_SHIFT)); /* flags octet */
42
                    m.b[ 1] = N_RESERVED; /* reserved nonce octet */
43
                    m.b[ 2] = (u08b) (p->pktNum[1] >> 8) & 0xFF; /* 48 bit pkt # */
44
45
                    m.b[3] = (u08b) p->pktNum[1]
                                                          & OxFF;
                    m.b[4] = (u08b) (p->pktNum[0] >> 24) & 0xFF;
46
                    m.b[5] = (u08b) (p->pktNum[0] >>16) & 0xFF;
47
                    m.b[6] = (u08b) (p->pktNum[0] >> 8) & 0xFF;
48
                    m.b[7] = (u08b) p->pktNum[0]
                                                            & 0xFF;
49
50
                    m.b[ 8] = p->TA[0]; /* 48 bit Transmit Addr */
                    m.b[9] = p->TA[1];
51
52
53
                    m.b[10] = p->TA[2];
                    m.b[11] = p->TA[3];
                    m.b[12] = p->TA[4];
54
55
56
                    m.b[13] = p->TA[5];
                    m.b[14] = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; /* l(m) field */
                    m.b[15] = len
                                           & 0xFF;
57
58
                    /*--- compute the CBC-MAC tag (MIC) */
59
                    AES_Encrypt(m.x, x.x); /* produce the CBC IV */ ShowBlock(&m,"CBC IV in: ", "\n", 0);
60
61
                    if (verbose)
62
                           ShowBlock(&x, "CBC IV out:", "\n", 0);
63
                    j = 0;
                             /* j = octet counter inside the block */
                    if (p->clrCount) { /* is there a header? */
    /* if so, "insert" length field: l(a) */
64
65
                            assert(p->clrCount < 0xFFF0);</pre>
66
67
                                   /* [don't handle larger cases (yet)] */
```

```
x.b[j++] ^= (p->clrCount >> 8) & 0xFF;
 1
2
3
                           x.b[j++] ^= p->clrCount
                                                             & OxFF;
 4
                    for (i = blkNum = 0; i < p->length; i++) { /* CBC-MAC */
                           x.b[j++] ^= p->data[i]; /* perform the CBC xor */
                           needPad = (i == p->clrCount-1) || (i == p->length-1);
                           if ((j == BLK_SIZE) || needPad)
 7
 8
                                   /* full block, or hit pad boundary */
9
                                   if (verbose)
10
                                          ShowBlock(&x, "After xor: ",
11
                                                 (i \ge p - clrCount) ? " [msg] \ " "
                                                 [hdr]\n",blkNum);
12
13
                                  AES_Encrypt(x.x, x.x); /* encrypt in place */
14
                                   if (verbose)
15
                                          ShowBlock(&x, "After AES: ", "\n", blkNum);
                                   blkNum++; /* count the blocks */
16
                                   j = 0; /* the block is now empty */
17
18
                           }
19
20
                    memcpy(T.b,x.b,p->micLength);  // save the MIC tag
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
                    ShowBlock(&T, "MIC tag : ", NULL, p->micLength);
                    /* ---- encrypt the data packet using CTR mode */
                    m.b[0] \&= \sim(A_DATA \mid (7 << M_SHIFT));
                           /* clear flag fields for counter mode */
                    for (i=blkNum=0;i+p->clrCount < p->length;i++) {
                           if ((i % BLK\_SIZE) == 0) {
                                   /* generate new keystream block */
                                  blkNum++; /* start data with block #1 */
                                  m.b[14] = blkNum/256;
                                  m.b[15] = blkNum%256;
                                  AES_Encrypt(m.x, x.x); /* encrypt the counter */
                                   if (verbose && i==0)
                                          ShowBlock(&m, "CTR Start: ", "\n", 0);
                                   if (verbose)
                                          ShowBlock(&x, "CTR[%04X]: " , "\n", blkNum);
38
39
                           /* merge in the keystream */
                           p->data[i+p->clrCount] ^= x.b[i % BLK_SIZE];
40
                    }
41
42
                    /* --- truncate, encrypt, and append MIC to packet */
                    m.b[14] = m.b[15] = 0; /* use block counter value zero for tag */
AES_Encrypt(m.x, x.x); /* encrypt the counter */
43
44
45
                    if (verbose)
46
                           ShowBlock(&x,"CTR[MIC ]: " ,NULL,p->micLength);
47
                    for (i = 0; i < p-\text{micLength}; i++)
48
                           p->data[p->length+i] = T.b[i] ^ x.b[i];
49
50
                    p->length += p->micLength; /* adjust pkt length accordingly */
51
52
53
                    p->encrypted = 1;
                    ShowPacket(p,"",0); /* show the final encrypted packet */
             }
54
55
56
            int main(int argc,char *argv[])
57
                    int i, j, k, len, pktNum, seed;
58
                    packet p;
59
60
                    seed = (argc > 1) ? atoi(argv[1]) : (int) time(NULL);
61
                    InitRand(seed);
62
                    printf("%s C compiler [%s %s].\nRandom seed = %d\n",
63
                           COMPILER_ID,__DATE__,_TIME__,seed);
64
65
                    /* 1st, make sure that our AES code matches NIST KAT vectors */
66
                    Validate NIST AES Vectors ( VERBOSE );
67
```

```
/* generate CTR-CBC vectors for various parameter settings */
 2
                    for (k = pktNum = 0; k < 2; k++) {
 3
                           /* k==1 => random vectors.
                           k==0 \Rightarrow "visually simple" vectors */
for (i = 0; i < BLK_SIZE ; i++)
 4
                                  p.key.b[i] =
 7
                                          k) ? (u08b) Random32() & 0xFF : i + 0xC0;
 8
                           for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
 9
                                  p.TA[i] = (k) ? (u08b) Random32() & 0xFF : i + 0xA0;
10
                                  AES_SetKey(p.key.x, BLK_SIZE*8);
11
                                          /* run key schedule */
12
13
                           /* now generate the vectors */
14
                           for (p.micLength = 8;p.micLength <12;p.micLength+=2)</pre>
15
                           for (p.clrCount
                                               = 8;p.clrCount
                                                                 <16;p.clrCount+=4)
16
                           for (len
                                               =32;len
                                                                 <64;len*=2)
17
                           for (i
                                               =-1;i
                                                                  < 2;i++) {
18
                                  p.pktNum[0] = (k) ? Random32() :
19
                                          pktNum*0x01010101 + 0x03020100;
20
                                  p.pktNum[1] = (k) ? Random32() & 0xFFFF : 0;
21
22
                                          /* 48-bit IV */
                                  p.length
                                              = len+i; /* len+i is packet length */
23
24
25
26
27
                                  p.encrypted = 0;
                                  assert(p.length <= MAX_PACKET);</pre>
                                  for (j = 0; j < p.length; j++) /* random pkt */
                                         p.data[j]= (k) ? (u08b) Random32() & 0xFF : j;
                                  pktNum++;
28
                                  printf("======= Packet Vector #%d
29
30
                                   ========\n",pktNum);
                                  ShowBlock(&p.key ,"AES Key:
                                                                   ","\n",0);
31
                                   ShowAddr (&p);
32
                                  Generate_CTR_CBC_Vector(&p,1);
33
                           }
34
35
                    return 0;
36
```

F.7.2. CCM test vectors

37

38

The test vectors included in this annex cover the generic CCM mode, not the conventions for 802.11i.

```
39
40
            ======== Packet Vector #1 ==========
41
           AES Key: C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
42
                 TA = A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
                                          48-bit pktNum = 0000.03020100
43
           Total packet length =
                                    31. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
44
                       00 01 02 03
                                   04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
45
                       10 11 12 13
                                   14 15 16 17
                                                18 19 1A 1B
                                                             1C 1D 1E
46
           CBC IV in: 59 00 00 00
                                    03 02 01 00
                                                A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                             A4 A5 00 17
47
           CBC IV out: EB 9D 55 47
                                   73 09 55 AB
                                                23 1E 0A 2D FE 4B 90 D6
48
           After xor: EB 95 55 46
                                   71 OA 51 AE
                                                25 19 0A 2D
                                                                            [hdr]
                                                             FE 4B 90 D6
49
           After AES: CD B6 41 1E
                                   3C DC 9B 4F
                                                             9E E7 F0 91
                                                5D 92 58 B6
50
           After xor: C5 BF 4B 15
                                   30 D1 95 40
                                                4D 83 4A A5
                                                             8A F2 E6 86
                                                                            [msq]
51
           After AES: 9C 38 40 5E
                                   A0 3C 1B C9
                                                04 B5 8B 40
                                                             C7 6C A2 EB
52
           After xor: 84 21 5A 45
                                                             C7 6C A2 EB
                                   BC 21 05 C9
                                                04 B5 8B 40
                                                                            [msg]
53
           After AES: 2D C6 97 E4
                                   11 CA 83 A8
                                                60 C2 C4 06 CC AA 54 2F
54
           MIC tag : 2D C6 97 E4
                                   11 CA 83 A8
55
           CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
                                   03 02 01 00
                                                A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 00 01
           CTR[0001]: 50 85 9D 91
56
                                   6D CB 6D DD
                                                E0 77 C2 D1
                                                             D4 EC 9F 97
57
           CTR[0002]: 75 46 71 7A
                                                64 OC 9C 06
                                   C6 DE 9A FF
                                                             DE 6D 0D 8F
           CTR[MIC ]: 3A 2E 46 C8
58
                                   EC 33 A5 48
59
           Total packet length =
                                    39. [Encrypted]
60
                       00 01 02 03
                                                58 8C 97 9A 61 C6 63 D2
                                   04 05 06 07
61
                      F0 66 D0 C2
                                   C0 F9 89 80 6D 5F 6B 61 DA C3 84 17
62
                      E8 D1 2C FD
                                   F9 26 E0
63
```

```
========= Packet Vector #2 ===========
2
            AES Key: C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 48-bit pktNum = 0000.04030201
            Total packet length =
                                    32. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B
                       00 01 02 03
                                                              OC OD OE OF
                       10 11 12 13
                                    14 15 16 17
                                                 18 19 1A 1B
                                                               1C 1D 1E 1F
            CBC IV in: 59 00 00 00
                                    04 03 02 01
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                               A4 A5 00 18
            CBC IV out:F0 C2 54 D3
                                    CA 03 E2 39
                                                  70 BD 24 A8
                                                               4C 39 9E 77
            After xor: F0 CA 54 D2
                                    C8 00 E6 3C
                                                  76 BA 24 A8
                                                               4C
                                                                  39 9E 77
                                                                              [hdr]
10
            After AES: 48 DE 8B 86
                                                  00 AA 42 C2
                                    28 EA 4A 40
                                                               95 BF 4A 8C
11
            After xor: 40 D7 81 8D
                                    24 E7 44 4F
                                                  10 BB 50 D1
                                                               81 AA 5C 9B
                                                                              [msg]
12
            After AES: OF 89 FF BC
                                    A6 2B C2 4F
                                                  13 21 5F 16
                                                               87 96 AA 33
13
            After xor: 17 90 E5 A7
                                    BA 36 DC 50
                                                  13 21 5F 16
                                                               87 96 AA 33
                                                                              [msg]
14
            After AES: F7 B9 05 6A
                                    86 92 6C F3
                                                  FB 16 3D C4
                                                               99 EF AA 11
15
            MIC tag : F7 B9 05
                                бΑ
                                    86 92 6C F3
                                                               A4 A5 00 01
            CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
16
                                    04 03 02 01
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
17
            CTR[0001]: 7A C0 10 3D
                                    ED 38 F6 C0
                                                  39 OD BA 87
                                                               1C 49 91 F4
18
                                                  F7 BE 9A 56
            CTR[0002]: D4 0C DE 22
                                    D5 F9 24 24
                                                               9D A7 9F 51
19
                                    96 D2 65 E5
            CTR[MIC ]: 57 28 D0 04
20
            Total packet length =
                                    40. [Encrypted]
21
22
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07
                                                  72 C9 1A 36
                                                               E1 35 F8 CF
                       29 1C A8 94
                                    08 5C 87 E3
                                                  CC 15 C4 39
                                                              C9 E4 3A 3B
23
24
25
26
27
                       A0 91 D5 6E
                                   10 40 09 16
            ======== Packet Vector #3 ==========
            AES Key: C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                   A4 A5 48-bit pktNum = 0000.05040302
28
            Total packet length =
                                    33. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
29
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
                       00 01 02 03
30
                       10 11 12 13
                                    14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B
                                                              1C 1D 1E 1F
31
                       20
32
            CBC IV in: 59 00 00 00
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                    05 04 03 02
                                                               A4 A5 00 19
33
                                    BF 8D 4D C5
            CBC IV out:6F 8A 12 F7
                                                 A1 19 6E 95
                                                              DF F0 B4 27
34
            After xor: 6F 82 12 F6
                                    BD 8E 49 CO
                                                  A7 1E 6E 95
                                                               DF F0 B4 27
                                                                              [hdr]
35
                                    C2 20 17 E7
                                                  33 80 43 OC
            After AES: 37 E9 B7 8C
                                                              BE F4 28 24
           After xor: 3F E0 BD 87
After AES: 90 CA 05 13
36
                                    CE 2D 19 E8
                                                  23 91 51 1F
                                                               AA E1 3E 33
                                                                              [msg]
37
                                    9F 4D 4E CF
                                                  22 6F E9 81
                                                               C5 9E 2D 40
38
            After xor: 88 D3 1F 08
                                    83 50 50 D0
                                                  02 6F E9 81
                                                               C5 9E 2D 40
                                                                              [msg]
39
            After AES: 73 B4 67 75
                                    C0 26 DE AA
                                                  41 03 97 D6
                                                               70 FE 5F B0
40
            MIC tag : 73 B4 67 75
                                    CO 26 DE AA
41
            CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
                                    05 04 03 02
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                               A4 A5 00 01
                                                  B4 7A 1D 9D
42
            CTR[0001]: 59 B8 EF FF
                                    46 14 73 12
                                                               39 3D 3C FF
                                    78 C7 9B 89
43
            CTR[0002]: 69 F1 22 A0
                                                  77 89 4C 99
                                                               97 5C 23 78
            CTR[MIC ]: 39 6E CO 1A
44
                                    7D B9 6E 6F
45
            Total packet length =
                                     41. [Encrypted]
46
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07
                                                  51 B1 E5 F4
                                                              4A 19 7D 1D
47
                       A4 6B 0F 8E
                                    2D 28 2A E8
                                                  71 E8 38 BB
48
                       57 4A DA A7
                                    6F BD 9F B0
                                                  C5
49
50
            ======== Packet Vector #4 ==========
51
            AES Key: C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
52
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                    A4 A5
                                             48-bit pktNum = 0000.06050403
53
            Total packet length =
                                    31. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
54
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
55
                       10 11 12 13
                                    14 15 16 17
                                                 18 19 1A 1B
                                                              1C 1D 1E
56
            CBC IV in: 59 00 00 00
                                    06 05 04 03
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 13
57
            CBC IV out:06 65 2C 60
                                    0E F5 89 63
                                                  CA C3 25 A9
                                                               CD 3E 2B E1
58
            After xor: 06 69 2C 61
                                    OC F6 8D 66
                                                  CC C4 2D A0
                                                               C7 35 2B E1
                                                                              [hdr]
59
            After AES: A0 75 09
                                AC
                                    15 C2 58 86
                                                  04 2F 80 60
                                                               54 FE A6 86
60
            After xor: AC 78 07 A3
                                                               4C E7 BC 9D
                                    05 D3 4A 95
                                                  10 3A 96 77
                                                                              [msg]
            After AES: 64 4C 09 90
61
                                    D9 1B 83 E9
                                                  AB 4B 8E ED
                                                               06 6F F5 BF
62
            After xor: 78 51 17 90
                                    D9 1B 83 E9
                                                  AB 4B 8E ED
                                                               06 6F F5 BF
                                                                              [msq]
63
                                    B5 93 E6 BF
                                                  B0 B2 C2 B7
                                                               OF 29 CD 7A
            After AES: 4B 4F 4B 39
                                    B5 93 E6 BF
64
            MIC tag : 4B 4F 4B 39
65
            CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
                                    06 05 04 03
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                               A4 A5 00 01
66
            CTR[0001]: AE 81 66 6A
                                    83 8B 88 6A
                                                  EE BF 4A 5B
                                                               32 84 50 8A
            CTR[0002]: D1 B1 92 06
                                    AC 93 9E 2F
                                                  B6 DD CE 10
                                                              A7 74 FD 8D
```

```
CTR[MIC ]: DD 87 2A 80
                                    7C 75 F8 4E
 2
                                    39. [Encrypted]
            Total packet length =
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B A2 8C 68 65
                       93 9A 9A 79
                                    FA AA 5C 4C 2A 9D 4A 91
                                                              CD AC 8C 96
                       C8 61 B9 C9
                                    E6 1E F1
            ======== Packet Vector #5 ==========
                     CO C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
            AES Key:
 9
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                    A4 A5
                                            48-bit pktNum = 0000.07060504
10
            Total packet length =
                                    32. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
11
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
12
                       10 11 12 13
                                    14 15 16 17
                                                 18 19 1A 1B
                                                              1C 1D 1E 1F
13
            CBC IV in: 59 00 00 00
                                    07 06 05 04
                                                 AO A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 14
14
            CBC IV out:00 4C 50 95
                                    45 80 3C 48
                                                 51 CD E1 3B
                                                              56 C8 9A 85
15
            After xor: 00 40 50 94
                                    47 83 38 4D
                                                 57 CA E9
                                                          32
                                                              5C C3 9A 85
                                                                             [hdr]
            After AES: E2 B8 F7 CE
                                    49 B2 21 72
16
                                                 84 A8 EA 84
                                                              FA AD 67 5C
17
            After xor: EE B5 F9 C1
                                    59 A3 33 61
                                                 90 BD FC 93
                                                              E2 B4 7D 47
                                                                             [msq]
18
                                    25 DB 11 01
            After AES: 3E FB 36 72
                                                 D3 C2 2F 0E
                                                              CA FF 44 F3
19
            After xor: 22 E6 28 6D
                                    25 DB 11 01
                                                 D3 C2 2F 0E
                                                              CA FF 44 F3
                                                                             [msq]
20
            After AES: 48 B9 E8 82
                                    55 05 4A B5
                                                 49 OA 95 F9
                                                               34 9B 4B 5E
21
22
            MIC tag : 48 B9 E8 82
                                    55 05 4A B5
            CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
                                    07 06 05 04
                                                 A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 01
23
            CTR[0001]: D0 FC F5 74
                                    4D 8F 31 E8
                                                 89 5B 05 05
                                                              4B 7C 90 C3
24
25
26
27
            CTR[0002]: 72 A0 D4 21
                                    9F 0D E1 D4
                                                 04 83 BC 2D
                                                              3D OC FC 2A
            CTR[MIC ]: 19 51 D7 85
                                    28 99 67 26
            Total packet length =
                                    40. [Encrypted]
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07
                                                 08 09 0A 0B DC F1 FB 7B
28
                                    9D 4E 13 12
                       5D 9E 23 FB
                                                 53 65 8A D8
29
30
                                    7D 9C 2D 93
                       51 E8 3F 07
31
            ======== Packet Vector #6 ==========
32
                                   C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
            AES Key: C0 C1 C2 C3
33
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                   A4 A5
                                           48-bit pktNum = 0000.08070605
34
            Total packet length =
                                    33. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
35
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
36
37
                       10 11 12 13
                                    14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B
                                                              1C 1D 1E 1F
                       20
38
            CBC IV in: 59 00 00 00
                                    08 07 06 05
                                                 A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 15
39
            CBC IV out:04 72 DA 4C
                                    6F F6 0A 63
                                                 06 52 1A 06
                                                              04 80 CD E5
40
            After xor: 04 7E DA 4D
                                    6D F5 0E 66
                                                 00 55 12 OF
                                                               OE 8B CD E5
                                                                             [hdr]
            After AES: 64 4C 36 A5
41
                                    A2 27 37 62
                                                 OB 89 F1 D7
                                                              BF F2 73 D4
42
            After xor: 68 41 38 AA
                                    B2 36 25 71
                                                    9C E7 C0
                                                 1F
                                                              A7 EB 69 CF
                                                                             [msq]
43
            After AES: 41 E1 19 CD
                                    19 24 CE 77
                                                 F1 2F A6 60
                                                              C1 6E BB 4E
44
            After xor: 5D FC 07 D2
                                    39 24 CE 77
                                                 F1 2F A6 60
                                                              C1 6E BB 4E
                                                                             [msg]
45
                                                 1C B8 86 E6
                                                              2F 29 91 29
            After AES: A5 27 D8 15
                                    6A C3 59 BF
46
            MIC tag : A5 27 D8 15
                                    6A C3 59 BF
47
            CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
                                    08 07 06 05
                                                 A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 01
48
            CTR[0001]: 63 CC BE 1E
                                    E0 17 44 98
                                                 45 64 B2 3A
                                                               8D 24 5C 80
                                                 B5 E1 7C 10
49
            CTR[0002]: 39 6D BA A2
                                    A7 D2 CB D4
                                                              79 45 BB C0
50
            CTR[MIC ]: E5 7D DC 56
                                    C6 52 92 2B
51
            Total packet length =
                                    41. [Encrypted]
52
53
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07
                                                 08 09 0A 0B 6F C1 B0 11
                       F0 06 56 8B
                                    51 71 A4 2D
                                                 95 3D 46 9B
                                                              25 70 A4 BD
54
55
                                   43 AC 91 CB 94
                       87 40 5A 04
56
            ======== Packet Vector #7 ==========
57
            AES Key: C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
58
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                    A4 A5
                                           48-bit pktNum = 0000.09080706
59
            Total packet length =
                                    31. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
60
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
                       00 01 02 03
61
                       10 11 12 13
                                    14 15 16 17
                                                 18 19 1A 1B
                                                              1C 1D 1E
62
            CBC IV in: 61 00 00 00
                                    09 08 07 06
                                                 A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 17
63
            CBC IV out:60 06 C5 72
                                    DA 23 9C BF
                                                 A0 5B 0A DE
                                                              D2 CD A8 1E
64
            After xor: 60 0E C5 73
                                    D8 20 98 BA
                                                 Аб
                                                    5C OA DE
                                                              D2 CD A8 1E
                                                                             [hdr]
            After AES: 41 7D E2 AE
65
                                    94 E2 EA D9
                                                 00 FC 44 FC
                                                              D0 69 52 27
66
            After xor: 49 74 E8 A5
                                    98 EF E4 D6
                                                 10 ED 56 EF
                                                              C4 7C 44 30
                                                                             [msq]
            After AES: 2A 6C 42 CA
                                   49 D7 C7 01
                                                 C5 7D 59 FF
                                                              87 16 49 OE
```

```
After xor: 32 75 58 D1
                                    55 CA D9 01
                                                 C5 7D 59 FF
                                                              87 16 49 0E
                                                                             [msg]
2
            After AES: 89 8B D6 45
                                    4E 27 20 BB
                                                 D2 7F F3 15
                                                              7A 7C 90 B2
            MIC tag : 89 8B D6 45
                                    4E 27 20 BB
                                                 D2 7E
            CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
                                    09 08 07 06
                                                 A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 01
            CTR[0001]: 09 3C DB B9
                                    C5 52 4F DA
                                                 C1 C5 EC D2
                                                              91 C4 70 AF
            CTR[0002]: 11 57 83 86
                                    E2 C4 72 B4
                                                 8E CC 8A AD
                                                              AB 77 6F CB
            CTR[MIC ]: 8D 07 80 25
                                    62 B0 8C 00
                                                 A6 EE
            Total packet length =
                                    41. [Encrypted]
9
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07
                                                 01 35 D1 B2
                                                              C9 5F 41 D5
10
                       D1 D4 FE C1
                                    85 D1 66 B8
                                                 09 4E 99 9D FE D9 6C 04
11
                       8C 56 60 2C
                                    97 AC BB 74
                                                 90
12
13
            ======== Packet Vector #8 ==========
14
            AES Key: C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
15
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                    A4 A5
                                            48-bit pktNum = 0000.0A090807
16
            Total packet length =
                                    32. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
17
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
18
                       10 11 12 13
                                    14 15 16 17
                                                 18 19 1A 1B
                                                              1C 1D 1E 1F
19
                                    0A 09 08 07
            CBC IV in: 61 00 00 00
                                                 A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 18
20
                                    6C
                                       79 F3 FA
                                                 78 38 B8 A2
                                                               80 36 B6 0B
            CBC IV out:63 A3 FA E4
21
22
            After xor: 63 AB FA E5
                                    6E 7A F7 FF
                                                 7E 3F B8 A2
                                                              80 36 B6 0B
                                                                             [hdr]
            After AES: 1C 99 1A 3D
                                    B7 60 79 27
                                                 34 40 79 1F
                                                              AD 8B 5B 02
23
            After xor: 14 90 10 36
                                    BB 6D 77 28
                                                 24 51 6B 0C
                                                              B9 9E 4D 15
                                                                             [msq]
24
25
26
27
                                    CB BE 75 58
                                                              6C 9F 82 E3
            After AES: 14 19 E8 E8
                                                 E1 E3 BE 4B
            After xor: 0C 00 F2 F3
                                    D7 A3 6B 47
                                                 E1 E3 BE 4B
                                                              6C 9F 82 E3
                                                                             [msg]
            After AES: E0 16 E8 1C
                                    7F 7B 8A 38
                                                 A5
                                                    38
                                                       F2 CB
                                                              5B B6 C1 F2
                                    7F 7B 8A 38
           MIC tag : E0 16 E8 1C
                                                 A5 38
28
            CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
                                    0A 09 08 07
                                                 A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 01
29
            CTR[0001]: 73 7C 33 91
                                    CC 8E 13 DD
                                                 EO AA C5 4B
                                                              6D B7 EB 98
30
            CTR[0002]: 74 B7 71 77
                                    C5 AA C5 3B
                                                 04 A4 F8 70
                                                              8E 92 EB 2B
31
            CTR[MIC ]: 21 6D AC 2F
                                    8B 4F 1C 07
                                                 91 8C
32
            Total packet length =
                                    42. [Encrypted]
33
                                                 7B 75 39 9A C0 83 1D D2
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07
34
                       F0 BB D7 58
                                    79 A2 FD 8F
                                                 6C AE 6B 6C D9 B7 DB 24
35
                       C1 7B 44 33 F4 34 96 3F
                                                 34 B4
36
37
            ======== Packet Vector #9 ==========
38
            AES Key: C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
39
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                   A4 A5 48-bit pktNum = 0000.0B0A0908
40
            Total packet length =
                                    33. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
41
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
42
                                    14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B
                                                              1C 1D 1E 1F
                       10 11 12 13
43
                       2.0
44
            CBC IV in: 61 00 00 00
                                    OB OA O9 O8
                                                 A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 19
45
            CBC IV out:4F 2C 86 11
                                    1E 08 2A DD
                                                 6B 44 21 3A
                                                              B5 13 13 16
46
                                    1C 0B 2E D8
                                                              B5 13 13 16
            After xor: 4F 24 86 10
                                                 6D 43 21 3A
                                                                             [hdr]
47
                                    3C 57 12 DC
            After AES: F6 EC 56 87
                                                 9C C5
                                                       3C A8
                                                              D4 D1 ED 0A
48
            After xor: FE E5 5C 8C
                                    30 5A 1C D3
                                                 8C D4 2E BB
                                                              C0 C4 FB 1D
                                                                             [msg]
            After AES: 17 C1 80 A5
49
                                    31 53 D4 C3
                                                 03 85 0C 95
                                                               65 80 34 52
:50
            After xor: OF D8 9A BE
                                    2D 4E CA DC
                                                 23 85 0C 95
                                                               65 80 34 52
                                                                             [msq]
51
            After AES: 46 A1 F6 E2
                                    B1 6E 75 F8
                                                 1C F5 6B 1A
                                                              80 04 44 1B
52
53
            MIC tag : 46 A1 F6 E2
                                    B1 6E 75 F8
                                                 1C F5
            CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
                                    OB OA O9 O8
                                                 A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                              A4 A5 00 01
54
                                    C0 29 9A 55
            CTR[0001]: 8A 5A 10 6B
                                                 5B 93 6B 0B
                                                              0E A0 DE 5A
55
                                                 B7 73 12 CB
            CTR[0002]: EA 05 FD E2
                                    AB 22 5C FE
                                                              88 D9 A5 4A
56
            CTR[MIC ]: AC 3D F1 07
                                    DA 30 C4 86
                                                 43 BB
57
            Total packet length =
                                    43. [Encrypted]
58
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07
                                                 82 53 1A 60
                                                              CC 24 94 5A
59
                       4B 82 79 18
                                    1A B5 C8 4D
                                                 F2 1C E7 F9
                                                              B7 3F 42 E1
60
                       97 EA 9C 07
                                    E5 6B 5E B1
                                                 7E 5F 4E
61
62
            ======== Packet Vector #10 ==========
63
                     CO C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
            AES Key:
64
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                    A4 A5
                                            48-bit pktNum = 0000.0C0B0A09
65
            Total packet length =
                                    31. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
66
                       00 01 02 03
                                    04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
67
                       10 11 12 13
                                    14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
```

```
CBC IV in: 61 00 00 00
                                     OC OB OA 09
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 00 13
 2
            CBC IV out:7F B8 0A 32
                                     E9 80 57 46
                                                  EC 31 6C 3A B2 A2 EB 5D
 3
            After xor: 7F B4 0A 33
                                     EB 83 53 43
                                                  EA 36
                                                        64 33
                                                                B8 A9 EB 5D
                                                                               [hdr]
            After AES: 7E 96 96 BF
                                     F1 56 D6 A8
                                                   6E AC F5
                                                            7в
                                                                7F 23 47
            After xor: 72 9B 98 B0
                                     E1 47 C4 BB
                                                  7A B9 E3 6C
                                                                67 3A 5D 41
                                                                               [msg]
            After AES: 8B 4A EE 42
                                     04 24 8A 59
                                                  FA CC 88 66
                                                                57 66 DD 72
 7
            After xor: 97 57 F0 42
                                     04 24 8A 59
                                                  FA CC 88 66
                                                                57 66 DD 72
                                                                               [msq]
 8
            After AES: 41 63 89 36
                                     62 ED D7 EB
                                                  CD 6E 15 C1
                                                                89 48 62 05
 9
            MIC tag : 41 63 89
                                 36
                                     62 ED D7 EB
                                                  CD 6E
10
            CTR Start: 01 00 00
                                0.0
                                     OC OB OA 09
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                                A4 A5 00 01
11
            CTR[0001]: 0B 39 2B 9B
                                     05 66 97 06
                                                  3F 12 56 8F
                                                                2B 13 A1 OF
12
            CTR[0002]: 07 89 65 25
                                     23 40 94 3B
                                                  9E 69 B2 56
                                                                CC 5E F7 31
13
            CTR[MIC ]: 17 09 20 76
                                     09 A0 4E 72
                                                  45 B3
14
            Total packet length =
                                     41. [Encrypted]
15
                       00 01 02 03
                                     04 05 06 07
                                                  80
                                                     09 OA OB
                                                                07 34 25 94
                                     2B 07 40 98
                                                                1B 94 7B 56
16
                       15 77 85 15
                                                  33 OA BB 14
17
                       6A A9 40 6B
                                     4D 99 99 88
18
19
            ======== Packet Vector #11 ==========
20
                                     C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
            AES Key:
                      C0 C1 C2 C3
21
22
                                             48-bit pktNum = 0000.0D0C0B0A
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                     A4 A5
            Total packet length =
                                     32. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
23
24
25
26
27
                       00 01 02 03
                                     04 05 06 07
                                                  08 09 0A 0B
                                                               OC OD OE OF
                                     14 15 16 17
                       10 11 12 13
                                                  18 19 1A 1B
                                                                1C 1D 1E 1F
            CBC IV in: 61 00 00 00
                                     OD OC OB OA
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                                A4 A5 00 14
            CBC IV out:B0 84 85
                                 79
                                     51 D2 FA 42
                                                   76 EF
                                                        3A D7
                                                                14 B9 62 87
            After xor: B0 88 85
                                78
                                     53 D1 FE 47
                                                  70 E8 32 DE
                                                                1E B2 62 87
                                                                               [hdr]
28
            After AES: C9 B3 64 7E
                                     D8 79 2A 5C
                                                  65 B7 CE CC
                                                                19 0A 97 0A
29
                                     C8 68 38 4F
            After xor: C5 BE 6A 71
                                                  71 A2 D8 DB
                                                                01 13 8D 11
                                                                               [msg]
30
            After AES: 34 OF 69 17
                                     FA B9 19 D6
                                                  1D AC DO 35
                                                                36 D6 55 8B
31
            After xor: 28 12
                             77
                                     FA B9 19 D6
                                 80
                                                  1D AC D0
                                                           35
                                                                36 D6 55 8B
                                                                               [msg]
32
            After AES: 6B 5E 24
                                     12 CC C2 AD
                                34
                                                  6F 1B 11 C3
                                                                A1 A9 D8 BC
33
                                     12 CC C2 AD
            MIC tag : 6B 5E 24 34
                                                  6F 1B
34
            CTR Start: 01 00 00 00
                                     OD OC OB OA
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                                A4 A5 00 01
35
            CTR[0001]: 6B 66 BC 0C
                                     90 A1 F1 12
                                                                12 20 77 BC
                                                  FC BE 6F 4E
36
37
            CTR[0002]: 97 9E 57 2B
                                     BE 65 8A E5
                                                  CC 20 11 83
                                                                2A 9A 9B 5B
            CTR[MIC ]: 9E 64 86 DD
                                     02 B6 49 C1
                                                  6D 37
38
            Total packet length =
                                     42. [Encrypted]
39
                       00 01 02 03
                                     04 05 06 07
                                                  08 09 0A 0B
                                                                67 6B B2 03
40
                       80 B0 E3 01
                                     E8 AB 79 59
                                                  0A 39 6D A7
                                                                8B 83 49 34
41
                       F5 3A A2 E9
                                     10 7A 8B 6C
                                                  02 2C
42
43
            ======== Packet Vector #12 ==========
44
                      C0 C1 C2 C3
                                    C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
            AES Key:
45
                  TA = A0 A1 A2 A3
                                     A4 A5
                                             48-bit pktNum = 0000.0E0D0C0B
46
                                     33. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
            Total packet length =
47
                                     04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
                       00 01 02 03
48
                       10 11 12 13
                                     14 15 16 17
                                                  18 19 1A 1B
                                                                1C 1D 1E 1F
49
                       20
50
            CBC IV in: 61 00 00 00
                                     OE OD OC OB
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                                A4 A5 00 15
51
            CBC IV out:5F 8E 8D 02
                                     AD 95 7C 5A
                                                   36 14 CF 63
                                                                40 16 97 4F
52
            After xor: 5F 82 8D 03
                                     AF 96 78 5F
                                                   30 13 C7 6A
                                                                4A 1D 97 4F
                                                                               [hdr]
53
            After AES: 63 FA BD 69
                                     B9 55 65 FF
                                                   54 AA F4
                                                           60
                                                                88 7D EC 9F
54
            After xor: 6F F7 B3 66
                                     A9 44 77 EC
                                                           77
                                                   40 BF E2
                                                                90 64 F6 84
                                                                               [msq]
55
            After AES: 5A 76 5F 0B
                                     93 CE 4F 6A
                                                  B4 1D 91 30
                                                                18 57 6A D7
56
            After xor: 46 6B 41 14
                                     B3 CE 4F 6A
                                                  B4 1D 91 30
                                                                18 57 6A D7
                                                                               [msg]
57
            After AES: 9D 66 92 41
                                     01 08 D5 B6
                                                  A1 45 85 AC
                                                                AF 86 32 E8
58
                                     01 08 D5 B6
            MIC tag : 9D 66 92 41
                                                  A1 45
59
            CTR Start: 01 00 00
                                00
                                     0E 0D 0C 0B
                                                  A0 A1 A2 A3
                                                                A4 A5 00 01
60
            CTR[0001]: CC F2 AE D9
                                     E0 4A C9 74
                                                  E6 58 55 B3
                                                                2B 94 30 BF
61
            CTR[0002]: A2 CA AC 11
                                     63 F4 07 E5
                                                  E5 F6 E3 B3
                                                                79 OF 79 F8
62
                                     63 EF 78 D3
            CTR[MIC ]: 50 7C 31 57
                                                  77 9E
63
            Total packet length =
                                     43. [Encrypted]
64
                       00 01 02 03
                                     04 05 06 07
                                                  80
                                                     09 OA OB
                                                                CO FF AO D6
65
                       F0 5B DB 67
                                     F2 4D 43 A4
                                                  33 8D 2A A4 BE D7 B2 0E
66
                       43 CD 1A A3
                                     16 62 E7 AD
                                                  65 D6 DB
67
```

```
======== Packet Vector #13 ==========
2
            AES Key: 71 FB FD 78 FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                    86 99
                                           48-bit pktNum = 2D38.1C9A0292
            Total packet length =
                                    31. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
                                    03 E1 E7 2B 5F AE 94 A9
                       94 51 99 9F
                                                               38 35 1C E8
                                    D9 46 54 26
                       DF 8B E9 F5
                                                 5A 67 74 8E
                                                              E6 31 F6
            CBC IV in: 59 00 2D 38
                                    1C 9A 02 92
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 17
            CBC IV out:B0 E6 25 C9
                                    37 B1 66 C5
                                                  70 79 3B 99
                                                               7D F0 C8 EC
9
            After xor: B0 EE B1 98
                                    AE 2E 65 24
                                                  97 52
                                                       3B 99
                                                               7D F0 C8 EC
                                                                             [hdr]
10
            After AES: 98 60 CE 17
                                    C0 FE C7 9E
                                                 9B 00 8B 8A
                                                               99 BC 4C B2
11
            After xor: C7 CE 5A BE
                                    F8 CB DB 76
                                                  44 8B 62 7F
                                                               40 FA 18 94
                                                                             [msg]
12
            After AES: 42 5F 75 68
                                    6D 69 31 EE
                                                 F6 B3 F4 3D
                                                               10 77 6F F4
13
            After xor: 18 38 01 E6
                                    8B 58 C7 EE
                                                 F6 B3 F4 3D
                                                               10 77 6F F4
                                                                             [msg]
14
            After AES: EF 93 3F
                                7F
                                    9F B5 7D 54
                                                 BF 29 32 5A
                                                               3F 69 9C 5D
15
                                    9F B5 7D 54
            MIC tag : EF 93 3F
                                7F
            CTR Start: 01 00 2D 38
16
                                    1C 9A 02 92
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 01
17
            CTR[0001]: 9B 63 18 4C
                                    23 A5 B1 18
                                                 49 71 1A 49
                                                               5C 40 DD DB
18
                                                 A5 AD EB 84
            CTR[0002]: 2E F5 4D 53
                                    86 73 A0 6E
                                                              D6 A9 37 02
19
            CTR[MIC ]: 2F 45 06 56
                                    3D 33 82 3B
20
            Total packet length =
                                    39. [Encrypted]
21
22
                       94 51 99 9F
                                    03 E1 E7 2B C4 CD 8C E5
                                                               1B 90 AD F0
                       96 FA F3 BC
                                    85 06 89 FD
                                                 74 92 39 DD
                                                              60 42 56 C0
23
24
25
26
27
                       D6 39 29 A2
                                    86 FF 6F
            ======== Packet Vector #14 ===========
            AES Key: 71 FB FD 78
                                   FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                    86 99 48-bit pktNum = 4DB9.0282DD86
28
            Total packet length =
                                    32. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
29
                       50 D2 5E F4
                                    B3 92 86 5A
                                                 06 F1 6B 83
                                                              83 88 72 91
30
                                    4D 5D 44 1F
                                                               A0 96 06 C3
                                                 70 D6 8F 6B
                       16 B6 F7 B8
31
                                                       39 C1
            CBC IV in: 59 00 4D B9
                                    02 82 DD 86
                                                  42 EC
                                                               86 99 00 18
32
            CBC IV out:92 27 D3 5E
                                    DD 64 94 B2
                                                 C9 6A 6F 0F
                                                               6F 3E AF DA
33
            After xor: 92 2F 83 8C
                                    83 90 27 20
                                                 4F 30 6F 0F
                                                               6F 3E AF DA
                                                                             [hdr]
34
            After AES: 9D 59 21 A7
                                    EE 66 16 56
                                                               5D 63 81 7A
                                                 A6 4F D9 BA
35
                                    6D EE 64 C7
                                                 B0 F9 2E 02
                                                               10 3E C5 65
            After xor: 9B A8 4A 24
                                                                             [msg]
36
            After AES: 52 98 87 DB
                                    DD 37 86 00
                                                 CE F4 83 C1
                                                               D1 8E 35 56
37
            After xor: 22 4E 08 B0
                                    7D A1 80 C3
                                                 CE F4 83 C1
                                                               D1 8E 35 56
                                                                             [msg]
38
            After AES: 46 AC 99 A0
                                    50 35 91 70
                                                 1A A2 9E E0
                                                              B3 5F 72 9D
39
            MIC tag : 46 AC 99 A0
                                    50 35 91 70
40
            CTR Start: 01 00 4D B9
                                    02 82 DD 86
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 01
            CTR[0001]: 72 D0 3E 15
                                    C3 F1 D5 65
41
                                                  66 32 A8 F2
                                                               CF A7 D1 9F
42
            CTR[0002]: 52 69 9E 35
                                    C9 C5 EE 07
                                                  70 80 67 C0
                                                               2B 38 41 20
43
            CTR[MIC ]: E7 B7 A3 E1
                                    84 B8 9C 6F
44
            Total packet length =
                                    40. [Encrypted]
45
                       50 D2 5E F4
                                    B3 92 86 5A
                                                 74 21 55 96
                                                               40 79 A7 F4
46
                       70 84 5F 4A
                                    82 FA 95 80
                                                 22 BF 11 5E 69 53 E8 C4
47
                                    D4 8D 0D 1F
                       A1 1B 3A 41
48
            ======== Packet Vector #15 ==========
49
50
            AES Key:
                       71 FB FD 78 FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
51
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                    86 99 48-bit pktNum = B5D4.B99983BA
52
            Total packet length =
                                    33. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
53
                       6D 83 00 ED
                                    50 09 A4 B2 6D E8 57 B7 58 49 19 CA
54
                       EE 43 9C E4
                                    8E BE OC AC 00 F2 F9 32 50 0A 1C DD
55
                       AC
56
            CBC IV in: 59 00 B5 D4
                                    B9 99 83 BA
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 19
57
            CBC IV out:04 16 DE 1D
                                    F7 77 E0 89
                                                 6E 07 B5 71
                                                              E9 1B 42 B2
58
            After xor: 04 1E B3 9E
                                    F7 9A B0 80
                                                 CA B5 B5
                                                          71
                                                               E9 1B 42 B2
                                                                             [hdr]
59
            After AES: 52 14 26 1E
                                    6A 9D 50 38
                                                 D3 35 D5
                                                           76
                                                               0E ED E8 2E
60
            After xor: 3F FC 71 A9
                                    32 D4 49 F2
                                                 3D 76 49 92
                                                               80 53 E4 82
                                                                             [msg]
            After AES: 32 F2 OF FA
61
                                    32 81 03 14
                                                 F9 CA FD C1
                                                               5E 37 27 0E
62
            After xor: 32 00 F6 C8
                                    62 8B 1F C9
                                                  55 CA FD C1
                                                               5E 37 27 0E
                                                                             [msq]
63
            After AES: 39 F5 F2 1E
                                    2E 57 D7 14
                                                 96 46 57 CA
                                                               3B 70 A8 4C
            MIC tag : 39 F5 F2 1E
                                    2E 57 D7 14
64
            CTR Start: 01 00 B5 D4
65
                                    B9 99 83 BA
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 01
            CTR[0001]: 19 22 A3 83
66
                                    B9 00 F2 DB
                                                 76 F3 84 65
                                                              D5 01 B4 C4
            CTR[0002]: 50 6C 24 D4
                                    OF 88 DB B0
                                                 68 98 12 E5
                                                              6E 64 A0 3B
```

```
CTR[MIC ]: 5B D9 B1 BB D3 93 45 CA
2
            Total packet length =
                                    41. [Encrypted]
                       6D 83 00 ED
                                    50 09 A4 B2
                                                 74 CA F4 34 E1 49 EB 11
                       98 B0 18 81
                                    5B BF B8 68
                                                 50 9E DD E6
                                                              5F 82 C7 6D
                                    A5 FD C4 92 DE
                       C4 62 2C 43
            ======== Packet Vector #16 ==========
                     71 FB FD 78 FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
            AES Key:
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                    86 99
                                           48-bit pktNum = AA65.BACC0941
10
            Total packet length =
                                    31. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
11
                       EF 8F 46 B4
                                   C9 77 98 32 BB F1 0A F1 C0 63 E7 C3
12
                       DD 47 94 DF
                                    53 A7 CD 68
                                                 CD 91 BF 29
                                                              04 4A 0B
13
                                    BA CC 09 41
                                                 42 EC 39 C1
            CBC IV in: 59 00 AA 65
                                                              86 99 00 13
14
            CBC IV out: C5 95 2A 10
                                    39 2B 60 9B
                                                 2C D5 30 83
                                                              CD 1D C8 FE
15
            After xor: C5 99 C5 9F
                                    7F 9F A9 EC
                                                 B4 E7 8B 72
                                                              C7 EC C8 FE
                                                                             [hdr]
            After AES: 41 D0 4D 56
                                    FF DD D7 3D
16
                                                 AC CD AC 7D
                                                              63 64 3E 31
17
            After xor: 81 B3 AA 95
                                    22 9A 43 E2
                                                 FF 6A 61 15
                                                              AE F5 81 18
                                                                             [msq]
18
                                    BE 2B F0 BD
            After AES: 9C 86 E1 EE
                                                 6D 11 20 3D
                                                              24 B1 B0 96
            After xor: 98 CC EA EE
                                    BE 2B F0 BD
19
                                                 6D 11 20 3D
                                                              24 B1 B0 96
                                                                             [msq]
20
            After AES: 3F 3A ED 74
                                    AB C6 52 6A
                                                 DA C8 8D 14
                                                              0A 9F 84 23
21
22
            MIC tag : 3F 3A ED 74
                                    AB C6 52 6A
            CTR Start: 01 00 AA 65
                                    BA CC 09 41
                                                 42 EC 39 C1
                                                              86 99 00 01
23
            CTR[0001]: BD EF 70 9B
                                    3C 70 A7 98
                                                 OF 36 C4 6E
                                                              7C D1 73 8D
24
25
26
27
            CTR[0002]: 23 CC E5 E9
                                    54 AD A2 09
                                                 21 17 FC 75
                                                              10 09 B3 E3
            CTR[MIC ]: 38 17 B3 02
                                    58 OA BA 84
            Total packet length =
                                    39. [Encrypted]
                       EF 8F 46 B4
                                    C9 77 98 32 BB F1 0A F1
                                                              7D 8C 97 58
28
                       E1 37 33 47
                                    5C 91 09 06 B1 40 CC A4 27 86 EE 07
29
30
31
                       2D 5E 76 F3
                                    CC E8 EE
            ======== Packet Vector #17 =========
32
                                   FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
            AES Key: 71 FB FD 78
33
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                    86 99
                                           48-bit pktNum = F01B.307ADDDB
34
            Total packet length =
                                    32. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
35
                                   E0 8C 16 9F CB 1F F5 9F B0 54 99 DD
                       33 DF F8 40
36
37
                       DD 6B EC 1E
                                    13 2B 57 CB
                                                 0F DD 93 CD
                                                              E0 89 43 87
            CBC IV in: 59 00 F0 1B
                                    30 7A DD DB
                                                 42 EC 39 C1
                                                              86 99 00 14
38
            CBC IV out:5C 16 AC 74
                                                 OF F1 5D 17
                                                              D2 CE 67 OE
                                    00 F3 24 1D
39
            After xor: 5C 1A 9F AB
                                    F8 B3 C4 91
                                                 19 6E 96 08
                                                              27 51 67 OE
                                                                             [hdr]
40
            After AES: 8C 93 BC 6C
                                    CA 8C 40 BB
                                                 03 FA 7C 0C
                                                              4F A0 10 42
            After xor: 3C C7 25 B1
                                    17 E7 AC A5
41
                                                 10 D1 2B C7
                                                              40 7D 83 8F
                                                                             [msg]
42
            After AES: OC 03 5F 87
                                    D7 DA 97 E5
                                                 77 7D D6 9C
                                                              EB 8C 84 86
43
            After xor: EC 8A 1C 00
                                    D7 DA 97 E5
                                                 77 7D D6 9C
                                                              EB 8C 84 86
                                                                             [msg]
44
            After AES: DO 8E 6D AC
                                    0C 55 2B 34
                                                 F8 D3 05 82
                                                              B7 28 E5 C4
45
            MIC tag : D0 8E 6D AC
                                    OC 55 2B 34
46
            CTR Start: 01 00 F0 1B
                                    30 7A DD DB
                                                 42 EC 39 C1
                                                              86 99 00 01
47
            CTR[0001]: 3F 92 05 5E
                                                 AF 6D C0 47
                                    E5 B1 2E F0
                                                              E8 FB 18 9E
48
            CTR[0002]: C6 FD 0C C5
                                    9F 93 37 F8
                                                 37 29 6A A6
                                                              E5 B7 00 F4
49
            CTR[MIC ]: FD F5 FD 7C
                                    00 82 8F 95
50
            Total packet length =
                                    40. [Encrypted]
51
                       33 DF F8 40
                                    E0 8C 16 9F
                                                 CB 1F F5 9F
                                                              8F C6 9C 83
52
53
                       38 DA C2 EE
                                    BC 46 97 8C
                                                 E7 26 8B 53
                                                              26 74 4F 42
                       2D 7B 90 D0
                                    0C D7 A4 A1
54
55
            ======== Packet Vector #18 =========
            AES Key: 71 FB FD 78
                                   FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
57
                                    86 99
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                            48-bit pktNum = CE82.0B57FD4C
58
            Total packet length =
                                    33. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
59
                       55 68 62 OF
                                    19 A9 5D CB 98 4B C7 18
                                                              27 BF 59 E8
60
                       8B FD 03 97
                                    17 9F 7A CA E6 B6 16 97
                                                              26 7A CO 5F
61
                       24
62
            CBC IV in: 59 00 CE 82
                                                 42 EC 39 C1
                                                              86 99 00 15
                                    0B 57 FD 4C
63
            CBC IV out:99 2D DF 68
                                    2D 48 EF 2A
                                                 14 FO 16 6E
                                                              E4 14 9B 54
            After xor: 99 21 8A 00
64
                                    4F 47 F6 83
                                                 49 3B 8E 25
                                                              23 OC 9B 54
                                                                             [hdr]
65
            After AES: B7 97 9F B4
                                    98 BC 07 E8
                                                 D2 60 92 00
                                                              1B 26 55 52
            After xor: 90 28 C6 5C
66
                                    13 41 04 7F
                                                 C5 FF E8 CA
                                                              FD 90 43 C5
                                                                             [msq]
            After AES: 2E 3E 5C 36
                                    EA 3B B1 BA
                                                 OD 4F DO EE
                                                              48 E7 38 DD
```

```
After xor: 08 44 9C 69
                                    CE 3B B1 BA
                                                 OD 4F DO EE
                                                              48 E7 38 DD
                                                                             [msg]
2
            After AES: 48 82 DE 1F
                                    F0 3F 78 29
                                                 77 7C 01 A0
                                                              80 45 D1 D7
            MIC tag : 48 82 DE 1F
                                    F0 3F 78 29
            CTR Start: 01 00 CE 82
                                    0B 57 FD 4C
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 01
            CTR[0001]: 34 18 98 69
                                    BD 1B AF 27
                                                 05 F2 7A C7
                                                              BF 2E F7 8A
            CTR[0002]: 1E C6 81 EE
                                    BC EE AF 2C
                                                 83 A1 37 C8
                                                               29 9B B1 DF
            CTR[MIC ]: 62 CO 72 9E
                                    52 D2 30 F3
            Total packet length =
                                    41. [Encrypted]
9
                       55 68 62 OF
                                    19 A9 5D CB
                                                 98
                                                    4B C7 18
                                                               13 A7 C1 81
10
                                                 59 98 E1 1D
                       36 E6 AC B0
                                    12 6D 00 0D
                                                              38 BC 41 B1
11
                       98 2A 42 AC
                                    81 A2 ED 48
                                                 DA
12
13
            ========= Packet Vector #19 ===========
            AES Key: 71 FB FD 78 FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
14
15
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                    86 99
                                            48-bit pktNum = 34B5.2F55F836
16
            Total packet length =
                                    31. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
17
                                    36 DC FE E3 01 DE B7 F9
                                                              4D 49 E3 20
                       30 27 70 18
18
                                    25 89 A5 6A
                       BF AA C3 99
                                                 72 85 AE 03
                                                              CA 56 5D
19
                                    2F 55 F8 36
                                                 42 EC 39 C1
                                                              86 99 00 17
            CBC IV in: 61 00 34 B5
20
            CBC IV out:07 03 FA 5A
                                    50 F2 3C 36
                                                 E0 29
                                                       79
                                                               F4 B9 75
                                                          21
21
22
            After xor: 07 OB CA 7D
                                                              F4 B9 75 1B
                                    20 EA 0A EA
                                                 1E CA 79
                                                          21
                                                                             [hdr]
            After AES: 2E 47 BB 82
                                    95 84 25 CC
                                                 93 DD 77 9B
                                                              77 F2 D3 24
23
            After xor: 2F 99 0C 7B
                                    D8 CD C6 EC
                                                 2C 77 B4 02
                                                               52 7B 76 4E
                                                                             [msq]
24
25
26
27
                                    A5 E3 CB A0
                                                 14 93 CD C7
                                                               61 FC EB 29
            After AES: 3C 1D D1 EB
            After xor: 4E 98 7F E8
                                    6F B5 96 A0
                                                 14 93 CD C7
                                                               61 FC EB 29
                                                                             [msg]
            After AES: F7 B0 EB A1
                                    6C 26 4B 50
                                                 D4 DC 9F 6D
                                                              E1 B2 5B FE
           MIC tag : F7 B0 EB A1
                                    6C 26 4B 50
                                                 D4 DC
28
            CTR Start: 01 00 34 B5
                                    2F 55 F8 36
                                                 42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 01
29
            CTR[0001]: 83 5D 2C BC
                                    1E 6D A5 E8
                                                 BC 67 D3 56
                                                               33 F0 2B D1
30
                                                 3C FC 00 2A
            CTR[0002]: E8 99 77 FC
                                    10 10 49 92
                                                              85 79 A7 C0
31
            CTR[MIC ]: 53 DD 0A 76
                                    3B 12 C5 33
                                                 01 98
32
            Total packet length =
                                    41. [Encrypted]
33
                       30 27 70 18
                                    36 DC FE E3
                                                 82 83 9B 45
                                                              53 24 46 C8
34
                       03 CD 10 CF
                                    16 79 8E BB
                                                 9A 1C D9 FF DA 46 14 A4
35
                       6D E1 D7 57
                                    34 8E 63 D5
                                                 44
36
37
            ======== Packet Vector #20 ===========
38
            AES Key: 71 FB FD 78
                                   FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
39
                                           48-bit pktNum = 9BB8.8848BE25
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                    86 99
40
            Total packet length =
                                    32. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
41
                       54 FF D9 C2
                                    A4 AE 72 B1
                                                 C9 33 92 50
                                                              20 D3 04 61
42
                       5F B1 4A EF
                                    9C 67 0E 0D
                                                 9F 8C D1 11
                                                               9D 25 69 5F
43
            CBC IV in: 61 00 9B B8
                                    88 48 BE 25
                                                 42 EC 39 C1
                                                              86 99 00 18
44
            CBC IV out: EF 78 98 2E
                                    7A 90 6E D4
                                                 72 A8 F4 11
                                                               8D E7 94 8A
45
            After xor: EF 70 CC D1
                                    A3 52 CA 7A
                                                 00 19 F4 11
                                                               8D E7 94 8A
                                                                             [hdr]
46
                                    F8 3C 51 3D
            After AES: D1 61 C3 62
                                                 F3 FF 7F 1A
                                                               26 D4 F6 B9
47
                                                                             [msg]
            After xor: 18 52 51 32
                                    D8 EF 55 5C
                                                 AC 4E 35 F5
                                                              BA B3 F8 B4
48
            After AES: 46 CA 2F 4A
                                    C4 99 EF C5
                                                 3B 5F FB 85
                                                               14 F7 BF 83
49
            After xor: D9 46 FE 5B
                                    59 BC 86 9A
                                                 3B 5F FB 85
                                                              14 F7 BF 83
                                                                             [msg]
50
            After AES: CD 55 F0 30
                                    92 12 AE 02
                                                 EA 25 FA 94
                                                               87 DE 36 OF
51
            MIC tag : CD 55 F0 30
                                    92 12 AE 02
                                                 EA 25
52
            CTR Start: 01 00 9B B8
                                    88 48 BE 25
                                                 42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 01
53
            CTR[0001]: E8 97 0A 1A
                                    3A 73 B4 9F
                                                 89 E3 75 CB
                                                              F2 14 39 55
54
            CTR[0002]: E9 CE 11 29
                                    F6 5F 32 11
                                                 CD 7A 86 34
                                                              9C 67 F1 B5
55
            CTR[MIC ]: 49 75 2B DA
                                    6D 4A E9 9E
                                                 F8 4C
56
            Total packet length =
                                    42. [Encrypted]
57
                                                 21 A4 98 4A 1A A0 B0 FE
                       54 FF D9 C2
                                    A4 AE 72 B1
58
                       D6 52 3F 24
                                    6E 73 37 58
                                                 76 42 C0 38
                                                              6B 7A 5B 4E
59
                       84 20 DB EA
                                    FF 58 47 9C
                                                 12 69
60
61
            ======== Packet Vector #21 ===========
                     71 FB FD 78 FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
62
            AES Key:
63
                                    86 99
                                            48-bit pktNum = 6E78.B6723686
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
64
                                    33. [Input (8 cleartext header octets)]
            Total packet length =
65
                       AF BB B4 19
                                    9C 13 D3 77 CE 25 C4 A7 B7 3B 06 1F
66
                       58 6E 08 93 F9 17 8D CB 11 31 B2 E6 27 86 9A 4F
67
```

```
CBC IV in: 61 00 6E 78
                                    B6 72 36 86
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 19
2
            CBC IV out:15 BF E5 B7
                                    83 9A C6 00
                                                  B1 6F C9 F5
                                                               DA A8 3F 1C
            After xor: 15 B7 4A 0C
                                    37 83 5A 13
                                                  62 18 C9 F5
                                                               DA A8 3F 1C
                                                                              [hdr]
            After AES: E4 19 EF 1E
                                    69 A1 48 EE
                                                  16 60 84 7D
                                                               D5 C9 D1 D6
            After xor: 2A 3C 2B B9
                                                               2C DE 5C 1D
                                    DE 9A 4E F1
                                                  4E OE 8C EE
                                                                              [msg]
            After AES: 31 02 9A 8B
                                    CA A3 07 1D
                                                  84 80 76 51
                                                               1D 9E 22 41
            After xor: 20 33 28 6D
                                    ED 25 9D 52
                                                  C0 80 76 51
                                                               1D 9E 22 41
                                                                              [msq]
            After AES: 21 5E E1 31
                                    37 17 98 A5
                                                  FD 6E BB 74
                                                               D4 8E 59 C1
            MIC tag : 21 5E E1 31
                                    37
                                       17 98 A5
                                                  FD 6E
10
            CTR Start: 01 00 6E
                                    B6 72 36 86
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                78
                                                               86 99 00 01
11
            CTR[0001]: 47 C1 8B 43
                                    AF B6 3A C4
                                                  0A 7F CA C3
                                                               AE E4 83 0D
12
            CTR[0002]: D9 91 74 F0
                                    AE 23 37 4F
                                                  54 45 80 0D
                                                               27 OD A4 49
13
            CTR[MIC ]: 17 E6 DC 69
                                    6A 2E 09 B0
                                                  76 32
14
            Total packet length =
                                    43. [Encrypted]
15
                       AF BB B4 19
                                    9C 13 D3 77
                                                  89 E4 4F E4
                                                               18 8D 3C DB
                                                  C8 A0 C6 16 89 A5 AD 00
16
                       52 11 C2 50
                                    57 F3 OE C6
17
                       10 36 B8 3D
                                    58 5D 39 91
                                                 15 8B 5C
18
19
            ======== Packet Vector #22 ==========
20
                     71 FB FD 78
                                    FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
            AES Key:
21
22
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                    86 99
                                            48-bit pktNum = D079.0F8F3A99
            Total packet length =
                                    31. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
23
24
25
26
27
                       5E C4 44 5A
                                    EA D7 1B B1 DA 9E B5 10
                                                               OB 5E 8D 9F
                                    2B FC FF 25
                                                               55 CB 36
                       4F 27 49 CE
                                                  B7 2C 81 17
            CBC IV in: 61 00 D0 79
                                    OF 8F 3A 99
                                                  42 EC
                                                        39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 13
            CBC IV out:47 4D BA
                                73
                                    6A 5C 84 22
                                                  F5 0C
                                                        8B A3
                                                               60 72 F7 24
            After xor: 47 41 E4 B7
                                                               D5 62 F7 24
                                    2E 06 6E F5
                                                  EE BD 51 3D
                                                                              [hdr]
28
            After AES: A0 AF ED 92
                                    55 EA 4C FC
                                                  5D 08 85 13
                                                               BE BF 07 25
29
            After xor: AB F1 60 0D
                                    1A CD 05 32
                                                  76 F4 7A 36
                                                               09 93 86 32
                                                                              [msg]
30
            After AES: F4 A9 E7 1A
                                    D7 61 45 83
                                                               25 5F B7 2D
                                                  A0 CC 88 FA
31
                                    D7 61 45 83
                                                  A0 CC 88 FA
            After xor: A1 62 D1 1A
                                                               25 5F B7 2D
                                                                              [msg]
            After AES: 69 9C B6 66
32
                                    03 78 1C 1B
                                                               55 85 F4 6C
                                                  92 93 86 F4
33
           MIC tag : 69 9C B6 66
                                    03 78 1C 1B
                                                  92 93
34
            CTR Start: 01 00 D0 79
                                    OF 8F 3A 99
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 01
35
                                    EF 85 41 18
            CTR[0001]: 30 4E B1 9A
                                                  7E A7 77 F9
                                                               8D OF BF E5
36
37
            CTR[0002]: D1 8D 23 55
                                    FA 2C 1C C7
                                                  F1 A5 86 A8
                                                               8E 7D 9E BF
            CTR[MIC ]: 64 C3 13 58
                                    1E EE F5 E8
                                                  E5 F2
38
            Total packet length =
                                    41. [Encrypted]
39
                       5E C4 44 5A
                                    EA D7 1B B1
                                                  DA 9E B5 10
                                                               3B 10 3C 05
40
                       A0 A2 08 D6
                                    55 5B 88 DC
                                                  3A 23 3E F2
                                                              84 46 15 0D
41
                       5F A5 3E 1D
                                    96 E9 F3 77
                                                  61
42
43
            ======== Packet Vector #23 =========
44
            AES Key: 71 FB FD 78
                                   FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
45
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1
                                             48-bit pktNum = A625.D6288BF2
                                    86 99
46
                                    32. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
            Total packet length =
47
                       04 OC CF 5E
                                    9E D7 4C EB
                                                  29 77 88 EB
                                                              E0 D2 59 4B
48
                       F4 18 94 D9
                                    BE 58 C4 EA
                                                  A3 BF 82 BF
                                                               A1 C5 3C 23
49
            CBC IV in: 61 00 A6 25
                                    D6 28 8B F2
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 14
50
            CBC IV out:4F BC D9 D4
                                    BB D2 77 FE
                                                  6B B3 CA 7A
                                                               AD 95 71 D2
51
            After xor: 4F B0 DD D8
                                    74 8C E9 29
                                                  27 58 E3 0D
                                                               25 7E 71 D2
                                                                              [hdr]
52
            After AES: E0 DD 09 D3
                                    48 43 C1 70
                                                  E2 7C FE B0
                                                               4D 87 0A 66
53
            After xor: 00 0F 50 98
                                    BC 5B 55 A9
                                                  5C 24 3A 5A
                                                               EE 38 88 D9
                                                                              [msq]
54
                                                  DE CA C7 14
            After AES: 4C 05 CA CC
                                    DA 7D 5B 07
                                                               D4 26 C5 D6
55
            After xor: ED CO F6 EF
                                    DA 7D 5B 07
                                                  DE CA C7 14
                                                               D4 26 C5 D6
                                                                              [msq]
56
            After AES: 84 C8 29 3A
                                    41 A2 E5 8C
                                                  6E 66 B2 26
                                                               BB B4 15 0D
57
            MIC tag : 84 C8 29 3A
                                    41 A2 E5 8C
                                                  6E 66
58
            CTR Start: 01 00 A6 25
                                    D6 28 8B F2
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 01
59
            CTR[0001]: 12 62 98 95
                                    AB 26 D2 51
                                                  4C 32 59 F4
                                                               8E 21 19 4C
            CTR[0002]: 1E 70 D2 AF
60
                                                  45 27 C4 25
                                    FE 0A 84 D5
                                                               75 5B 99 5D
61
            CTR[MIC ]: OF EE 6A 8E
                                    47 D2 BC 52
                                                  C9 CB
62
            Total packet length =
                                    42. [Encrypted]
63
                                                    77 88 EB F2 B0 C1 DE
                       04 OC CF 5E
                                    9E D7 4C EB
                                                  29
64
                       5F 3E 46 88
                                    F2 6A 9D 1E
                                                  2D 9E 9B F3
                                                               BF B5 EE 8C
65
                       8B 26 43 B4
                                    06 70 59 DE
                                                  A7 AD
66
            ======== Packet Vector #24 ===========
```

```
12
            AES Key:
                       71 FB FD 78 FB E2 99 29 82 01 24 CC 71 44 75 7E
                  TA = 42 EC 39 C1 86 99
                                            48-bit pktNum = 7CD9.622F4AED
3
            Total packet length =
                                    33. [Input (12 cleartext header octets)]
                       AB CB OA 7E
                                    49 E6 F8 74 E7 1D AA 1A
                                                               CC 96 CA 13
                                                  1D 28 88 00
                       39 66 05 81
                                    59 70 D4 65
                                                               F2 35 DA 22
                       63
            CBC IV in: 61 00 7C D9
                                    62 2F 4A ED
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 15
8
            CBC IV out:6B 58 00 94
                                    F8 F3 99 9C
                                                  9E 23 D0 58
                                                               57 E8 F9 58
9
            After xor: 6B 54 AB 5F
                                    F2 8D D0
                                             7A
                                                  66 57
                                                        37 45
                                                               FD F2 F9 58
                                                                              [hdr]
10
            After AES: 75 6A 35 9E
                                    7F 06 79 D1
                                                  16 9E 8B FF
                                                               A1 4B 7C F1
11
            After xor: B9 FC FF 8D
                                    46 60 7C 50
                                                  4F EE 5F 9A
                                                               BC 63 F4 F1
                                                                              [msq]
12
            After AES: 00 12 C1 1D
                                    3B 6F D0 B5
                                                  8E 72 2F A4
                                                               DB 2A 91 29
13
            After xor: F2 27 1B 3F
                                    58 6F D0 B5
                                                               DB 2A 91 29
                                                  8E 72 2F A4
                                                                              [msg]
14
            After AES: 65 71 83 09
                                    48 3B 45 14
                                                  9C 05 90 A9
                                                               C7 96 56 E4
15
            MIC tag : 65
                          71 83 09
                                    48 3B 45 14
                                                  9C 05
            CTR Start: 01 00 7C D9
16
                                    62 2F 4A ED
                                                  42 EC 39 C1
                                                               86 99 00 01
17
            CTR[0001]: A7 50 18 88
                                                  DA ED 59 36
                                    92 3F 63 B0
                                                               2D 61 93 50
18
            CTR[0002]: 8C 32 57 34
                                    AB 75 8E AB
                                                 57 A7 DB B0
                                                              F2 41 EA AD
19
            CTR[MIC ]: D8 39 8F F8
                                    7A 1C 3F 34
                                                  E5 94
20
            Total packet length =
                                    43. [Encrypted]
21
22
                                                               6B C6 D2 9B
                       AB CB OA 7E
                                    49 E6 F8 74
                                                  E7 1D AA 1A
                       AB 59 66 31
                                    83 9D 8D 53
                                                  30 49 1B 50
                                                               7E 07 8D 16
23
                       C8 BD 48 0C F1 32 27 7A
                                                 20 79 91
```

F.8. Suggested pass-phrase-to-preshared-key mapping

F.8.1 Introduction

24

25

- 26 The RSN pre-shared key consists of 256 bits, or 64 bytes when represented in hex. It is difficult for a user
- 27 to correctly enter 64 hex characters. Most users, however, are familiar with passwords and pass-phrases,
- and feel more comfortable entering them than entering keys. A user is more likely to be able to enter an
- 29 ASCII password or pass-phrase, even though doing so limits the set of possible keys. This suggests that the
- 30 best that can be done is to introduce a pass-phrase to preshared key mapping.
- 31 This clause defines a pass-phrase to preshared key mapping that is the preferred mechanism of this sort for
- 32 RSN and TSN networks. This pass-phrase mapping was introduced to encourage users unfamiliar with
- 33 cryptographic concepts to enable the security features of their WLAN.
- 34 A pass-phrase typically has about 2.5 bits of security per character, so the pass-phrase mapping converts an
- 35 n byte password into a key with about 2.5n + 12 bits of security. Hence, it provides a relatively low level of
- 36 security, with keys generated from short passwords subject to dictionary attack. Use of the key hash is
- 37 recommended only for IT-less environments. A key generated from a pass-phrase of less than about 20
- characters is unlikely to deter attacks against small businesses and enterprises.
- 39 The pass-phrase mapping defined here uses the PBKDF2 method from PKCS #5 v2.0: Password-based
- 40 Cryptography Standard.
- 41 PSK = PBKDF2(PassPhrase, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 256)
- PassPhrase is an ASCII string which has a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 63 characters not including the null terminator. The limit of 63 characters comes from the fact that 256 bits is represented by 64 characters in hex.
- 45 PassPhrase should consist of characters from the following three groups

46

Group	Examples
Letters (upper and lower case)	A, B, C, (and a, b, c,)
Numerals	0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Symbols (all characters not defined as letters or numerals)	`~!@#\$%^&*()_+=-{} []\":;'<>?,./

2

3

4

5

9

- ssid is the SSID of ESS or IBSS where this pass-phrase is in use, encoded as the hex string used in the Beacons and Probe Responses for the ESS or IBSS. Implementations of this pass-phrase mapping should by default define a unique SSID for each AP, e.g., the BSSID of the AP, and non-AP STA's should learn the SSID from the AP, so the user need not enter it.
- *ssidlength* is the number of octets of the *ssid*.
- 4096 is the number of times the pass-phrase is hashed.
- 256 is the number of bits output by the pass-phrase mapping.

F.8.2 Reference implementation

```
10
              * F(P, S, c, i) = U1 xor U2 xor ... Uc
11
12
              * U1 = PRF(P, S | | Int(i))
13
              * U2 = PRF(P, U1)
14
              * Uc = PRF(P, Uc-1)
15
              * /
16
17
             void F(
18
                    char *password,
19
                    unsigned char *ssid,
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
                    int ssidlength,
                    int iterations,
                    int count,
                    unsigned char *output)
             {
                    unsigned char digest[36], digest1[A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN];
                    int i, j;
                    /* U1 = PRF(P, S || int(i)) */
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
                    memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidlength);
                    digest[ssidlength] = (unsigned char)((count>>24) & 0xff);
                    digest[ssidlength+1] = (unsigned char)((count>>16) & 0xff);
                    digest[ssidlength+2] = (unsigned char)((count>>8) & 0xff);
                    digest[ssidlength+3] = (unsigned char)(count & 0xff);
                    hmac_shal((unsigned char*) password, (int) strlen(password),
                         digest, ssidlength+4, digest1);
36
37
38
                    /* output = U1 */
                    memcpy(output, digest1, A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
39
40
                    for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {</pre>
41
                            /* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
                           hmac_shal((unsigned char*) password, (int) strlen(password),
42
43
                                digest1, A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN, digest);
44
                           memcpy(digest1, digest, A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
45
```

```
/* output = output xor Un */
 1
2
3
4
                          for (j = 0; j < A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN; j++) {</pre>
                                 output[j] ^= digest[j];
 5
6
7
            }
 8
9
               password - ascii string up to 63 characters in length
10
             * ssid - octet string up to 32 octets
             * ssidlength - length of ssid in octets
11
12
             * output must be 40 octets in length and outputs 256 bits of key
13
             * /
14
            int PasswordHash (
15
                   char *password,
16
                   unsigned char *ssid,
17
                   int ssidlength,
18
                   unsigned char *output)
19
            {
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
                   if ((strlen(password) > 63) || (ssidlength > 32))
                          return 0;
                   F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 1, output);
                   F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 2,
                       &output[A_SHA_DIGEST_LEN]);
                   return 1;
            }
28
     F.8.3 Test vectors
29
30
     Test case 1
31
     Pass Phrase = "password"
32
     SSID = { 'I', 'E', 'E' 'E' }
33
     SSIDLength = 4
34
     PSK =
35
            534036bd932a231c80f8b52ccb18ce0d17cc78fc4675c7b4dfa4396540111450
36
     Test case 2
     Pass Phrase = "ThisIsAPassword"
37
     SSID = { 'T', 'h', 'i', 's', 'I', 's', 'A', 'S', 'S', 'I', 'D' }
38
39
     SSIDLength = 11
40
     PKS =
41
            520f0426ee757e8dfbb254e17971409a66969b2483f7492b5342dcce682b1155
42
     Test case 3
43
     Password = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
     44
45
            "Z', "Z', "Z', "Z', "Z', "Z', "Z'}
46
     SSIDLength = 32
47
     PKS =
48
            b4266b172c373a47260ee97faa0d199aaba2a31dbe5fc5a8becc1784857c0fbc
```

49 F.9. Suggestions for random number generation

- 50 In order to properly implement cryptographic protocols, every platform needs the ability to generate
- 51 cryptographic quality random numbers. RFC 1750 explains the notion of cryptographic quality random
- 52 numbers and provides advice on ways to harvest suitable randomness. It recommends sampling multiple
- 53 sources each of which contains some randomness, and by passing the complete set of samples through a

- 1 pseudo-random function. By following this advice, an implementation can usually collect enough
- 2 randomness to distill into a seed for a pseudo-random number generator whose output will be unpredictable.
- 3 This annex suggests two sample techniques that can be combined with the other recommendations of RFC
- 4 1750 to harvest randomness. The first method is a software solution that can be implemented on most
- 5 hardware; the second is a hardware-assisted solution. These solutions are expository only, to demonstrate
- 6 that it is feasible to harvest randomness on any 802.11 platform. They are not mutually exclusive, and they
- 7 do not preclude the use of other sources of randomness when available; in this case, the more the merrier.
- As many sources of randomness as possible should be gathered into a buffer, and then hashed, to obtain a 8
- 9 seed for the pseudo-random number generator.

F.9.1 Software Sampling

10

26

27

28

- Due to the nature of clock circuits in modern electronics, there will be some lack of correlation between two 11
- 12 clocks in two different pieces of equipment, even when high quality crystals are used—crystal clocks are
- 13 subject to jitter, noise, drift, and frequency mismatch. This randomness may be as little as the placement of
- 14 the clock waveform edges. Even if one entity were to attempt to synchronize itself to another entity's clock,
- 15 the correlation cannot be perfect, due to noise and uncertainties of the synchronization.
- 16 Two clock circuits in the same piece of equipment may synchronize in frequency, but again the correlation
- 17 will not be perfect due to the noise and jitter of the circuits.
- 18 The randomness between the two clocks may not be much per sample—a tenth of a bit or less—but enough
- 19 samples may be collected to gather enough randomness to form a seed.
- 20 A device can use software methods to take advantage of this lack of synchronization, to collect randomness
- 21 from different sources. As an example, an AP might measure the packet arrival times on a Ethernet wireless
- 22 ports. There is always some amount of traffic on modern Ethernets: ARPs, DHCP requests, NetBIOS
- 23 advertisements, etc. The following example algorithm takes this traffic. In the example, an AP obtains
- 24 randomness from the available traffic; if Ethernet traffic is available, the AP measures that for randomness:
- otherwise it waits for the first association and creates traffic that it can obtain randomness from. 25
 - The clocks used to time the packets should be the highest resolution available, preferable 1ms resolution or better. The clock used to time packet arrival should not be related to the clock used for packet serialization.

```
29
           Initialize result to empty array
30
           LoopCounter = 0
31
           Wait until Ethernet traffic or association
32
33
34
           Repeat until global key counter "random enough" or 32 times {
                  35
36
                  LoopCounter++
                  Repeat 32 times {
37
38
39
                        If Ethernet traffic available then
                               Take lowest byte of time when Ethernet packet is seen
                               Concatenate the seen time onto result
40
41
                        else
                               Start 4-way handshake, aborting after message 2
42
                               Take lowest byte of time of when message 1 is sent
43
44
                               Take lowest byte of time of when message 2 is
                                     received
45
                               Take lowest byte of RSSI from message 2
46
                               Take SNonce from message 2
47
                               Concatenate the sent time; receive time, RSSI and
48
                                     SNonce onto result
49
                  }
50
51
           Global key counter = result = PRF-256(0, "Init Counter",
                  Local Mac Address | Time | result | LoopCounter)
```

3

18

Note: The Time may be 0 if it is not available.

F.9.2 Hardware Assisted Solution

4 This example implementation uses hardware ring oscillators to generate randomness, as depicted in below.




Figure 55—Randomness generating circuit

- The above circuit generates randomness. The clock input should be about the same frequency as the ring oscillator's natural frequencies. The LFSR should be chosen to be one that is maximal length. Example LFSRs can be found at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~koopman/lfsr/.
- The three ring oscillators should be isolated from each other as much as possible, to avoid harmonic locking between them. In addition, the three ring oscillators should not be near any other clock circuitry within the system, to avoid these ring oscillators locking to system clocks.
- The output of the LFSR is read by software and concatenated until enough randomness is collected. As a rule of thumb, reading from the LFSR eight to sixteen times the number of bits as the desired number of random bits is sufficient.

```
28
29 Initialize result to empty array
30 Repeat 1024 times {
31 Read LFSR
32 result = result | LFSR
33 Wait a time period
34 }
35 Global key counter = PRF-256(0, "Init Counter", result)
```

F.10. Additional test vectors

F.10.1 Notation

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18 19 In the examples here, frames are represented as a stream of octets, each octet in hex notation, sometimes with text annotation. The order of transmission for octets is left to right, top to bottom. For example, consider the following representation of a frame:

Description #1	00 01 02 03
	04 05
Description #2	06 07 08

- The frame consists of nine octets, represented in hex notation as "00", "01", ..., "08". The octet represented
- 8 by "00" is transmitted first, and the octet represented by "08" is transmitted last. Similar tables are used for
- 9 other purposes, such as describing a cryptographic operation.
- 10 In the text discussion outside of tables, integer values are represented in either hex notation using an "0x"
- 11 prefix or in decimal notation using no prefix. For example, the hex notation 0x12345 and the decimal
- notation 74565 represent the same integer value.

F.10.2 WEP Encapsulation

The discussion here represents an RC4 encryption using a table that shows the key, plaintext input, and ciphertext output. For reference, here is a table that describes test vector "Commerce" of <draft-kaukonencipher-arcfour-03.txt>, a work-in-progress.

Key	61 8a 63 d2 fb
Plaintext	dc ee 4c f9 2c
Ciphertext	f1 38 29 c9 de

The MPDU data, prior to WEP encapsulation, is as follows:

MPDU data	aa	aa	03	00	00	00	08	00	45	00	00	4e	66	1a	00	00	80	11	be	64	0a	00	01	22
	0a	ff	ff	ff	00	89	00	89	00	3a	00	00	80	аб	01	10	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00
	20	45	43	45	4a	45	48	45	43	46	43	45	50	46	45	45	49	45	46	46	43	43	41	43
	41	43	41	43	41	43	41	41	41	00	00	20	00	01										

RC4 encryption is performed as follows:

Key	fb 02 9e 30 31 32 33 34
Plaintext	aa aa 03 00 00 00 08 00 45 00 00 4e 66 1a 00 00 80 11 be 64 0a 00 01
	22 0a ff ff ff 00 89 00 89 00 3a 00 00 80 a6 01 10 00 01 00 00 00
	00 00 20 45 43 45 4a 45 48 45 43 46 43 45 50 46 45 45 49 45 46 46 43
	43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 41 41 00 00 20 00 01 1b d0 b6 04
Ciphertext	f6 9c 58 06 bd 6c e8 46 26 bc be fb 94 74 65 0a ad 1f 79 09 b0 f6 4d
	5f 58 a5 03 a2 58 b7 ed 22 eb 0e a6 49 30 d3 a0 56 a5 57 42 fc ce 14
	1d 48 5f 8a a8 36 de a1 8d f4 2c 53 80 80 5a d0 c6 1a 5d 6f 58 f4 10
	40 b2 4b 7d 1a 69 38 56 ed 0d 43 98 e7 ae e3 bf 0e 2a 2c a8 f7

- 22 The plaintext consists of the MPDU data, followed by a 4-octet CRC-32 calculated over the MPDU data.
- 23 The expanded MPDU, after WEP encapsulation, is as follows:

IV	fb 02 9e 80
MPDU	f6 9c 58 06 bd 6c e8 46 26 bc be fb 94 74 65 0a ad 1f 79 09 b0 f6 4d 5f 58 a5
data	03 a2 58 b7 ed 22 eb 0e a6 49 30 d3 a0 56 a5 57 42 fc ce 14 1d 48 5f 8a a8 36
	de a1 8d f4 2c 53 80 80 5a d0 c6 1a 5d 6f 58 f4 10 40 b2 4b 7d 1a 69 38 56 ed
	0d 43 98 e7 ae e3 bf 0e
ICV	2a 2c a8 f7

- 25 The IV consists of the first three octets of the RC4 key, followed by an octet containing the KeyID value in
- 26 the upper two bits. In this example, the KeyID value is 2. The MPDU data consists of the ciphertext,

- 1 excluding the last four octets. The ICV consists of the last four octets of the ciphertext, which is the
- 2 encrypted CRC-32 value.

F.10.3 TKIP encapsulation

- 4 The discussion here represents a Michael calculation using a table that shows the key, input data, and MIC
- 5 output. For reference, here is a table that describes a the test vector for input string "Michael" shown in
- 6 Annex F:

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Key	d5	5e	10	05	10	12	89	86
Input data	4d	69	63	68	61	65	6с	
MIC	0a	94	2b	12	4e	са	a5	46

The discussion represents calculation of phase 2 of the temporal key mixing function using a table that shows the TTAK key, the IV input, and the RC4-key output. For reference, here is a table that describes test vector #4 shown in Annex F:

TTAK	a2 db 10 2a 3e a3 56 82 99 56 c4 5d 7b 11 fc 54
IV	55 c6
RC4 key	55 75 c6 a5 04 2b 11 29 25 1e 22 f4 5a 25 c7 d6

The MSDU data, prior to TKIP encapsulation, is as follows:

Ī	MSDU	aa	aa	03	00	00	00	08	00	45	00	00	4e	66	1a	00	00	80	11	be	64	0a	00	01	22	0a	ff
	data	ff	ff	00	89	00	89	00	3a	00	00	80	аб	01	10	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	20	45	43	45
		4a	45	48	45	43	46	43	45	50	46	45	45	49	45	46	46	43	43	41	43	41	43	41	43	41	43
		41	41	41	00	00	20	00	01																		

13 The MIC is computed using Michael, as follows:

Key	d5 5e 10 05 10 12 89 86
Input data	aa aa 03 00 00 00 08 00 45 00 00 4e 66 1a 00 00 80 11 be 64 0a 00 01 22
	0a ff ff ff 00 89 00 89 00 3a 00 00 80 a6 01 10 00 01 00 00 00 00 00
	20 45 43 45 4a 45 48 45 43 46 43 45 50 46 45 45 49 45 46 46 43 43 41 43
	41 43 41 43 41 43 41 41 00 00 20 00 01
MIC	31 2d 0f fb 8c d6 58 30

- 15 The input to the MIC calculation is the MSDU data.
- The MSDU and MIC are concatenated, and if necessary, the concatenated result is fragmented into several MPDUs. In this example, it is fragmented into two MPDUs, as follows:

MPDU #1 data	aa aa 03 00 00 00 08 00 45 00 00 4e 66 1a 00 00 80 11 be 64 0a 00 22 0a ff ff ff 00 89 00 89 00 3a 00 00 80 a6 01 10 00 01 00 00 00 00	-
MPDU #2 data	00 20 45 43 45 4a 45 48 45 43 46 43 45 50 46 45 45 49 45 46 46 43	43
	41 42 41 42 41 42 41 42 41 41 41 00 00 00 01 21 01 05 51 0 16	

MPDU #2 data 00 20 45 43 45 4a 45 48 45 43 46 43 45 50 46 45 45 49 45 46 46 43 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 41 00 00 20 00 01 31 2d 0f fb 8c d6 58 30

To encrypt the first MPDU, the RC4 key is derived using phase 2 of the temporal key mixing function, as follows:

TTAK	a2 db 10 2a 3e a3 56 82 99 56 c4 5d 7b 11 fc 54
IV	5b a0
RC4 key	5b 7b a0 d7 9a ee c2 2e 0d d1 a9 14 bd b8 42 30

- In this example, the IV has value 23456, or 0x5ba0.
- 23 RC4 encryption of the first MPDU is performed as follows:

Key	5b	7b	a0	d7	9a	ee	с2	2e	0d	d1	a9	14	bd	b8	42	30							
Plaintext	aa	aa	03	00	00	00	08	00	45	00	00	4e	66	1a	00	00	80	11	be	64	0a	00	01
	22	0a	ff	ff	ff	00	89	00	89	00	3a	00	00	80	аб	01	10	00	01	00	00	00	00
	0.0	99	22	5f	4e																		

Ciphertext	e0 3f 0e 76 ce dd d	d5 54 cb 7d af 74 41 8f 9f db 86 ed 6a 46 fl 1c e	e0
	6a 64 53 3e 95 76 4	43 3a 93 ac e5 5d 65 ac f0 8e ec 87 88 e7 a8 ad :	f6
	04 ee 4b 64 6e		

- 1 The plaintext consists of the MPDU data, followed by a 4-octet CRC-32 calculated over the MPDU data.
- 2 The expanded first MPDU, after encapsulation, is as follows:

IV	5b 7b a0 40
MPDU #1 data	e0 3f 0e 76 ce dd d5 54 cb 7d af 74 41 8f 9f db 86 ed 6a 46 f1 1c e0
	6a 64 53 3e 95 76 43 3a 93 ac e5 5d 65 ac f0 8e ec 87 88 e7 a8 ad f6
	04
ICV	ee 4b 64 6e

- 4 The IV field consists of the first three octets of the RC4 key, followed by an octet containing the KeyID
- 5 field in the upper two bits. In this example, the KeyID has value 1. The MPDU data consists of the
- ciphertext, excluding the last four octets. The ICV consists of the last four octets of the ciphertext, which is
- 7 the encrypted CRC-32 value.

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8 To encrypt the second MPDU, the RC4 key is derived using phase 2 of the temporal key mixing function, as follows:

TTAK	a2 db	10	2a	3e	a3	56	82	99	56	с4	5d	7b	11	fc	54
IV	5b a1														
DCA leave	Flo 7lo	_ 1	2 ~	67	016	a la	70	~ 7	~ ?	20	Г.	1 /	a٦	2 -	~7

- 11 The IV for the second MPDU is the value of the IV for the first MPDU, plus one.
- 12 RC4 encryption of the second MPDU is performed in the same manner as for the first MPDU, as follows:

Key	5b 7b al 2c 67 9b cb 70 e7 c3 d6 5e 14 d5 2a c7	
Plaintext	00 20 45 43 45 4a 45 48 45 43 46 43 45 50 46 45 45 49 45 46 46 43 43	41
	43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 41 00 00 20 00 01 31 2d 0f fb 8c d6 58 30	b6
	d3 a7 06	
Ciphertext	9f 26 25 79 b8 bf 49 9e 27 bc a6 a9 2c 4d 21 95 4b 3b 84 45 c0 77 33	11
	f1 78 ff 14 57 83 15 3c a0 93 31 81 ac 2d bb 1c 81 cc 0e 0b e3 60 06	04
	98 9c dc	

The expanded second MPDU, after encapsulation, is similar to that of the first MPDU, as follows:

IV	5b 7b a1 40
MPDU #2 data	9f 26 25 79 b8 bf 49 9e 27 bc a6 a9 2c 4d 21 95 4b 3b 84 45 c0 77 33
	11 f1 78 ff 14 57 83 15 3c a0 93 31 81 ac 2d bb 1c 81 cc 0e 0b e3 60
	06
ICV	04 98 9c dc

16 **F.10.4 AES-CCMP**

F.10.4.1 AES-CCMP Encapsulation Example

The MPDU parameters and data, prior to AES-CCM encapsulation, is as follows:

```
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32
                                        = 11
            Type
                              SubType
            ToDS
                       = 1
                              FromDS
                                        = 1
            MoreFrag = 1
                              Retry
                                        = 1
            PwrMgt
                              moreData = 1
            WEP
                       =
                         1
            Order
            Duration = 200
            A1 = a1:a1:a1:a1:a1
            A2 = a2:a2:a2:a2:a2
            A3 = a3:a3:a3:a3:a3
            seqNum = 4000 fraqNum = 1
            A4 = a4:a4:a4:a4:a4
            OC = 0xff77
```

```
1     QOS-TID = 7  QOS-FEC = 1
2     QOS-AckP = 3  QOS-TXOP/QL = 0xff
3     Algorithm = AES_CCM
4     KeyId = 1
5     PN = 0x00000000001 (decimal = 1 )
6     Data =
7     69 6e 6f 76 61 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 69 6e 20 77 69
8     72 65 6c 65 73 73
```

The calculation of the encrypted MPDU is as follows:

The calculation of the energy	Act wil De is as follows.
CCM additional	b8 c7 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a3 a3
auth data	a3 a3 a3 01 fa a4 a4 a4 a4 a4 a7 00
(muted header)	
CCM Nonce Value	07 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 00 00 00 00 01
Encryption Header	00 00 00 60 00 00 00 01
Note PN is	
big-endian!!	
CBC Input Blocks	59 07 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 00 00 00 00 01 00 16
	00 le b8 c7 al al al al al al a2 a2 a2 a2 a2
	a3 a3 a3 a3 a3 01 fa a4 a4 a4 a4 a4 07 00
	69 6e 6f 76 61 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 69 6e 20 77 69
	72 65 6c 65 73 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
CBC MIC Value	a6 de 98 74 73 da 55 34 5b f0 26 e6 f0 b8 d9 27
CTR Mode	01 07 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
Preload (0)	
CCM Final MIC Value	7d 63 5f d0 d8 3f 8b 6c
CTR Mode Data to Encrypt	69 6e 6f 76 61 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 69 6e 20 77 69
	72 65 6c 65 73 73
CTR Mode	6b 64 99 64 53 85 64 fl 28 69 08 ab fb 12 41 ed
Encrypted Data	10 04 d4 44 da 3f
CCM Encrypted MPDU with	b8 ff c8 00 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2
FCS	a3 a3 a3 a3 a3 01 fa a4 a4 a4 a4 a4 77 ff
	00 00 00 60 00 00 00 01 6b 64 99 64 53 85 64 f1
	28 69 08 ab fb 12 41 ed 10 04 d4 44 da 3f 7d 63
	5f d0 d8 3f 8b 6c d5 67 81 13

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F.10.4.2 Additional CCMP Vest Vectors

The following CCMP test vectors are full 802.11 CCMP encrypted MPDUs. The MPDUs and CCMP processing can be tested by using the supplied key to decrypt the MPDU and checking the MIC value.

Description	ccm#0001 : Data Packet, no A4 and no QC
Key	CO c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf
CCMP Encrypted	08 41 02 01 00 06 25 a7 c4 36 00 02 2d 49 97 b4
MPDU with FCS	00 06 25 a7 c4 36 e0 00 06 05 00 a0 04 03 02 01
	le e5 2d 13 b1 be 3f 20 42 5b 3f de dd d4 55 2b
	98 71 d8 7b 65 8c fd 57 f7 96 ad 71 87

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Description	ccm#0002 : Data Packet, no A4 and no QC, retry
Key	c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf
CCMP Encrypted	08 49 02 01 00 06 25 a7 c4 36 00 02 2d 49 97 b4
MPDU with FCS	00 06 25 a7 c4 36 e0 00 06 05 00 e0 04 03 02 01
	1e e5 2d 13 b1 be 3f 20 42 5b 3f de dd d4 55 2b
	98 71 d8 7b 65 8c fd 57 f7 67 c5 18 73

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Description	ccm#0003 : Data Packet,A4 with no QC
Key	c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf
CCMP Encrypted	08 43 02 01 00 06 25 a7 c4 36 00 02 2d 49 97 b4
MPDU with FCS	00 06 25 a7 c4 36 e0 00 41 42 43 44 45 46 00 00
	00 20 00 00 00 01 3b e9 b2 46 c6 fc 7a 51 55 1e
	14 c6 a8 85 28 bc 06 56 67 c8 ef 30 b3 12 69 14
	6c 3b c3

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Description	ccm#0004 : Data Packet,A4 and QC
Key	c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf
CCMP Encrypted	88 43 02 01 00 06 25 a7 c4 36 00 02 2d 49 97 b4
MPDU with FCS	00 06 25 a7 c4 36 e0 00 41 42 43 44 45 46 04 00
	00 00 00 20 00 00 00 01 46 72 f2 9e 41 54 e9 11
	58 47 c2 a9 ae dc 10 0c e8 82 53 bd a2 04 ae 1d
	33 05 af 02 1e

1

Description	ccm#0005 : Data Packet,QC no A4
Key	c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf
CCMP Encrypted	88 41 02 01 00 06 25 a7 c4 36 00 02 2d 49 97 b4
MPDU with FCS	00 06 25 a7 c4 36 e0 00 04 00 00 00 20 00 00
	00 01 46 72 f2 9e 41 54 e9 11 58 47 c2 a9 ae dc
	10 0c e8 dc 91 98 bf 6a 52 c8 03 67 12 0b 83

Description	ccm#0006 : Data Packet, no A4, No QC, look out for the C9
Key	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 c9 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
CCMP Encrypted	08 41 02 01 00 06 25 a7 c4 36 00 02 2d 49 97 b4
MPDU with FCS	00 06 25 a7 c4 36 e0 00 06 05 00 a0 04 03 02 01
	de bf 2c c9 94 e6 5a 70 2c ee e3 19 84 21 39 c3
	f2 9a 2e 12 63 11 74 5f 3c 20 3d fd 4e

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Description	ccm#0007 : Data Packet, same as 144r4 data, odd a4 alignment
Key	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
CCMP Encrypted	08 43 12 34 ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 40 96 45 07 f1
MPDU with FCS	08 00 46 17 62 3e 50 67 aa aa 03 00 00 00 00 05
	00 a0 04 03 02 01 22 3b 8c 39 95 b0 d0 c5 81 d7
	19 2f e4 4a ad 02 76 61 30 fe 1a 2c 1d 54 0b e2
	ce 2f 4d 53 03 1b 62 68 8f 9d 75 81 08 ff 6d 35
	e5 a0 75 f4 c2 0a 95 d2 f2 c7 45 94 b6 9e 64 63
	3a fa 6e 5c 97 57 ea 49 24 66 f4 e5 3e e9 81 77
	d2 0b f9 d9 82 15 ac ce 8f e8 7b 7e f1 ef ae cc
	9b ac

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Description	ccm#0008 : All flag bits set with QC
Key	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
CCMP Encrypted	b8 ff c8 00 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2
MPDU with FCS	a3 a3 a3 a3 a3 01 fa a4 a4 a4 a4 a4 77 ff
	00 00 00 60 00 00 00 01 6b 64 99 64 53 85 64 fl
	28 69 08 ab fb 12 41 ed 10 04 d4 44 da 3f 7d 63
	5f d0 d8 3f 8b 6c d5 67 81 13

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F.10.5 AES-OCB encapsulation

The discussion here represents an AES-OCB encryption using a table that shows the key, nonce input, plaintext input, ciphertext output, and tag output. For reference, here is a table that describes test case "OCB-AES-128-34B" available at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb/.

10 11 12

Key	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
Nonce	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Plaintext	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
	18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21
Ciphertext	01 a0 75 f0 d8 15 b1 a4 e9 c8 81 a1 bc ff c3 eb d4 90 3d d0 02 5b a4 aa
	83 7c 74 f1 21 b0 26 0f a9 5d
Taq	cf 83 41 bb 10 82 0c cf 14 bd ec 56 b8 d7 d6 ab

13 14 The MSDU data, prior to AES-OCB encapsulation, is as follows:

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MSDU data	aa	aa	03	00	00	00	08	00	45	00	00	4e	66	1a	00	00	80	11	be	64	0a	00	01	22	0a
	ff	ff	ff	00	89	00	89	00	3a	00	00	80	аб	01	10	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	20	45
	43	45	4a	45	48	45	43	46	43	45	50	46	45	45	49	45	46	46	43	43	41	43	41	43	41
	43	41	43	41	41	41	00	00	20	00	01														

15 I

- In this example, the following parameters will be used:
- Replay counter value is 123456789 = 0x75bcd15.
- QOS traffic class is 4.
- 18 KeyID is 2.
- Source MAC address is 0x123456789abc

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Destination MAC address is 0x23456789abcd

AES-OCB encryption is performed as follows:

Key	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
Nonce	75 bc d1 54 12 34 56 78 9a bc 23 45 67 89 ab cd
Plaintext	aa aa 03 00 00 00 08 00 45 00 00 4e 66 1a 00 00 80 11 be 64 0a 00 01 22
	0a ff ff ff 00 89 00 89 00 3a 00 00 80 a6 01 10 00 01 00 00 00 00 00
	20 45 43 45 4a 45 48 45 43 46 43 45 50 46 45 45 49 45 46 46 43 43 41 43
	41 43 41 43 41 43 41 41 41 00 00 20 00 01
Ciphertext	3f 42 a7 b6 8c 4d ea 07 e1 2b 2d c6 82 e4 72 81 70 45 a3 02 21 ee b6 bf
	0a f0 26 a6 8d 73 e6 f3 55 dc 15 60 8e 7e 92 52 0b 4e 11 73 a3 a5 ce 7c
	39 93 65 70 al 16 40 79 02 al 85 17 f6 5e 9d eb 35 bf 2c 18 49 6c 2c 2b
	33 8b d4 0f d5 4e 1c 50 eb fd fa 56 95 56
Tag	06 9e e2 41 c6 1e 60 2d b3 05 76 53 03 a5 5f 5e

The first three octets of the nonce are the upper 24 bits of the replay counter value. The upper nibble of the fourth octet of the nonce consists of the least significant 4 bits of the replay counter value. The lower nibble of the fourth octet of the nonce is the QOS traffic class. Octets five through ten of the nonce are the source MAC address. Octets eleven through sixteen of the nonce are the destination MAC address. The plaintext consists of the MSDU data.

The expanded MSDU, after AES-OCB encapsulation, is as follows:

Replay	75 bc d1 85
MSDU data	3f 42 a7 b6 8c 4d ea 07 e1 2b 2d c6 82 e4 72 81 70 45 a3 02 21 ee b6 bf
	0a f0 26 a6 8d 73 e6 f3 55 dc 15 60 8e 7e 92 52 0b 4e 11 73 a3 a5 ce 7c
	39 93 65 70 a1 16 40 79 02 a1 85 17 f6 5e 9d eb 35 bf 2c 18 49 6c 2c 2b
	33 8b d4 0f d5 4e 1c 50 eb fd fa 56 95 56
MIC	06 9e e2 41 c6 1e 60 2d

The first three octets of the replay field are the upper 24 bits of the replay counter value. The fourth octet of the replay field is the concatenation of: the 2-bit keyID value; two 0-bits; and the least significant 4 bits of the replay counter value. The MSDU data consists of the ciphertext. The MIC is the first eight octets of the

the replay counter value. The MISDU data consists of the ciphertext. The MIC is the first eight octets of the

14 tag value.

F.10.5 The PRF Function - PRF(key, prefix, data, length).

A set of test vectors are provided for each size of PRF function used in this specification. The input to the PRF function are strings for 'key', 'prefix' and 'data'. The length can be any multiple of 8, but the values: 192, 256, 384, 512 and 768 are used in this specification. The test vectors were taken from RFC2202 with additional vectors added to test larger key and data sizes.

Test_case	1
key	0b 0
prefix	"prefix"
data	"Hi There"
length	192
PRF-192	bc d4 c6 50 b3 0b 96 84 95 18 29 e0 d7 5f 9d 54 b8 62 17 5e d9 f0 06 06

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Test_case	2
key	'Jefe'
prefix	"prefix-2"
data	"what do ya want for nothing?"
length	256
PRF-256	47 c4 90 8e 30 c9 47 52 la d2 0b e9 05 34 50 ec
	be a2 3d 3a a6 04 b7 73 26 d8 b3 82 5f f7 47 5c

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Test_case	3																							
key	aa																							
	aa																							

	aa
	aa aa aa aa aa aa
prefix	"prefix-3"
data	"Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"
length	384
PRF-384	0a b6 c3 3c cf 70 d0 d7 36 f4 b0 4c 8a 73 73 25
	55 11 ab c5 07 37 13 16 3b d0 b8 c9 ee b7 e1 95
	6f a0 66 82 0a 73 dd ee 3f 6d 3b d4 07 e0 68 2a

Test_case	4
key	0b 0
prefix	"prefix-4"
data	"Hi There Again"
length	512
PRF-512	24 8c fb c5 32 ab 38 ff a4 83 c8 a2 e4 0b f1 70
	eb 54 2a 2e 09 16 d7 bf 6d 97 da 2c 4c 5c a8 77
	73 6c 53 a6 5b 03 fa 4b 37 45 ce 76 13 f6 ad 68
	e0 e4 a7 98 b7 cf 69 1c 96 17 6f d6 34 a5 9a 49

2

Test	5																										
_cas																											
е																											
key	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa	aa
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th PRF-	768 67 c6 a5 8e	27 23 94 04	a3 5b 1c b7	e8 e0 0c 2c	d5 0c 77	2c 8c 4b c7	f2 13 00 88	70 03 25 a7	08 77 7f ba	3 ce 7 26	e 46 5 af 7 c6 2 4f	d 68 E fo 5 e2 E 69	3 36 2 bc 2 4c 9 68	e 45 c 02 c 81 8 7k	5 99 2 29 1 02 5 ek	9 25 9 17 2 87 5 de	5 7 7 5	rnar	n Or	ne i	3100	CK-	SIZE	е ра	ata'		

F.10 Key hierarchy test vectors

- 4 The following test vectors provide an example of both pairwise and group key derivation for CCMP, TKIP
- 5 and WRAP.

F.10.1 Pairwise Key Derivation

- Pairwise keys are derived from the PMK, AA, SA, SNonce and ANonce. The PMK in this example is
- 8 taken from the phasephrase generation test vector with pkbkdf2("ThisIsAPassword", "ThisIsASSID", 4096
- 9 ,256). The values below are used for as input to the pairwise key derivation test vectors.

10

3

PMK	0d c0 d6 eb 90 55 5e d6 41 97 56 b9 a1 5e c3 e3
	20 9b 63 df 70 7d d5 08 d1 45 81 f8 98 27 21 af
AA	a0 a1 a1 a3 a4 a5
SA	b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
SNonce	c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
	d6 d7 d8 d9
ANonce	e0 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9 f0 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
	f6 f7 f8 f9

11 F.10.1.1 CCMP Pairwuse Key Derivation

- 12 Using the values from section F.x.1 for PMK, AA, SA, SNonce and ANonce the key derivation process for
- 13 CCMP generates:

TK1	8c b7 78 33 2e 94 ac a6 d3 0b 89 cb e8 2a 9c a9

F.10.1.2 TKIP Pairwise Key Derivation

3 Using the values from section F.x.1 for PMK, AA, SA, SNonce and ANonce the key derivation process for

TKIP generates:

5

MK	aa 7c fc 85 60 25 1e 4b c6 87 e0 cb 8d 29 83 63
EK	ba 53 16 3d f3 2a 86 38 f4 79 ab e3 4b fd 2b c8
TK1	8c b7 78 33 2e 94 ac a6 d3 0b 89 cb e8 2a 9c a9
TK2	36 4a ff bb ce 87 5f 5d f2 dd 58 41 c0 ed 2a 41
small_to_large_MIC_key	36 4a ff bb ce 87 5f 5d
large_to_small_MIC_key	f2 dd 58 41 c0 ed 2a 41

F.10.1.3 WRAP Pairwise Key Derivation 6

7 Using the values from section F.x.1 for PMK, AA, SA, SNonce and ANonce the key derivation process for

WRAP generates:

9

8

TK1	8c b7 78 33 2e 94 ac a6 d3 0b 89 cb e8 2a 9c a9

10 11

F.10.2 Group Key Derivation

Group keys are derived from the values of GMK, AA and GNonce. The test vectors in the following sections use these values to generate the associated group keys for CCMP, TKIP and WRAP.

GMK	01 23 58 13 21 34 55 89 14 42 33 37 76 10 98 71
	59 72 58 44 18 16 76 51 09 46 17 71 12 86 57 46
AA	a0 a1 a1 a3 a4 a5
GNonce	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
	10 11 12 13

5

6

1

4

F.10.2.1 CCMP Group Key Derivation

7 Using the values from section F.x.2 for GMK, AA, and GNonce the key derivation process for CCMP

8 generates:

9

TK1	02 36 05 al ae 5b e4 dl ba b4 7e 40 2f a4 da 5e

10 F.10.2.2 TKIP Group Key Derivation

11 Using the values from section F.x.2 for GMK, AA, and GNonce the key derivation process for TKIP

generates:

13

12

TK1	02 36 05 a1 ae 5b e4 d1 ba b4 7e 40 2f a4 da 5e
TK2	65 73 96 c6 c6 de bc 5f 67 fc 80 bf 9a be ce 25
small_to_large_MIC_key	65 73 96 c6 c6 de bc 5f
large_to_small_MIC_key	67 fc 80 bf 9a be ce 25

14 F.10.2.3 WRAP Group Key Derivation

15 Using the values from section F.x.2 for GMK, AA, and GNonce the key derivation process for WRAP

16 generates:

17

TK1	TK1		
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18